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ABSTRACT
Much debate exists about the difficulties and structural obstacles that impede
foreign companies when conducting business in Japan. Consequently, foreign
concerns frequently neglect or even spurn the opportunities presented in the
Japanese market. While much is known about the success of Japanese companies
penetrating and dominating Western markets, much less is known about the actual
experience of those companies attempting to reverse the flow. The research
conducted for this thesis is based on approximately forty interviews, many of them
Chief Executives of MNCs successfully operating in the consumer good's industry
in Japan, also included were advertising agents, consultants and other facilitators.
Peer group evaluation was used to gauge the success of the companies and
interviewees were selected on this basis. The research is based on interviews
conducted in Japan during 1990-91. By applying the principles of grounded theory
a broad assessment was made of the approaches adopted toward consumer goods
marketing. Japanese opportunities and obstacles were appraised, as were foreign
companies' responses to them, by drawing on frameworks established by Porter
(1991) and Quelch and Hoff (1986). Moreover, efforts were made to synthesize the
ingredients of successful strategy.
The question was probed what difficulties foreign MNCs perceive, in both Japan
and its markets and a central issue tackled is whether these perceptions are matched
by reality. A marked contrast was evident between the views of the protectionist
lobby and that of those foreign executives active in the market. The view of the
latter is that the Japanese consumer market can be considered an open market.
However, being open does not mean that it is easy to penetrate. Japan offers a
testing commercial climate, one in which only the strongest survive, Japanese or
otherwise.
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It was concluded that certain styles of Western marketing were successful.
Foreign companies have successfully applied Western marketing strategies and have
beaten indigenous Japanese companies into second place in some key product
categories. What becomes apparent is the Japanese market not only offers attractive
opportunities, it is one in which foreign companies can and do succeed. Moreover,
what appears likely is that as Japan continues to export its management
methodologies alongside its products, being able to survive the Japanese commercial
climate will become a prerequisite for maintaining competitive advantage world¬
wide.
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CHAPTER 1— INTRODUCTION
The overall objective of this study is to analyze a sample of foreign MNCs
which have achieved significant presence in the Japanese consumer products'
market and induce from that analysis some strategic implications for marketing
strategy which can potentially benefit foreign companies attempting to penetrate that
market.
Japan has established a formidable reputation in the post-war period, both as an
economic success and as a market in which it is difficult or even, as some claim,
impossible to do business as an outsider. It is often seen as a country where the
barriers to market entry are so complex, its distribution system with over 1.5
million retail establishments (MITI) and local culture so impenetrable, that those
who attempt to do business there frequently retreat in confusion. This viewpoint,
by no means unique to the business world, is reinforced by economic
circumstances; for example, mention of the relationship between Japan and its
trading partners usually includes reference to serious misunderstandings and threats
of reprisal from the US or EC. Unfortunately, this gap in understanding, which is
usually cited as the reason for communication breakdown, has worldwide
implications.
This raises the question whether there are genuine reasons for these difficulties.
Talking about Japan — nihonjinron — has become something of a growth industry
in both academic and business circles. Nihonjinron characterized by Dale (1986:14)
as "the commercialized expression of Japanese nationalism". It acts to support the
gap, to which Yoshino (1992:164) drew attention, that exists in the Westerners'
image of Japan. He maintained, these circumstances have provided Japan's
business elites with an opportunity to act as spokesmen for the majority of ordinary
Japanese on the subject of Japanese social culture. Emmott (1989), going further,
claims that Japanese businessmen actually promote misunderstanding in business or
trade circles because they are uncomfortable with the idea that they might be
understood. Talking about Japan — and about how different its inhabitants are —
is, Emmott continues, an obvious attempt to put opponents on the defensive.
Similarly, in cultural and academic circles, he asserts, the idea that there is a
singular spiritual dimension to being Japanese is an important ingredient of both that
country's self-esteem and foreign coming-to-terms with an alien culture.
Seemingly, Western authors from as far back as Lafcadio Hearn in the late 19th
century emphasized these so-called differences of thinking and acting (perhaps more
visible then), and neglected Japanese similarities to other nations and peoples
(Hearn, 1959). In so doing, they have prolonged misunderstanding.
Japan has always attracted myths. From the legend of the emperor's descent
from the goddess Amaterasu to the recent academic excavations of the Japanese
brain (supposedly more developed on the rational side) (Kiyoshi, 1979); and from
comic book racial stereotypes to the traditional belief in the seamless society,
concepts of uniqueness and indivisibility have clung to Japan. All societies like the
idea of being special, and although Japan has clearly borrowed much of its culture
from other parts of the world (China and Korea in the past; US and Europe in the
present), it is arguable that the end-product is a unique synthesis — or, to use the
current terminology: Japanized (Ichihashi, 1983). Complete isolation from the
world between 1639 and 1854 certainly played its part in forging this self-
consciousness. However, decades of foreign observations on Japan have played an
equally important role in converting self-consciousness to myth. According to
Gluck (1985), the distinctive ideologies of Japan have been invented, to suit
circumstances, at key periods during its history.
Despite the perceived culture gap, modern Japan is very much connected with
the rest of the world. Ten million of its citizens travel abroad each year (Edwards,
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1990); its modern architecture, art and music draw on many international
influences; its restaurants have perhaps the widest and most sophisticated range of
cuisines in the world. To view the country as a unique Eastern mystery is therefore
to see it through an old-fashioned lens. Japan is a fast-moving country where ideas
are quickly out-of-date. What becomes clear to the visitor is that the Japan of
image and reality does not precisely match the perceptions once held widely in the
West. No wonder that direct experience of Japan affords so many startling
contrasts.
To the outsider or inexperienced, Japan appears to be a very alien place.
Tokyo, for example, is one of the world's most frenetic cities. In many ways it
reflects its position as being at the centre of a technological hub. It is crammed
with high-tech service industries, giant split screens and constant video images,
incredibly complex over — and underground rail systems. It has a fast pace of life,
in which there are crowded streets and subway trains into which passengers are
crammed forcibly at some of the major subway intersections.
What is also true is that much of the subway system appears to be no busier than
other major international cities such as Hong Kong, London, New York, Paris etc.
And, in fact what can be witnessed in the Tokyo subway system most of the day is
orderly queuing at the point at which the train doors open. In addition to a
proliferation of narrow congested streets which abound in the suburbs, there are
also beautiful boulevards coupled with a relatively low incidence of high rise
buildings.
Japan may be full of contradictions, but it is not unfathomable. It is possible to
feel at home in Tokyo no matter from where one originates as the Japanese appear
to have a flair for the translation of foreign eating concepts just as they have a
passion for foreign imitation in a quest to be "chic". Whether wine bars, Italian
restaurants or whatever, the ambiances the Japanese have created are often very
much more typical of the originals than appears the case in other sophisticated
3
Asian cities. Downtown Tokyo, however, is not representative of Japan as a
whole. Tokyo, Fields (1983) averred, is not a city but a collection of 23 villages
each of which has its own insular economies in the sense that much trade is
contained within networks of local retailers and service providers. But having said
that it is not typical, with just four per cent of the nation's land, it has more than 25
per cent of the population, 53 per cent of listed firms and 43 per cent of university
students, most of whom will stay on to work in the capital after graduation. Tokyo
offers the best job opportunities, the newest fashions, the widest choice of goods
and life in Japan's most glamorous city. Its appeal is beamed out every day in
television programmes and magazines to people around the country (O'Neill, 1992).
Japan's goods have conquered many foreign markets, and the country has
greatly increased its foreign assets via a process of considered investments, mergers
and acquisitions. In one year, 1988, Japan invested 4.5 times as much in
developing foreign markets than the US$10 billion its trading partners jointly
invested in developing the Japanese market over a period of 38 years to 1988
(Lacktorin, 1989), with the result that Japan has the lowest level of foreign
investment per capita of any of the major industrialized countries (Economist,
1993:66).
Yet, it is likely that many employees of non-Japanese multinational corporations
(MNCs) own Japanese consumer goods and some of these people may be wondering
why the companies on which their livelihoods depend have failed to develop market
positions in what is the world's second largest consumer market. The firms'
shareholders are certainly asking themselves the same question. Why do many
Western concerns neglect or even spurn the opportunity presented by Japan as
evidenced by the investment imbalance referred to above? Is it because of the
difficulties they perceive in both the country and its markets? A central issue
tackled in this thesis is whether these perceptions are matched by reality.
The problem is that there is a general perception that the obstacles in the
4
Japanese market are formidable (Grossberg, 1990). Many business people in the
US, in particular, have developed a defeatist attitude toward Japan as they wait for
the US government to resolve trade issues (Best, 1990). And, we hear and learn
very little about the successes of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) in the
Japanese market (Grossberg, 1990). In order to compensate for this shortfall in the
literature this thesis will attempt to redress the balance in some small way by
analyzing a sample of foreign MNCs, primarily North American and European,
which have achieved significant positions in the Japanese market and inducing from
that analysis some strategic marketing implications. It will be argued throughout
this thesis, the obstacles in the consumer goods industries are perceptual rather than
real and the key to overcoming them is not to be found in Tokyo, but in New York,
London or Bonn.
The research was concentrated in the consumer goods arena. The data was
collected during 1990-91 and reflects the situation at that time. No attempt will be
made to address the "post bubble economy". It will be shown that being far from
impossible to penetrate the Japanese market, to develop a position in the Japanese
consumer products market is plausible. What is required by foreign MNCs to
develop a market position in Japan is implementation of the marketing concept to its
fullest extent: the critical — and obvious — message being is that if MNCs can
understand Japanese cultural differences, Japanese consumers and their needs,
develop strategies which take account of the particular quirks of the Japanese
market, primarily in terms of its high quality standards and sophistication, Japan
offers great opportunities. Not only that, Japan is becoming the development
ground for international markets. It is increasingly becoming a trend setting forum
and companies with international interests will find it essential to establish a
learning and monitoring presence there in order to hold their positions in their
traditional markets. Interviews conducted with various foreign businessmen
reinforced this conclusion: many of the perceived obstacles to doing business in
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Japan are indeed perceptions and are largely relics of the past. As a major target
for trade, Japan demands to be treated with, at the very least, the same level of
zeal, professional and objective skill that companies apply in other key markets.
Much can be gained by identifying the ingredients of marketing success. In this
attempt to glean a better understanding, a sample of successful MNCs was chosen
on the basis of recommendations made by international management consultants
operating in Japan and managers experienced in the Japanese business world. The
selection included not only senior representatives of successful corporations, but
also — to give a broader perspective to the data — distributors, consultants,
advertising agents and other facilitators.
Because of the complexity and multifacetedness of the topic, face to face
interviewing was relied on as the primary method of data collection. This was
supplemented by desk research in libraries and access of other private data sources.
In this way attempts were made to avoid some of the pitfalls of those other studies
reported on. A paucity of in-depth findings resulted from previous research studies,
so an attempt was made to gain a comprehensive picture about the issue — effective
marketing strategies in Japan from a foreign company perspective.
Chapter 2 gives a review, based on published sources and interviews, of the
opportunities and threats posed by the Japanese market. Starting with the macro
economic picture, it proceeds to assess market obstacles presented by what is
allegedly unfair Japanese business practices and examines the reality behind the so
called conspiracy to block foreign imports theories; the difficulties of grappling
with Japanese cultural barriers; selecting appropriate market entry modes; the
Japanese tendency toward taking a longer term market perspective; the much
vaunted complex Japanese distribution system, and the problems of obtaining
suitably qualified staff. Also in Chapter 2 the characteristics of the market are
scrutinized, in particular: the Japanese consumer, gift giving custom, market
segmentation, buying concentrations and market opportunities. The Chapter
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proceeds to assess the competitive environment by investigating the Japanese
corporations (kaisha1) as competitors within their home market and highlights some
key characteristics which should be noted. In particular, it also examines the way
that the Japanese harness their group culture to formulate corporate philosophies,
gather market intelligence and compete aggressively.
The thesis proceeds in Chapter 3 to develop the theoretical background by
reviewing the literature on strategic management and marketing in order to
demonstrate the complexity of the subject and thus pinpoint the danger of searching
for a narrow solution derived solely from the marketing literature. In this way
some methodological approaches toward the research will be discarded and a basis
provided for others. The strategic model presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to 3.7
influences the overall structure of the thesis and a particular framework is identified
(Porter, 1990) that is utilized in Chapter 6, whereas review of the international
marketing literature revealed a particularly salient topic: the standardization versus
adaptation debate.
Chapter 4 builds on Chapter 3 by arguing that the topic under consideration
involves the behaviour of enterprises and their constituent organizations. It reviews
some previous research by this author and shows that, in performing any such
investigation, there are several different methodological approaches which could be
adopted, but that the validity and cost of applying them varies. The available
selection is ample, it involves both quantitative and qualitative approaches. On the
basis of past experience referred to and the nature of findings from other studies a
qualitative methodology incorporating the principles of grounded theory is
favoured: involving face to face interviews conducted in Japan with key
representatives of foreign MNCs that have successfully developed a position in the
1 The practise, often applied in the literature of using Japanese terms, will
be followed in this thesis. Such terms will be italicized.
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Japanese consumer products market.
Having distilled from the literature an assessment of opportunities and threats
that was presented in Chapter 2, Chapter 5 assesses the responses which foreign
MNCs, as reflected by the companies selected for study, have made. Attempts are
made to pull the foregoing into a cohesive entity and highlight successful consumer
goods strategies for the Japanese market. These involve probing consumer
fundamentals via marketing research; determining the optimum mode of market
entry; formulating responsive corporate strategies; formulating an aggressive and
dynamic product strategy; managing the communications process and developing
distribution strategy. Two key frameworks derived from Porter (1990) and Quelch
and Hoff (1986) are rolled forward to Chapter 6 and used as a basis to analyze the
sample of companies. This framework identifies three dimensions of global
marketing: business functions, products, and marketing mix elements. Along each
of these dimensions the companies are classified according to the degree of
standardization which is imposed or the degree to which the companies have
adapted their operating standards to the Japanese context.
Overall conclusions are presented in Chapter 7, these show that the Japanese
market, far from being mysterious and impenetrable, can be penetrated by
straightforward application of the marketing concept which has much to offer for
foreign MNCs as well as Japanese companies. Failure often derives from foreign
MNCs neglect to take account of such fundamentals. Moreover, if companies can
learn to compete in Japan then that expertise may offer major potential benefits in
other markets. Conversely, to fail to do so will render their positions vulnerable to
attack in their traditional markets by Japanese and other competitors offering higher
quality and more up to date consumer solutions.
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SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
There are many misunderstandings regarding what makes Japan successful just
as there is little appreciation of what is involved for foreign companies to become
successful in the Japanese market. Therefore the objectives of this research study
are to explore the reality of this situation; to explode or support the myths
surrounding the Japanese market and by so doing analyze the self reported
experiences of a sample of foreign MNCs which have successfully developed a
presence in the Japanese market and appraise the effective consumer goods
marketing strategies for Japan from the perspective of foreign companies.
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CHAPTER 2 — JAPANESE OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES
2.1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1 it was suggested that many people: employees, consumers and
stockholders must find it perplexing that their indigenous companies are ignoring
the Japanese market and the opportunities that are offered. In this chapter, by
drawing on published sources as well as some interview material, an attempt will be
made to highlight the scale of that opportunity and to reveal the truth about the
obstacles that exist. Using a funnel approach (Chisnall, 1981:145), by starting with
the broadest issues and progressively narrowing to the micro level, the chapter
explores:
• A macro economic viewpoint
• Obstacles to trade
• The competitive environment
• Market characteristics.
2.2. A MACRO ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT
Without doubt, Japan offers attractive opportunities to consumer goods'
producers. It comprises a large population — approximately 124 million in 1990
— many of which is as wealthy and sophisticated as any group of its leading trading
nation counterparts' affluent citizens. This populace represents a sizeable consumer
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Country
Source: Anzai (1991)
There is no question that Japan has given fresh meaning to the term "economic
miracle": from 1985 to 1989, the country's GNP growth rate exceeded that of the
six major Western industrial economies (see Figure 2.1) and brought it to the
position of the second most significant economy in the world (see Figure 2.2). The
notion of "economic miracle" is not new. Rapid growth in Japan occurred during
1946-51, the years of the US occupation. Even into the 1950s it seemed no great
surprise that Japan continued to muster GNP growth rates approaching 10 per cent
because of its proximity to Korea and its ability to benefit from the Korean War. It
was only after the mid-1950s that it became the central topic of Japanese economic
debate. Reviewing the role of central policy making in this success, Morris-Suzuki
(1989:132) indicated that many writers have emphasized the pivotal role ofMITI
and the Bank of Japan, more recently, however there has been a tendency to argue
that the significance of MITI has been exaggerated:
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Farfrom being the outcome of the planning of a small elite, Japan's
high growth rate was achieved only as the result of the high rate of
saving by the people, by their will to work, and by the vigorous
efforts ofJapan's entrepreneurs (Kosai and Ogino, 1984:120).
It is also a fact that the central authorities avoided the hindrance of economic
processes that had gained its own momentum: It was primarily the efforts of the
people, mainly in the industrial world, which produced economic growth.
However, this is not to say that the economic policy played no role in the process.
It is a fact that the economic policy making authorities at first
underestimated growth capacity, and it is also a fact that once
growth had begun, they made every effort to sustain it and strove to
remove obstacles to it (Nakamura, 1981:80).
Sheer market size makes Japan attractive to many exporting companies world¬
wide, but population is only part of the picture: in 1990, Japan generated a GNP of
US$3 trillion, placing it second after the US (then US GNP was approximately
US$5.5 trillion Figure 2.2). This statistic disguises that on a GNP per capita basis,
Japan exceeds not only the US, but also all its major international competitors (see
Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.2 GNP/GDP 1990
US Japan W. Gm Italy* UK* France*
* GDP
Source: Global Forecasting Service Business International 1990-91
Figure 2.3 GNP/GDP per capita 1990
Japan W. Gm US Italy* UK* France*
* GDP
Source: Global Forecasting Service Business International 1990-91
Japan's average per capita income in 1970 was just 40% that of the US figure,
but by 1990 it had surged ahead, topping US levels by more than US$2,000.
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Moreover, the domestic market is both massive and highly sophisticated: Japanese
consumers now demand a comprehensive range of goods and services, creating an
enormous potential market for MNCs in almost every industry.
Although in GNP per capita terms, Japan is the world's second wealthiest nation
after Switzerland (Business International, 1991); these figures do not necessarily
translate into consumer wealth. There are other ways to measure the well-being of
a population, and to focus solely on GNP per capita can be misleading. For
instance, certain infrastructural provisions in Japan lag behind those of its industrial
counterparts: only 65% of Japanese roads are paved in contrast to the UK and
former West Germany, where almost all are sealed. No more than 41% of Japan's
population is served by main drains, compared with 95% in the UK, and 73% in
the US. Only 20% of the electric cables are buried beneath the streets in Tokyo,
while in London and Paris they are all below the surface (Economist, 1991a).
The Japanese are however less well off than their US or European counterparts
because of high local price levels. A 1988 study by the official Economic Planning
Agency examined 400 products and concluded that Tokyo prices were 40-50%
higher than in New York and Hamburg. At around the same time, the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) concluded that overall,
Japanese prices were 57% above those in the US and these prices were often not
fully offset by salaries (Smith, 1990). Since the magnitude of GNP is determined
by exchange rates, these comparisons are always clouded by currency fluctuations;
however, using purchasing power parity (PPP) as a measure of international prices
avoids this problem because it focuses on the quantity of goods and services that can
be bought by different currencies. This measure shows that during 1985, for
example, when the yen was valued at around ¥218:US$1; the PPP value was at a
similar level. When the yen strengthened to ¥128:US$1, ¥201 was still required in
PPP terms to buy one dollar's worth of merchandise (Rowley, 1991). In this sense,
the yen is overvalued and the domestic purchasing power of yen incomes is low
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when compared with nominal incomes in other countries, although there are some
items that might be considered relatively inexpensive in Japan such as automobiles,
beer, cigarettes and clothes at the bottom end of the market.
Figure 2.4 Japan's Trade Balance 1984-95
(1990-95 Forecasts)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Source: Global Forecasting Service Business International 1990-91
Figure 2.5 Balance of Trade
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Anzai (1991c)
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Japan has a large trade surplus with many of its trading partners (see Figures 2.4
and 2.5). By 1989, it had run surpluses for the previous five years, although
figures for 1990 showed a drop of 8.4% to US$54.5 billion. This trend is forecast
to continue down to levels of approximately US$42 billion by 1995. However,
since Japan is virtually devoid of mineral resources, it is highly dependent upon
imports of fundamental commodities. In 1988, Japan incurred a net balance of
trade loss of US$27 billion on imported raw materials (see Figure 2.6). Its balance
of trade deficit on crude oils and other fuels amounted to US$56 billion (see Figure
2.7), equivalent to 96% of the US deficit on the same account and for a population
half the size of the US.
Figure 2.6 Net Balance Trade Raw Materials
Japan USA WG France UK Italy
Source: OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade
Despite its high profile with GNP performance, Japan imports fewer manufactured
goods and other high value-added commodities than most of the other "Big Six"
(see Figures 2.8 and 2.9). Its high value-added imports are dwarfed by those of the
US.
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Source: OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade
Figure 2.8 Import of Manufactured Goods 1988
Source: OECD Statistics of Foreign Trade
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Figure 2.9 Imports manufactured goods
1980-1989
% Share total imports












Source : OECD, Statistics of Foreign Trade 1987 (Anzai, 1990)
Clearly Japan spends less on importing manufactured goods than on
commodities (see Figures 2.9 and 2.10), but current trends offer greater hope for
companies eager to secure a slice of its domestic market. As the country's trade
surplus with the world begins to decline, manufactured goods represent an ever
growing portion of its imports' bill, of this a good percentage is accounted for by
consumer products. The strength of the economy as indicated by the above figures
is precisely the reason why Japan's modus operandi is so heavily criticized by
foreign concerns. The country compensates for its lack of natural resources through
an ingenious "value-added" strategy: Like the former West Germany, its economic
clout derives from its ability to convert its materials imports into products prized by
consumers world-wide. Japan adds greatly to its surplus by exporting high value-
added items such as machinery, vehicles, industrial products and manufactured
goods (see Figure 2.10). At the same time, it is strengthening its tertiary
educational infrastructure to support the growth of its research and development
capabilities. In 1988, 37% of the potential age group continued on to higher
education, compared with 44% in the US, and 24% in the UK (Anzai, 1991e).
Despite major and unprecedented success in both world markets and GNP per
capita terms, the majority of Japanese still consider themselves poor. These
attitudes are rooted in common belief and are strongly linked to the country's
shortfall of mineral and other natural resources. Japan's success is consistent with
this belief, since it is primarily based upon manufacturing ingenuity. With the
highest population density of any of its major competitors (see Figure 2.11), Japan
must leverage its habitable land resources at a rate four times that of former West
Germany (see Figure 2.12). This means that only 4% of available land in Japan is
harnessed for dwellings (see Figure 2.13). Combined with a booming economy,
these structural conditions have caused a revolution in property values, residential
land prices in particular increasing at a dramatic pace. According to the Japan Real
Estate Institute, the city residential land price index increased from a national base
of 100 in 1955, to 15,456 in 1989; in the same period, and at the same base level,
the consumer price index increased only five-fold, to 520. Consequently, the
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provision of residential buildings lags behind that of comparative countries.
Moreover, the houses have smaller floor areas (see Figure 2.14), which in Japan is
measured in tatami1 —a traditional straw mat floor covering. In 1988, the average
number of tatami per dwelling was about 31 or 90 square metres.
Figure 2.11 Population Density
Source: U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (Anzai, 1990)
1 There are different sizes of tatami that apply in: 1. Old style country
houses; 2. Urban accommodation; danchu— apartment blocks.
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Figure 2.12 Population & GNP density
per habitable area (1988)
IGNP/hab sq km US$ ®Popn/hab sq km
Source: National Land Agency (Anzai, 1990)
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Figure 2.14 Housing Conditions
Seleted Countries
Floor area per sq m
Japan(1987) USA(1986)
Source: Ministry of Construction Japan (Anzai, 1990)
France (1984) WG(1986)
Urban houses are not only small2, they are often unaffordable and while some
Japanese may be fortunate enough to inherit property, the majority do not (Smith,
1990). The lucky group, 62 per cent of families according to Neff et al. (1990)
who can claim to be property owners now forms a new wealthy segment of the
population (see Chapter section 2.3.1 for a discussion of their buying behaviour),
but those less fortunate must usually abandon hope of ever owning their homes.
One plan under discussion is the introduction of 100 year mortgages that would
obligate children and grandchildren (Neff et al., 1990). Individuals in this latter
category, according to market research concerns interviewed, form an important
part of the market in their own right, since they spend money that would normally
be put towards a mortgage on travel, eating and clothing. Regular outgoings
common in industrialized countries are not necessarily usual in Japan, for example,
2 Much generalization occurs around the "Japanese live in rabbit hutches"
theme and while urban housing is cramped these stereotypes do not fit country
farm houses and some other types of housing outwith the urban areas.
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those (77% of households) which can afford to buy and run a car may find
themselves stretched to bear the cost of parking it— should they even have access
to a suitable space (Smith, 1990).
The value of Japanese land is so high that it presents barriers to investment
while simultaneously providing massive collateral for Japanese companies to make
acquisitions elsewhere, for instance, the area on which the Imperial Palace is
located in Tokyo has a real estate value greater than the entire state of California. It
has been suggested that Tokyo is so highly priced, that the yen would need to be
devalued to about ¥15,000 to the US dollar to achieve purchasing power parity in
the real estate market (Smith, 1990). One of the consequences of this situation is
that the Japanese have harnessed this collateral and thereby gained strong positions
in other countries' economies — a point that has exacerbated frictions with major
trading partners.
In April 1991, legislation was approved by the Diet for a new land holding tax
designed to curb the land price spiral by making it more costly to own land for
speculative purposes. Japan's previous land tax policy penalized those who sold
land but virtually exempted farmers from fixed property taxes, even if their
holdings happen to be in large cities. This bias had the effect of restraining land
transactions while simultaneously inflating notional land values, and because more
than half the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) MPs depend on support from
the farming community, policy changes were avoided lest they lead to hostility and
undermine the party's position.
A similar problem exists concerning the potential dismantling of the keiretsu
structure, in theory, the LDP could revise the commercial code and require banks to
list their stable share holdings at market price rather than at book values, but again
this jeopardizes large blocks of its support (Smith, 1990). However, repeated
pressure by the US urging Japan to loosen the hold of keiretsu ties is beginning to
show some progress. In May 1991, US requests included removing the anti-
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competitive aspects of cross-share holding among keiretsu groups; strengthening
minority shareholders' rights; and facilitating mergers and acquisitions (Economist,
1991a). Although all these points are being considered by the Japanese, the only
move to date has been a pledge to review minority shareholders' rights and ask the
Diet to instigate the necessary changes.
Figure 2.15 Retail establishments
000s ■
3-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 1004- Dept
636.113 70.394 31.386 5.362 0.207 1.911
Source: M1TI, Japan Marketing Data, 1990
The domestic economic picture is unlikely undergo radical change soon. While
Japan has recently entered a relatively low-growth phase, its GNP growth rate still
remains 1-1.5% higher than the rest of its major trading partners (see Figure 2.1).
The Japanese economy has responded with remarkable resilience to the challenge of
the strengthening yen. After a brief slowdown to 2.5% in 1986, Japanese real
economic growth bounced back to 4.7% in 1989, 5.6% in 1990; and it looks set to
stay above 3% for the rest of the century (Business International, 1991a;
Economist, 1991c). Since GNP growth rates in other OECD nations are likely to
remain between 2% and 3% in the future, the Japanese share of global GNP will
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continue to grow, giving its consumers ever-greater purchasing power.
Many have wondered whether buying clout has led to a saturation of the
Japanese consumer market. On the surface it appears so: 99% of Japanese homes
have refrigerators, colour television sets and washing machines (Anzai, 199If). On
the other hand, local consumers have demonstrated a willingness to dispose of and
update consumer goods with regularity; hence, the challenge for producers is to
engage in more aggressive product planning, coupled with creative marketing
strategies. The pay-off for this kind of investment is likely to grow in to the 1990s,
especially considering MITI's pronouncement that in the next decade the average
citizen should enjoy a greater share of Japan's affluence, work shorter hours and
take longer vacations (Palmer, 1990; Rapoport, 1990). As a result of pressure from
within the country and from major trading partners, official weekly working hours
have been reduced twice in the last five years from 48 to 44 — a trend the
government believes has now been adopted by companies. Nevertheless, the
Japanese remain hardworking and richer than anyone else (Rapoport, 1990). The
average annual work time remains 200 hours above US and UK totals, and 400
above levels in France and former West Germany (Anzai, 1991f).
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Figure 2.16 Ownership of consumer durables by
household March 1989
W m/c Col TV V/clr Refrg Cmra Cars M/wve VCR
Source: Economic Planning Agency (Anzai, 1990)
2.3. MARKET OBSTACLES
In the previous section some impression was given of the scale of the
opportunity presented by the Japanese consumer goods' market. In this section the
reality of the myths behind Japanese market obstructiveness will be explored and the
question will be addressed whether despite the rosy economic picture the Japanese
market for consumer products is indeed open.
2.3.1. TARIFFS AND TRADE
Every country has traditionally protected its indigenous industries and interests
by maintaining control over market access and entry (Keegan, 1989). This control
ranges from singular resource based restrictions such as those which apply to fishing
rights and extend to more high tech applications such as broadcasting and
communications. In July 1989 there were 21 product groups, largely agricultural
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and fishery commodities, still subject to quantitative restrictions in Japan, compared
with 490 product categories in the 1960s (Shapiro and Hamilton, 1990). Most
measures of control can be categorized as tariff or non tariff barriers.
2.3.1.1. Tariff systems
This system of control provides for either a single rate of duty applicable to all
countries, or two or more rates applicable to different countries or groups of
countries. As Keegan (1989:529) illustrated, tariffs are usually grouped into one or
two classifications: single column and two-column. The former consists of a
schedule in which the rate applies to imports from all countries on the same basis,
whereas in the second this initial single-column is supplemented by a second column
of "conventional", that is agreed by some convention, duties that shows reduced
rates agreed through tariff negotiations with other countries. The conventional rates
are those applicable to all countries enjoying MFN (most favoured nation status)
under the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) under which all nations
agree to apply their most favourable tariffs to all nations that are signatories to the
agreement, with some notable exceptions.
2.3.1.2. Non Tariff Barriers
Sometimes non tariff barriers have a legitimate place in the policy making of
sovereign states, but on other occasions they may represent structural impediments.
For example US regulations on automobile exhaust emissions may seem reasonable
requirements to the US environmental lobby but be viewed as a non tariff barrier to
foreign motor manufacturers that are not yet producing to the US standards,
whether they are fair or not is a question of judgement. The major types of non
tariff barrier are: quotas and trade control, discriminatory policies, restrictive
customs procedures, selective monetary controls and discriminatory exchange rate
policies, restrictive administrative and technical regulations (Keegan, 1989:532).
28
The strong positions gained by the Japanese in foreign markets has caused friction
with its major trading partners. These differences in viewpoint stem primarily
from: (1) Japan's policy on land holdings3, and (2) the keiretsu system — the
interlocking network of share holdings between major companies (including banks),
coupled with an array of other relationships and obligations.
2.3.2. OBSTACLES OR OPPORTUNITIES?
As interviews will later indicate, there are no insurmountable obstacles to
penetration of the Japanese consumer products' market. Barriers often stem from
the attitudes and shortcomings of foreign companies, and it is not uncommon to find
MNCs that lack a comprehensive understanding of both the Japanese market and the
local way of doing business. Many business people, in the US in particular, have
developed a defeatist attitude toward Japan as they wait for the US government to
resolve trade issues (Best, 1990). However, as will be argued throughout this
thesis, the treatment for these deficiencies is not to be found by mustering political
onslaughts toward Tokyo, but by taking courageous business decisions in New
York, London or Bonn.
Outside pressure is one technique being used to expand access to the Japanese
market (Economist, 1992b). Some executives, although they feel that constant
vigilance is necessary to open the market, are concerned about the confrontational
tactics employed by US companies and government negotiators. Although
legislative obstructions may be bogus, structural obstacles remain — varying in
strength between sectors and multiplying in the high-tech industries (Berger, 1990).
Nevertheless, there are some specific problems that MNC marketers continually
revisit to explain either entry difficulties or lack of success in the Japanese market.
3 The result of this is a high cost of land and was discussed earlier.
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These are:
• Cultural difficulties and nihonjinron
• Unfair Japanese practice;
• Distribution;
• Market acceptability;
• Modes of market entry;
• Long termism;
• Staff.
2.3.2.1, Cultural difficulties and Nihoniinron
The ACCJ's 1990 position paper on US-Japan trade urges US companies
wishing to do business in Japan to show greater sensitivity to culture. It argues that
the US: "...must co-operate to create a climate of positive support for exports. It
has been indicated elsewhere that cultural difficulties are more frequently
encountered obstacles than legal barriers and tariffs (Peak, 1991). I shall therefore
continue by giving a brief review of aspects of Japanese culture— a topic which
has a rich and varied literature, for example Van Wolferen, 1989; Emmott, 1989;
Hofstede, Neuijen and Sanders, 1990; Gluck, 1985; Yoshino, 1992; Moeran, 1988;
Moeran, 1989; Moeran, 1990; Nakane, 1973; Valentine, 1990— that are germane
to the impediment of business development in Japan and try to avoid the temptation
of drifting too far into the world of social anthropology.
In interpreting what is written about Japan, great care must be taken so as not to
be duped by much of the tendentious writing and word of mouth communications
on the subject. The term that embraces this tendency — nihonjinron— was
introduced briefly in Chapter 1.
As an illustration of how Japan attracts myths and promotes contradiction, Dale
(1986:16) writing about the elite Japanese universities highlighted that despite their
prestige they had attracted conflicting judgements from outside. For example,
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Havens (1973) noted that Kyoto and Tokyo Universities are "characterized by an
openness, vigour, and imagination — probably reaching as close to the ideal of free
inquiry and the unbiased search for truth as has any other institution in Japan or
elsewhere." Whereas (Mills, 1977) takes a polarized perspective "...little of what
contemporary Japanese scholars write and publish in Japanese could be published
intact in a literal English translation without becoming the butt of amazement and
even ridicule abroad. Yet these works, which are widely read in Japan, are by
eminent men writing in their own fields."
Partly, the confusion has been caused by deliberate efforts to reshape Japanese
identity from time to time. According to Gluck (1985) the distinctive ideologies of
Japan have been invented at key periods during its history. Kokutai, the concept of
a mystical national polity, was turned to many uses including that of exhorting
everyone to participate in the acceptable mode of thought (Gluck, 1985:15).
Altering the kokutai was included as a crime against the state in the Peace
Preservation Law of 1925. By the 1930s, kokutai appeared, in lower school
textbooks as well as in ideological tracts, usually in lofty, mystical, and sometimes
impenetrable description. The first paragraph read:
"The unbroken line ofEmperors, receiving the Oracle of the Founder
of the Nation, reign eternally over the Japanese Empire. This is our
eternal and immutable kokutai. ...We must to begin with, know with
what active brilliance this fountain/read shines within the reality of
the founding of the nation."
No one in the 1940s was supposed to know anything about the kokutai but they
were supposed "to feel it" (Gluck, 1985:283). Yet, even today the Japanese
authorities maintain close control of their invented history and are selective about
which parts of it is reflected in school textbooks. This invention process was
sustained by what Gluck termed suasion, the effect of which outweighed coercion.
This process of suasion was sometimes moral, sometimes social, and sometimes
institutional, as it was in the schools and the military.
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Even in Emperor Hirohito's radio broadcast infoming his people of the end of
the war he proclaimed that kokutai had been preserved. Later in 1946 conservatives
in the government and the Diet asserted that the post var Constitution would not
result in change to the kokutai although by this time its neaning had began to wither
in favour of the existence of the imperial institution. However, Gluck (1985:285)
noted that the militaristic (tennosei) ideology of the 1930s was quickly abandoned,
according to scholars, because the relation between experience and ideology had
become so strained that the official ideology was relatively easy to abandon once the
institutional apparatus that sustained it was dismantled.
Nihonjinron was characterized by Dale (1986:14) as 'the commercialized
expression of Japanese nationalism. "...It gathers within its ample embrace
writings of high seriousness imbued with deep, often specious, erudition, all the
facile dicta of interpretative journalism." As he put it, girls who have been sexually
assaulted can console themselves that in Japanese tradition love follows rape.
Everything from the distasteful tedium of the factory line to daily violence can be
made to resonate with archaic significance. In this way the nihonjinron, "Through
the consistent linking by analogy of the hallowed past with the haggard present,
tend to sanctify the hollow banalities of the contemporary world."
Two groups, according to Yoshino (1992), are normally prominent in the
development of cultural nationalism: intellectuals who formulate ideas and the
intelligentsia (well-educated social groups) who respond to sucih ideas and relate
them to their own situations. He (1992:164) drew attention to the gap that "xists in
the Westerners' image of Japan: on the one hand there is the popular image of
Japan as a manufacturing base for electronic products; on the other there is the
orientalist image of exotic Japan, a view reinforced by Mishima's novels and the
movies of Kurasawa. These circumstances have offered a change of propagandist
pattern and provided Japan's business elites with an opportunity to act as spokesmen
for the majority of ordinary Japanese on the subject of Japanese social culture. In
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explaining how ordinary Japanese people behave they have often reinterpreted the
theories of Japanese academics through their own experiences. Yoshino (1992:167)
revealed that many of his research respondents had learned about such theories as
Nakane's Vertical Society in this way. He cautioned that it was not possible to say
how much recycling of academics' ideas occurred with the originality of their ideas,
but stressed that these business elites play a key role in the diffusion of ideas of
Japanese uniqueness.
Various linguistic forms (e.g., pronominal usage, honorifics, & donatory
verbs), according to Moeran (1988), reflect the division of Japanese society into an
apparently infinite series of in-outgroups. He showed how the use of vocabulary
and key words serves to overcome this social differentiation, to create solidarity
among these groups, as well as enforce a sense of "Japaneseness" vis-a-vis the
outside, primarily Western, world. In a later work Moeran (1990), borrowing from
Said's (1979:1) definition of orientalism, describes the practice of "Japanism" as a
way of coming to terms with Japan that is based primarily on Japan's place in
Western European and American experience. Japanism he notes is a mode of
discourse, a body of knowledge, a political vision of reality that represents an
integral part of Western material civilisation both culturally and ideologically.
Japanism exerts a three way force —- on Japan itself, on Japanists, and on Western
consumers of Japanism. The process of Japanism not only marks Japan as the
province of the Japanist but also forces the uninitiated Western reader to accept
Japanist codifications...as the true Japan. Moeran (1990) claims that Japan even
confuses the Japanese. In his attempts to "unwrap" Japan he notes that tensions
have existed over many centuries as a result of older generations attempted control
of the young by insisting that the proper form of honorific language is applied, just
as employers today complain about the standards of Japanese school leavers and
their inability to use the correct forms when occupying job positions as company
receptionists or telephone operators.
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In Japanese social interaction, Valentine (1990) noted that it is vital to adopt
suitable form and to know how to behave appropriately. To accomplish this one
must define the situation correctly, and in particular know who the other is and
where he belongs. Especially crucial is the designation of the other as belonging
inside (uchi) or outside (soto). Since people are defined by where they belong,
their frame (Nakane, 1973:2), it is important that they do not change it too often or
their "belongingness property" is likely to become ambiguous resulting in their
loyalty becoming suspect, which, according to Valentine (1990:24), arouse not only
suspicion but contempt. He noted that being on the margin can mean being even
more of an outsider than a true outsider. He provided the example that someone of
mixed Japanese and foreign parentage is more rejected than a pure gaijin. This
marginality extends to Japanese born abroad and even to returnees from various
types of foreign posting. Surprisingly, what he also found was that men that change
companies frequently encounter little in the way of exclusion, but men who did not
drink alcohol were marginalized as a result of their inability to participate fully in
the socializing that forms an important part of Japanese business life. Worse still,
he noted, is a woman in a "man's" occupation.
During drinking sessions what is said is supposed to be soon forgiven and
forgotten. Drinking acts as an outlet for repressed feelings. It is only when
drinking that a junior member of a team may criticise his senior and for that
criticism to be accepted. However Moeran (1989) noted that not only was
information stored that was acquired in these sessions it was used to pursue political
gains. He found that there were major disparities in the form of the language used,
and between "official" declared descriptions of respondents' roles and positions and
those that were revealed during the drinking sessions with the same individuals.
Topics that provoked only embarrassed smiles and evasions during the day were
discussed intimately and frankly in the context of drinking sessions.
Professional women (unless they are in women's professions) are, according to
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Valentine (1990), neither in their proper place, nor fully accepted and are
potentially rejectable by males and females. In his analysis of Japanese cultural
forms Moeran (1989) noted that the "group" model of Japanese society was
primarily male and women were frequently portrayed as being "polluted" unless
they adopted the mantle of good wife and wise mother. Even in advertising, where
stereotypes were questioned, the underlying ideology supported the male dominant
model.
Despite the existence of influences that cause tensions in Western societies,
Moeran asserts that Japanese society does appear to function well, but it is more
stratified than is commonly imagined. For example, the use of the Japanese
language prevents a Japanese speaker from using it neutrally. The speaker, he
maintains, always ends up being "higher" or "lower" than the other person. So that
when mention is made of the Japanese group ideal what is overlooked is that it is a
rather elite model based on samurai values. He asserts that leaders are leaders
because they are able to "lower" themselves and be seen to mix with those of the
lowest social order. Although status differences may exist, Moeran argues, no one
is absolutely superior or inferior, social divisions are blurred in such a way that
"...the Japanese do seem to be one happy family".
With consensus a feature of Japanese society, group values are of critical
significance. They are emphasized throughout childhood and formalized in the
educational system. One of the most frequent threats that Japanese mothers use on
their children is that they will be made to go stand outside the house as a symbol of
their disenfranchisement from the family group. In schools, this group mentality is
built up in various ways, one of which is a kind of self-policing by the group. For
instance, school children are often responsible for cleaning the school at the end of
the day, new children are put into the care of children a year their senior, just as in
an English public school; they in turn have someone a year their senior to take
responsibility for them. The onus is on the children themselves to ensure that
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boisterous students sit quietly before teaching starts. In this way, vertical groupings
are formed.
Over the centuries, Japan's rich and distinctive culture has embodied and
harmonized many conflicting philosophies, often imported from overseas. Ichihashi
(1983) refers to Japan's propensity to import, adapt and adopt things from the
outside as a "third value," in other words, one that is neither the imported element
per se nor the original Japanese culture. This phenomenon (Ichihashi, 1983), which
is also referred to as Japanization, has great importance for both manufacturer and
distributor, especially when considered in tandem with Japan's extremely strong
group ethic. The Japanese orientation toward group values plays a major role in
consumer behaviour. For foreign MNCs, Japanization and the peer group mentality
means that success in Japanese markets hinges on the ability to "Japanize" one's
viewpoint and conduct business in the Japanese way, failure to make this effort will
probably mean complete failure. Appreciation of Japanese values and a thorough
familiarity with Japanese consumer behaviour are essential. For example, as will
be discussed later, Japanese approaches to advertising often appear highly oblique to
the Western mind, and, as the interview materials will later show, many expatriate
managers indicated this made the choice of creative solutions for positioning and
promotion very difficult. Executives are required to stretch their minds to
appreciate the relationship that Japanese consumers have with advertising, in other
words that it is used as a source of information and entertainment as well as simply
influencing brand choice.
The Japanese believe in two types of obligation, on and giri. On is the sense of
obligation passively received by a subordinate for favours bestowed by a superior.
Shane (1988) argued that one must always try to repay it, but it can never be repaid
fully. Giri is a contractual obligation; it is limited in time and must be repaid with
a mathematical equivalence to the favour received. He noted that the buyer is
always superior in Japan because the seller receives an on when someone buys a
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product. To repay on, marketers may make quality improvements to a point
beyond rational economic trade-offs between quality and cost. In a rather weak
attempt to make the theory fit his observations, some companies, Shane noted, work
giri into marketing strategies by distributing free samples to create an obligation
among consumers to purchase the product later.
2.3.2.2, Unfair Japanese Practice
For years the Western press, supported by politicians, has suggested that Japan
engages in a variety of unfair trade practices. The general view cultivated is that
there are many inscrutable and invisible barriers that render penetration of the
Japanese market not merely difficult, but almost impossible. This issue has been
and is at the heart of an ongoing conflict between the US and Japan.
An interesting response has emerged to deal with the problem of non tariff
barrier issues. It is known as the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). In an
interview with John B. Taylor, a member of President Bush's Council of Economic
Advisors, he spoke about the SII and indicated high expectations for the initiative
because it was an alternative to protectionism or managed trade. In so doing the US
has made suggestions that would not entail major restructuring of the Japanese
economy and has put forth proposals to implement some of Japan's reciprocal
suggestions, such as limiting imports by increasing the savings rate in the US.
Pending failure, Taylor suggested, draconian fall back positions were prepared at
least on the US side and probably Japan's also (Anonymous, 1990b).
The US-Japan Working Group on the SII released its first annual report on May
22, 1991, (Anonymous, 1991c). The report summarizes the actions taken by the
Japanese and US governments over the previous year toward fulfilling commitments
made in the 1990 Joint Report on the SII talks, which were broadly aimed at
reducing the Japanese trade surplus with the US and making its market more easily
available to US companies. Japan made concessions in six key areas: pricing
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mechanism, distribution system, savings and investment, land policy, exclusionary
business practices, and keiretsu groupings. For example, Tokyo proposed to
introduce a 52 point policy to reduce domestic prices of various products that are
high compared to international levels. Yet, the Japanese alleged that these
initiatives were not a response to SII but represent the country's own effort to make
the Japanese economy compatible with the world economy (Awanohara, 1990).
One topic with which SII was concerned was the 24-hour clearance on imports
through entry procedures. The Japanese attempted to cope with this issue by
implementing measures concerning the expeditious and proper import procedures
listed in the final report on the 1990 SII talks. The Sea Cargo Automated
Processing System was scheduled for introduction in Tokyo and Yokohama ports
during October 1991. A liaison committee was established to continue efforts to
reduce the average time required for all import related procedures (Anonymous,
1992a).
Furthermore, Japan agreed to revise its anti-monopoly laws by March 31, 1991,
and strengthen enforcement of those laws. The SII report (Anonymous, 1991)
reflected US concerns that the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has been
inadequately funded and lacks sufficient authority to enforce the anti-monopoly laws
(Maretz, 1990). Among the points to be covered by the guidelines drafted by the
JFTC, the report recommends eliminating unreasonable interference in the business
activities of trading partners, increasing price competition, increasing market
openness, and facilitating market entry for foreign and domestic firms.
As the SII talks were being held, enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Act of
1947 (AMA) was improved. This act is at the core of Japan's antitrust regime.
Compared to competition laws in other advanced industrialized countries, the AMA
has been neither intrusive nor strictly enforced (Rowley et al., 1991; Yoshida,
1991). However, the recent SII talks with the US have focused attention on the
law. The result is an atmosphere favouring more rigorous enforcement by the
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Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) and legislative amendments covering a broad
range of business practices. The powers exercised by the JFTC are generally
classified as administrative, quasi-legislative, or quasi judicial (Rowley et al.,
1991). The AMA concerns itself with four principal areas: cartels and restrictive
trade association activity, merger control, acts of private monopolization and unfair
business practices. It applies to both domestic and foreign companies as well as to
domestic and foreign activities
On May 8, 1991, the Japanese Diet passed two bills submitted by MITI
accompanying further deregulation related to the Large Scale Retail Store Law
(LSRS). This new legislation represented the second step in the Japanese
government's efforts to adhere to the commitments it made in the US-Japan
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII); to reform the Japanese distribution system,
and to liberalize implementation of the LSRS law, one viewed as a major structural
impediment to the import of foreign goods. In January 1989, Japan's cabinet
approved changes that would partially deregulate distribution and speed up the
approval process for new, large stores. The Japanese side also committed itself in
the SII accords to adopt extraordinary measures to accommodate large-scale retail
stores specializing in imported goods. It was hoped that the special law on import
boutiques would satisfy that commitment (Bates, 1991). However, the final report
was not as harsh as some expected, and many on the Japanese side were reportedly
relieved. According to Fields (1990), Japanese store chains responded by
scrutinizing the directive for opportunities, while representatives of small stores
organized to slow down if not prevent the relaxation of new initiatives.
The Japanese criticize managers of US businesses for being obsessed with short
term gain. As will be shown later, there is a great deal of truth behind these
assertions. Yet, the approach being adopted by the Bush administration is decidedly
long term; it is pushing a variety of gradual, decade-scale approaches to opening the
Japanese market and resolving trade disputes with Tokyo. Observers have
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commented that Japan's economy is gaining strength at such a rate that the US
response has probably arrived too late. It has been argued that instead of attempting
to change the nature of an ancient civilization the US would be wiser to concentrate
on revitalizing its own (Fallows, 1990).
The remainder of this section attempts to question the truth as to whether the
widely held views of Japanese obstructiveness are valid, to discover whether in the
views of companies operating in Japan, such barriers indeed exist, and to uncover
the extent to which MNCs are encountering problems.
There is little doubt that in the past there were real obstacles to foreign
competition in the Japanese market. According to the Chairman of BMW (Japan),
as recently as the early 1980s, for instance, many parking lots prohibited the entry
of foreign cars; however, we will see later that this kind of obstructionism is now
more the exception than the rule (Tajima, 1990).
An unpublished January 1989 survey4 cited only a few specific cases of
discrimination (such as the Large Scale Retail Law). Almost all complaints
concerned the competitive business behaviour of commercial firms: for example,
car dealers were prohibited from acting as dual dealers because of pressure from
their main suppliers (ACCJ, 1989) — an unsurprising situation, since any strong
principal can be expected to resist the dilution of its effort. Most structural barriers
identified apply equally to Japanese businesses; in other words, although foreign
MNCs obviously face obstacles these are probably more cultural and commercial
than political.
One of the last legislative barriers to foreign MNCs, the Large Scale Retail
Law, underwent changes in May 1991 that promise to have far-reaching effects on
the distribution system and opportunities for foreign MNCs. The most significant
step is the scrapping of the previous requirement that retail outlets with more than
4 Based on the views of members of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Japan (ACCJ)
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500 square metres of floor space cannot open without approval from other local
retailers. This clause protected small shopkeepers, who constitute a massive
Japanese lobby group, by giving them a chance to stop the development of large-
scale local competition. Since small stores are not equipped to handle large
quantities of imported goods, and foreign firms have expertise in large-scale
retailing, the policy also discriminated against foreign companies. The revised
approval process has also been shortened from 18 months to one year.
Vertical integration of major manufacturers into the downstream distribution
system is another characteristic of Japanese business that limits new entrants' ability
to build an effective distribution network for their own products. Dual distributors
are virtually unknown in the automobile industry. Manufacturers' secure exclusive
control, by offering financing to distributors and extend their influence directly to
distributors at downstream levels, who then rely on these long credit lines for
funding. Since under this arrangement, services and products are often not paid for
until four to five months after receipt, working capital requirements are extremely
burdensome for foreign companies trying to compete (Kanabayashi, 1978).
Even if distributors consider adopting a foreign product line, it is not unknown
for them to receive warnings from other principals threatening to withdraw key
lines, or that immediate payment for goods is required. The ACCJ report
acknowledged that such practices are well known but infrequently documented, and
it cited the threat by Japan's largest agricultural co-operative to withhold subsidy
payments if farmers purchased foreign feed or fertilizer. The report also claimed
that product testing by testing organizations staffed by ex-government officials is
likely to result in faster approval by the ministries. This practice of hiring ex-
government officials (amakudari), which is widespread in Japan, remains a strategy
that foreign companies cannot readily apply. They must forge their own
connections as best they can (ACCJ, 1989).
One area where some charges can be made about Japan is that of patenting. The
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Japanese system limits the issuance of patents to foreigners (Morgan and Morgan,
1991). It was not until 1991 that the invention of the integrated circuit was
registered when the Japanese government relented and accepted a request made back
in 1960 by Texas Instruments. Although the reverse is true with patent flows from
Japan to the USA it is more a measure of Japanese creativity than Japanese
obstructiveness. In 1988 Japanese corporations and individuals received over 21%
of the patents issued in the USA. Of the top five companies filing for American
patents, a good barometer of creative renewal, only one was American.
2.3.2.3. Distribution
Many overseas companies are unable to penetrate the Japanese market simply
because they failed to utilize the Japanese distribution system at all— or at least
properly. Japan's distribution infrastructure can be described as a "traditional
system," although this is somewhat of an oversimplification, since it does possess
particular features that are built on a long tradition of trade practice peculiar to
Japan. According to an authoritative work published by Business
Intercommunications (1985), many of the crucial elements that determine the nature
of distribution in Japan are inherited directly from the Tokugawa period, the last of
the pre-modern eras, in which the merchant class developed practices that were
often based on such restrictive measures as price fixing. The resultant marketing
system established large wholesalers in key positions, specializing in exclusive
products. The contemporary extension of this system may seem to have simple
characteristics, but it is a logistical and financial nightmare: the task of ensuring its
products are within reach of consumers requires extensive planning, negotiation and
relationship development.
The chart below is a representative example of the distribution system of a
Japanese food manufacturer. Japanese distribution usually has several layers
involving primary and secondary wholesalers. The primary wholesalers are
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classified into A and B categories: in the chart, the primary A wholesaler may be
instrumental in introducing primary wholesaler B into the network to round out
geographical or other functional coverage; the primary A wholesaler would invoice
on behalf of the manufacturer, despite the primary B wholesaler receiving deliveries




Each of the several distribution layers has its own specialized functions such as
merchandising, product specialization, and geographical focus. The number of
layers involved varies from sector to sector and, within sector, from product to
product. Within product groups, the layering varies among manufacturers. The
above source on the subject charts 150 different patterns of distribution for common
products. Frequently, the Japanese distributive trade competes on service; indeed,
the services offered to retailers by the wholesaler, and by wholesalers to
manufacturers, include training in merchandising, tuition in retail skills, store
layout and pricing. The provision of such services helps account for the large gap
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between what the consumer pays and the manufacturer's selling price.
The structure of the Japanese distribution network is determined by that
purchasers in the major conurbations live in densely populated areas and in
proximity to their neighbours; their living and storage space are limited. This in
turn means that the Japanese shop frequently, often favouring small local stores.
Liquor is delivered directly to the home, vending machines are within a short walk
of almost everyone, and since consumers have grown accustomed to convenient
local shopping, the distribution system that has evolved supports small retailers with
frequent deliveries.
In the US or Europe, distribution is regarded as a technical function — the sort
of activity that may be processed by a food broker or jobber. In Japan, however,
the role is comprehensive and involves much more than simply delivering a
product. Distributors provide most of the weekly and daily deliveries, carry out the
order processing, and frequently conduct the selling as well as the merchandising.
The partnership between a principal and the distributor or broker is very close in
Japan, and the newcomer must try to find precisely the right distributor with whom
to build such a relationship.
Japan has around one million retail shops that sell food or associated products.
In the food sector in the US or Europe, the distribution channels often go directly
from manufacturer to the retailer. Accustomed to this arrangement, some foreign
companies have therefore attempted to circumvent Japan's more lengthy distribution
channels, often with disastrous results. Moreover, many Japanese consumer goods'
companies have direct investments in the wholesale trade; and consequently, the
dividing line between a manufacturer's regional warehouse and sales office, and that
of an independent wholesaler, can be blurred. In any event, the Japanese
wholesaler has a much greater influence on retail trade sales than his Western
counterparts in most other markets.
The retail and wholesale industries account for nearly 15% of Japan's domestic
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production; its structure is characterized by the high density of stores compared to
other countries (Shiotani, 1988). Rising imports of manufactured goods are making
inroads into the Japanese market and changing the complex distribution system. If
this continues, it may result in a restructuring of Japan's export oriented economy.
Factors responsible for increased imports include the appreciation of the yen,
diversifying consumer tastes, and encouragement from the government to import to
reduce its trade surplus (Anonymous, 1989c). Four government agencies were
involved in making recommendations aimed at applying existing laws in a mode
that favours the consumer rather than manufacturers or distributors.
In 1989 Japanese retail prices were 48% higher on average than those in the US
and 55% than UK prices, a situation attributed to the distribution system. The
perceived problem with the Japanese distribution system stems from the
proliferation of retailers. For example, a poll taken by the Asahi newspaper group
of 100 major Japanese corporations found that the major causes between overseas
and domestic prices were the distribution system and government regulations.
Trade is not carried out on rational (Western) economic principles. According to
Sumiya of Chiba University of Commerce, wholesalers concentrate on annual rather
than specific sales and charge retail stores equally whether they receive high or low
frequency servicing (OECD, 1990).
Yet, this is only a partial explanation. For example, Hiroaki (1988) performed
surveys of Japanese and British manufacturers to compare production and
distribution practices in the two countries. The objectives were to determine
whether: 1. The total of the retailers' gross margin, the wholesalers gross margin,
and the wholesalers' distribution cost was the same between countries, 2. Recent
changes in production and distribution practice fell into the same pattern, and 3.
The cost of distribution influenced the retail selling price. Although both countries
experienced changes in the consumer good's industry that resulted in smaller orders,
many of the Japanese manufacturers reduced their production runs while many of
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the British had increased theirs. British manufacturers rely on supermarkets to a
very large extent that acted as a spur to large batch production. Conversely,
Hiroaki mentioned that Japanese retailers demand much smaller deliveries thereby
inflating distribution costs. In this regard these two markets are driven by separate
sets of forces.
Proposals to reform Japanese distribution were prompted during the economic
summit meeting in Toronto in June 1988 when Noboru Takeshita, then Prime
Minister volunteered to help foreign firms get more of their goods on Japanese
shelves (Economist, 1989). Measures proposed to make shopping in Japan easier
and cheaper consisted of: sole agents' arrangements, secret rebates, manufacturer
price maintenance, sales promotion restrictions, as well as the Large Scale Retail
Store Law referred to previously. Fields (1988) attributes the existence of such a
law to the Japanese emphasis on wa or internal harmony, which was established to
protect small stores from the encroachment of larger operations.
In Japan, large and small companies are treated equally, so it is more difficult
for smaller companies to succeed. Even if completely free market principles were
allowed in Japan, a Western style distribution structure would not emerge.
Likewise, Fields (1989) argued that removing the restriction in the Large Retail
Store Act would probably not result in dramatic reductions in distribution costs.
The most profound organic change, he argued, would be to place the power into the
consumers' hands. Fields asserts that the most serious deterrent to changing the
Japanese distribution system is the lack of consumer representation and the lack of
realization by the consumer that this is what keeps distribution costs high. His
argument is perhaps somewhat dramatized, but his point is valid that standards of
product availability and high service levels are background factors to most Japanese
consumers, however after greater exposure to other countries their ability to
contrast the differences come will be enhanced.
Buckley et al (1990) outlined two component decisions to be taken by the firm
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in determining its distribution channel policy. They were:
• The need for and location of wholesalers
• Internalization versus externalization of wholesaler functions.
In the Japanese context we must also stress:
• Relationship building
• The role of the Sogo Shosha
• The wholesaler's pivotal role
• The Proliferation of retailers.
2.3.2.3.1. The need for, and location of wholesalers:
The need to provide local market inventories and physical distribution is
usually assumed to be a result of the manufacturer's remoteness from the target
market, both in physical and cultural terms. The usual perspective given in the
international business literature suggests that stocks are located close to the origin of
demand and the points at which market information can be best accessed (Buckley
et al., 1990). The location of wholesaling is usually discussed in connection to
costs. Optimum location is based on stock ratios to optimize customer service and
the technology of warehouse design. These must be offset against transportation
costs as it is the interplay between inventory and distribution costs that leads to
optimization of stock holding costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976).
A critical assumption behind the analysis above is that the quality of service to
the customer is fixed but there are product and market circumstances where this
cannot be justified. For example, remoteness may mean being out of touch with
market needs which may motivate the decision to appoint foreign market
distributors. They argued that the choice of production location may be influenced
by the location of wholesaling and distribution operations5. This is especially true
5 LEGO attributes a large part of its success to its locating its offices in
Japan in Asakusa, Tokyo A centre of the toy industry's wholesalers.
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where competitive success relies heavily on rapid delivery to retailers. Moreover,
they cautioned that it cannot be assumed that the MNC faces an unrestricted choice
of types and locations of distributors because established networks can provide a
formidable barrier to entry.
2.3.2.3.2. Internalization versus externalization of wholesaler functions:
Inventory holding decisions must be prefaced by the decision whether they
should be held internally within the company or externally with intermediaries. The
choice, according to Buckley et al., is determined by: relative costs, importance of
market intelligence, the manufacturer's perceived need to control operations, the
host market infrastructure and the firm's competence.
The popular view of the Japanese distribution system is that it is labyrinthine,
controlled by long-term established relationships, and inordinately difficult to break
into— which is partly true. Long-term relationships between the manufacturer and
the distributors are a key factor, Japanese distribution arrangements being complex
and composed of so many players whose close co-operation must be sought and
retained over a long time (Tajima, 1989). However, there is nothing unique about
the system as a whole; it is simply what the textbooks call a "traditional system"
(Kotler, 1988) and differs from Western models only in degree (Yoshino, 1971).
Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to oversimplify the structure, since it does have
idiosyncrasies and complexities that will tax the unwary MNC. Marketing channels
are generally long; there are many different wholesale levels and players of various
sorts; the number of stages that the product passes through leads to a price build-up,
which, as was indicated earlier, the consumer ultimately pays for at the retail level.
It is true however that between 1983 and 1985, the number of retail establishments
decreased by 5.3%, and the wholesale industry continues to shrink.
In Japan, for example, there are a vast number of small retail outlets that must
be reached and serviced frequently. Most Japanese companies operate with little
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equity capital and much debt, and so manufacturers supply goods to wholesalers for
promissory notes ranging up to six months; wholesalers can therefore generate
funds by generating stock turnover before making payment. Since wholesalers can
survive with relatively little capital, manufacturers spread their risks by dealing with
many different wholesale operators. In this way, the distribution system acts as
financing system, in other words it ensures a continual supply of credit
(Kanabayashi, 1978). With service playing such an important role, Japanese
wholesalers are usually willing to take back unsold goods from retailers, and the
large number of wholesalers in the system enables the overall marketing risk to be
spread. Clearly the characteristics of the Japanese distribution system mediate in
favour of foreign MNCs externalizing distribution.
2.3.2.3.3. Relationship building:
Building and maintaining relationships are key functions of the sales force.
Existing customers may favour alternative manufacturers' brands if they consider
better standards of service or attention is available elsewhere. This issue of
balancing resources between the potential and extant customer base is of perennial
concern, even to major companies. After the nuclear family, the next most
important social unit tends to be the work group, and then the slightly more distant
relations, such as uncles and aunts, etc. Personal networking is not usually
connected with the family and since the firm fulfils some of the roles that are
fulfilled by the family in Western society, primarily at the ideological level, it is
perfectly normal, as is argued by Moore (1967), for company relationships to
become critical.
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2.3.2.3.4. The role of the Sogo Shosha:
These organizations have become immensely powerful. For many foreign
MNCs seeking distribution, the sogo shosha6 are the first stopping point, although
there have been many instances recorded where these groups have disappointed or,
as interview material will later indicate, failed their foreign partners. One of the
reasons is that they tend not to handle small volumes, i.e., less than ¥20 million of
goods, and therefore often lack the sensitivity to handle smaller brands (Business
Inter., 1985).
2.3.2.3.5. The wholesaler's pivotal role:
In the Japanese consumer good's sector, grocery wholesalers tend to carry select
lines of merchandise that they offer to all retailers. Conversely, in the US, a
wholesaler may often carry a broad range of merchandise to service a selected range
of stores with which it is connected. Japanese wholesalers try to avoid competitive
lines.
To a much greater extent than in Western countries, major retail chains in Japan
use conventional wholesalers instead of creating their own facilities and systems,
and many of these arrangements exist on an exclusive or semi-exclusive basis. The
wholesalers co-operate very closely with the manufacturers on new product
introductions — an important requirement, since the sector receives some 30,000
new products each year compared to some 6,000 in the US. Competition between
grocery wholesalers is fierce; the number of wholesalers in this sector is growing at
more than 1,000 per annum (German, 1989).
6 Despite their size and variety these are, at their cores, simply trading
companies. They are channels connecting demand and supply. They are more
than mere intermediaries, however, they are also active creators of long-term
demand and supply to ensure stability and to generate new business
opportunities. They are highly diversified global businesses, each one handling
between 10,000 and 20,000 products (Young, 1979:3-5).
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It is not only the number of wholesalers that makes their role a key one. In the
US and Europe, a major manufacturer may succeed in circumventing the
wholesaler, but in Japan the extremely fragmented nature of the trade means there is
no way to reach the (million plus) selling points without using the wholesaler. Giri
plays a big part in the relationships between business contacts: once a
manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer tie-up is established, tremendous pressure is
exerted on each party to maintain the relationship. "Hit and run" agreements are
frowned upon.




• Tertiary (German, 1989).
2.3.2.3.5.I. Primary:
Out of approximately 430,000 registered wholesale businesses, there are
several hundred referred to as primary or class A wholesalers. Their role is to buy
merchandise from the manufacturer and sell it on to other wholesalers in the chain.
Many of these firms are well-established companies with close manufacturer
relationships that extend beyond pure business transactions and derive their
personal, quasi-feudal nature from links reaching back into Japanese history.
Companies such as C. Itoh, Marubeni-Iida, Toyo Menka, Nichimen Jitsugyo and
Gosho, all fall into this category (Anonymous, 1989b).
One of the interviewees, George Maruyama of Chuo Bussan KK uses a railway
metaphor to illustrate the distribution principle: the A class wholesaler has a distinct
function in the Japanese system, rather like a main-line express train; it travels 400
kilometres between stops, but a local train is necessary to carry the traveller/goods
to the final destination. That local train is the B class wholesaler. As an extension
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to A and B, there are various jobbers and other tertiary wholesalers, each with their
own functions.
The primary wholesaler acts as the manufacturer's associate or agent, often
invoicing on the manufacturer's behalf. For example, an 'A' class wholesaler may
set up a 'B' Class wholesaler to service Hiroshima; a percentage would be agreed
for collection of receivables and whatever other function is agreed necessary. The
wholesaler often has a substantial sales force, with salesmen dedicated to a
particular supplier's products.2.3.2.3.5.2. Secondary:
Secondary wholesalers buy from the primary wholesalers, and in turn sell to
tertiary wholesalers or to retailers. These secondary wholesalers are often much
bigger than the primary wholesalers from whom they procure supply and, although
they would prefer to buy directly from the manufacturers, the rigidity of the system
means they are unable to bypass the primary wholesaler.
2.3.2.3.5.3. Tertiary:
There are no exact figures for the number of tertiary wholesalers in Japan,
however, according to Chuo Bussan KK's sources, a total that included both
registered and unregistered one-man operations might run to more than 300,000
(Anonymous, 1989b).
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2.3.2.3.6. Proliferation of retailers:
According to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) figures
for 1986, there are approximately 1.6 million retailers in Japan, with over one
million in the "mom and pop" category. All of these outlets are serving separate
market catchments on a highly local basis. They tend to hold low inventories and
require frequent reliable supply services from wholesalers (see Figure 2.16).
Manufacturers in Japan place great emphasis on maintaining good relationships
with retail dealers, and make strenuous efforts to reinforce these ties by funding
trade promotions and events of various types. Both primary and secondary
wholesalers feed a range of differently sized retail clients, from large depatos to
very small convenience and "mom and pop" outlets. To the outsider, this aspect of
the Japanese distribution system may seem inefficient, but it is built into the very
fabric of society. While "mom and pop" stores accounted for 80% of all retailers in
1958 they were reduced to 41% by 1988 (Fields, 1991).
The number of retail stores decreased by 5.4% between 1982 and 1985; a loss
of approximately 93,000 stores and the number of wholesalers decreased by 3.7%.
This decrease in retail stores mostly involved marginal stores with four or fewer
employees. Retail stores with about 30 employees or more increased by about 7%.
This is partly accounted for by the trend for prosperous retailers to buy out small
shops thus creating chains (Anonymous, 1988c). Although old style retail stores
are declining, stores with special management forms are experiencing high growth.
In particular the sector is also seeing the rising influence of the koubidi, 24 hour
convenience stores. More stores are dropping out of shopping streets, and new
shopping centres are opening in suburban areas (Nakanomoyo, 1990). For
historical reasons, the retailer has maintained a very high degree of influence that
can be traced back to pre-industrial days when manufacturing was predominantly
small-scale. Under these circumstances, manufacturers developed little in the way
of direct relationships with consumers; hence, indirect consumer contact with the
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consumer by way of a retailer was normal — a pattern that has carried over to the
present day (Anonymous, 1989b).
A key difference in the Japanese distribution system is the degree to which
wholesalers place retailers in pride of place, irrespective of cost, and the inordinate
lengths to which they go to provide service. Retailers demand smaller package
units and smaller drop sizes. Wholesalers will frequently ship an uneconomic
delivery to retailers on service-based grounds, as opposed to economic criteria.
With approximately 200,000 retail outlets handling soap and detergent products, the
servicing costs are immense. As Schofield (1987) illustrated, wholesalers are
integrating retailers into what they call their value-added networks (VANs). This
means that they are bringing retailers on-line and sharing information, so that the
channel as a whole can become more responsive to market requirements. They are
also offering the retailers tuition in retail skills. As Asano (1990)7 indicated, there
are various types of VAN, such as the distribution VAN, the regional VAN, and
the industrial VAN all of which are based on the electronic ordering system (EOS) .
Major retailers have a great deal of computer expertise on their own account. It
provides great benefits with stock control, but large computer systems also limit
flexibility, which can create difficulties for the manufacturer trying to win new shelf
space. Moreover, partly as a result of computer dependence, many launches of new
product in supermarkets are crowded into the March and September seasons and for
this reason other important requirements such as finely tuned seasonal preferences
are sometimes neglected.
The relaxation of the Large Scale Retail Law will also have some indirect but
far-reaching effects on Japan's distribution system. Among the most significant
changes are likely to be the break-up of some traditional trading customs and a
wider choice for consumer trade-offs between high-price quality service and lower-
7 See Box 5.6
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price reduced service offers. The gathering wave of large stores buying in bulk
from manufacturers will increasingly reach round and over the established bastion
of the wholesaler and his fixed function. Moreover, intensified competition will
limit small shopkeepers' ability to pass on the costs of the traditional multi-layered
system.
2.3.2.4, Market acceptability
There may be some reservations in Japan about the quality of foreign products
but there is another side to the coin (that is foreign at least West European, is
traditionally associated with something good). There is nothing wrong with foreign
per se; the consumer is far more open-minded about foreign products than is
commonly believed. Indeed, several interviewees pointed out that Japanese
consumers often consider foreign products highly attractive simply because they are
foreign. Rather, the issue is MNC's operational abilities to deliver quality goods
that meet Japanese expectations.
Non-Japanese cosmetics' companies have benefited from this eclecticism, as
have many foreign designer labels. Japan could well be regarded as the major
world market for new products, and it is common to hear the word atarashii (new)
in shopping malls and department stores. Housewives are fond of trying all kinds
of innovative products simply because of their newness. New products that remain
as growth products are all breakthroughs that have established and maintained their
essential qualities, from development to final marketing and consumer satisfaction.
A health drink containing vegetable fibre that was marketed with chic style and
packaging and aimed at women was also purchased by men, the middle aged and
elderly simply because it was based on needs that already existed (Matsuda, 1990).
Foreign goods ipso facto will be considered within a positive category,
especially if the items succeed (paradox as this may seem) in tapping some
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traditional consciousness; for example Aunt Stella cookies8. Events happen
extremely quickly in consumer markets especially in Japan. With disposable
income at its highest level in Japan's history, tastes are becoming more
sophisticated. In the first half of the 1980s, sake sales fell off as people turned to
wines and other non traditional beverages. The entire beverage industry is
broadening its range of products beyond the traditional male drinkers and is
targeting both women and youth (Pepper, 1990). Since my starting to write this
thesis, Asahi seemingly secured its future with its new product Super Dry
(accounting for 95% of its sales); its further success has been threatened by demand
for Japanese beers flattening out. The company is desperately attempting to
capitalize on its recent success by launching another new product, a draft brew
called Z, in Japan and the US (Miller, 1991).
Providing Japanese consumers with what they want is of course a key part of the
selling process, but it is not the only factor involved. Quality plays as influential a
role in persuading the consumer to buy or continuing to buy foreign products; and
while some foreign brand names as Burberry or Polo may automatically have value
in the Japanese consumer's mind, other fundamentals cannot be ignored. Clearly,
high-quality foreign goods can attract the Japanese consumer.
8 See Box 5.10
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2.3.2.5. Modes of market entry
The vast majority of foreign companies in Japan began operations via JVs
(Kane, 1981), but many quickly found out that they were difficult to manage as a
result more companies are attempting to go it alone. This may be so, but few firms
can muster the funds and expertise that are at the disposal of certain international
blue chip companies, and if there is any doubt that an MNC has the singular
products, knowledge or requisite funds to compete directly in Japan, a JV is still the
primary option. Ralph Lauren, for example, teamed up with the sales arm of the
Seibu Department Store in 1976. The partnership agreement covered 14 associated
depato, and in 1988 — in what was considered a logical expansion — a separate
Ralph Lauren company was established in Japan to develop independent boutiques,
and so further enhance the Polo market presence. In 1990, the Supermarket group
Jusco Co. entered an agreement with the Body Shop to set up a franchised chain in
Japan. Similarly, in September 1990, the Virgin Group inaugurated its first audio
visual operation in Japan. Virgin Megastores Japan Ltd is an equal equity venture
between the Virgin Group and Marui Co., a major Japanese department store.
Marui is expected to contribute management, marketing and local knowledge and
Virgin to contribute dynamism, image and product strategies (Schultz, 1991).
While quality is always a key issue in Japan9, once the knowledge that a product
is being manufactured domestically becomes widespread, it can work against the
producer. This was the case with Burberry. Its strong image in Japan was
associated with its Britishness, an allure that was considerably lessened when
Burberry permitted production under license in Japan (Nakada, 1981). The setback
in this case was only temporary — the consumer has adjusted, and comments from
the trade suggest that Burberry has subsequently strengthened its presence.
Generally, the emphasis on quality combined with advertising a quality image is a
9 See Boxes 5.1 and 5.13
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successful formula.
Brooks Bros., for example, entered the market through a JV with a Japanese
company, and they succeeded because they marketed their status, locating their
store in Tokyo's prestigious Aoyama district. Moreover, a, self described,
luxurious American store layout was chosen and the prices set considerably higher
than in the US. However, this strategy does not necessarily lend itself to the mass
market, where the foreign company must compete on equal terms with powerful
Japanese companies, and where more orthodox methods must be adopted. For
example, Kraft tied up with Morinaga Milk Industry Co. to break into the Japan
market, at the time dominated by Snow Brands, which held 70-80% of the cheese
market. Relying on its reputation as a processed cheese producer, Kraft attacked
Snow in a head-on confrontation, but was forced to retreat (Nakada, 1981).
Another US company, Borden, approached things differently. It entered a JV
with Meiji Milk Products Co., but avoided direct competition with Snow Brands. It
concentrated instead on sliced and snack cheeses, areas on which Snow had not
focused. In this way, it created the impression that sliced cheeses were proprietary
to Borden (Nakada, 1981). The success of Borden was regarded, until recently, as
one of the most impressive in that industry. However, in March 1991, after an
association of some 20 years, Borden decided to break away, publicly declaring that
its Japanese partner had set out to systematically destroy the relationship. Borden
acrimoniously complained that Meiji was acting too slowly to protect Borden's
market interests, especially in the ice cream sector. According to Nakada, it is
Borden's intention to take over control of its brands, but Meiji has launched new
products such as ice cream to plug the gaps in its own portfolios. In April 1991,
Borden filed a motion in the US seeking an injunction to halt the sale in Japan of
Aya and Brueges ice cream brands. Borden says these were launched to compete
with its own brands well before the license agreement with Meiji expired. The US
company says this is an obvious violation of the agreement. The lesson Borden has
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drawn from this experience is never to enter a contract that has inherent conflicts of
interest. However, damage can only accrue to the company's reputation — as some
analysts are suggesting in this case.
2.3.2.6. Long termism
Many companies either fail to win a position in the Japanese market altogether,
or they reap disappointing rewards from their efforts. Japan is not a market for the
faint-hearted, since the Japanese have achieved economic strength partly as a result
of their willingness to suffer losses in the market to build their position (Kotler et
al., 1985). Moreover, Japanese corporations appear to be more adept in developing
a long-term position; and in so doing they are prepared to absorb short-term losses
to a degree that would be unacceptable to many Western companies. To succeed in
Japan, foreign MNCs, Jones (1990) maintained, ought to modify headquarters and
shift the relevant parts of the head office operation to Japan to force top corporate
management to understand Japan from close up. A challenge, he asserted, for
foreign MNCs' Japanese subsidiaries and their parent companies is to understand
the harnessing of global strength to compete effectively in Japan means changing
the organization both inside and outside Japan
59
2.3.2.7. Staff
When foreign executives are asked to list the three major obstacles they come
across in the Japanese market, they frequently respond "people, people, and
people." Their concern is recruiting the right number of people, with the
appropriate level of experience, capable of operating in Japan with foreign
personnel10.
As would be expected in a booming economy, there is virtually no
unemployment— in 1990, it was running at 2.1% (OECD, 1990); hence, the
recruitment of high calibre staff is extremely difficult. A further complication is the
hierarchical way in which opportunities are ranked: there is a well-known "pecking
order" of preferred employers, which is topped by local companies targeted by
university graduates. In this respect, Japan is unlike other countries — especially
those of the Pacific Rim — where working for a foreign company represents joining
the top echelon. When Japanese students apply for jobs, they do not ask what job
they are going to get; they ask what company they are going to work for.
According to Abegglen and Watanabe (1990), the general lack of movement in
the Japanese work force can be explained by the Japanese system of incentives:
• Even when lifetime employment does not apply, a wage system based on
seniority makes it costly for employees to leave and join another concern
especially if they embark on a career track with a major firm or government
agency; in which case wages start low and increase gradually with the length of
tenure, reaching their peak just before the retirement age of 55 to 60, at which
time very large settlements are paid. Although employees in the US can often
better their situation by frequently changing jobs, it is quite rare in Japan.
Moreover, changing jobs in the West is often viewed as a positive part of career
development, a sign of competence and ambition, but employees in Japan who
I® See Boxes 5.1, and 5.8
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leave a good company are immediately suspect— professionally, if not morally.
• Long-term employment also gives employees a strong sense of security.
Many employees hope and expect that they will not be laid off in the normal
course of business cycle fluctuations, unless there is a complete catastrophe
involving the permanent decline of the firm or industry. This improves morale
and encourages workers to make sacrifices— both with wages and extra effort
— that they would be unwilling to make in a strictly contractual relationship.
Furthermore, identification with the company is aided by employees spending
many years with the same colleagues working toward a common purpose. It
also has the effect of increasing unity. Long-term employment also enables
employees' performances to be judged more accurately, since those who act
only to better themselves at the expense of others (or the firm's future) will
probably be exposed in the long run.
• Most Japanese firms conduct company-specific training to a greater extent
than in other countries. Rather than simply procuring skills (that workers may
have acquired in school or from other work experience), firms prefer to hire
promising young people and develop their capabilities in-house. Investment in
on-the-job training is a less risky proposition in an environment where workers
are loath to take their talents elsewhere. Furthermore, many positions involve
specific knowledge— such as experience in dealing with particular clients or
colleagues, or familiarity with a unique product or facilities— that may not be
transferable. This is closely linked to the fact that workers cannot go elsewhere
because training is company specific.
• Enterprise unions, another distinctive feature of Japanese industry, are
formed within a single company, and cover both production workers and low- to
mid-level management. About a third of the total labour force is unionized, and
90% belong to enterprise unions. However, confrontation with management is
rare, and, according to a 1981 survey by the Japan Federation of Employers'
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Associations, nearly three-quarters of all corporations have directors with
experience working as officials in the company's union! Although unions exist,
enterprise unions are generally more important, not only in yearly wage
bargaining but also in the provision of social and welfare services. For these
reasons, enterprise unions play a significant role in limiting labour mobility and
encouraging employees to cast their fate with that of their companies. The
availability of similar wages throughout the industry for standardized, well-
defined tasks also produce little movement, since the majority of employees
prefer the kind of colleague unity that develops through belonging to a company
union for many years.
Redding and Baldwin (1991) propose the following pointers for staff policy:
• Good executives are hard to recruit but tend to stay, once hired;
• Successful foreign MNCs tend to be those that operate within the patterns
imposed by Japanese culture;
• Non-financial rewards, and in particular status, are extremely
• important;
• The labour shortage is becoming more acute;
• Expatriates are very expensive;
• Corporate headquarters is unlikely to understand or be sympathetic to the
problems of recruitment;
• Technically qualified professionals are increasingly difficult to locate;
• Japanese culture can be used to good effect in organization, once
understanding has been acquired; and
• There are few female executives.
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2.3. THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
Japanese business, as compared with US and Western European companies,
practice retains some singular characteristics. The same is true of Japanese
competitor companies. Any company entering a new market, especially one as
competitive as Japan, should try to understand how its competitors are likely to
behave at the corporate level.
Japanese companies in particular are highly committed to winning corporate
wars. A senior Japanese politician and novelist, Shintaro Ishihara, in his
controversial book The Japan that Can Say No, averred that the Japanese possess a
"hunger mentality", a driving force that stems from a sense of crisis dating back to
the kamikaze winds that blew away the Mongol invaders 700 years ago (Morita and
Ishihara, 1989). In stating that many Japanese believe they have a peculiar sense of
destiny, Ishihara may be somewhat over zealous, but whether this belief is justified
or merely more Nihonjinron output is not clear. However, the Japanese spirit, if
that is what it is, leads to some singular business behaviour. This next section aims
to provide some insight into the realities behind that behaviour.
There are a number of theories about Japanese companies that attempt to explain
why they have been so successful (Japanese corporations account for 17 of the
world's 30 largest firms: see Figure 2.18). One interesting idea, from Keegan
(1983), worth examining is that the Japanese harness their group culture to:
• Formulate corporate philosophies;
• Manage intelligence gathering;
• Compete aggressively in a focused way.




The World's Top 30 Firms by Market Capitalization
(Feb. 1990) Rank
Company Name Country Market Value (US$
billions)
1 NTT (l/10th) Japan 50.52
2 Industrial Bank of Japan Japan 91.35
3 Sumitomo Bank Japan 67.15
4 Fuji Bank Japan 66.12
5 Daiichi Kangyo Bank Japan 61.38
6 Exxon Corp US 59.85
7 IBM US 58.08
8 General Electric USA US 56.15
9 Mitsubishi Bank Japan 55.68
10 Sanwa Bank Japan 54.21
11 Toyota Motor Corp. Japan 52.00
12 Tokyo Electric Power Japan 51.83
13 Nomura Securities Japan 43.92
14 American Tel & Tel US 41.95
15 Royal Dutch Petroleum Neth. 40.49
16 Long Term Credit Bank Japan 49.57
17 Philip Morris COS US 35.00
18 Mitsui Bank Japan 34.07
19 Hitachi Ltd Japan 33.35
20 Matsushita Elect Ind'l Japan 32.80
21 Tokai Bank Japan 32.80
22 Nippon Steel Japan 32.77
23 British Telecom UK 30.59
24 British Petroleum UK 30.55
25 Kansai Electric Power Japan 29.78
26 Merck & Co US 28.66
27 Amoco Corp US 27.66
28 Bristol-Myers Squibb US 27.09
29 Shell T&T UK 26.96
30 Du Pont (E.I.) De Nemours US 26.66
Source: Abegglen and Watanabe (1990).
2.3.1. CORPORATE PHILOSOPHY
The establishment of a corporate philosophy is the starting point for many well-
ordered corporations (Keegan, 1983; Kotler, 1988). A clearly defined mission or
statement of philosophy is intended to unite the efforts of all those in the business
around corporate aims. Such mission statements, Keegan contends, should
highlight target customer groups, the technologies to be harnessed and the areas on
which the company will focus; they will also incorporate certain aspirations (for
example the company wants to achieve a leadership position, or to excel with
innovativeness). It was Keegan's view that Japanese companies excel at harnessing
the energies of all in the corporate team toward the company mission. If a direction
embarked on turns out to be a mistake some time in the future, blame may be
attributed to an individual, he or she may even be expected to take action to remedy
the situation, but it is the group that bears the wider responsibility— and it is likely
that the group will extract lessons about the individual mistake for future group
activities. This makes individuals reluctant to express their views in debate before
learning the views of the group and its leader. Then they agree.
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2.3.2. INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT
One of the observed phenomena of the Japanese "miracle" is the ability of
Japanese companies to successfully identify major opportunities. On the surface it
appears that they have identified these intuitively: Industries such as motor cycles
and shipbuilding were thought by Western producers to be in the late phases of their
life-cycles until the Japanese entered the arena, regenerated these mature industries,
and made them almost proprietary to Japan (Keegan, 1983). Was this all intuitive
or good data gathering and intelligence management? He maintained that Japanese
corporations spread their tentacles by ensuring that key people travel to trade fairs
and visit other companies worldwide; they collect data in the form of photographs,
brochures, and so on then feed these back into the organization. These imported
ideas are appraised through formalized group processes, and then the company
focuses on the development of those that pass the appropriate test.
2.3.3. COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR
The Japanese have shown themselves to be formidable competitors in many
international arenas, none more so than in the Japanese market. On the domestic
front, they exhibit singular qualities that Western companies would be wise to
recognize and attempt to emulate. These qualities are conditioned by:
• Ownership structure;
• Organization and staffing;
• Nemawashi (literally binding of the roots, or bonding);
• Product development;




At the end of World War II, the Occupation authorities deliberately aimed to
break up the powerful zaibatsu (the gigantic holding companies that dominated the
pre-war economy) to create a broader base for "capitalist democracy" (but failed to
do so, so that the US is entirely responsible for its own problems with present day
keiretsu). By the end of the Occupation in 1952, the steady selling-off of individual
stock had enhanced the opportunities for institutions to increase their friendly share
holdings. In 1949, financial institutions had held less than 10% of listed
companies' shares; by 1956, this ratio had increased to more than 20%; by 1968, to
more than 30%; and by 1988, to more than 44% (Abegglen and Watanabe, 1990).
These ownership patterns now represent what is perhaps the most important
structural impediment to acquisition in Japan. As of March 1988, 73% of all
national stock exchange listed shares were held by institutional shareholders, not by
pension funds churning portfolios daily to maximize returns, but by long-term
investors concerned with the substance of the firm's activities. Financial companies
are most favoured, but even manufacturing concerns are usually 50% institutionally
held. Various researchers estimate that the level of portfolio holdings in major
corporations ranges from 12% to 30%. For example, in March 1988, 55.7% of
NEC Corp.'s shares were in the hands of financial institutions, another 18.2% with
other firms, and only 23.5% with individuals and foreigners.
Corporate groupings (gurupu) contain highly diversified industrial companies
clustered around their own banks. Each large member of a gurupu sits at the tip of
a vertical keiretsu, which in turn may comprise several hundred companies.
Gurupu like the Sumitomo Group have been a major force in the Japanese economy
since well before the war (Abegglen and Watanabe, 1990). There are three types of
keiretsu (besides the old zaibatsu: bank groups, manufacturing groups, Hitachi for
example), and now marketing groups such as Tokyu and Seibu.
In total, however, there are six giant keiretsu: The Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and
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Sumitomo groups are the legacy of pre-war zaibatsu that were formally dissolved
under the occupation. The Fuyo (Fuji), Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, and Sanwa groups
have taken their present shape since World War II, and centre around the major
banks. Major keiretsu usually include a bank, a trust bank, a life insurance
company, a non-life insurance company, a trading company, and a series of
manufacturing firms. Although limited by anti-monopoly legislation and ceilings on
financial institutions, these firms generally have very close interrelationships,
including:
• Large, often reciprocal share holdings;
• Interlocking directorates;
• Lending, borrowing, and guarantor relationships;
• Joint strategic planning through regular meetings of high-level officers;
• Intensive trading of products and services; and
• Temporary exchange of employees and information (Abegglen and
Watanabe, 1990).
Besides the big six, there are a number of smaller conglomerate groupings, and
institutional equity holdings often cross group lines. Vertically structured clusters
of firms located at various stages in the production and distribution chains are also
important; they offer many of the same functions as other Japanese conglomerates.
Japanese automobile manufacturers, for instance, often have close ties to their
suppliers, involving significant share holdings. Today, keiretsu companies often
co-ordinate their investment plans, employment practices and political donations
(Economist, 1991).
Nihonjinron type explanations are often offered as to the rationale behind these
keiretsu. Analogies are drawn to the Samurai spirit as an explanation for their focus
on growth, for example Morita and Ishihara (1989), but Kester (1991) argues that
the ties in the keiretsu are singularly commercial. Membership entitles them to
privileged rights such as the provision of credit or to supply other parts of the
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keiretsu. Growth, he argues, may be an objective purely to widen and complicate
the keiretsu to further entrench the positions of existing members because they are
the only ones capable of unravelling the complexity.
2.3.5. ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
According to Clark (1979) Japanese companies are more pyramidal than many
Western companies. Progression is dependent upon vertical progression and
competition tends to be more muted because experience is given its due, although it
is true that fast tracks exist so that graduates from the elite Imperial universities
have received accelerated promotion into senior management positions. However,
in the main the allocation of rank is a compromise between meritocracy and
seniority. Moreover there is no universal acceptance of what comprises merit. He
noted that progress through the ranks is to some extent automatic but as people
become more senior further promotion is more closely linked to what they have
been seen to achieve. Seemingly competition begins at the level between section
head and department head. This is motivated by the relatively low retirement age in
Japan that is set at among 55-60 for men. Therefore, someone achieving the
responsibility of senior management rank or a director's position could then expect
to continue on higher income until 65 or more. The word "responsibility" refers to
the symbolic assumption of guilt. Such symbolic responsibility is the price of status
and senior management automatically "takes responsibility" to lift blame from their
subordinates.
Companies take great pains to employ the best talent they can, and recruit with
the intention to train employees over a lifetime career. Japanese companies are
officially forbidden to visit university campuses before September, but, according to
Alletzhauser (1990) many ignore these strictures and fill their vacancies well before
then, frequently sending out younger employees to search for the best talent in their
alma mater. Students commonly receive mysterious phone calls from company
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representatives, inviting them to meet in coffee shops, from which they will be led
— taking care they are not being followed — to specially rented halls, along with
hundreds of other applicants. He illustrated how Nomura often removes its target
employees during the official recruitment period by inviting them to Hawaii. The
levels of largesse these companies offer are linked to the prestige of the institutions
from which they are recruiting; students from less respected colleges are lucky to
get a weekend in some cheap resort within an hour of Tokyo.
Apart from being appreciated with status and therefore highly sought after as
employees, Japanese companies are extremely well run, pay good salaries, and
provide many advantages such as luxury quarters and resort facilities14 most
workers do not expect to be offered by a foreign company. Lifetime employment is
another such benefit, although this may now be more of a goal than a reality:
according to Clark (1979), approximately 50% of all Japanese employees in Japan
work for an organization that has an actual lifetime employment system. Japan
having experienced a constant labour shortage; it seems reasonable to suppose that
this level may have increased rather than have decreased. This aspect of long
termism is not peculiar to Japan; it is a characteristic of business behaviour in
Pacific Rim countries (Redding, 1990).
2.3.6. NEMAWASHI
Like many Japanese maxims, the idea of nemawashi is said to have its basis in
agriculture and is said to derive from the process of transplanting plants or trees by
binding the roots of a plant before moving it. The general application in business is
that commitment from the group is more likely if the group itself is tightly bound
(Willoughby, 1981). More recently, however, the term has developed a special
The "Japanese employment system" of "permanent" employment with
fringe benefits is only available to an elite group of university male graduates.
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meaning in the context of organizations, in particular within the setting of the
decision making process.
According to Clark (1979) collective decision making is rare in the West and
responsibility more clearly assigned to the individual whereas in Japan consensus is
the norm. He offers an explanation for the consensus approach to decision making:
the majority of Japanese managers are generalists with background education in
economics and commercial subjects and compared to the West there are very few
financial or operations research specialists whose arbitration might carry weight.
Without an overriding view it makes much sense to confer and balance a variety of
opinions. Moreover since many functions are carried out by sub contractors many
Japanese managers have not the power to order things to be done and must learn to
negotiate and persuade. For these reasons, in Japan, a great deal of attention is
devoted to nemawashi, it is linked with consensus, and, like consensus, there are
many ways in which nemawashi is built. The most obvious is the way that Japanese
workers at all levels are expected to go out one or two evenings each week drinking
with their peers. This creates bonding, trust and common understanding. Senior
members of the group, however, frequently attempt to manipulate this process by
building obligation into it.
Supposing a major decision such as a new venture is under consideration, for
example a Japanese trading company considering distributing a new product,
typically the Assistant General Manager will assign a task force to evaluate its
market potential and foresee the division's capability in marketing the product.
Much effort would be spent on consensus building with upper management and
related groups to foster a sense of group commitment (Nicholson, 1983). Quite
apart from assessing profitability, attempts will be made to assess the impact the
project would have on the entire company. Scrutiny would be made to establish
whether the project fits within company traditions and philosophies. Intense
probing would be made how it would be perceived from outwith the business, in
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particular by customers, competitors and the press. Loss of face if there is failure
would be calculated and its impact weighed. Known as the kessai process, the
stages of the decision making process are depicted in Box 2.1 (Branne et al., 1990).
In a Japanese company there exist ka's and bu's. A ka is a section and a bu a
department. The kacho is the head of a section and the bucho the head of a
department. Kacho's are very powerful in the degree to which they can influence
decisions. When a new idea for a project is tabled the kacho will first write a ringi
— a memo that could be circulated to as many as 80 people in a large company.
The recipients will chop the memo and add various constructive comments to it
(Nicholson, 1983). As a device for enlisting involvement, this constitutes a
sensible approach, but for those more accustomed to autocracy, it smacks of delay.
However, as Clark (1979) noted, the ringi is sometimes used not to take decisions
but rather to provide a record of decisions that have already been made and to
distribute responsibility for it among the management.
Box 2.1 The kessai process: Japanese stages of decision making
1. Sodan - discussion
2. Johoshushi - information gathering
3. Nemawashi - informal laying of the groundwork
4. Tatakidai - "pounding platform" pre proposal
5. Yohikaigi - preparatory meeting
6. Totaru meritto - total merit
7. Setai - business entertaining
8. Honkaigi - main or final meeting
9. Hanko - personal signature
10. Kessai - decision by top management
11. Ringi-sho - final approval without meeting, using circular letter.
Source: Brannen, Liu & Commanday, course materials for "Business Communications
and Japanese Decision Making Process" (April 1990).
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The ringi-sho is a typical business plan that outlines the details and merits of the
project, its risks, resource requirements and contract terms. A typical ringi-sho
would be complete with boxes for managers to apply their hanko or chop.
Managers not supporting the plan might apply their hanko upside down or sideways
as a signal that more discussion is required. Meetings are not viewed negatively in
Japan. Often such discussions might continue all day with routine tasks postponed
until late in the evening (Morgan and Morgan, 1991).
In the company context, individual members often make a major commitment to
the betterment of the group, even to the point of self-sacrifice— or at least sacrifice
of family life. This occurs to a much greater extent in Japan than Westerners
appreciate; the Japanese achieve self-realization through enhancement of group
identity, and so when people join a new company they join the informal
organization (Inaoka, 1983). They then work hard, not only because of formal
requirements but also because of informal relations with their supervisors. This
may be partly true about companies in the West, but it is even more true of those in
Japan.
Taylor (1983) argued that the importance of shame in Japanese culture is
underpinned by the Japanese language having eleven different words to describe
shame. The most common word, hajiru, he claimed is derived from the word
hazure, which means detached. In other words, shame often has its basis in being
detached from the group. The degree to which this trait is endemic in Japanese
society can be illustrated by the prosecution of the president of All Nippon
Airways, Tokuji Wakasa, for his company's part in the Lockheed bribery scandal
(Sakisaka, 1982). He was found guilty of perjury, but Wakasa's crime was
lessened in the judge's eyes by the powerful obligation he had shown towards the
group: "...we recognize the main motive as an attempt to protect the honour and
trust of All Nippon Airways...such matters must be considered in a manner
favourable to the defendant." Scandals in the Western world tend to be followed by
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many who are prepared to put their names to books and articles that purport to tell
the inside story but such behaviour would be quite shameful to the Japanese. When
former Prime Minister Tanaka was investigated regarding the Lockheed bribery
scandal his chauffeur committed suicide rather than betray confidences regarding
where he had driven his leader (Yamamoto, 1979).
Consensus does not necessarily mean the elimination of individuality. At Sony,
for instance, employees are encouraged to bring their ideas out into the open
because it is believed that if ideas clash, something better may develop from the
conflict (Morita, 1987). In other words, consensus should allow for the expression
of individual ideas and creativity in a group context. Nevertheless, MNC expatriate
managers often find this process of nemawashi frustrating (they are excluded from
the decision process) and time-consuming.
2.3.7. PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
Morita describes the development of the transistor by AT&T's Bell
Laboratories. Sony licensed use of the transistor technology from the patent holder,
Western Electric, in 1949; the technology was in a raw state and required much
further development by Sony before it could be applied. The Bell people advised
Sony that the only application would be in hearing aids. Then, Sony did not have
any specific application in mind (Morita, 1987). To apply the technology it had to
further develop it, and in doing so it travelled down development routes that Bell
Laboratories had previously discarded. As a result, it is therefore the Japanese—
not the Americans — who dominate the field of microprocessor development; the 1
MB semiconductors at the heart of current computer technology are only made in
Japan. The US has the expertise to make them, but at the manufacturing level it
does not have the technicians: it lacks both the competent employees and the
production management capability (Morita and Ishihara, 1989).
The basis upon which Japanese companies compete has even been described as
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"passionate" (Keegan, 1983); logic does not appear to play much of a role in the
decisions. Of course if such efforts turn out to be unsuccessful, analysts are just as
ready to call the same behaviour "pig-headed". Certainly, there are situations
where passion triumphs over logic: Take the case of Toyo Kogyo, one of 23
licensees of Wankel rotary engine technology. All the other licensees found the
technical problems so formidable that they gave up, thereby leaving the field clear
for Toyo Kogyo to achieve technological leadership (Keegan, 1983). According to
Kenichi Yamamoto, the company's rotary project team leader, to develop a new
technology like the rotary engine 'you need consistent passion, not just logic'(New
York Times, 1982). Toyo expended vast sums on developing the technology,
creating a continuous stream of improvements that took the company beyond its
original licensing source. The rotary engine thus developed was almost entirely
different from the original German design concept; with the exception of the basic
rotary feature. However, this type of passion certainly costs money: in Toyo
Kogyo's case, the company overran its cash budget and eventually the lead bank
called the directors to account and replaced the entire board.
2.3.8. LONG-TERM ORIENTATION AND FINANCIAL
EXPECTATIONS
Japanese companies' tend to pursue long-term aims (Doyle, et al., 1988;
Keegan, 1983), just as Japanese society as a whole exhibits a long-term orientation.
Some kinds of employee in some kinds of company experience the following career
pattern: a man who graduates from university at 23 joins a company until the
mandatory retirement age of 55; he will receive one month pay for each year of
service; he may even be rehired by the company on a retainer basis, but with no
benefits beyond this time. However, if he is managing director, he may stay
working up to the age of 70 (Nicholson, 1983). Redding, (1990) offers an
explanation for certain business behaviours by arguing that social respect of seniors
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is a common feature of all Asian societies. However the same principle of social
respect could be argued to exist in African societies. What can be observed is that
in Japanese business, this sometimes carries over insofar as senior retirees are
retained in consulting roles for life.
2.4. MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS
Having highlighted the apparent obstacles to entry of the Japanese market and
explored some of the methods that foreign companies have brought to bear, in this
section the nature and characteristics of the Japanese market will be outlined and
some salient pointers to watch will be identified.
There can be no doubt that Japan is a significant market in terms of size,
volume and propensity to consume. Its characteristics and trends are considered
under the following headings:





2.4.1. THE JAPANESE CONSUMER
The majority of Japanese believe that there are two groups: We Japanese (Ware
Ware Nippon-jin) and everyone else. The term gaijin, frequently interpreted as
foreigner, but perhaps more accurately as outsider, tells us much about Japanese
value orientation (Whitehill, 1991:51).
He maintains that the Japanese are an unusually homogeneous ethnic group.
Everyone speaks Japanese; everyone looks Japanese; everyone thinks Japanese. A
stroll down the Ginza is likely to reveal a different pattern than on London's Regent
Street or New York's Park Avenue; in both these places there is a wide variety of
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ethnic mixing, but not in Japan. The Japanese derive a feeling of solidarity from
this sameness; a sense of security from being an insider. The expression "we
Japanese" is heard frequently and not only reflects the insider-outsider syndrome but
also implies a uniqueness of which the Japanese are very proud. Group identity,
Whitehill (1991:51) noted is a key issue; to be lonely, to be a stranger, to be
isolated from one's group— these are constant dreads among Japanese people. As
a result groupism, in the sense of total commitment and identification to the group
is a treasured cultural value. Yet there are many similarities shared between Japan
and her trading partners. According to Whitehill, a prominent Japanese
businessman once observed: "The Japanese and American management systems are
95% the same, and differ in almost all important respects."
If they are to make any progress in the Japanese market, foreign marketers must
follow the fundamental rule of marketing and learn to understand the consumer by
identifying consumer preferences and defining the product accordingly. It is usually
insufficient to import concepts originating abroad — no matter how successful they
have been elsewhere— without tailoring either the formulation or the
communications. This fundamental was endorsed strongly by the executives
interviewed.
The key factors to consider in the adaptation process are:
• Structural and cultural influences;
• Advertising
• Consumer needs;
• The role of the female consumer;
• Consumer interest criteria;
• Quality; and
• Consumer wealth and lifestyles.
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2.4.1.1. Structural and cultural influences
In Japan's major conurbations and along its seaboard, many Japanese live in
proximity to each other, and this tight-spaced habitation leads to some interesting
purchasing patterns. For example, with so little living space, there is no room to
store dirty clothes; hence, consumers launder small amounts frequently, creating a
huge detergent market (Fields, 1983, and a special type of preferred washing
machine. Market research originally conducted by Johnson & Johnson (Japan) in
the 1960s and verified many times subsequently, showed that babies' diapers are
changed by Japanese mothers twice as frequently as they are by their US or
European counterparts. One reason is that smell is easily detected in a small living
space. Johnson & Johnson initially expected that this would lead to higher talcum
powder consumption; but this was not so. More frequent changes leads to fewer
rashes, but, what is more important, the preferred method of talcum powder
application is with a puff, since it provides a more focused application and causes
less mess in the space available.
New products that remain as growth products are all breakthroughs that have
established and maintained their essential qualities, from development to final
marketing and consumer satisfaction. Marketing research by Hitachi revealed that
as the number of working women outnumbered those remaining at home, washing
occasions were transferred to night and early morning which revealed an
opportunity to introduce quiet washing machines (Shizuka Gozen) (Nishikawa,
1989).
Clear benefits result from obtaining a detailed understanding of the consumer.
This is especially true when structural data is combined with knowledge of Japanese
traits. For example, given that the average consumer has little storage space
available for supplies and other commodities, provisions are never too far from
view. Since that consumer is known to be concerned with quality and aesthetics,
interviewees indicated that very few dented cans are sold in Japan. Furthermore,
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packaging standards are of a very high order, and with origami (paper cutting art)
and ikebana (flower arranging) among the unique arts of Japan, little wonder that
the average packaging in Japanese depato exceeds that seen anywhere else in the
world.
Bathing in Japan is as much a therapeutic as a hygienic process. The Japanese
wash and swill off before climbing into the bath tub; the clean water is shared
between several family members. Nevertheless, this custom does not prevent
Western features being included in the bathrooms. A majority of Japanese
bathrooms include a shower (Fields, 1983). However, in Japan, the shower is used
differently: many shower before soaking, while others shower after soaking to
wash their hair.
2.4.1.2. Advertising
Rix (1992) noted that there is no strong Western research based understanding
of Japanese advertising and argued there is a requirement to explain better to
Western observers of Japan the role of advertising, its role in the media and its
place in shaping contemporary Japanese culture.
Overall monthly circulation of all magazines is approximately 240 million; and
according to ABC (Audited Bureau of Circulation), data is available for 74 major
magazines. There are undoubtedly many more, and for every possible hobby and
taste (there is even a rock music magazine targeted at bass guitarists). Moeran
(1991) indicated that there are 2,200 magazines on the market. These can be
divided into various categories: according to frequency of publication, target
audience (men, women, age groups), subject matter (general, entertainment,
hobbies, comics, sports, and so on). Some magazines, like the specialist journals
sell only a few thousand copies; others sell well over a million. Almost all
magazines are bought at retail outlets (station bookstalls, convenience stores, book
shops); since very few magazines operate on a subscription basis. Advertising
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agencies pay the magazine publishers cash within one month of advertisements
appearing in the magazines. According to Moeran, advertisements that are placed
direct from "sponsors" would be paid by post dated cheque, perhaps delaying
payment by as much as six months. It is very difficult to buy space in well-
established magazines, unless for one reason or another a space falls vacant. Even
so, publishers still set a condition that the substitute advertiser should have
acceptable status and ranking. Publishers keep their readerships in mind and strive
to have advertisers that meet their readers' expectations.
The publication of a new magazine is extremely important, he claims, because it
affords an opportunity to buy space on a regular basis. Prime spaces are put out to
tender in the Autumn of each year, and each agency makes its submission with
client's name and type of campaign it intends to run. The publishers then decide
which tenders to accept, on the basis of preferences which include type of
commodity and the status of the company. Here the corporate ranking found in
Japan's "the status gradation of industry" (Clark, 1979) is essential, with the result
that if Shiseido or Kanebo wished to advertise, they would be preferred to Revlon
or Clinique.
Radio is more limited, there being few FM stations and therefore few high-
quality audio opportunities to communicate with the consumer in Japan. However,
the same is not true of commercial television. There are more than 33 million
television sets in Japan, one for every 2.12 persons, and of these sets more than
700,000 are able to receive satellite broadcasting. Furthermore, some six million
people subscribe to cable services. Tokyo is served by five TV stations, each of
which is potentially able to reach over 12 million households.
There are at present around 105 TV stations in Japan. Two of them are run by
the National Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), while the rest are commercial
stations, many of which belong to one of five networks. All five network stations
can be seen in the major cities of the Hokkaido (Sapporo), Kanto (Tokyo), chubu
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(Nagoya), Kansai (Osaka) and Kyushu (Fukuoka) regions. The inhabitants of most
other major cities (Sendai, Hiroshima, Okayama, Kumamoto, Niigata, Fukushima,
and so on) have access to four channels. The two national television channels
broadcast by NHK are available all over the country. Each of the networks tends to
be closely associated with a major newspaper group and this has resulted in given
each of them a distinct characteristic.
The type of advertising time available for buying are structured differently
from, for example, the UK and it bears a greater similarity to that of the US (upon
which it is based). The major difference is that there are two types of available
purchase: programme or time, and spot advertising. In the former case the
advertiser buys time on the entire network, while with the latter he buys it in a
particular broadcasting area. Broadly speaking advertisers tend to use time
advertising to improve their corporate images and spot advertising to inform
consumers about their products. Many programmes have advertisers' names in
their titles (Mitsui Housewives' Theatre or Kao Love Theatre). Often a programme
may become more renowned for the Nestle or Suntory commercials that appear as
opposed to what Moeran (1991) describes as rather dull programme content.
A "one hour" programme is divided into 54 minutes of specified programme, in
which there are six minutes of commercials, followed by one minute of spot
commercials and what is known as a five minute mini-programme, focusing on
news or the weather, of which one minute is again for spot commercials. A "30
minute" programme, for its part, is calculated as being of 29 minutes' duration,
during which three minutes are allowed for sponsored commercials. The one
minute remaining is then devoted to spot commercials between programmes. Time
commercials of 90 seconds' duration all told will be shown at the beginning and end
of a 30 minute programme; alternatively three sets of 60 second breaks for
commercials may be broadcast at the beginning, middle and end of the programme.
The distribution of commercials depends to some degree on the content of the
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programme sponsored: a discussion programme will continue uninterrupted and
thus has only two commercial times; a manga cartoon is more likely to have three
commercial breaks.
Advertising research experience indicates, not surprisingly, that Western and
Japanese advertising take different routes to the same ultimate goal — sales.
Western advertising, often using US-style, hard-sell approaches, stresses what is
being said; Japanese advertising focuses on the way that it is said, and frequently
takes recourse to mood advertising.
The only detailed analysis according to Rix (1992), of the language of Japanese
advertising is that of Moeran (1989) which showed that Japanese advertising
differed from that of the British approach by "an emphasis on alliteration, assonance
and structural completeness in English, as against a preference for association,
suggestion and structural incompleteness in Japanese advertising." "The language
of English advertisements would appear to prefer to play on grammatical
structures....Japanese slogans are more likely to focus on lexical items, which then
become keywords in the advertising discourse." This, Moeran argued, is because
the Japanese language stresses an aesthetic of suggestion on which words of
association express an undercurrent of meaning. He noted that every nation has its
myths and the major myth of the Japanese is their language and further argued that
popular forms of the language are used to support the myth of Japaneseness.
Japanese advertisements, Tanaka (1990) argued, tend to produce stereotypical
images and in doing so contradict the overt words used in the headlines. Qualities
such as intelligence and individualism are used but reduced to mere attributes of
fashion, and feminism is used employed to endorse attitudes that feminists would
consider chauvinistic. In a recent study that examined the level of Westernization
in Japanese advertising and whether this level has increased or decreased over the
past decade, Mueller (1992) content-analyzed a sample of Japanese print
advertisements from 1978 and 1988. Her results revealed that well over 75 per cent
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of the sample incorporated at least one non translated English-language word.
English, Kanji and Katakana words were more prevalent. However, considering
that 98% of the population speak only Japanese, appearing to miss the point of why
English is used she questioned its utility. With the attention given to Western
celebrities in Japanese advertising, Mueller noted that less than one ad in 100 used a
Western star.
The use of Western models was somewhat more common, with slightly more
than one ad in 10 containing a Caucasian model. The results suggested that
Japanese advertising is still far from being Westernized. The use of gaijin in
advertising has never been controversial among the Japanese. It represents quite a
change that one citizen's group has taken up the matter of gaijin in advertising.
The Forum for Citizen's Television (FCT), with a membership of 150 people,
analyzed the contents of Japanese television commercials in which gaijin appear.
The group analyzed the contents of all commercials aired in the Tokyo area during
the week of June 11, from 7:00 a.m. to noon and then from 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
Those with foreigners or with foreign background accounted for 29% of
commercials aired. Some 84% of the gaijin appearing were Caucasian, and 71% of
the foreign places featured were either North America or Europe (Fields, 1991b).
Most commercials in Japan are 15 seconds, and simply attempt to imprint the
product name on the viewer's mind (Kishii, 1988). In another recent study
(Ramaprasad and Hazagawa, 1992) that also uses the content analysis method,
American and Japanese commercials were compared regarding the use and format
of creative strategies. The results, based on 311 American and 373 Japanese
commercials, revealed some similarities and differences in US and Japanese
commercials. Unsurprisingly they found that the countries differed in the products
they advertise on prime-time television and in the commercial lengths favoured.
The authors argued, by succumbing to the nihonjinron perspective, that Japan's
greater use of 15-second commercials could be "yet another example of the
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Japanese emphasis on the compact yet efficient product". The frequencies of use of
the three strategies of brand image, user image, and use occasions of the two
countries' advertising approaches were similar. Their findings appear to de-
emphasize previous findings that point to the comparatively emotional nature of
Japanese advertising and its use of the soft sell. The largest differences in the two
countries' advertising existed in the use and format of informational strategies.
While graphic advertising in Japan is less arresting than television advertising, it
is the focus of much creativity in Japanese advertising. For example, apparently
many advertisements were first conceived in graphic form and subsequently adapted
to electronic media. Japanese TV advertisements are often akin to moving posters.
Advertisements that use concepts such as the significance of the company and its
products rather than creative themes once were the strength of graphic advertising
producers. Advertisements have shifted from "concept work" to "creative work" as
campaign-type advertising has become smaller in scale. Playful, expressive,
entertaining graphics that appeal to favourable feelings are being selected over
ponderous, conventional graphics (Anonymous, 1988e).
One article suggested radio commercials sought to perfect the conventional
advertising presentation technique and use logical humour, whereas television
commercials are a mirror of the trends of the times. Based on 1986 observations it
asserted that they "reflected the beauty of dreams, gorgeous and grand in scale."
The success of commercial director Jun Ichikawa lay in his portrayal of real
characters full of warmth and empathy for man. This effect goes far beyond the
"slice of life" approach and is referred to as "heart to heart" communications.
Comparative advertising, although controversial, is being used more frequently
(Anonymous, 1988a). However, most commercials that are successful and effective
inside Japan are difficult for foreigners to appreciate. For example, a commercial
that helped boost Nikka Whisky's sales by 20% used indirect means to highlight the
product. American soprano Katherine Battle sang a simple sentence, "I know good
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whisky," and the brand name Nikka, followed. The Japanese tend to appeal to the
emotions or state of mind of the viewer with little explanatory content. Celebrities
who appear in commercials are seen as close acquaintances and confer status on
products. Emphasis on the size and reputation of a company are more important
than product quality.
One of the interviewed companies, Asatsu, indicated an approximate
communications budget for a national launch of US$10million-US$13 million.
Figures 2.19 and 2.20 show relative advertising expenditures in the Japanese
market.
Figure 2.19










9 Direct Mail 182.8
10 POP 142.2
11 Telephone directs 99.0
12 New media 9.5
Total 5081.3
.Source: Dentsu (Anonymous, 1990a)
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Figure 2.20













Source: Dentsu, Anonymous (1990a)
Of course, any foreign company entering the Japanese market must be able to
think and plan around the dynamics of the Japanese consumer. Back-up
development plans are essential, as is a preparedness to aim at a moving target in a
segmented landscape. Since the Japanese buyer is constantly being bombarded with
new opportunities, a low-level effort will not result in a secure, long-term market
position. MNCs must think ahead, and be prepared to spend.
In the wake of the recession that hit Japan in the late 1980s, Japanese corporate
attitudes toward advertising and sales promotion turned to campaigns and events
that produce immediate sales results. Trade shows were one of these vehicles that
benefited from this shift (Anonymous, 1988d). The number of sales promotions'
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campaigns in 1986 amounted to 1,300, about the same as in 1985. Sales
promotional events such as trade shows and exhibitions were limited mainly to
private shows organized by single companies (Anonymous, 1988c).
According to Goldstein (1991), companies in Asia are increasingly realizing that
attaching their names to sports events is an effective way to generate television and
newspaper exposure. Several factors make Asia ripe for the companies that
package sports events, sell sponsorship rights and, in some cases, manage the
players involved. The primary reason is those consumer markets for all kinds of
goods are growing faster in Asia than elsewhere and local companies are
recognizing the potentials for using sports to help sell their products within the
region. Moreover, non-Asian companies wanting to enter the Asian market see the
same benefits to be gained from sponsoring sporting events. Asian companies,
principally the Japanese, are using the same tactics to establish themselves in
Western markets. Leading the Western influx is the International Management
Group, which has faced difficulties in tapping Japan. Japanese advertising
agencies, such as Dentsu and Hakuhodo, secure the locations, find sponsors, and
book the television time, leaving little for an outsider to do. Numerous signs,
Goldstein noted, point to continued rapid growth for the sports marketing business
in the 1990s.
2.4.1.3. Consumer needs
Considering the enormous scale of Japan's rebuilding after the war and that the
lives of their parents and grandparents were so dominated by work, it is perhaps
understandable that leisure is so important to the dokushin kizoku (new singles, or
single aristocracy). The name refers to the coveted lifestyle that young adults have
in Japan, theirs being the first generation to want as much creative free time as
possible— and to have the funds to enjoy it. The value of individual expression in
Japan is increasingly important, especially among the young (Kilburn and Wilk,
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1988). In some instances remaining single is one of the modes of expression of this
individuality. Younger consumers, while they are determined to succeed
financially; they nonetheless want more leisure time to enjoy a meaningful life
(Vandermerwe, 1990). The singles' market has been estimated at 9.6 million15
(Anonymous, 1990a). Apparently there was an increase among 25-29 year old
singles from 55 to 60.4% among males and from 24 to 30.6% among females.
Almost one third of female singles in Tokyo was living alone and a higher
proportion of males was also living away from their parents. This trend was more
pronounced among university educated people (Kilburn and Wilk, 1988).
MNCs must gain a full grounding in the complexities of Japanese life, ranging
from understanding corporate group culture to possible social reasons for choosing
certain brands. For example, a consumer may smoke Marlborough throughout the
day in order not to alienate his boss (a Marlborough smoker) and to facilitate the
sharing practice, but he may smoke an imported brand at home. It was an
expectation of some marketers interviewed that as greater tolerance of individualism
creeps into Japanese work and social systems, this kind of peer influence may begin
to break down; however, group pressure is likely to remain an important element of
consumer behaviour, and it is one that marketers should appreciate. Moreover, the
product itself must be relevant to the market, positioned appropriately, and sold at
the right price; people must learn about it. These are basic concerns that apply as
much to Japanese marketing as to anywhere else, but to get them even slightly
wrong in Japan is to risk missing out on the buying power of a group of highly
discerning consumers.
Japan is constantly changing so it should not be surprising those consumer needs
and preferences are equally volatile. To become and remain successful, marketers
must ensure a steady stream of new products onto the shelves. Product planning
^ Source: Minryoku 89, Ashai Shimbun
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must reflect Japanese consumers' criteria for selecting goods, and since these
criteria are subject to rapid shifts, a continuous market presence is crucial. No
market sector is immune to these changes. For example, as mentioned earlier,
disposable income is at its highest level in Japan's history and tastes are becoming
more sophisticated.
2.4.1,4. The female consumer.
In the Japanese vertical society, a steady progression up the corporate ladder is
the expectation, although often unfulfilled. After marriage the Japanese female is
dependent for vertical progression upon the success of her husband. Meanwhile,
she secures her position by forging horizontal relationships with suppliers, parents
of her children's school peers and so on. To facilitate vertical progress she
dedicates herself primarily to her children's well being and to some degree to that
of her husband's, his health, his dress, etc. Nakane's (1990) model of Japanese
society is based upon concentric circles. The centre circle she calls the primary one
that is surrounded by the secondary circle which in turn meets with the tertiary
circle. There are no others beyond. Japanese housewives have traditionally
managed their husbands' money. Nowadays, since more than 50% of these so-
called housewives work (earning around US$1000 per month on average), they
often have control of two wallets (Tajima, 1989). This two-in-one consumer
presents the international marketer with a considerable challenge. One of the
Japanese female consumer's distinguishing characteristics is that she is used to
products that have come from a zero-defect production system. She therefore
expects excellence with both quality and value.16
According to Ichihashi (1983), women dominate consumer goods buying to a
greater extent than is true in Western cultures, and tend to evaluate their options on
See Boxes 5.15 and 5.17.
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emotional bases that must be addressed in advertising and other media
communication. Obtaining a qualitative appreciation of the market is therefore
crucial; however, he argues that foreign executives should beware of reliance on
research that uses English-speaking Japanese females who are among the most
Americanized of the population and not representative of the majority attitude.
One subsection of the female consumer group that merits particular attention is
that of the young single female. Japan sports a population of over 8.5 million
females between the ages of 21-30 (Anonymous, 1989a), many of who remain
unmarried until the age of around 25, in Tokyo 20% remain single until 30. Before
marriage many often live with their parents and make only token contributions to
their accommodation costs. As a result, with average private sector earnings for
females running at US$19,000 (Anonymous, 1990a), they have massive
discretionary spending power, and are major customers for the designer goods and
foreign travel markets.
2.4.1.5. Consumer interest criteria.
As mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, there is a certain contradictory attraction for
the Japanese consumer in things foreign. Despite the intense pride in Japanese
quality standards, foreign concepts can be adopted with great enthusiasm — but this
requires careful handling. Foreign products often have positive connotations, and at
a very simple level, the image of a foreign brand, even its packaging (translating
the foreign pack data with sticky labels), can be attractive to the Japanese buyer.
The Japanese have a penchant for foreign travel, and as more go abroad their
lifestyles become commensurably different. Approximately ten-million Japanese
travel abroad each year and the numbers are growing. Most Japanese travel in
groups. The five main groups of holiday travellers are:
• Honeymooners;
• Women in their 20s;
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• Men in their 30s to 40s;
• Groups of women in their 40s, or above;
• Sightseeing groups in their 40s (Edward's, 1990).
Women in their 20s are major contributors to the international travel market:
Generally unmarried, they represent around 16% of all travellers from Japan. Most
have secretarial-type jobs, travel in work related groups, and will go to a wide
variety of destinations. Men in their 30s and 40s tend to travel with work
colleagues, and it is from this large group that most sex tourism stems: South
Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand are their main destinations. Young
women also engage in "sex tourism" to Guam, where they queue outside American
bases, to Bali and elsewhere in Asia where they hire "beach companions." Groups
of women in their 40s tend to travel to Hong Kong and other destinations, primarily
for shopping and eating out. Those in their 40s or above, many of them married
couples, are primarily interested in sightseeing (plus shopping) and go on large
group tours— to Europe, China, Indonesia and Thailand.
Japanese travellers are heavy spenders while abroad — an average shopping
expenditure of more than US$400 per person per visit to most major destinations
(Edward's, 1990). Much of this expenditure is due to high prices at home, but as a
result of the exposure, they become more directly familiar with foreign products,
and are more inclined to demonstrate their acquired cosmopolitan attitudes when
they return to Japan. Having witnessed the lower prices at which Japanese products
are available elsewhere; they demand even higher quality standards at home.
2,4,1.6. Quality
Some Japanese trace their concern for quality far back in their history: they
have always been surrounded by aesthetically pleasing objects, and their attention to
detail and concern with doing a good job is considered to be part of their cultural
tradition. Whether reality or ideology is not clear, but many of the foreign
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marketers of today in Japan insist those quality standards in Japan reflect these
traditions of precision handiwork. One of the reasons for Japanese success in global
markets is that they offer more value by the addition of quality to products that are
already competitively priced. This preoccupation with quality also influences
Japanese workers, who are used to producing and using goods manufactured to the
highest standards.
Their concern for quality may, to some, seem excessively fastidious, but to the
Japanese there is a clear logic to it. For example, Pilkington's Glass was supplying
windscreens to Nissan. They delivered a large batch that had some tiny chips on
the outer rim. Pilkington's maintained that they were acceptable because the
blemishes could be covered with at least two centimetres of rubber seal on the
outside. The windscreens were rejected outright. Why? The Japanese believed that
the existence of the flaws indicated that there had been insufficient attention to
detail — and so other faults might exist that were not apparent. While quality is
clearly one of the critical ingredients for organizational success it is not the only
ingredient. Today, marketing is the more decisive weapon for the Japanese
(Beckham, 1990). This is a view for which, as we shall see later in Chapter 5, the
interview data provided a great deal of support.
2,4.1.7. Consumer wealth and lifestyles
Japan has some of the richest consumers in the world, both with the highest per
capita income in the world (at US$23,000) and the highest disposable income
(Cunningham, 1990). Astute marketers recognize that there is nothing made in
Japan that the Japanese consumer cannot afford, while every product manufactured
by foreign consumer goods' manufacturers is readily affordable to the Japanese
consumer. However, this does not mean that every consumer is rich. The
increased value of the yen has not benefited consumers proportionately and, as will
be seen in Chapter 5, escalating property values has created a special sub-stratum of
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wealthy Japanese.
The high cost of living makes Japanese lifestyles much more modest than many
Westerners think. Even the wealthy have traditionally lived lives in which thrift
and frugality are considered virtues. Since World War II, the Japanese have
considered themselves to belong to an enormous and homogeneous middle class (see
Figure 2.21), but this is beginning to break down with the emergence of the newly
rich; in the main these are composed of those lucky enough to own land. Many of
the new rich have a strong inclination to spend their money and to renounce the
austere lifestyles of the past. Conversely, those people for whom owning their own
home is unrealistic do not even bother to save for eventual home ownership,
maintaining that it is better to enjoy life now and spend more.
Figure 2.21 Ciass perceptions May 1989
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Source; Prime Minister's Office (Anzai, 1990)
Eating out is becoming ever more popular. The proportion of the average
family's food budget spent on eating out has been steadily increasing since 1980,
reaching 14% by 1985. By 1990, 63% of the population over 14 years of age was
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eating out at the rate of 16 times a year (Wilk and Kilburn, 1988). This growing
market has attracted a number of foreign fast-food operators, such as McDonald's,
Kentucky Fried Chicken, plus a variety of lesser-known fast food franchises which
have all made an impact. At the other end of the spectrum, La Tour D'Argent and
Maxim's have restaurants in Tokyo, with dinner for two in such restaurants easily
costing ¥100,000, in between lies a vast and growing culinary market.
Japanese consumers have also grown accustomed to the fact that manufacturers
are able to cater for a wide variety of tastes. Among Japanese marketers, the idea
of mass marketing is giving way to individualized target marketing: aiming at
smaller groups of sophisticated consumers. In a parallel trend, manufacturing
systems have evolved that are geared to very short runs, inverting the traditional
notion of mass production. Now the prime goal of manufacturing is the production
of smaller quantities at ever decreasing costs; many production lines now have
built-in flexibility, and even automobiles— usually products of a rigid flow process
— are available with a rich variety of features and options. Similarly, the
consumer electronics industry is able to offer an astonishing variety of goods: The
Sony Walkman, for instance, is available in innumerable variants. Japanese
panache for applications development derives both from extraordinarily flexible
manufacturing engineering, and from manufacturing's ability to fuse comfortably
with development. MNCs would do well to consider that it is the rich, varied
output of this fusion that Japanese consumers have grown to expect.
Extravagant modes of buying behaviour have been further encouraged by recent
tax revisions. Duties were reduced on a range of luxury items including cars and
imported whiskies. An inclination to spend in any way possible, particularly on
travel, has led to the development of newer luxury travel concepts such as a 21-hour
rail trip on the Twilight Express — a train with scenic windows and a French
restaurant that buys fresh fish direct from the ports as it makes its way from Osaka
to Sapporo. The train has suite-style bedrooms and fully equipped bathrooms; the
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cost of a one-way trip is around ¥55,000 (Kilburn and Wilk, 1989).
With so many rich consumers looking for items that will set them apart from the
crowds, a major opportunity exists for marketers in luxury items. According to
Infoplan, a market research company, five psychographic categories can be
identified in the lifestyle model it has created: Quiets (generally female high-school
graduates, now rather tradition-bound housewives or the widows of rich men);
Conservatives (older men inclined by tradition not to self-indulge); Classics (male
social and political leaders from old families, probably having lived abroad at some
time); Moderns (young, independent and exceptionally individualistic); Overts
(unashamed nouveau riche). Of these, the Overts are considered particularly
appealing to marketers — and for obvious reasons: They are heavily involved in
conspicuous consumption; 64% of them are likely to buy foreign products
compared with only 24% of the rich category overall; 27% of them own a second
home, in contrast to only 15% of the rich overall (Cunningham, 1990).
2.4.2. GIFT GIVING
Gift giving is a popular practice in Japan. There are traditionally two gifting
seasons — ochugen in mid-summer, and oseibo at year end — when companies and
individuals give to just about everyone with whom they are connected (Kilburn and
Wilk, 1988). Gift giving is a cultural trait (of give and take) connected with social
exchange networks. The custom is another example of how the Japanese are adept
at importing elements of other cultures and Japanizing them: Christmas trees,
Father Christmas and other symbols join forces with oseibo, although Christmas
presents tend to be more personally oriented. The Christmas business is still
considerably smaller than oseibo itself; however, major department stores report
that it is growing in importance. Other Western gifting festivals have also been
imported: The chocolate industry has virtually claimed ownership of St Valentine's
Day, while Japan is now the second largest market for diamonds in the world. By
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successfully promoting the concept of engagement and wedding rings, and then
broadening the idea to include costume jewelry, De Beers has introduced the notion
that women should give diamond jewelry to the men they love— and vice versa—
as a token of their feelings, especially at Christmas.
2.4.3. MARKET SEGMENTATION
In segmenting markets, as we shall explore further in the next chapter, there is
usually a debate over what is cause and effect; although one may identify some
consumer characteristic that enables a product opportunity to be distinguished, it
frequently requires the provision of a particular type of product to cause a consumer
segment to identify itself. Some experts maintain that segmentation of markets
should begin with an a priori market analysis; they criticize Japanese companies for
being poor marketers, since they frequently begin with product development and not
a market focus17. Nevertheless, the observer can identify many interesting
examples of markets that have been successfully segmented18. For example,
observations in a drug store or personal care store will reveal a market that has a
vast number of different types of shampoo equal to, or more than, the variety in
other Western countries.
More Japanese corporations are trying to appeal to certain niches of the
consumer market19. The Sony Walkman, with its countless variations, has already
been mentioned. Another example is magazines. There are probably more of these
in Japan than anywhere else in the world. Media audits show readers spend ¥800
billion each month on magazines of various kinds (Anonymous, 1990a). TV starts
early in the morning and goes into the night; in some cases all through the night,
17 See Box 5.12.
18 See Box 5.13
19 See Box 5.12.
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and the cluster of local as well as national channels, creates a wide variety of media
opportunities for the marketer to buy. These choices are the communication routes
to particular market segments.
2.4.4. BUYING CONCENTRATIONS
The Japanese market of 124 million people, concentrated in a land area that
approximates to California, is clearly much more concentrated than elsewhere, and
in this regard offers some advantages. Despite the country's division into many,
different sized islands, — the largest of which, Honshu, is bigger than the UK —
neither the US nor the EC offers a similar impression of homogeneity, particularly
to the marketer.
Japan was once even more concentrated economically than it is today. Since the
1950s, economic expansion has forced large operations to move out of the Tokyo
area to as far away as Kyushu and Okinawa. Toyota, for instance, is currently
planning to expand outside Toyota City (on the north coast of Honshu) because of
space shortage there, and will set up a whole new complex, perhaps in Kyushu.
Honda is already established in southern Kyushu. Nearer to Tokyo, the cities of
Yokohama, Kawasaki, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe act like satellite extensions
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However, although consumers may be located in massive concentrations, the
distribution system does not offer the same levels of focus. In the UK, for
example, buying power is often concentrated in the major supermarket chains,
which offers some advantages in so far as marketers can easily approach the chains
with a new product proposition. If the chains agree, the combined exposure will be
sufficient to launch the product; if the chains decline, there is probably a research-
based reason underlying the refusal. It is therefore possible to develop an informed
dialogue with supermarket retailers to build a productive partnership.
By contrast, in Japan, Daiei — the largest supermarket company — has a
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relatively small share (1.5%) of total retail sales (Anonymous, 1990a). It would be
possible to win distribution with Daiei but only scratch the surface of the target
audience. There are 87,000 drug stores and more than two million retail outlets of
various other descriptions in Japan, which would offer greater market penetration
but for the fact that gaining distribution through them is rendered more difficult by
there being so many buying points.
2.5. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS— OPPORTUNITIES AND
OBSTACLES
The Japanese economy has been shown to be an outstanding growth performer.
In foreign investment terms Japan has out paced its industrial counterparts
(Lacktorin, 1989) and has reaped the rewards with its superior trade performance
which in turn has resulted in an overvalued Yen. The consequence of this has been
to render imported consumer goods relatively less expensive. However the major
opportunities in the Japanese consumer goods' market are for everyday consumables
for which Japanese companies compete fiercely and thus require local supply
sourcing. Coupled with the MITI initiative that the consumer should enjoy a
greater share of Japan's affluence, an opportunity has been presented for foreign
consumer goods' companies.
Japanese consumers are wealthy with a propensity to consume on a grand scale,
as a result, the Japanese market for consumer products is sufficiently large to
deserve consideration by any serious global marketing concern. Urban Japanese
tend to live in massive conurbations with small living space. It has been learned
that as consumers they are sufficiently distinctive to make it worthwhile researching
their basic habits and attitudes. "New singles" and "single females" are particularly
interesting target segments. Because of its sophistication, the Japanese market is
also highly segmented. Advertising is expensive but there is a wide proliferation of
media targeted at a rich variety of interest groups. Buying access to these audiences
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is expensive.
High levels of service apply and often these appear to defy economic rationality.
One of the major areas of contention, the Large Scale Retail Law, underwent
changes during this research. The effect of this is yet to emerge. However, the
foregoing does not mean that it is going to be plain sailing for foreign companies
with opportunities begging to be exploited, as the sheer tedium of deciphering
Japanese practice may be an obstacle in itself. Moreover, yesterday's rules will not
necessarily apply tomorrow since Japan is a highly dynamic society and, while
reluctant to bow to the pressures of its trading partners, she is simultaneously
sensitive to it. When she does decide to change, restructuring can occur quickly as
may happen with environmental issues.
There are many very real opportunities worthy of scrutiny by foreign MNCs and
the numerous wealthy Japanese have a propensity supported by a proneness to spend
on foreign consumer products, it is worth repeating that Japanese consumers are
much more discerning than their western counterparts. Given the high costs of
investment and the longer term payback periods that apply, the opportunities exist
only for those foreign companies capable of dedicating their efforts over long term
planning horizons. The Japanese market requires heavy investment backed by
corporate management committed to winning a position in Japan.
It was argued that it is necessary to question the fundamentals of consumer
behaviour before entering the Japanese market. Basic practices and expectations
may possess a quintessential Japanese perspective. Even the most familiar products
may require modification both in form and/or positioning. Individual expression is
becoming more evident in consumer buying behaviour, but there are limits to this
which foreign companies must strive to understand. Females are particularly
powerful consumers, as are young singles. Foreign travel is proving to affect the
consumers' perception of value as they compare what their Yen buys at home and
abroad.
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The high population concentrations in turn support a distribution system that
relies on many small retailers which offer a high degree of service to the
populations they serve.
It has been shown that Japanese competitors are large, powerful and are difficult
to predict using Western criteria. The interlocking keiretsu system can render
interpretation of their actions particularly challenging. Japanese financial
expectations from their investment tend to be much lower than comparable foreign
MNC investors. Yet they pour funds into product development at a rate that
discomforts foreign MNCs (Jones and Ohbora, 1990). Above all they have a long
term orientation toward the development of their markets. While this may be
inconvenient for foreign companies— in particular American — that are expected
to show growing quarterly returns no matter what, being able to adopt and fund a
long term orientation is a critical success factor for any company operating in the
Japanese market.
The foregoing raises some key issues that will be probed in Chapter 5. They
are:
• Why is there is there a massive imbalance in investment by foreign MNCs in the
Japanese market? Are there serious difficulties present that justify the neglect of
the opportunity?
• What specific aspects of the Japanese consumer market offer opportunities for
foreign MNCs and how should they respond?
• Are the formulation and communication of corporate philosophy a prerequisite
for success in the Japanese market?
• Is setting up an intelligence network one of the keys to Japanese success?
• Precisely how is the massive consumer opportunity in Japan being addressed by
foreign MNCs?
• Is Japanese culture a major obstacle or merely a nihonjinron induced filter?
• Is unfair practise endemic in the Japanese market?
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• Is distribution as arcane as outsiders believe? What response strategies do
foreign MNCs adopt?
• Among the myriad of wholesalers is it possible to forge new networks?
• Are alliances with the sogo shosha a suitable distribution approach?
• What are implications for staff recruitment?
• In which ways do the competitive behaviours of Japanese companies require
responses from foreign competitor companies, in particular with consensus
management and product development?
Having considered some of the characteristics of Japanese consumers and the
traits of competitor companies; in the following chapter I shall continue to present a
review of the literature to establish an approach for subsequent analysis of the
interview data. This takes place in Chapter 5, where the interview data is used to
depict the ways which foreign MNCs have responded to the Japanese challenge.
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CHAPTER 3— THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Having reviewed the Japanese opportunities, obstacles and identified some
specific topics to probe; in this chapter I will examine the theoretical background to
the thesis first by reviewing international marketing theory in a Japanese context;
then by taking a lengthy tour through the literature on strategic management and
before continuing "downstream" to underpin the international marketing theory by
exploring the more operational areas of marketing theory. My purpose is to
demonstrate the complexity of the subject; highlight a lack of concurrence where it
exists; introduce terms and concepts that will be referred to later; show the context
in which marketing strategies are conceived; develop an analytical framework; and
pinpoint the danger of seeking a denouement solely from the marketing literature.
In this way I hope to be able to discard some methodological approaches and to
provide a basis for others.
3.2. INTERNATIONAL MARKETING STRATEGY
At this point we will turn to some of the particular issues of international
marketing strategy and in particular that of developing strategy for Japan from the
perspective of the General Manager.
According to Brooke and Remmers (1978), complete identification with the
foreign market is necessary for the foreign based general manager. They assert that
foreign general managers should be able to promote "two way traffic" between their
market and the corporate headquarters and in this way contribute to the
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development of international strategy. In executing international strategies Hamel
and Prahalad (1985) highlight that global competition often starts with a sequence of
competitive reaction and reaction. For example a competitor uses cash flow
generated in its home market to attack the markets of domestically oriented foreign
competitors. Then competitors retaliate in other foreign markets where the
aggressor is most vulnerable. However, they emphasize that it is necessary to
distinguish among various causes of global marketing: global competition, when
companies cross-subsidize national market share battles in pursuit of global brand
and distribution positions; global business, in which the minimum volume required
for cost efficiency cannot be generated in the enterprise's home market; global
companies, which have distribution systems in key foreign markets that enable cross
subsidization, international retaliation, and world scale volume.
International strategy ought to be distinguished from global marketing strategy
which implies one strategy for the globe. The former relies on a degree of
customization to take account of market differences. In addressing the meaning of
globalization, Leontiades (1986) suggested that its main feature is that of seeking a
combination of co-ordinating mechanisms that will achieve business objectives with
a minimum of interference with the freedom of nationally based operating units.
This is a major issue for companies that are developing internationally. If
handled carefully the rewards are great, yet if practices and policies are forced on
foreign subsidiaries then the results can be negative. Advertising and
communications policy is a particular problem area because if these activities
remain uncoordinated between markets then a confused image may result. For
example, British Airways was accredited with being a pioneer in the development of
global advertising. In partnership with its advertising agency, Saatchi and Saatchi,
it created a ninety second commercial that the partners believed would restate the
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airline's position as the world's favourite airline.1 Before, major markets were
responsible for creating their own advertising campaigns so this was a radical
departure from conventional practice as it meant that decisions that were normally
taken in the markets were to be taken in London. According to Quelch (1984) this
departure from standard practice required a great deal of persuasion and selling to
market managers. Not all general managers in the foreign markets accepted the
logic and the degree varied to which individual market budgets were dedicated to
support the global activity.
Similarly, PepsiCo has been regarded as being a successful exponent of the
global marketing approach. During the 1980s it established a communications
platform that was based on the statement "The choice of a new generation" and in
this way attempted to win over the international youth market. Yet it learned that
western youth icons such as Michael Jackson did not "travel" well in all markets.
As a result, local versions of the international commercials were shot, thus adding
to production costs. For example, BBDO, the Pepsi advertising agency, substituted
Michael Jackson with Leslie Cheung in an attempt to win greater appeal across
South China.
1 Influenced by the film director Steven Spielberg, it depicted Manhattan
Island being piloted to London by BA aircrew. It used the copyline "Every
year we fly more people across the Atlantic than the entire population of
Manhattan."
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3.2.1. TRADITIONAL MODES OF MARKET ENTRY





• Direct investment; and
• JVs.
3.2.1.1. Indirect exporting:
In terms of gearing their organizations to deal with the nuances of foreign
markets, this involves both the least effort and lowest investment from companies.
Often neither an export department nor an overseas sales force is required, and all
foreign contacts can be handled via intermediaries. Usually middlemen are
involved, the underlying assumption being that they will take the interests of the
principal to heart. In many respects, this arrangement minimizes risk: if well
chosen, the intermediaries bring to the arrangement an expertise that the exporting
company may not possess.
3.2.1.2. Direct exporting:
Under this set-up, companies undertake their own exporting arrangements, and
as a result, are required to invest in export overhead. This may involve a home-
based export department and/or overseas sales offices; or incorporate a team of
overseas sales representatives, and in addition could involve a network of foreign-
based distributors and/or agents. Direct involvement and commitment provides a
deeper understanding of the markets than is the case with indirect exporting.
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3.2.1.3. Licensing:
This is a straightforward way for companies to extend the scope of their
expertise, but there may be several other reasons why this option is considered
attractive. Basically, the licenser receives a licensing fee from the licensees of his
process and/or brands; little effort is required on the licenser's part, and the fees
received go directly to the bottom line. On the negative side, the licenser
relinquishes control of his brand in the market, and it may well be that by licensing
a process for a limited period of time, he is actually helping to lay the foundation
for the development of a potential competitor in the future (Kotler, 1991:414;
Keegan, 1989:296). If this happens then licensers find that the easy up-front money
they obtained from licensing turns out to be very expensive revenue. One way to
ensure that this does not happen is to ensure that all licensing agreements provide
for a cross technology exchange between licenser and licensee (Keegan, 1989:296).
Unless the licenser can continue to innovate, develop the process and persuade his
licensees to enter into new agreements, in other words unless control is retained
over the brand property, that is exactly what will happen. Sometimes, the danger
of unintentionally assisting a competitor can be avoided by the provision of some
secret ingredient: Coca Cola took these steps with its base syrup, the formula for
which is supposedly known to only a few key people.
3.2.1.4, Direct Investment:
As a mode of entry, direct investment provides two advantages: control and
better communications (Keegan, 1989:298). Control, or the lack of it, is an
important consideration as was indicated by many of those interviewees with
experience of JVs; an issue which will be dealt with in some detail in Chapter 5.
Needless to say that if the foreign marketer wishes to make any number of decisions
relating to matters such as advertising or pricing, they can be made without
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reference to a partner which may be pursuing a different agenda. If new product
ventures are involved then the marketer may require major investments in market
development activity which may be viewed as investment but without direct control,
it may be difficult to win the levels of commitment and patience necessary from a
partner (Keegan, 1989:297). In this way plans may be executed swiftly without
being encumbered by the need to communicate at length and/or distance with a
foreign partner.
3.2,1.5. Joint ventures (JVs):
A joint venture (JV) is a particular mode of foreign direct investment. It is an
arrangement where a foreign partner with considerable technological and process
expertise but lacking in market knowledge co-operates with a local partner to
compensate for its weakness. Given Benson's (1975) argument that managers seek
to maintain organizational autonomy while gaining access to resources, joint
ventures should be a preferred form of inter-organizational agreement. Managers
often show a preference for contracts and mergers as forms of inter-organizational
agreement over joint ventures (Berg et al., 1982; Harrigan, 1987; Killing, 1983).
According to Berg et al there are three primary reasons for the creation of joint
ventures:
• The creation of greater market power by combining resources or generating
economies of scale
• The avoidance, reduction, or sharing of information
• The acquisition or sharing of information (Berg et al., 1982).
Other reasons should be added to this list:
• To overcome cultural, political or legal impediments (Kent, 1991)
• To meet host country requirements (Chu, 1987; Franko, 1973; Harrigan,
1987; UNTC, 1987)
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• To manage rivalry in an industry by converting potential competitors into
allies (Bernstein, 1965; Boyle, 1968; Fusfeld, 1958; Hennart, 1988; Mead,
1973; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976).
JVs in Japan are usually structured around the foreign company bringing
technological expertise or certain brands to the joint agreement, and the Japanese
partner offering local market knowledge, connections and the general wherewithal
to secure adequate distribution. Although JVs are political necessities in many
Asian markets, in Japan this is no longer the case.
The process of internationalization of the firm is a subject on which a great deal
of research has been conducted. I will now review this research to glean what





This theory represented largely by Dunning (1988) is largely concerned with
direct investment in production. His paradigm attempts to explain such decisions
with three sets of advantages: ownership specific, internalization and locational.
Ownership specific advantages stem from structural and market imperfections and
relate to technological advantage or multinational power. Internalization relates to
the ability to transfer ownership specific advantages across national boundaries
within its own organization. He proposed that locational advantages fall into two
categories: structural and transactional. For example the former relates to
differences in factor costs while the latter refers to leverage.
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3.2.3. PROCESS MODEL
This particular approach is based on the process of internationalization of the
firm (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Bilkey, 1978; Wiedersheim-Paul et al., 1976;
Cavusgil, 1980; Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). Reid and Rosson (1987) developed
one of the most widely adopted concepts in the field which in turn is based on the
work of Johanson and Vahlne (1977).
This model has its theoretical base in the behavioural theory of the firm
(Penrose, 1959; Cyert and March, 1963; Aharoni, 1966). It is seen as a process by
which the firm gradually increases its international involvement. This process
evolves as a result of interaction between knowledge acquisition concerning foreign
markets and the de facto increased commitment of resources to those foreign
markets (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). That is to say that management feels
differently about a foreign opportunity once it has learned about it and is truly
committed to it in some way.
In this analysis two kinds of knowledge are recognized: objective knowledge
that can be taught and experiential knowledge that can only be acquired by way of
direct involvement (Penrose, 1959). Direct involvement leads to the generation of
business opportunities and is consequently a driving force in the internationalization
process as well as one that aids risk reduction. It tends to be market specific
expertise that is acquired and the enterprise can be expected to make incremental
commitments as experience is accumulated (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990).
The firm is viewed as a loosely coupled system in which different actors have
varying views about regarding its progression (Cyert and March, 1963; Weick,
1969; Pfeffer, 1981). So, it can be expected that those with experience of a foreign
market will have views about the relative attractiveness of developing those markets
and will promote their causes. Thus this model predicts that the internationalization
process will tend to continue with its own momentum once it has started.
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Market development, according to Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975), can
be described by way of a chain of events. For example, at the start of an
enterprise's involvement no regular export activities are performed, then export
takes place through independent representatives, later through a sales subsidiary.
These initiatives may be followed by manufacturing. The first stage yields
practically no market experience whereas the second provides some sort of market
information channel. According to these authors, during this second stage firms
tend to enter markets with increasingly greater psychic distances; defined in terms
of differences in language, culture, political systems that could potentially disturb
the flow of information between the firm and the market. It has, however, been
averred that the world has become much more homogeneous and as a consequence
psychic distances have been reduced (Nordstrom, 1990).
Buckley et al. (1990) attest that much of the work on international business over
concentrates on manufacturing decisions to the neglect of marketing and
distribution. If a company is in an expansionist mode, it is necessary to consider
the whole channel in making such decisions and once a part of the channel is
"externalized" (processed by intermediaries), downstream activities will not be
"internalized" (handled direct). They concluded by arguing that the usual
classification of foreign market strategies into exporting, licensing and foreign
investment is too crude because it ignores the differences between distribution,
inventory, transport, communications, retailing and market development costs.
Such costs they argue cannot be aggregated.
The process model has grown out of empirical research based on traditional
micro economic theory about Swedish firms competing internationally (Carlson,
1966; Carlson, 1975). While the literature abounds with Scandinavian followers,
the geographic field covered is more pervasive. For example researchers in
Wisconsin have reported results consistent with the model (Bilkey, 1978; Bilkey and
119
Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980; Cavusgil, 1984). Others from the USA have reported
broadly similar findings (Davidson, 1980; Davidson, 1983; Denis and Depelteau,
1985; Hook and Czinkota, 1988) for exporting firms, and Japanese export strategies
(Johansson, 1983), Turkish exporters (Karafakioglu, 1986), Australian exporters
(Barret, 1986). Moreover, a study of US entry by acquisitions and joint ventures
was supportive of the model (Kogut and Singh, 1986) and in a study of export
development of firms from less developed countries that export; entries are first
made in culturally close countries and subsequently in the developed countries
(Ford, 1987).
The model has been criticized as being too deterministic (Reid, 1983; Turnbull,
1987; Rosson, 1987). Such criticisms are levelled chiefly at the "stages' theory" on
the contention that the firm has a strategic choice as to modes of entry and
expansion. Such a choice is dependent on market conditions and a transaction cost
approach is superior to the process model in explaining diversity in
internationalization conduct (Reid, 1983; Turnbull, 1987). Although their logic is
plausible these authors could be criticized for advocating the need for "overkill" in
any one model.
It has likewise been claimed that the process model is only important in so far as
the early stages of internationalization are concerned when lack of market
knowledge and resources are still constraining factors (Forsgren, 1989). Once the
company is directly involved in a market it is able to allocate resources with greater
degrees of confidence. Moreover, environmental changes such as the supply of
information and communications have resulted in less fragmented markets that, in
turn, impact on the process of internationalization (Nordstrom and Vahlne, 1985).
As with all models, care is required not to overgeneralize on their sphere of
application. It has been shown for instance that the internationalization process is
not valid for service industries. In research on banking it was shown that foreign
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enterprises are not governed by cultural distance but market entry was made in
small steps (Tschoegl, 1982; Engwall and Wallenstal, 1988).
According to Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987), during the 1970s many firms that had
been dependent for their performance in the international marketplace on a single
factor such as cost advantage, began losing share to competitors that had managed
to acquire both scale economies and individual market responsiveness. In other
cases, firms that were dependent on scale or responsiveness became disadvantaged
because new technology or changes in government policies shifted competitive
advantage from one factor to another such as the effect of the 1992 movement in the
EC.
3.2.4. ECLECTIC PARADIGM VERSUS INTERNATIONALIZATION
PROCESS MODEL
The eclectic paradigm sets out to reveal "The extent form and pattern of
international production" (Dunning, 1972), whereas the internationalization model
attempts to explain the pattern and mode of establishing marketing oriented
operations (including manufacturing for the local market) (Johanson and Vahlne,
1990). The internationalization model rests on behavioural theories while the
theoretical support for the eclectic paradigm assumes that the decision makers have
access to perfect information. Even Dunning admits the need for more research on
specific firm attributes and their propensity to respond differentially to his three
types of advantage (Dunning, 1988). Others argue that the commitment and
experience gained are examples of such attributes. The eclectic paradigm is static
in nature, while the internationalization model pays attention to changes in the
explanatory variables as the process progresses. The two frameworks are
inconsistent as the basic assumptions differ.
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3.2.5. INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS
Several of the shortcomings of the internationalization model can be highlighted
by relating it to the concept of industrial networks. For example, it has been shown
that enterprises in industrial networks develop enduring relationships with other
complementary institutions (Hakansson, 1982; Turnbull and Valla, 1986). Such
relationships develop through interactions in which the collaborators build mutual
trust that translates into strong commitment to the relationship (Ford, 1979). These
relationships are connected by way of networks comprising a variety of different
types of enterprise— customers, suppliers, competitors, distributors, agents and
consultants (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). Such networks are rather elusive
phenomena not easily observed or understood by the outsider and particularly so if
there is a cultural distance between the players. To enter a network from the
outside requires those on the inside to be inclined to allow it to happen and
invitations are more likely to be directed to indigenous players in a market. This
implies that significant inertia has to be overcome to break into a network which in
turn suggests that high "switching costs" are involved (Porter, 1980:114). Breaking
into a network is a particularly acute problem in the Japanese context (Goodnow
and Kosenko, 1990).
This recognition has lead to the term "strategic alliances" a topic that has
attracted a fair amount of attention in the literature. Strategic alliance is an
umbrella term that describes a menu of relationships that is more subtle than
vendor-customer relationships yet less formal than the rights of ownership. These
arrangements, developed during the 1980s, take on many shapes: JVs, licensing,
R&D consortia, reciprocal marketing deals, and so on. According to some
management strategists, alliances take advantage of the natural symbiotic links
between companies. The core notion behind strategic links lies in global strategic
positioning (Lorinc, 1990). These alliances are a response to emerging market
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opportunities; they attempt to integrate various combinations of deliverable
resources and capabilities (Baranson, 1990). Successful strategic alliances require a
clear understanding of objectives; a well-defined decision making and management
framework; effective monitoring capabilities; patience and willingness to adapt to
each other's culture; good training of personnel (Anonymous, 1987).
According to Roland Smith, the ex-chairman of British Aerospace, Britain's
largest engineering and exporting company, such partnerships are often the quickest
and cheapest ways of developing a global strategy. To succeed, he argued, firms
require to pick a compatible partner and not rush into a deal. It may be better to
choose a partner with complementary products or markets rather than one that
competes directly with one's own company, although never easy they have become
fundamental to doing business in the 1990s (Weimer et al., 1988; Main, 1990).
3.2.6. TRANSNATIONALISM
Developing the stream of thought on internationalism, Lacktorin (1990)
differentiates among three major international strategies: international (that is
exporting from home base), multinational (foreign market concentrated), and
transnational. Transnational firms are those that grapple with the conflicting
requirements of balancing national responsiveness and economies of scale.
Transnational companies he defined as those firms that:
• Allocate assets and sales across the Triad of USA, EC4 (the old West
Germany, UK, Italy, France) and Japan. The allocation should be made in line
with each leg of the Triad's share of world GNP
• Simultaneously capture insider responsiveness advantages, without
sacrificing economies of scale
• Have multiple national identities, often being perceived as local companies
• Decentralized decision making to such an extent that local management has
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significant impact upon strategic decisions as well as tactical.
This leads to the hypothesis that perhaps the greatest difficulty in becoming a
transnational company and thus adapting to the Japanese market in particular, is in
reaching the optimal level of national responsiveness without becoming non
competitive by sacrificing economies of scale. Becoming transnational usually
involves offering a high degree of independence to local subsidiaries. Scale, he
states, suggests geographic concentration of manufacturing while responsiveness
connotes the reverse. Although scale and responsiveness are in conflict the
transnational company successfully achieves both. International firms concentrate
all links of the value chain outside the local market. In crucial areas such as sales
and service they rely on agents. International firms tend to be centralized, offer






The optimal scale/responsiveness mix varies according to business function, and
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national market (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2
Scale and national responsiveness
high business function national mkt
national differentiation
Adapted from Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987)
The box on the left in Figure 3.2 shows the strategic centre of gravity for
different businesses. Aerospace and foods occupy extreme positions with
pharmaceuticals in between. Competitive advantage in aerospace is primarily a
function of scale, whereas foods are sensitive to a high degree of differentiation in
national tastes. The flow of the arrows signifies a hierarchical process. Taking the
pharmaceuticals' business as an example its research is internationally oriented but
its marketing subject to a high degree of national differentiation. In terms of
national markets the US, Europe and Japan are clustered for aerospace whereas for
foods those markets would be highly differentiated (Lacktorin, 1990).
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3.2.7. INTERNATIONAL MARKETING THEORY IN JAPANESE
CONTEXT
Japanese industrial success has often been viewed as a sublimation of Japanese
military aggression and that the major Japanese corporations have been seen to co¬
operate to win over foreign markets has reinforced this attitude. However,
Abegglen and Stalk (1985) dismissed conspiracy theory as the rationale behind the
success in world markets of the kaisha. They argued that their position was because
of their choice of competitive fundamentals that include:
• A growth bias
• A preoccupation with the actions of competitors
• The creation and ruthless exploitation of competitive advantage
• The choice of economically consistent corporate financial and personnel
policies.
For example, they posed the question whoever heard of Tohatsu? Tohatsu was
Japan's leading motorcycle manufacturer. However, Honda replaced Tohatsu
(which went bankrupt) by growing its production capability 50 per cent faster than
demand called for; thus influencing 45 other producers to withdraw from the
market.
Japanese top management regards it as their responsibility to harness the skills
of their people and their technologies to maintain employment and employee
relations therefore play a major part in the mix of Japanese success factors. As a
result, major companies often demonstrate enviable levels of flexibility. Canon, for
example, in response to a declining demand for cameras it diversified. Now
cameras account for less than one third of its sales. Western companies often delay
making such fundamental decisions until it is too late. To reinforce this point
Abegglen and Stalk (1985) averred that it is difficult to name a healthy West
German camera company. Further, they suggested that by the time Japanese
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products have found their way into Western markets the competitive position has
usually altered in favour of Japan. Urging that competition can be best met head on
in Japan, the competitive battleground, they insist, is inside the Japanese economy
and often it has been ceded without any kind of fight. The most effective strategy
they argue is to invest in Japan and take advantage of the fast growth by matching
Japanese price and quality capability.
Ohmae (1989) drew an analogy between horticulture and organizations by
suggesting that no one organizational or business approach is likely to succeed
without sufficient care and attention being given to local "growing conditions". He
cited problems that have occurred with American enterprises in Japan by their being
forced to remain committed to original plans rather than being allowed to respond
to the changing demands of the Japanese marketplace. The trick he argues is to
become an insider in the Japanese marketplace and make the costs of doing business
independent of the home country currency. Ohmae revealed that Matsushita aimed
to serve needs all over the world and in so doing expected no repatriation of profits.
The result of these actions is that it derives a better understanding of its consumer's
needs in whatever territory it operates. Foreign companies, Omhae alleged, tend to
neglect the likely time horizon for investment pay off when considering setting up a
Japanese operation.
The obstacles to trade with Japan arouse much controversy. It has been claimed
Japan's tariff and non tariff barriers have prohibited non Japanese companies from
developing a quid pro quo position in the Japanese marketplace (McKinsey & Co.
and Japan-US Trade Group, 1990), but these obstacles are only part of the story.
According to Abegglen and Stalk (1985) the Japanese market has been protected
from foreign investment in two ways: first by Japanese government regulation and
second by foreign companies' "indifference, ignorance, and unwillingness to pay
the price with effort and patience" to succeed in it. Whereas McKinsey et al. claim
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that those foreign companies that appear to have the highest success profile in Japan
are those which are engaging in global marketing.
This issue of global marketing is one that has engendered much debate. Levitt
(1983) wrote of a "new commercial reality— the emergence of global markets for
standardized consumer products on a previously unimagined scale." His enthusiasm
for the "global" concept sparked criticism by Philip Kotler. Attack and defence of
the argument were conducted in the letters' pages of international print media
culminating in a climb-down by Levitt. He confessed that he had put insufficient
emphasis on the requirement to customize standardized concepts as individual
markets demand. However, later, Kotabe (1990a) provided some substance to the
argument that Levitt's climb-down was somewhat premature, he showed that
foreign multinational firms, in particular Japanese firms, increasingly stress the
simultaneous strategic importance of product and process innovations; arguing in a
marketing context, that it has become important for them to expand commonalities
across national boundaries rather than focusing on consumer differences between
territories.
The findings of Kotabe and Duhan (1990), suggested that most but not all the
PIMS principles found to exist in the United States are perceived by Japanese
executives to apply in Japan.2 However they found that Japanese marketers placed
a greater emphasis upon product-service quality, brand image, and product value
than on other strategic dimensions. Moreover, Japanese companies appear to
emphasize the same product/value-related strategy variables that they do in foreign
markets. They noted those product innovations that are backed by manufacturing
process innovations have been found to improve competitiveness much more than
would be the case with product innovations alone.
Despite the increasing value of the Yen against the US dollar (it appreciated
^ PIMS is discussed more fully later in this chapter.
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from ¥360:US$1 in 1970 to ¥150:US$1 by 1990), making it more difficult to invest
in Japan, the strategic value of the Japanese market has caused many US. based
firms to increase their investment in Japan (Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 1990). On
the other hand, the success of Japanese companies in international markets is well
documented. The reasons for this success are attributed to a variety of reasons,
which include: a strong industrial policy orchestrated by MITI (Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (Johnson, 1982). The 1987 US. trade deficit with
Japan was $59.8 billion; almost 40 per cent of its world trading deficit and over 60
per cent of its deficit with the Triad market comprising United States, the European
Community and Japan which consumes almost 80 per cent of the world production
(Ohmae, 1985). Kotabe (1984) argued that a major influence upon the Japanese
success was that of the large oligopolistic trade groupings or keiretsu which
characterize the Japanese business scene.
Some authors believe that the Japanese success is largely a function of Japanese
management style (Pascale and Athos, 1981). Those authors stressed the
similarities between Japanese and US management but highlighted the failure at the
US end to harness people as a key resource. By harnessing the McKinsey 7s'
framework they concluded that Japanese success stemmed from the harnessing of
the framework in its entirety whereas US management had tended to over
concentrate on strategy, structure and systems and had neglected the "soft Ss". The
benefit to Japanese corporations, they noted, has been a high degree of shared
understandings and beliefs about their company, about what takes priority and what
is expected of them, and about their high value to the company. Development of
high levels of sophistication on each "S" comes at a high cost; it requires
commitment to individuals, a preparedness to support them through tough times and
help them develop. Every firm has to evolve its own way of being good at all the
Ss and their fit to one another. Mechanistic, "programmatic" solutions that do not
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change how executives behave, are likely to fail. The task is not to imitate
cosmetically, but to evolve organically. Each company, like each individual, has to
develop in its own way.
In Matsushita, Pascale and Athos maintain, employees are urged to learn from
their mistakes. However the company's basic principles are enshrined and
employees deviating from the following could be expected to be dismissed:
• Mission: To recognize our responsibilities as industrialists, to foster
progress, to promote the general welfare of society, and to devote ourselves to
the further development of world culture.
• Employees creed: Progress and development can be realized only through
the combined efforts and co-operation of each member of our Company. Each
of us, therefore, shall keep this idea constantly in mind as we devote ourselves
to the continuous improvement of our company.
• The Seven "Spiritual" Values: National service through industry; Fairness;
Harmony and co-operation; Struggle for Betterment; Courtesy and Humility;
Adjustment and Assimilation; Gratitude.
According to Pascale and Athos, these values, taken to heart, provide a spiritual
fabric of great resilience. They foster consistent expectations among employees in a
work force that reaches from continent to continent. They permit a highly complex
and centralized firm to maintain a continuity that sustains it even when operational
guidance breaks down and when compared with American firms of the same vintage
it is difficult to find one with the same vitality. They concluded that it must be
caused by Matsushita's value system (Pascale and Athos, 1981:76).
Further, Kotler et al. (1985) proposed that a major reason for Japanese
economic dominance was its apparent willingness to suffer losses in markets in
order to build its position. Those authors also stressed that Japanese firms and their
use of marketing have been one of their major contributors to their success in the
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US and elsewhere. Moreover, they contended that the lack of success of American
firms in Japan was due to their lack of Japanese market understanding. This is
partly, they emphasized, due to the abundance of published information in the
business field that is based upon American experience and situations, thus availing
others with a ready made opportunity to learn about the US. Whereas the same
situation does not exist in reverse (Kotler et al., 1985). This is an issue which in
some modest way this thesis addresses.
Kono (1984) claims that there is a greater use of long range planning in Japan
than there is in the UK, at least as far as larger corporations are concerned. The
explanation for this is the much talked about longer term orientation of Japanese
companies. The cause of this, he argues, is pressure from "middle management" as
a result of their long term, or indeed lifetime, employment expectation. He argued
that the main reason for using planning in each country is to clarify goals.
By applying the fifteen criteria of determining whether a company is a good
competitor established by Porter (1985) to Japanese companies, Brouthers and
Werner (1990) concluded that Japanese corporations tend to have no clear self
perceived weaknesses and (unsurprisingly) they do not play by American rules, nor
do they have strategies that are inherently self limiting. Moreover, they showed,
that Japanese corporations have high exit barriers that is to say they do not retreat
easily. Their goals are irreconcilable with those of American firms. They have
high strategic stakes and tend to view return on investment, profitability and cash
generation differently. Furthermore, they have long time horizons and are risk
averse. The Porter (1985) recommended response to such situations would be to:
• Abandon the industry
• Attempt to change the "bad" competitors into good ones
• Prepare for a protracted siege.
Given knowledge of Japanese corporations and the existence of some deeply rooted
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links between their behaviour and the Japanese culture, such recommendations
appear naive as they would virtually preclude any foreign company attempting to
enter the Japanese market.
Although, as was mentioned in Chapter 1, foreign companies have not matched
Japanese FDI reciprocally, Lacktorin (1989) showed that 19 of the top 27 Fortune
500 manufacturing industries are represented in Japan in the form of direct
investment. Eighty-four per cent of the Fortune 50 have direct invested, 74% of
the Fortune 100 and 64% of the Fortune 200. However their stakes may be small:
Japan is home to 1,300 manufacturing firms with foreign capital of at least 50%,
the nearly $10 billion in gross equity capital invested by foreign firms in Japan over
38 years between 1950-1988 compares to $45 billion invested by Japanese abroad in
1988 alone. As of 1986, Japan's cumulative FDI position in foreign countries was
seven times higher than that of the total of foreign countries' positions in Japan.
While it may often be cost effective to manufacture in Japan, Lacktorin argues
that it is critical that the foreign company makes significant investments in
marketing, service, and R&D facilities to establish and maintain contact with the
consumer. Only in this way is it possible to design products to satisfy Japanese
consumers and to compete in this very difficult market.
It is true that there is a lack of true understanding of the Japanese market that
extends through the distribution system to the strategic environment of Japanese
markets (Lazer et al., 1985). However, as Smothers (1990) argued, these problems
are not always insurmountable since additional strategic advantages emerge for
firms that are able to identify unfamiliar patterns and forge strategic links between
them. It has been argued that to survive in Japan, foreign-affiliated companies in
Japan must adapt to but not mimic Japanese responses to a radically unfamiliar
industry structure, style of competition, and process of decision making (Jones and
Ohbora, 1990). Those authors argue that "soft integration" in many Japanese
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industries; the competitive emphasis on aggressive "product churning;" channel
suffocation; and the lack of strict reliance on quantitative analyses— all of these
factors call on Western managers to respond in what they must feel to be "heretical"
ways. The heresy is necessary — and unavoidable. One form of heresy is to offer
a high degree of independence to local subsidiaries (Lacktorin, 1990).
Earlier, Kotler (1986) indicated that often market opportunities occur on a
bigger stage than that on which tactical marketers are geared to perform. For
instance PepsiCo outwitted Coca Cola in India subsequent to the latter pulling out of
the market in protest at then government policies. PepsiCo worked with an Indian
group in a joint venture under terms that were designed to win government
approval. PepsiCo also offered to bring new food processing and water treatment
technologies to India. Moreover the Japanese government supports Japanese
companies by lobbying the Indian government for a relaxation of the ban on
Japanese products either by the transformation into quotas or normal tariffs. In
return Japan offers to buy more Indian goods and services. Such actions are way
beyond the remit of marketers. As a result he argued that marketers should learn to
harness political power in their strategies.
What we have seen so far in this section is a variety of views and perspectives.
These have included how knowledge and experience of a market aid commitment to
it and that the speed at which commitment grows depends upon the actors involved.
We have seen how the process of market development will be aided or impeded by
cultural obstacles and development of marketing channels involves different
processes and costs according to which parts of the channels are being developed
whether the thrust is for market development or distribution development. The
process model views internationalization as an incremental process and provides an
explanation of market development, albeit one that is biased toward manufacturing
operations. Moreover as a company reaches a more "mature" stage of
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internationalization it can develop its activities with greater confidence. It was also
claimed that psychic distances are shortening and caution was urged that the
internationalization process theory may not be valid for service industries.
Japanese corporations offer a learning model in the way they create competitive
advantage and their behaviour is to some extent explained by network theory. The
contentious debate on globalization, introduced by Levitt (1983) is largely
unresolved but some light will be shown later in this thesis. We shall see in
Chapter 5 that companies that are successfully "transnational" often learn to balance
market responsiveness with economies of scale which at the micro level reduces to
the pros and cons of standardization versus decentralized customization. Keegan




• Customization of Global Marketing.
I will now briefly review each of these topics.
3.2.8. STANDARDIZATION
Walters and Toyne (1989) emphasize that much of the debate on standardization
has "unfortunately" focused on the extreme of complete uniformity versus full
localization. Such a debate of polar opposites can, however, be counterproductive.
Indeed, Porter (1986) wondered whether the wrong questions had been asked and
suggested that the asking of the alternative question "should we standardize our
marketing activities or not" may have led to different conclusions.
Various studies, (Aylmer, 1970; Kakker, 1972; Sorensen and Weichmann,
1975; Bakker, 1977; Aydin and Terpstra, 1981), point to the product policy area as
the one where the tendency of firms toward international standardization is greatest.
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Moreover, Takeuchi and Porter (1986) argued cogently that the physical
standardization of the product is of supreme importance from a strategic viewpoint.
They suggested that with physical product characteristics, three basic types of
practice may be distinguished: universal, modified and country tailored product
policies. Universal products are physically identical from market to market;
modified products are substantially similar in all markets whereas country tailored
are localized.
According to Keegan (1989:595), there are tremendous cost advantages in
having a global marketing plan and such an approach can limit needless product and
advertising proliferation. He stressed that this standardized approach when applied
by the Italian white goods' industries enabled longer runs, lower costs and increased
share of world markets. Moreover, he contended that standardized product can
yield benefits to consumers who travel and thus enjoy a standard product wherever
in the world they happen to be. The fact remains however that the majority of
consumers remain static more of the time than they are internationally mobile.
In their survey of 100 senior executives among 27 packaged goods' companies
Sorensen and Weichmann (1975) found that on their index, 63 per cent of the total
marketing programmes were judged to be highly standardized. The highest degree
of standardization being with product design, brand names and packaging.
However pricing decisions were found to be less standardized as manufacturer's
costs, competitive prices, taxes and market positions varied from country to
country. Advertising and promotional messages were found to be highly
standardized in over three quarters of cases. Their major finding was that the real
advantage for the multinational company is derived from the extent to which it is
able to standardize the marketing process as opposed to its marketing programmes.
Such a standardized process, they claimed, imparts a disciplined framework for
sharing experience and importing ideas from one market to the next.
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Dunn and Yorke (1974) indicated that from 1964 through to 1973 the proportion
of companies using the same basic message abroad as at home declined. Research
investigating the effectiveness of standardization as a basis of communicating with
global audiences has produced mixed results. However in her study, Mueller
(1991) found that the overall usage of standardized messages was more common for
advertisements transferred between Western markets than for messages transferred
from Western to Eastern markets.
Quelch and Hoff (1986) identified four dimensions of what they term global
marketing: business functions, products, marketing mix elements and countries.
On each of these dimensions they compared the approaches of Nestle and Coca Cola
for adaptation versus standardization. They found that Coca Cola had standardized
its methods much more than had Nestle. This framework is used later in Chapter 6
to compare the companies in this study. In so doing it will be shown that these
global generalizations do not hold for these companies in the Japanese marketplace
of the 1990s. In particular those two companies Coca Cola and Nestle were found
to be highly adapted to the Japanese market.
The dimensions of the Quelch and Hoff analysis were:
• Business functions
• Products
• Marketing mix variables.
3.2.8.1. Business functions
Standardization, according to Quelch and Hoff (1986), can be greater in
production, R&D or finance than in marketing as the latter is more difficult to
measure. Of course there is often a power pull between HQ staff and local




Products that possess high scale economies or efficiencies and are not highly
culture bound are easier to market globally than are others. Quelch and Hoff argue
that efficiencies passed on with lower prices can overcome most culture bound
market obstacles. While this may be true in Third World markets, it will be shown
later that in Japan, success will not follow unless Japanese quality standards can be
assured. Creating the perception of quality is no easy task in Japan. Moreover
consumer packaged goods do not lend themselves quite so easily to manufacturing
economies. Quelch and Hoff argued that, in Nestle's case, the main advantage of
global marketing was the global utilization of marketing ideas. Products that are
used in the home such as soups and food products are, they assert, generally more
culture bound than are products that are used externally such as credit cards and
cars. Also where the main consumers are young people or those who travel
frequently between cultures the degree of cultural bounding is lessened.
3.2.8.3. Marketing mix elements
Few consumer goods' companies market the same product world-wide using the
same marketing programme. The appropriate degree of standardization varies from
market to market. Strategic elements such as product positionings tend to be more
centrally controlled than are execution sensitive elements such as sales promotion.
However Quelch and Hoff argued that when headquarters believes it has a superior
idea, whether that be with packaging design, product concept or whatever, then it
pressurizes its subsidiaries to adopt it. However they did admit that where foreign
markets are large and local management is strong, more resistance to HQ
intervention can be expected.
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3.2.9. DECENTRALIZATION
The relaxation or adaptation of policy and strategies is clearly linked with
decentralization policy. In one of the classic texts, Brooke showed that there was
no ultimate reality in the centralization debate and that companies did not exhibit
any steady state of progress either toward centralization or away from it.
Moreover, they were moved backwards and forwards by opposing forces (Brooke,
1984).
Zaichkowsky and Sood (1989) indicated that the advertising industry is split
over the degree to which global campaigns should be put to work. In their work
they identified usage patterns and compared them to involvement scores over a wide
range of markets. According to those authors, product involvement varies across
markets but it does not necessarily relate directly to consumption patterns. Many
companies have simply found centralization too difficult a method to work with and
have thus devolved decision taking to the markets (Keegan, 1989:596). Ohmae
(1989) argued that problems of inflexibility stem from a reluctance to decentralize
strategic decisions and this problem is one that has beset many American
companies, in turn it is almost entirely responsible for a diminution in the US
market share position in the Far East.
Others have attempted to look specifically at the Japanese market and evidence
has emerged that market share structures and PIMS data were comparable
(Campbell, 1988). Like many similar studies however, the scope of his work was
limited and likewise it suggests those business principles that apply in the United
States and elsewhere can also be applied in Japan, although the degree to which
such generalizations can be made is limited.
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3.2.10. INTERACTIVE
Keegan (1989:596) described this approach as an intelligent hybrid system
where local personnel are able to ensure that the marketing plan takes account of
local conditions and opportunities with headquarters remaining in a state of constant
alert in an attempt to achieve a high level of performance versus the advantages of
decentralizing staff activities and assigning people direct to activities. For example
some companies have successfully centralized advertising strategy decisions whereas
others have centralized product design.
3.2.11. CUSTOMIZATION OF GLOBAL MARKETING
Despite the noise on this issue, the vast majority of managers view the
advantages of globalization as being more theoretical than real (Morrison et al.,
1991). Keegan (1989:599) made the point that to view global marketing as an all
or nothing affair is to miss the point. Flexibility, he argued, is essential and argued
that managers should tailor their approaches to fit their own products with market
situations. Furthermore, Graves (1989) emphasized that flexibility is a great
strength in Japanese companies. He asserted that the image of the Japanese
company as based on fixed traditions and as a result becoming dysfunctional, is an
outmoded idea and was misplaced anyway. There is a flexible trait at its core, an
irreverence for organization that keeps it relevant to its environment.
This is especially true when companies are attempting to read the Japanese
consumer. Even shared consumer tastes do not mean a product can succeed
worldwide without adjustments for different countries, and this ability to fine tune
products depends on accurate knowledge of tastes and lifestyles in different regions.
Reinforcing this view, Ohmae (1987) infers that by gaining knowledge through
establishing a presence in countries where it has major sales; a firm can become an
insider for which many markets will remain open.
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Having reviewed the focal theory; we will continue on a rather lengthy review
of the background theory.
3.3. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING
Now that we have considered the focal theory of international marketing
strategy, in particular the implications that international theory has for the Japanese
context, I will now deal with the background theory consisting of general issues of
strategy, followed by marketing issues later on in the chapter. In doing so, I intend
to illustrate the context in which these issues of international marketing strategies
are dealt with in companies.
Since marketing strategies are conceived and implemented in the context of
frameworks established by strategic management decisions and often based on
corporate plans, I will now explore the relationship between marketing and
corporate strategy. In one of the earlier references on corporate strategy Andrews
(1971:18) stated: "Corporate strategy is the pattern of decisions in a company that
determines and reveals its objectives, purposes or goals, produces the principal
policies and plans for achieving those goals, and defines the range of business the
company is to pursue, the type of economic organization it is or intends to be, and
the nature of the economic and non-economic contribution it intends to make to its
shareholders, employees, customers and communities." Marketing decisions and
strategies contribute to all the above.
When executed, marketing strategies constitute a stream of actions that
contribute toward the overall pool of behaviours of the enterprise. So, we will
review some evidence in the process of modifying the behaviour of organizations in
ways that impact upon the corporate positioning and in so doing scrutinize the
relationship between marketing and corporate strategy. I will show those textbook
"templates" often fail to mirror reality and that the implementation and execution of
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strategy are beset with difficulties, perceived and real, irrespective of the market
situation.
Strategic management decisions are made considering corporate strategic
policies and influenced by them; and, we will here review some of the key and
often conflicting views of the strategic management and marketing planning
processes. This is particularly germane since some authors argue that the reason for
Japan's success is based on the strategic strengths of the kaisha (Abegglen and
Stalk, 1985; Doyle etal., 1986; Keegan, 1983; Kotleretal., 1985; Lacktorin,
1990; Porter, 1990). Operational marketing activities such as product planning and
market development have to be resourced according to the priorities established by
strategic corporate plans so that it would be myopic to consider marketing in
isolation.
3.3.1. NEED FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
Major corporations frequently appear to make monumental strategic mistakes so
much so that no amount of sophisticated marketing can redress their errors. As
Porter (1987:19) has indicated, the annals of corporate history are permeated with
countless instances of major investment errors that can be attributed directly or
indirectly to ineffective strategy formulation and/or ineffective execution. Such
failures can help explain why, for example, Guinness underwent a major
diversification program, only to reverse its direction following the controversial
resignation of its Chairman in Spring 1987; they can also explain why IBM had by
1987 suffered a dramatic decline in its position among the Fortune list of most
admired companies— a decline apparently related to the charge that "Big Blue" had
been slow to adjust to the concept of the personal computer (PC) and had locked
itself into its traditional arena of mainframe technology. The heritage of these
mistakes caused it to announce massive lay offs in late 1991 along with a radical
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international reorganization.
Porter (1980) argues that, when assessing strategy, full account should be taken
of the need to incorporate the total situation. In so doing it is essential to
understand the environment in which the industry operates and relate company
strategy specifically to the environment. Like many writers, he stresses that fit
between the organization and its external environment is critical, but he gives scarce
mention to strategy implementations or to the processes of consensus formation
necessary for policy to be effectively developed.
To make improvements to the behaviour of an enterprise is extremely difficult
since frequently the necessary commitment and energy (including alterations to the
organization and/or the people in it) do not exist in companies. It requires a great
commitment perhaps. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), for example, explored what
types of organization are most effective under different environmental conditions.
One characteristic that the top managers in these organizations seemed to have in
common was a constant search for ways to improve their organization's
functioning. They found those star companies in the business of fast moving
speciality plastic's industry had a more decentralized organization, whereas the top
performers in a more stable slow moving industry had simple functional
organizations and simple control systems.
Every firm competing in any industry has a formal as well as an informal
competitive strategy. Strategies may often be implicit. They may have resulted
from a planning process, or stemmed from the activities of various departments
each pursuing its own approaches. Porter (1980) argued that the sum of such
disparate approaches rarely constitutes the best strategy, and argued that a strategic




In the literature there is a wide, though not unanimous, body of agreement
regarding the nature of strategic management and planning. "The widely accepted
theory of corporate strategic planning is simple: using a time horizon of several
years, top management reassesses its current strategy by looking for opportunities
and threats in the environment and by analyzing the company's resources to identify
its strengths and weaknesses" (Vancil and Lorange, 1975). It is often portrayed as
a dynamic process by which companies identify future opportunities. They then
link their evaluation of issues with endeavours to grow or acquire resources so that
the business can be positioned to benefit from its strengths. All this occurs against
the back-cloth of a changing situation. This view reflects the perceptions of
strategy held by that body of scholars to whom Mintzberg (1989) referred as the
"design school," primarily represented by Ansoff (1965). The flows and processes,
typically expected in that view of strategic planning, together with their links with
marketing strategy are indicated in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to 3.7.
Ansoff (1965) produced a pioneering work in the field of corporate strategy.
There are, he indicated, three types of decision: strategic, administrative, and
operating. Strategic decisions, he argued, are concerned with the product-market
scope which comprises the products that the company sets out to supply and the
markets in which it attempts to supply them. This is one of the fundamental aspects
of what will later be referred to as corporate positioning — the collective effect of
the brand positions in the product portfolio of the enterprise, coupled with the net
sum effect of its marketing mix strategy. He was subsequently supportive of a
positive relationship between planning and corporate performance (Ansoff et al.,
1970). We will see later that achieving a sound corporate positioning is a key to
success in the Japanese context.
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3.3.1.2. Other views
While it is true that much of the literature considers the approach to strategic
planning and management in the above way, there are other schools of thought,
notably that of the incrementalist school. Lindblom (1959) described the strategy
formulation as "muddling through." He was followed by some notable others
(Quinn, 1980; Pondy and Huff, 1983). They argued that a "logic" exists in
incremental strategy development insofar as, by learning through doing (a
description that suits the Japanese approach to product planning)3, it facilitates
decision making and implementation within the political context of an organization.
In attempting to solve complex problems— which strategic ones arguably are—
Lindblom (1959) argued that the manager has neither the intellectual nor
informational resources to rely on. If pressed, the manager would admit that he
was ignoring many related values and many consequences of his policies...for
complex problems the intellectual capacity and sources of available information do
not exist. A more realistic model, he argued, is the method of "successive limited
and important comparisons." In this model, analysis is drastically limited and
important possible outcomes are neglected. Subsequently he noted that the
incremental manager is a "shrewd, resourceful problem solver, wresting bravely
with a universe he is wise enough to know is too big for him" (Lindblom, 1968).
In a later paper, he criticized idealized models of decision making as being over
simplistic (Lindblom, 1979). In particular, he castigated Sorenson's model of
decision making (Sorensen and Weichmann, 1975).4
^ See Chapter 7
4 This comprises:
fact agreement
agree overall policy objective
define problem precisely
canvas all possible solutions
list consequences that flow from these solutions
recommend and choose ideal alternative
communicate the selection
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The phrase which Lindblom (1979) employed to describe this kind of approach
was "simple minded inadequacy." Instead he offered a "branch" method, by which
he meant that managers went along the familiar branch on a tree of development
and restricted themselves to policies in areas of familiarity. As a result their
stratagems may not stand scientific scrutiny, but they feel comfortable with them.
Lindblom regretted the use of the term "muddling" because it implied that managers
operated by intuition whereas it is perfectly reasonable when a problem is too big
for the minds of decision takers that they should simplify them and apply their
powers of rationality within more limited boundaries.
The political context of any organization is very real. Livingston (1971) attested
that while to be described as a political person within the context of an organization
may not sound complementary; the development and uses of power, authority,
influence, and politics are natural adjuncts to the processes needed to formulate,
shape, and implement strategies. This area has been explored extensively by
Mintzberg and Waters (1983) in which they sought to understand the complex
process of strategic change over time and within the confines of the culture of the
organization. For example, Stevenson (1976) found that managers tend to treat
strengths differently from weaknesses, as has this author (Reid, 1989b). Stevenson
argued that the manager's position and responsibility in the organization are crucial
influences on the way in which he carries out the process of defining strengths and
weaknesses.
Before the term "logical incrementalism" was coined by Quinn (1980), Ansoff
(1972) had previously identified the existence of behaviours that he described as
"maintainers of equilibrium." Quinn, however takes issue with this interpretation
and infers that Ansoff missed the point by believing that managers were just
- plan execution.
145
muddling through. His point is that "logical incrementalism" is what it says and
that it is a purposeful, effective approach adopted by a skilful manager. Its
application, he argues, improves and better integrates both the analytical and
behavioural aspects of strategy formulation. Mintzberg (1977), supports this view
and sees incrementalism as a management learning process. Later he supported the
idea of an incremental pattern of strategic development and differentiated between
"intended strategies" and "realized" strategies (Mintzberg, 1978). Realized strategy
was taken as the observable output of an organization's activity and this was
operationalized by its positioning over time. Intended strategy is the strategy that
managers espouse.
In another article giving examples of how real managers do not behave
according to the "strategic models" in the literature, Wrapp (1967) views the
management process combining formulation and implementation as being entirely
behavioural and political. He also noted that most important strategic decisions
occur outside the formal planning structure even if the organization has a highly
developed planning culture. He then went on to question the emphasis that is
placed in the management literature on the development of sophisticated models that
do not mirror the real behaviour exhibited by organizations.
Later Wrapp (1979) argued that:
Good managers have always been a scarce commodity, but today the
supply is rapidly dtying up, and many of those remaining are being
organized into impotence. Just as bad money has always driven out
good, so the talented general manager— the person who makes a
company go —is being overwhelmed by a flood ofso called
professionals, textbook executives more interested in the form of
management than the content, more concerned about defining and
categorizing and quantifying the job than in getting it done... They
have created false expectations and wasted untold man-hours by
making a religion offormal long-range planning.
The concept of incrementalism has become accepted as a major descriptor of the
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strategic management process. It was certainly useful in understanding the
descriptions of Japanese corporate behaviour obtained during this study. Quinn
(1980) highlighted some key observations regarding planning in major enterprises.
One was that planning is often a bureaucratic procedure resulting in paper
documents which at their most positive tend to result in another method of securing
control. In other words it becomes a weapon of organizational politics rather than
one that achieves a refinement of direction.
The proposition established by Quinn (1980) is that instead of following rigidly
developed planning procedures, strategies are developed through processes not
explained by the models that Wrapp criticized, or rather he argued that "managers
consciously and pro-actively move forward incrementally." In addressing the issue
of corporate positioning, he argued that formal planning approaches only assist as
long as the general nature of the contingency has been anticipated. However there
are instances where major unanticipated circumstances have brought about major
changes in positionings, for instance: General Motors and the Oil crisis, Pilkington
and the emergence of Float glass technology. Often recognition of the significance
of a change requires some time; therefore reaction to it is more likely to occur on
an incremental basis. Quinn (1980) lays out the textbook picture of the formal
rational planning or design school model5. He makes the point that it is well
understood that managers do not always conform to that model but highlights the
idea that it is assumed that their failure to do so is a defect that somehow could be
rectified.
Quinn's argument is that managers do not and should not make their strategic
^ Analysis of strengths and weaknesses; profit projections; external
environmental trends; opportunities and threats; establish broad goals; identify
gaps; communicate plans to divisions; occasionally make special studies of
alternatives; review divisional plans; develop long term budgets; assign
implementation of plans; monitor and evaluate performance.
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decisions in the way set out above. He suggests four ways in which effective
strategies are in reality made: businesses consist of sub systems and each considers
company wide issues in a disciplined way but does so opportunistically and
incrementally; each sub system has its own agendas; because of the independence of
agendas the organization behaves in the same way and steers a course between those
agendas of the sub systems; skillful managers who use this incremental approach are
not muddling through, they are using it to improve the quality of decision making
and purposive action. Thus the different units are pursuing company requirements
through their individual lenses and the company has to take account of the
interactions between these sub systems.
Wheelwright (1984) asserted that strategic management has been largely
dominated by portfolio analysis, experience curves, market share and other concepts
of competitive strategy since 1970. While he acknowledges their potential he
warned against blind adoption and appraised their advantages and advocated an
incremental value based approach. As Bateman and Zeithaml (1989) indicated, the
decision making process is dependent not only on objective information and
rationality, but also on decision makers' cognitions about the world — a view
shared with Anderson and Paine (1978); Das (1986); Mitchell et al. (1986); Simon
(1957); Weick (1983). Decisions in the context of an organization, in particular
strategic decisions, are the result of a pattern of organizational behaviours that occur
over a time and reflect a series of individual decisions that are taken (Mitroff et al.,
1977). For example a decision to develop a position in the Japanese market would
involve inputs from many key people and would be unlikely to happen
instantaneously.
Bateman and Zeithaml (1989) developed a model of the psychological context of
strategic decisions and determined that the future of decision makers is likely to be
conditioned by past events and current conditions. Although these findings were
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experimentally determined they are no more than most people would intuitively
believe. In the Japanese context it would imply that a failure to make progress in
Japan during its obstructive era would deter management from later attempts.
While there are many articles that argue that business has much to learn from
the military approach to strategy, for example (Widmer, 1980), Weitz and Wensley
(1984) cautioned that much strategic thinking is based upon military analogies but
these may be ill founded. The first false assumption is that certain resources are
only available from directly controlled supplies. However in a business situation
the company may go outside to procure resources not available within its
"armoury," viz.: creative advertising, cash, etc. Military strategy assumes that
resources may not be available at market prices. That territorial boundaries are
adjusted at the expense of the enemy is the second assumption of military strategy,
but this view that competition is a zero sum game does not fit many market
situations, for example, the result of new competitors can be to cause the market to
grow.
What has been identified so far is that there is a measure of agreement that a
"process" exists in the development of strategy, but in the execution of that process
the players branch off and deal with issues incrementally before re-joining the
process. That process element can be represented by Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to 3.7.
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3.3.2. LINKING STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT WITH MARKETING
STRATEGY
The starting point in linking strategic marketing with strategic planning and





As Abell and Hammond (1979) indicated, a strategic plan is not the same as a
marketing plan. The former plans all aspects of an organization's strategy in the
marketplace, while the latter, in contrast, deals with actions surrounding the
products and market segments. As is shown in Figure 3.3, in strategic marketing
planning, five analytical building blocks are required:
• Environmental data;
• Consumer and market understanding;
Followed by analysis of:
• Competitors;
• Relative strengths and weaknesses;
before formulating:
• Goals and strategic objectives.
These topics will be reviewed in turn.
3.3.2,1. Corporate mission
Mission statements are intended to impart a sense of vision to all relevant
players in the business. Such statements are considered very important in Japan,
certainly Matsushita (1979) considers the matter of crucial importance "...without a
philosophy there is no point in business." By defining the mission in need terms,
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the role of technology can be highlighted and put into perspective. In this way,
genuine opportunity areas can be charted. Moreover by being committed and
communicating that commitment, the mission can serve to motivate all those who
play a part in shaping the future of the business. As Ohmae (1982) argued,
"successful business strategies result not from rigorous analysis but from a
particular state of mind." He is not alone in believing that the Japanese success is
largely a function of Japanese management style (Pascale and Athos, 1981).
Porter's (1985) second book attempts to correct some of the deficiencies of his
first— which ignored execution by people almost entirely— first in the chapters
on horizontal strategy and inter-relationships; these chapters describe how an
organization may produce "synergy" between organizational sub units. However
these chapters offer little advice to management and touch on behaviour only
tangentially, an important omission, for as Quincy Hunsicker (1980) asserts, no
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matter how sophisticated or smooth the strategic planning process, it will not yield
perceptible benefits unless the process begins with good creative ideas and ends with
the management resolve to execute the plans thoroughly.
A key factor in mission formulation is consensus; it follows that if all agree that
the direction is the correct one then they are more likely to pursue the direction with
enthusiasm. This trait is one that Keegan (1983) indicated is prevalent in Japanese
companies. However, according to Morita (1987), consensus in most Japanese
companies means the elimination of individuality. "At Sony people are encouraged
to bring their ideas out into the open because it is believed that if ideas clash
something better may develop from the conflict". And, according to Ohmae
(1981), Japanese management keeps telling the workers that those at the frontier
know the business best. In this way it is argued that ..."Well run companies rely
heavily on individual or group initiatives for innovation and creative energy."
3.3.2.2. Strategic market segmentation
The next step is to segment the market at a strategic level as Abell and
Hammond (1979) suggested. That is to say that relatively homogeneous sections of
the market should be identified for which the company deems it worthwhile to offer
modified or dedicated marketing mixes. These segments imply sub markets
composed of customers with common uses or applications (Day et al., 1979). They
are segments that can be expected to have similar patterns of purchase or usage
behaviour (Frank et al., 1973). In this way decisions can be made to determine the
product-market scope or as this author prefers it, select arenas.
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3.3.2,3. Arena selection
Arenas are areas of consumer opportunity where competitors compete to satisfy
the needs of their target consumers. Arenas are consumer need based and
competitors may compete by way of the products and technologies of their
choosing, technologies being substitutable. An arena many comprise one or more
market segments. It is necessary to identify key arenas to foresee with which
competitors the enterprise will have to contend, and against which the strengths and
weaknesses of the enterprise may be compared.
Attempts, were made by Day et al. (1979), to examine the needs of marketing
planners for strategic analyses of competitive product-markets. They found that
seldom do the approaches that stress similarities of production processes, function
or raw materials give a satisfactory picture of either the threats or opportunities
facing a business. Market definitions tend to be narrow, reflecting a short term
orientation in the sense that there is a "chunk of demand to be filled with the
resources at my command," whereas the concerns of strategic planning are to reveal
a larger product-market to account for:
• Presently unserved potential markets
• Changes in technology, price relationships, and supply which broaden the
array of substitutes
• The time required by prospective buyers to react to these changes.
They define a product-market as "the set of products judged to be substitutes,
within those usage situations in which similar patterns of benefits are sought, and
the customers for whom such usage's are relevant." While the choice of one
definition of market over another may be indefensible, Day (1981) indicated that
the effect upon the business may be profound and the choice of market definition
may depend upon the type of analysis that is employed.
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3.3.2.4. Environmental Scanning
Environmental scanning is advocated as the key activity that enables
opportunities to be identified (Aguilar, 1967, Keegan, 1974; Keegan, 1983)6.
Conducting this type of analysis appears deceptively simple but in practice it is
inordinately difficult. "It requires data, imagination, experience and good
conceptual skills" (Abell and Hammond, 1979). Harvey (1982) gave the following
as the reasons why strategists do environmental analysis:
• Accelerating rate of change
• Changing opportunities and threats
• Companies that do tend to be more effective
Some techniques of environmental analysis are:
• Scanning and information gathering (Keegan, 1974:13)
• Expert opinion such as professors, consultants, etc. (Harvey, 1982:97) In
particular, there is the "Delphi" method that involves using a group of
knowledgeable people who make anonymous predictions that are then
summarized by computer and fed back to the panel until a consensus is reached.
Competitive intelligence may be obtained by way of a variety of approaches both
ethical and unethical such as:
• Buying competitive product and analysing it
• Field force feed back
• Key people spend a few days per year talking to end customers
• Sales force de briefings
• Hiring or pretending to hire competitor personnel (Harvey, 1982:108).
Drucker (1985) emphasized the importance of interpreting and responding to
environmental intelligence: the House of Rothschild, he disclosed, was the world's
6 See later this chapter in section 3.4.2.5
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most dominant financial power but it failed to evaluate the significance of the many
people who were emigrating from Europe to North America; Rothschild believed
that only "riff raff" would leave Europe. Whereas J.P. Morgan took over
Rothschild's remit by establishing a world wide bank in New York, rather than in
Europe. This it did by financing immigrant based industries in North America.
Porter (1979) proposed that "In the fight for market share, competition is not
only manifest in the other players. Rather, competition in an industry is rooted in
its underlying economics, and competitive forces exist that go well beyond the
established combatants in a particular industry. Customers, suppliers, potential
entrants, and substitute products are all competitors that may be more or less
prominent or active depending on the industries." Changing conditions may also
play a major part in the destiny of an enterprise, for example, when the Polaroid
patents expired the cost entry barrier built by proprietary technology was removed.
It was not surprising that Kodak plunged into the instant camera arena. What
Porter did not mention was that it was a disastrous move because the consumer held
a particularly well defined perception of Polaroid and Eastman Kodak's launch
advertising expenditure was easily translated into sales for Polaroid as a result of
Eastman Kodak's inability to ensure adequate retail inventories of its product
(Kotler, 1988). Later we will explore Eastman Kodak's entry strategy in the
Japanese market.
Linneman and Klein (1985), showed that a high percentage of US companies
use environmental scenarios in strategic planning. Scenarios, they argue, provide a
visible way to present changes in the operating environment. They make the point
that studies have shown that the perceived usefulness of multiple scenarios is
directly related to management's involvement in the process. Leemuis (1985)
mentioned that Shell Nederland has experimented with a process of strategy
development over the last few years. They learned that corporate planners require
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flexibility to gear their approaches to operating managers and one of the key
approaches in offering such flexibility has been the application of scenarios.
The result of environmental scanning may well produce an intuitive appreciation
of opportunities. As Drucker (1985) noted demographic shifts are difficult to
predict but the prize for doing so is valuable. He offered the example: "The drop
in infant mortality in the Third World can be explained only in retrospect. It was
caused by a convergence of old technologies; the public health nurse; placing the
latrine below the well; vaccination; the wire screen outside the window; and of very
new antibiotics and pesticides such as DDT. Yet it was totally unpredictable."
3.3.2.5. Consumer and market data
Scanning data, as we shall see later in this chapter under the heading Probe in
section 3.4.2.5 is often a prelude to the procurement of more specific market and
consumer research data. When the acquisition of this data leads to a better
understanding of the consumer behaviour, it forms an important building block for
marketing and strategic decision taking.
3.3.2.6. Competitor analysis
The value of the arena concept is that it helps pinpoint existing and potential
competitors, the latter being those that can serve the same groups of needs,
irrespective of their technologies (Levitt, 1960). As Hamel and Prahalad (1989)
asserted, few Western companies have good track records in anticipating the
movements of global competitors and that is due to the way they have approached
competitor analysis. Indeed, it is only after the competitors have been identified
that the company's own strengths and weaknesses may be assessed, for they are
relative to competitors. A major weakness of SWOT (strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats) analysis is that it often misses this critical point (Reid,
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1990).
3.3.2.1. Relative strengths and weaknesses
Porter (1979) highlighted that strategic decisions involving a large segment of an
industry can have a major impact upon the threat of entry. For example, US wine
producers in the 1960s increased product introductions, raised advertising levels,
and expanded distribution channels. In that way they increased the barriers by
improving economies of scale and making access to distribution channels more
difficult. Similarly, Dr Pepper took advantage of its unique flavour to "piggy
back" on Coke and Pepsi bottlers who wanted a full line to sell to customers; a
strategy shown to be important for foreign companies developing a position in Japan
(Schofield, 1988). Exploiting industry change and industry evolution is important
strategically because evolution brings with it changes in the sources of competition
(Porter, 1979).
Later, Porter (1985) proposed the value chain as a basis for identifying potential
competitive advantages. Arguing that every firm is a collection of activities that are
performed to design, produce, market, deliver, and support its product, the value
chain disaggregates a firm into nine strategically relevant activities to understand the
behaviour of costs in the specific business and industry as well as the existing and
potential sources of differentiation. The nine value activities consist of five primary
activities and four support activities (see Figure 3.4). The task of the firms is to
examine its costs and performance in each value activity and look for
improvements. By estimating its competitor's costs and performances and
establishing them as benchmarks, it may gauge its relative performance and thus
assess whether it has achieved a competitive advantage. In the quest for
competitive advantage the enterprise requires to look beyond its own value chain
into that of its suppliers, distributors and customers. In this way, it may help its
157






firm infrastructure \ >









3.3.3. GOALS AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
The next stage in Figure 3.3 is to establish corporate goals for the enterprise
based on the knowledge of the selected arenas and what they can be expected to
deliver. Keegan (1983) argued that these goals should be expressed qualitatively,
for example, to be the most reliable, among the fastest, to dominate, and so on. As
is shown in Figure 3.5, goals can then be translated into measurable terms and then
compared with the view of what is likely to be achieved without strategic efforts
(Keegan, 1983; Mintzberg, 1973). Some term this approach as linear (Chaffee,
1985), others regard it as rational (Peters and Waterman, 1982), with Fredrickson,
(1983) applying the term rational comprehensive.
Chaffee (1985) produced three models of strategic management: the first, the
"linear" model (formal planning), the second the "adaptive" model a term also used
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by Mitchell et al. (1986) which corresponds to the idea of incremental strategic
change (Quinn, 1980). The explanations for which vary from satisficing behaviour
in the context of organizational politics (Simon, 1957) to that of others who see it as
essentially logical. Her (Chaffee, 1985) third model the "interpretative" model was
challenged by Weick (1983) who indicated there is the presumption of logic on
behalf of managers meeting a complex situation. He argued that they bring their
own cognitive maps which provide a view of the world that helps them interpret and
respond to the changes that the organization faces.
Paul et al. (1978) asserted that to avoid ambiguity in the communication of
strategic objectives, quantification has usually been relied upon. Thus
management's vision of the future has tended to be summed up in purely financial
terms. They argue that the strategic gap has often been quantified in this way and
since the forecast of sales and profits from existing products tends toward the
pessimistic, many companies that engage in strategic planning have been lured into
diversification. Those authors cite this based upon their consulting experience but
give no figures. However they seem to be lending support for the argument that
ambiguity is something that should be tolerated, perhaps harnessed positively, just
as it has been in the objective setting processes of Japanese companies. For
example, top management in some kaisha claim to deliberately keep goals vague for
the express purpose of stimulating creative thought (Person, 1989; Yoshino, 1990).
What the apparent disputes in the literature have in common is that they
underline the complexity of human behaviour that is usually compounded further
when expressed in the context of an organization. Harnessing human behaviour in a
positive way is one of the greatest challenges of management. As Quinn (1984)
asserted, effective top managers do not announce goals to the organization as
precise packages. They do not because they recognize that to do so will centralize
the organization in an undesirable way, for to issue them is to state what is
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important and to foreclose thought and consideration on other alternatives. Good
managers want to benefit from the genuine participation and dedication of those
who have it.
On paper, the model depicted in Figures 3.3, and 3.5 to 3.7 appears entirely
rational, but Minkes (1987:59) made the point that rational decision making models
make the following assumptions:
• There is no difficulty in agreeing on what facts are
• That an overall policy objective is meaningful
• A precise mutually acceptable definition of the problem exists.
Although there is some logic to this and observations of, say, falling sales may be
not be in dispute, the causes may be debatable. Moreover, in most organizations
there will be a number of strategic objectives that are in conflict so an overall view
may be hard to obtain. For example, a decision to develop the Japanese market will
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require much investment over a long time horizon, the costs of which may be
burdensome and impair corporate performance in the medium term.
Given that goal and objective setting has been ambitious, a gap between the
view and the desired state is likely (Figure 3.5). As Hamel and Prahalad (1989)
put it: the new global corporate leaders of today began with ambitions that were
out of all proportion to their resources and capabilities. Their obsession with
winning at all levels of the organization has been termed "strategic intent." This
concept encompasses an active management process and provides consistency to
short-term action, while leaving room for reinterpretation as new opportunities
emerge. Achieving strategic intent requires enormous creativity concerning means.
This creativity comes in the service of a clearly prescribed end. Whereas the
traditional view of strategy focuses on the degree of fit between existing resources
and current opportunities, strategic intent creates an extreme misfit between
resources and ambitions. Top management challenges the organization to close the
gap by systematically building new advantages. To accomplish, they argued, a
strategic intent, a company must carefully manage competitive engagements so that
scarce resources are conserved. Aiming to be number one in a business is the
essence of strategic intent.
The gap between the two positions of where the company is and where it wants
to be is that which the planning process is intended to bridge. Broadly speaking the
gap can be plugged organically by implementing two types of strategies (Figure
3.6), product and market (Ansoff, 1965), while taking account of the need to
develop and take account of:
• Common thread (Drucker, 1968)




There has been much debate in the literature as to the value of "sticking to the
knitting" as expressed by Peters and Waterman (1982), or synergy— the 2+2=5
effect— (Ansoff, 1965). Synergy is a benefit derived from the property of
relatedness. Yet, in a UK study during the 1970's, it was shown that consistent
unrelated product strategies provided greater returns at less risk than companies
consistently following single, dominant or related product strategies over the period
(Luffman and Reed, 1984), whereas earlier Scott (1973) argued that related
constrained conglomerates perform more consistently.
Peters and Waterman (1982) argued that shared values represent the core of the
corporate culture, a trait that is at the heart of the Japanese corporate system.
Whereas Hoffstede et al (1990) analysed ten different organizations on twenty
different business units. They concluded that the "one best way" assumption held in
Peters and Waterman's (1982) eight maxims were too generalized. As a counter
argument they proposed that what is good or bad depends in each case on where one
wants the organization to go, and a cultural feature that is an asset for one purpose
is, more often than not, a liability in another.
Hofstede et al. empirically showed shared perceptions of daily custom, habit,
tradition etc. to be at the core. Their explanation of the difference between theirs
and the findings of Peters and Waterman (as well as those of many other US
authors) is a fundamental one. Description of organizational cultures in the US
based management literature "rarely distinguishes" between the values of founders
and "significant leaders" and those of the bulk of people in the organization. The
usefulness of the Hofstede approach was to gauge to what extent the views of these
"corporate heroes" obtain ownership amongst their constituencies, those being the
employees whom they are hoping to motivate. It is particularly relevant in the
Japanese context as the views of founders tend to become hallowed (Keegan, 1983).
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Other attempts have been made to gauge the usage of strategic planning and
attitudes towards its usefulness in steering the business between cultures.
Shrivastava (1985) stressed that the culture of the organization is a critical variable
for effective strategic planning. That author argued that managers need to examine
the culture of the organization and its potential impact upon strategy. While it may
be rather difficult to change the organizational culture, awareness of it can lead to
strategies that are consistent with it.
In an influential work, Rumelt (1974) clarified the product/market concept by
defining a business unit as one that could be managed separately from the firms
other activities. He argued that "related-constrained" conglomerates are more
consistent performers than those without the constraint. However Montgomery
(1979) removed the pharmaceutical companies from his sample and challenged his
results. Later, Rumelt (1982) presented a new seven category system, formed from
the original nine category typology, by combining two categories each in the
dominant and unrelated diversified groups. He again showed a
diversity/performance relationship; related constrained firms being the best
performers on a 5 year average return on invested capital measure.
By analyzing performance differences between established firms diversifying
into young industries, performance was found to be associated with firm size and
financial strength, (this will be shown later to be a characteristic of the Japanese
situation), time of entry, and the maturity of the firm's markets (Smith and Cooper,
1988). As an industry evolves, the relative importance of variables appears to
change. The authors suggested that when entry into a young industry is being
considered, success is more likely the earlier it is made. As we shall see later,




The anticipation of change can be substantially improved if an organizing
framework can be used to identify sources and directions of change in a systematic
manner. Appropriate responses to change require a clear understanding of the
alternative strategic options available to management as a market evolves and
change takes place. These changes result in a predictable change in fit between the
firm and its markets— leading to defined periods during which a "strategic
window" exists and can be exploited (Abell, 1978).
PIMS (Profit Impact of Market Strategies) is one of the main aids that have
been developed to enhance the evaluation of strategic alternatives. It was originally
developed at General Electric using confidential data on 1000 businesses and then
transferred to the Strategic Planning Institute. The most publicised use of the PIMS
data consisted of a regression model involving 37 independent variables that predict
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80% of the criterion variable— Return on Investment (ROI) (Ansoff, 1965).
PIMS initiated much thought about the true nature of the relationships among those




The net outcome of this process is the preparation of operational plans that
specify what will happen both in product and market terms, what investments will
be made in each of these respects and how responsibility will be delineated for the
execution of the plans (Figure 3.7). The output of the process is the marketing
mix; a combination of products, pricing and branding strategies, distribution
coverage, communications actions, etc. (Borden, 1964). As was mentioned earlier,
it is the collective effect of all of these elements of which timing is a critical
element that determines the relative success of a company in the marketplace (Reid,
1980). It will be shown later in this thesis that one of the characteristic differences
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between Japanese companies and Western companies is that they appear to react
very quickly with new products.
Peters and Waterman (1982) argued that strategy used to mean a good idea "to
knock the socks of the competition," whereas now it is synonymous with
quantitative breakthrough. They stressed that the process of implementation is
crucial. While there are companies that are the envy of their peers with being able
to perform detailed effective analysis of situations such as Procter and Gamble.
Although they may be good at using the numbers to solve problems, companies are
all too frequently paralyzed by analysis which is to say that their plans are
insufficiently creative or they fail because insufficient regard is paid to the
practicalities of implementation. In the words of TI's Patrick Haggerty ..."those
who implement the plans must make the plans" (Peters and Waterman, 1982).
Quinn (1979) argued that a major error is to freeze plans too soon. Design and
development he noted needs to be oriented to invention, innovation and change. It
is, he argued, necessary to adopt the best currently available technical solutions and
to adapt to the customers' most current perceived needs. In this way the process
should be designed to offer the quickest possible feedback from the marketplace and
technical communities. Later Quinn (1985) argued that big and successful
innovative companies tend to behave like many small entrepreneurs. They accept
the essential chaos of development. They pay close attention to their users' needs
and avoid making detailed marketing or technical plans at an early stage. This
prescription is very much like the Japanese model that has been observed and will
be reported on later7.
7 See Chapter 5
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3.3.3.4. Conflicting Opinions
Porter's model of competitive strategy shown in Figure 3.8 shares some
common ingredients with that shown in Figure 3.3 and Figures 3.5 to 3.7 but is less
detailed and the iterative nature of strategy development is less apparent. However
amidst all the foregoing writings, different philosophies appear to vie with each
other to be seen as most representative of reality. This apparent conflict has been
crystallised rather appositely by a debate between Henry Mintzberg and Igor
Ansoff. Mintzberg (1990) called into question some of the most fundamental
beliefs of strategic management theory by questioning what he refers to as the
design school — that is the approach advocated which proposes a simple model that
views the process as one of design to achieve an essential fit between external
threats and opportunities and internal distinctive competence. In this way he
attempts to systematically demolish the essential premises upon which that mode of
thinking was built. In particular he focussed on one central theme, he denigrated
the idea that thought exists independently of action then argued that strategy
formulation exists as a process of conception rather than one of learning. He
supports his thesis by questioning the validity of strengths and weakness analysis
and cites a work by Stevenson as his primary evidence in which it was found that
general agreement regarding strengths and weaknesses did not wholly exist
(Stevenson, 1976). As attractive as his superficial logic is (Mintzberg, 1990); he
errs on the side of the polemic by attempting to justify that the field of strategic
management should be left to the "emerging strategy school," represented primarily
by himself.
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In a response article in the Strategic Management Journal, Ansoff (1991) found
Mintzberg's analysis deficient in two fundamental areas: methodological soundness
and factual veracity. He deemed that Mintzberg's (1990) descriptive assertions
were at variance with facts readily available in current strategic management
practice even to the extent of criticizing Mintzberg's definition of strategy
(Mintzberg, 1990). Ansoff also condemned Mintzberg's failure to distinguish
between prescriptive and descriptive statements; and his failure to define the context
for his prescriptions. He was especially concerned about Mintzberg's preoccupation
with the managers' need to be sure about situations and the inference that they
cannot act before they are sure, something that could never be assumed in the
Japanese market. The reality is that these disputes of philosophy are more to do
with degree than they are about fundamentals and the writers are bound by more
issues than divide them.
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We will now proceed downstream into the operational zone of the model
depicted in Figure 3.7 to consider the execution phase represented by the
implementation of marketing strategies.
3.4. MARKETING
"Marketing is a social and managerial process by which individuals and groups
obtain what they need and want through creating and exchanging products and value
with others" (Kotler, 1988). This definition is based on notions of: needs, wants,
demands, products, utility, value, satisfaction, exchange, transactions,
relationships, markets, marketing and marketers. From the marketers' side it
involves identification of market opportunities, preparation and planning to exploit
the opportunity profitably, followed by effective execution of the plans. It thus
brings together many variables which if combined well will determine corporate
fortunes. Marketing strategy and planning are thus key to the destiny of the
enterprise.
A positive destiny it can be argued can be best assured by ensuring that the
enterprise occupies a series of secure intermediate positions. Porter discussed the
dominant strategic positions that are available and how they can be achieved. A
framework for assessment of the strategic position of an enterprise is provided by
his analysis (Porter, 1980; Porter, 1985). He maintained that competitors within an
industry jockey for position within a domain dictated by external forces: bargaining
power of suppliers and customers, the threat of new entrants, substitute products or
services and competitors. The combination of these five factors determines the
position of a particular firm inside the industry.
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According to Porter (1985) are three potentially successful generic strategic
approaches in which a company can succeed in an industry. It can strive for overall
cost leadership, pursue differentiation or focus on a market niche. Since industries
may offer more than one means of differentiation and several market niches, there
are opportunities for numerous firms to be successful in the same industry.
Effective implementation of either of these strategies requires a total commitment
with appropriate organizational support.
The worst situation that may befall a company Porter asserted is to be "stuck in
the middle" by which it develops an indistinctive corporate positioning and the firm
cannot or fails to adopt a specific strategy. We shall see later that this turned out to
be a key problem with foreign companies in the Japanese marketplace. More
generally, such firms experience vulnerability to their long term survival, especially
in times of recession. Using Porter's template a firm is able to assess its position
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within the industry, whether it is a leader, follower, differentiator, nicher, etc., and
its competitive power relative to the other participants. In this way it may assess
the potential threats and its available scope for manoeuvre. Adopting a particular
position is no guarantee of success. For example a high cost differentiator may
become vulnerable during times of recession and as a consequence cost reduction
may become its prime strategy.
The tactical aspect of the strategy is to develop and execute the marketing mix
— the controllable variables available to the marketer (Borden, 1964). First it is
necessary to obtain a clearly defined view of the target consumer by segmenting the
market into sub groups with clearly defined needs.
3.4.1. MARKET SEGMENTATION
Segmentation is a method used to refine the marketers view of the market and
aid the identification of a target market on which the company will focus a fine
tuned marketing strategy. It involves linking observations of consumer
characteristics with their buying behaviour. Segmentation is as much creatively
based as it is analytically derived. It will be shown later that creative segmentation
strategies are extremely important in the Japanese context. A lengthy regurgitation
of the descriptions of segmentation methods will not be given here as such can be
found in any worthwhile text book. However, to develop this argument we will







The process of segmentation hinges around that which can be measured.
Segmentations can be based on many different types of measure, for example,
demographics, psychographics, benefits, life style, usage behaviour, ACORN (A
Classification of Residential Neighbourhoods: a system that is predicated on the
belief that like minded value sharing people will flock to the same kind of areas),
and many others. No one method is perfect for the marketer's requirements.
Efforts are continuously being made to find alternative methods of segmentation
that work. The company ACCI which markets ACORN attempted to introduce a
method that utilized the names of householders using the logic that Ethels and
Myrtles are likely to manifest buying behaviour unlike Clarindas and Geraldines.
Demographic segmentation is probably still the most popular segmentation
method merely because of the wide availability of statistical data that give the
impression that segmentation measures can be found. For example there are
census, earnings, employment statistics and readership leading to social
classification terminology such as A, B, CI, C2, etc. Yet does it mean that if
heavy users of a particular lipstick brand tend to be clustered in social classes C2
and D and be between the ages of 14 to 17 that the marketer has established a
cause-effect relationship or merely one based on association? The latter is the case,
although it is also true that a causal relationship may exist but it cannot be proven
by the data alone.
The most fundamental of all communications principles is to know one's
audience. If demographic data are to be used intelligently they may provide
guidance on media selection but would provide little guidance to a copywriter or
creative director in constructing a commercial with appropriate "tone of voice"
because females answering to the above demographic description may represent
many different values, interests and orientations. Therefore this demographic data
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requires to be supplemented by other data types such as psychographic information
to provide a more rounded comprehensive understanding of the consumer (Roberts
and Wortzel, 1979; Bearden etal., 1978; Schipchandler, 1979; Teel etal., 1979).
This question of shared values is an important consideration in identifying
segments which it is anticipated will react with some degree of homogeneity to a
modified marketing mix. Certainly it was the experience of wine marketers during
the 1980s — a time when table wine retained some upper class cachet— that
certain working class areas, for example Brixton, had concentrations of heavy users
of an "upper class product." It was argued by ACCI that ACORN type G, into
which Brixton was classified, was a more composite segmentation measure in that
people that shared similar thinking values are more likely to precipitate towards
similar areas and this sharing of values transcends a working class demographic
profile8.
3.4.1.2, Substantiality
The principle of marketing focus is predicated on the enterprise considering it to
be worthwhile to adapt or originate a marketing mix for an identified target market.
Such departures from standard formulae add to costs significantly. For example,
shorter production runs result perhaps involving labor intensive methods
(automation being ruled out until viability has been demonstrated and some degree
of market position having been won). Production is however the most obvious
addition to costs but the increase to marketing costs may be immense. Advertising
and promotion costs can account for as much as 60% of sales during the launch of a
new consumer brand (Buzzel et al., 1972). It is necessary therefore that companies
commit to heavy expenditures until their brands are shouldered above threshold.
So, even if the aggregated market is huge, as is the case in Japan, it may also be
^ Conversations with Richard Webber, the "inventor" of ACORN
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true that it is also fragmented into segments that are uneconomic to serve.
The point is that creative judgments are required at every level to benefit from
the use of the segmentation approach; the data alone will not solve the problem.
For example, if a company's response to a segmentation opportunity is to develop a
new product, the company will encounter difficulty translating consumer knowledge
into a product concept and successfully nurturing its transition through the product
development stage to market test and full commercialization, as the attrition rate of
new product ideas among commercialized products demonstrated by Booz Allen and
Hamilton testifies (1982). No one can guarantee that the same consumers will still
be eager to buy and consume the product when it eventually reaches the market.
No one can vouch that the consumer will respond to the advertising and other
communications urging them to do so. Creative and business judgments are
necessary at every stage of the process and the risks are high.
So, when many commentators claimed there was something new about PepsiCo
creating the "Pepsi Generation" one is bound to consider whether it is any more true
than there was a segment of consumers readily awaiting Procter and Gamble to
perfume their washing powders in the early 1950s, or awaiting Colgate Palmolive to
insert spearmint into its toothpaste; after consideration one is bound to conclude no.
What is likely is that there exists research data of various types, all of which
contribute to an understanding of a complex consumer problem. Most importantly
there is interpretation of that data, followed by the execution of a strategy to address
the opportunity that it is believed has been identified. So while markets may be
segmented into "fragrance loving detergent" or "spearmint non appreciative"
consumers, the categories could not exist without there first being an effort by the
marketers to offer the product and build an image for their brands.
The "Pepsi Generation" segmentation resulted, as do so many opportunities, as
a backlash to a competitor's success. Coke had, via its world-wide advertising
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McCann Erickson, for some 20 years been running life style advertising. These
commercials were purposefully designed to maximize broad consumer appeal.
They depicted all ages, sexes, classes and ethnic groups, engaged in activities in
which consumption of Coke could be considered relevant. For many years it was a
successful formula. The opportunity to which PepsiCo made its creative response
was the lack of proprietary appeal that Coke offered to particular age groups. They
seized upon the youth market which was buying the product in spite of its
advertising and focused upon that segment as they are heavy consumers of soft
drinks and have a tendency, according to Enrico and Kornbluth (1986), to prefer
what their parents do not.
In conjunction with its advertising agency BBDO, PepsiCo startled the
marketing and wider world by paying Michael Jackson US$5 million in 1983 to
appear in two commercials, and later US$13 million to shoot one in which the
temperamental star would only allow his face to be shown for six seconds. Such
decisions require faith and creative decision making ability to be coupled with other
circumstantial factors; Roger Enrico, President of PepsiCo was in a honeymoon
period when he allowed the first major investment in Jackson to be made.
Subsequently it (PepsiCo) has outshone Coca Cola in advertising terms. In 1991
consumer research in conducted in the United States verified that Pepsi had been
winning the advertising battle for some time9. This contrasts with Japan where
Coca Cola dominates the vending machine distribution channel and thus prevents
Pepsi from gaining a significant position.
^ Source: BBDO—Pepsi's advertising agency.
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3.4.1.3. Accessibility
The principle of segmentation is hinged on the principle that the enterprise
concentrates on certain target markets and by implication ignores others. However
in practice it is very difficult to address one target audience to the exclusion of
others. Television audiences are notoriously volatile in so far as they change from
one slot to the next. Moreover particular spots such as the news may attract many
different types of consumer. Hence communications costs are high because the
creative message may be tailored to the few, but the media costs incurred buy
access to the many! Chapter 2 detailed that the fragmented nature of Japanese
media aids segmentation strategies in that market.
3.4.1.4. Actionability
With all the different types of research data— attitude and opinion,
psychographic, lifestyle, benefits sought, and so on, many opportunities exist to
segment markets. However while it may be true at the conceptual level, practical
exploitation of such opportunities may yet evade the marketer. For example should
Cartier or Giorgio Armani identify that their customers possess a common trait of
acquisitiveness it will be of only limited use unless effective strategies could be
formulated to utilize the knowledge. At the end of the day it is necessary to use the
data to construct a marketing mix. That means a product strategy utilizing
acquisitiveness, harnessing that knowledge to formulate distribution policy and
determine— outlets, geographical concentration, types of shopping area and so on.
Some implications for pricing may be rather more obvious with high skimming
pricing strategies to underline product desirability. However when it comes to
communications strategies the property of acquisitiveness may be utilized in creative
terms but be impossible to use for media selection.
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3.4.2. THE MARKETING MIX
After considering the strategic perspective, the tactical aspects of the strategies













The marketing mix, originally conceptualised as four variables: Product, Price,
Promotion and Place (Borden, 1964), and subsequently extended to include Probe
(market intelligence) (Keegan, 1974) recognizes that results are derived from a
combination of variables over which the marketer has control. Over the years it has
been suggested that packaging should be considered as a separate "P" and latterly
that "P" for people should be included in the mix. What is crucial, however, is that
selection of and concentration on a particular combination determines a collective
effect. In essence the marketing mix concept is about maximizing consumer utility
by providing a finely honed offer that embodies the right product at the right price
Price Promotion Place Probe
List price Advertising Channels Marketing
Discounts Selling Coverage research
Allowances Sales prom. Location Intelligence
Settlement Publicity Inventory Scanning data
Credit terms Transport
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in the right place at the right time, presented in the right way. There are two
guiding rules in applying the marketing mix: consistency and blend (Borden,
1964).
Each of the variables is required to be consistent, for example if the product is
up market then this quality need be reflected in the choice of distribution channel
and communications support. If the ingredients of the mix are blended in a unique
way, then it presents a key opportunity to differentiate a commodity product or one
that incorporates no proprietary technology. These rules imply that firms should
not waste effort and resources on a variable in the mix that is not consistent with its
strategy. It may be advantageous for enterprises to explore the marketing mix of
their products and reassess the effectiveness and efficiency of the variables. In this
way inconsistencies with the overall strategy may be removed and ways examined
to improve the effectiveness of each variable and its contribution to the mix because
it is the overall collective effect of the mix that ultimately determines market share
position (Reid, 1980). The implication is that in extremely competitive market
situations, such as we shall see exists in Japan, great efforts are required to
differentiate the offer by loading the marketing mix accordingly.
Marketing mix strategy is usually depicted in the context of the product life
cycle (PLC) theory. The theory classifies the life of a product into several phases:
introduction, growth, maturity, decline and the emphasis of marketing mix variables
changes according to PLC phase (Kotler, 1988). While the PLC theory has been
remarkably durable, there are flaws in the analogy and in the application of the
concept. It has, however, been argued that the product life cycle is a useful concept
with a part to play in forecasting, pricing, advertising, and product planning
(Smallwood, 1973). Others contend that products gain second lives— for example
motor bikes as a result of the Japanese shake up, or re incarnation due to brilliant
promotion. While many writers have failed to distinguish between product class
and product form (cigarettes versus filtered cigarettes) or brand, it does not matter.
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The PLC concept has little validity as evidenced by brands that buck the product
class trend and vice versa and application of the generalized strategies to meet the
stages are likely to cause more confusion than they will help (Dahlia and Yuspeh,
1976). However specific exceptions do not invalidate a theory that at best can only
be approximate.
To build an effective marketing mix requires an understanding of consumers and
how they differ. Identifying useful differences is the process of market
segmentation.
3.4.2.1. Product
If a product or service fails to perform against consumers' expectations repeat
purchase will be unlikely. Furthermore, negative word of mouth communications
will be triggered resulting in a reduction of trial (Engel et al., 1990). In some
instances consumers will trade off one dimension against another such as paying
more for superior quality (Bettman, 1979). Product differentiation is considered to
be present when essentially similar products are made to appeal to different target
groups or be deemed more suitable for certain occasions. This is achieved by
developing differential perceptions by consumers by adding value by combining
variations of product options, branding, packaging, style, sizes and so on. For
example, water and sugar are commodities. With the addition of brominated
vegetable oils and caffeines, colas are formed. Market and endow them with
emotional values as Coke and Pepsi and they become brands. Branding is a key
form of differentiation; it identifies commodities by endowing them with distinct
personalities. A brand image takes considerable time to develop and represents the
investment element of many years of communications expenditure. In the words of
Sir Hector Laing of United Biscuits:
Buildings age and become dilapidated, machines wear out, cars rust,
but what lives on are brands (Economist, 1988).
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It is a relatively recent development for companies to include a value on its brands
in the balance sheet. RHM was among the first to do this by rating its brand
portfolio at £678 million in its 1987 accounts. Not only do manufacturers brand
products, they also brand the experience of purchasing them. For example BMW
checks that the dealers that supply and service the product are clean; it sells
expensive leather jackets and briefcases to expensive looking drivers giving users
the distinct feeling they have joined an elite (BMW has been particularly successful
in Japan). Thus brand and product identity are of crucial importance in relation to
consumers' wants and needs providing they accord with their perceptions of value,
especially at premium prices.
Attempting to be all things to all people by attempting to offer a universal
product of indeterminate identity to a group of consumers only vaguely defined
result in being what was referred to earlier as "stuck in the middle" (Porter, 1980).
To avoid this situation Porter argues that it is necessary to:
• Increase differentiation or cost focus
• Narrow the scope in order to receive a better hearing.
To operationalize this, firms need to understand the segmentation concept which is
often about identifying subtle differences between consumer groups and reflecting
these differences with product propositions and positionings. Enterprises that
successfully build brands achieve longer term protection in the marketplace. Given
the right sort of communications and development support, brand names become
indelibly locked into the consumers' mind and perceptions become linked with
positive properties in the way that Rolls Royce is linked with quality. In this way
an enterprise may enhance its competitiveness by adding values which consumers
actually prize. Moreover, firms may leverage their established brands by exploiting
their brand concepts in other product categories.
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3.4.2.2. Price
No matter how good a product is there will always be some consumers for
whom there is a price limit. Others may be able to afford the higher price but
prefer to allocate their discretionary spending power elsewhere. On the other hand,
even though a product is available at a lower price the buyer may not accept lower
standards of product performance and willingly pay a premium; a characteristic we
see often in the Japanese context. So, pricing a product is not merely the process of
setting the price that the consumer will pay but establishing a strategy that will
satisfy consumers and trade alike, yet yield satisfactory returns to the originator.
Marketing can be viewed as shifting the battleground away from price to other
factors by establishing qualitative values in the eyes of consumers, and price is seen
as something to be balanced against these factors: for example perceived value
versus price premium. Price can be altered without alienating consumers providing
essential changes have been accounted for in the other marketing mix variables.
For example a price hike may be supported by changes and/or improvements to:
promotion, product and distribution and so enhance value perceptions with the
consumer.
A variety of different types of pricing policy could be adopted to suit diverse
circumstances: destroyer, penetration, promotional, skimming, etc. To be a
destroyer relies on the enterprise having a powerful market position to defend and
the resources to drive weaker competitors out of the business. Penetration involves
pricing keenly to deter new entrants while taking advantage of the high price
elasticity of demand in the market. Promotional deals are frequently offered to
induce consumers to try a new product. Whereas skimming is often used where the
market is limited in scale, not responsive to price offers and/or a conservative
management is attempting to claw back cash quickly to offset any development
expenses that may have been incurred (Kotler, 1988).
Price as a variable in the marketing mix is especially important in the face of
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competition. It is also the interface where the consumer decides what represents
value to him.
3.4.2.3. Communications
In the context of marketing mix discussions this function is referred to as
Promotion but only to round out the use of the letter "P." Communications is a
much broader term and is now used more frequently to include: advertising,
personal selling, sales promotions, publicity. Advertising is paid for identifiable
communication. It is clearly dedicated to persuading the consumer to buy or
promote attitude change and the consumer knows it. Advertising communications
are de-coded by the consumer in a way that reflects a lifetime of experience with
advertising and is to some degree culture specific10. We will see later that this is a
salient issue for foreign marketers in Japan.
Advertising does offer the advantage of enabling the communicator the power to
exaggerate and repeat the message. It is extremely expensive in terms of overall
cost magnitude but in terms of the cost per viewer or reader it is low and in this
way justifies the high amount of expenditure allocated to it. However ensuring that
the vast figures spent on advertising do justice is a skilled, professional process. As
Nestle, a company that has been directly communicating with consumers since
1866, put it:
Unpublished research by this author on whisky advertising demonstrated a
wide variety of interpretations across ethnic groups
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Advertising is our principal voice to the consumer and probably the
most powerful brand builder at our disposal. Therefore, since
budgets are always limited, it behooves us to use it well. Results
have proven that good, intelligent advertising works many times
harder than mediocre advertising.
Nestle Advertising Manual
Personal selling involves two-way communications and enables the message to
be adapted as the interaction continues. Consumers know that they are being sold
to and treat the information received accordingly. However where technical matters
are under consideration the perceived technical expertness of the salesperson can
overcome this time of resistance and in the eyes of the customer he can translate
into a technical consultant whose advice is valued (Anonymous, 1978; Engel et al.,
1990).
Publicity refers to non paid communications such as the reproduction of press
releases and other "non media generated" editorial. Event management and press
conferences are the key activities involved. Information that is transmitted to
consumers through editorial can have high source credibility (Engel et al., 1990).
The disadvantage is that it can only be done once. However, such communications
devices can promote positive word of mouth and like exchanges have the highest




This element refers to the way the company ensures the product reaches the
consumer. It deals with distribution policy. In some ways it represents the least
controllable element since it usually relies heavily on intermediaries. It involves
decisions on direct and indirect channels of distribution; geographical coverage;
inventory allocation by location; inventory levels and investment; physical
transportation. Channels of distribution refers to the system of marketing
institutions that aid the transfer of title from producer to consumer (Kotler, 1988),
regarded as a complex issue by those first attempting to develop a Japanese
business.
Decisions on the use of distribution channels affect other aspects of the
marketing operation and usually imply long term associations. In fixing
arrangements consideration require to be given to the types of intermediaries used
and the number of stages in the chain; the number and types of intermediary; the
tasks and responsibilities to be carried out by the marketing organization and by the
members forming the distribution chain. It is thus desirable that enterprises reassess
channels on a continuous basis and make adjustments when opportunities permit. In
doing so, trade discounts may also be kept under review alongside the standard of
service which such discounts buy from distributors.
3.4.2.5. Probe
The fifth P represents probe or scanning, i.e., to procure market intelligence.
Scanning is information acquisition of which there are two modes: surveillance and
search. The former is about acquiring information by general viewing, it is not
especially focused but it implies a dedication to the acquisition of information,
whereas the second is about monitoring or giving focused attention to a particular
issue or topic area (Keegan, 1974). Search is a relatively limited and informal
seeking out of specific information and may involve structured research.
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Apparently the vast bulk of strategic information results from surveillance (see
Figures 3.10 and 3.11).
FIGURE 3.10 - SCANNING MODES
Modes of Coverage
Surveillance Orientation
Viewing General exposure to external information where the
viewer has no specific purpose in mind other than
exploration
Monitoring Focused attention, not involving active search, to a
clearly defined area or type of external information
Search
orientation
Investigation A relatively limited and informal seeking out of specific
information




FIGURE 3.11 -- IMPORTANCE OF SCANNING MODES










Keegan (1983) argued that Japanese marketers are prepared to make decisions
based upon their subjective judgement because they are active scanners and as we
saw earlier perception and judgement goes hand in hand.
3.4.3. POSITIONING
Positioning is an attempt by the marketer to influence the mind of the prospect
in some way that will be beneficial to the brand (Ries and Trout, 1986). By
identifying some key dimensions or qualities that the consumer deems important,
the marketer can attempt to ensure that the product performs well against them and
then communicate the merits of using his brand in a particular light. These relevant
dimensions may be functional or emotional. Brand positions will result without any
purposeful intent by the marketer; therefore it is crucial that attempts are made to
steer the brand into a positive zone. These zones can be plotted using research
techniques such as multidimensional scaling (Hair et al., 1987) and interpreted in
such a way that the dimensions of the problem are reduced to key issues. In this
way cognac brands could be separated into dimensions of gifts and self purchase,
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everyday or special occasion and an assault may be made to develop a suitable
position in the minds of consumers (see illustrative example in Figure 3.12).
Figure 3.12










3.5. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS
The purpose and effect of the considered application of much of the foregoing is
to lead to competitive advantage. This is a quality which many Japanese companies
have in abundance and renders it difficult for foreign companies to compete in the
Japanese market. For this reason the framework proposed by Porter (1990) was
selected as a basis for comparing the strategies and approaces of the sample
companies.
Porter proposed that one of the key determinants of the success of national
economies is the ferocity of competition within their home markets. Japan, and
what was West Germany are, he argued, both extremely competitive markets.
Japanese companies, in particular, compete ferociously at home and their ability to
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compete world-wide is determined by this preparation. His analysis provides a
useful framework for assessing the basis on which companies achieve competitive
advantage. He contended that successful companies took steps to make their home
nation an even more favourable environment in which to operate and amplified their
home based advantages while offsetting home-based disadvantages. Porter
(1990:578-584) provided a checklist that has been adapted for use in this study as
follows:
• Competitive advantage grows out of improvements, innovation and change
• Competitive advantage involves the whole value chain
• Competitive advantage is sustained only through relentless improvements
• Sustaining advantage demands that its sources be upgraded
• Sustaining advantage ultimately requires a global approach to strategy.
• Furthermore he asserted that companies should actively seek out pressures
and challenges rather than try to avoid them. In doing so he proposed that
companies ought to:
• Sell to the most sophisticated, demanding buyers and channels
• Seek out buyers with the most difficult needs
• Establish norms of exceeding the toughest regulatory hurdles or product
standards
• Source from the most advanced international and home based suppliers
• Treat employees as permanent
• Establish outstanding competitors as motivators.
This framework will be used in the analysis of the foreign companies' responses
that appears in Chapter 6. The use of such a framework can offer great utility
because, as Porter (1991) illustrated, it helps identify the relevant variables and the
questions that the user must answer to develop conclusions. Frameworks, he noted,
aid the thinking through of the problem by offering an understanding of the firm
and its environment and defining and selecting among the strategic alternatives.
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3.6. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Attempting to cover and draw together the literature on strategic management
and marketing and place it in an international context has been a formidable task
especially since it is equivocal on many issues, a lack of cohesion summed up by
the recent debate between Mintzberg (1990) and Ansoff (1991). The strategy
theory is complex and multidimensional, a complex subject which, too often, too
many authors have attempted to over simplify. In the words of Hamel and Prahalad
(1989:71): "It is not very comforting to think that the essence of Western strategic
thought can be reduced to eight rules for excellence, seven S's, five competitive
forces, four product life-cycle stages, three generic strategies, and innumerable two-
by-two matrices."
Much of what has been achieved by this literature review has been to provide
guidance in two areas: process of research and focus on its content. It was learned
from previous research by the author that direct questions often produce low
quality, partially considered responses, for example a stated commitment to plans
and corporate policies may be a varying phenomenon subject to the pressures of the
moment11. Asa consequence, the literature survey has influenced the choice of
research methodology in a qualitative direction to maximize insight into the overall
issue of how foreign MNCs pursue the development of competitive advantage in
Japan.
The distillation of the previous pages raises some further issues for the research:
• How is Japanese strategic behaviour characterized and how do foreign
MNCs respond?
• Is there an absence of incentive amongst Foreign MNCs in the Japanese
market to plan for the longer term?
• Is segmentation a cornerstone of success in the Japanese market?
Appendix III
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• Is segmentation strategy applied at a strategic level?
• How have foreign MNCs in Japan developed their market positions?
• Is it the view of foreign MNCs that Japanese companies are strategically
superior?
• Does the theory of late entry provide any information on Japanese market
behaviour?
• Is common thread perceived differently by Japanese companies?
• Is the principle of consensus a key to success?
• What light does the process model of internationalization shed?
To probe the above issues, in Chapter 5 we will appraise the responses by the
foreign MNCs chosen for this research to the obstacles and opportunities confronted
by them, as outlined in Chapter 2. Certain concepts and frameworks identified in
reviewing the literature on global marketing strategy will be revisited and used in
Chapter 6 to appraise the sample companies (Quelch and Hoff, 1986; Porter, 1990).
In Chapter 7 implications for marketing strategies based on those adopted by the
successful MNCs in the sample will be presented, but first in Chapter 4 we go on to
examine the methodological implications of performing this study.
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The topic of effective marketing strategies for foreign companies in Japan
involves the behaviour of enterprises and their constituent organizations. In
performing any such investigation there are several different approaches that could
be adopted, however the validity and cost of applying them varies. The available
selection of methodology is ample; it involves both quantitative and qualitative





These approaches will be reviewed in the light of findings in the literature but
firstly the selected methodology will be supported by sections that cover:
• Survey and selection of interviewees
• Learning from some of the author's previous research.
4.2. SURVEY AND SELECTION OF INTERVIEWEES
As mentioned in Chapter 1, face to face interviewing was relied on as the
primary method of data collection because of the complexity and multifacetedness
of the topic. Firstly attempts were made to identify successful foreign consumer
goods' companies in Japan, but while some documentation existed in the economic
and business press, this only provided a starting point. Expert opinion was relied
on: consultants such as McKinsey and Boston Consulting Group, major
international advertising agencies with offices in Japan such as BBDO and McCann
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Erickson, and other MNCs were contacted that had Japanese operations and with
which the author has a relationship: Asatsu, Business International, Johnson and
Johnson and Unilever. Besides inviting these companies to participate, I asked
them to identify foreign companies known to them that they considered to be
successful in the Japanese market. In this way the first wave of target companies
was identified. This wave of target companies was contacted by telephone in Japan
and invited to participate in the study. In most cases target companies sought
verifications via mail or fax that this was a genuine research project. Mention that
Nippon Lever and Johnson and Johnson were participating helped elicit further
cooperation.
Subsequently interviews were conducted; and at the end of each interview,
interviewees were asked to suggest other foreign companies that to their knowledge
were achieving success in Japan. The bulk of the data was collected over a seven
month period during the latter part of 1990 although follow up by telephone and fax
continued through 1991-92. As the interviewing programme proceeded it became
clear from the suggestions received and the way they duplicated those already
interviewed or that were on the schedule for interview that many of the major
success stories were reflected1.
As with all such studies the degree to which a sample is limited is a function of
cost, time and other available resources, this problem is particularly acute in this
case since the cost of travel and accommodation in Japan is legendary. However
for such a qualitative study, the sample provided a rich source of experience and
wisdom to tap: the sample included not only senior representatives of successful
MNCs, but to give a broader perspective to the data a quota of distributors,
consultants, advertising agents and other facilitators several of which were locally
owned. The interviewees are listed in Appendix I. The classification of the
A thumbnail sketch of each of the companies interviewed is provided in Appendix I
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participating companies follows:
Table 4.1 - Profile of companies interviewed












































































Kennedy Intl Direct marketing USA FDI 1985
Kohler Japan Bathroom/ USA FDI 1986
KK plumbing
Levi Strauss Jeans, Clothing USA FDI 1971
KK
Market Consultants USA FDI 1987
Makers
Master Foods Foods USA FDI





McDonald's Restaurants Japan/ USA JV 1971
Co (Japan)
Ltd




Philip Morris Consumer USA FDI 1970
KK products
Procter & Consumer USA FDI 1973
Gamble Far products
East Ltd
Reynolds/ Tobacco Japan/USA JV 1975
Tobacco Ltd
Revlon KK Cosmetics USA FDI 1962
Roily Doll Cookies, Japan/USA Local 1972
Inc Retailing, Travel
Furniture




Boston Consultants USA FDI —
Consulting
Group
TAC - Dick Entrepreneur USA FDI 1960
Bush
United Airline USA FDI 1984
Airlines
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4.2.1. LIMITATIONS OF SAMPLE
As with most research of this type, the generalizations that can be made are
limited not only by the qualitative base of the sample but also by the nature of the
responses and non response to invitations to participate. Most of the foreigners
were exceedingly helpful and willing to cooperate. However the value of the data
they provided is limited by the fact that much of it represented self explanations by
these foreign MNC executives of situations and their companies' responses to them.
Such explanations may involve post rationalizations and their accuracy may be
impaired by the variable time horizons involved. In several instances they had not
been directly involved and their understanding was based on the experience of
others.
Cooperation from the Japanese side was much more evasive. Difficulties were
encountered in arranging interviews with Japanese executives. For example Ito
Yokodo, the entrepreneur behind 7-11 Stores, offered several dates and times but
was finally unable to make an appointment. Fortunately data on this company was
obtained from other sources. Even Kellogg's, also managed by a Japanese and a
previous employer of this author, refused to participate.
As the first wave of data were interpreted, it became apparent that none of the
companies had achieved their success overnight. Consequently further visits were
arranged to Japan to contact enterprises that were known to have achieved success
relatively quickly. These were, in the main, managed by Japanese executives and
again little cooperation was forthcoming.
Consideration was given to assessment of the experience of companies that had
failed or made dramatic mistakes. For obvious reasons outright failures cease to
exist and are difficult to track, although some names were collected of executives
who had left Japan and might have had experience to share. However, none of the
companies interviewed represented pure successes, most of them had, in addition to
some disastrous failures, encountered their share of mistake making over the years,
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and their learning is presented and synthesized in the following chapters.
4.2.2. INTERVIEW APPROACH
Broadly speaking the interviews were conducted according to the topics list in
Appendix I. However, it became apparent in the very first interview that to restrict
the subject too closely to the predetermined topics' list would be to ignore the
wisdom provided by "grounded theory" and to exclude potentially valuable data
from that collected.
All interviews were taped and in order to make interviewees comfortable with
the recording process they were assured that nothing would be published and
attributed to them directly without securing their prior permission. In some cases
this was a matter of concern, but in most cases it was not. During several
interviews, company documents were provided for subsequent analysis. Interviews
lasted on average about two hours. The tape recordings were transcribed by the
author; and in so doing, the contents of the interviews were reviewed several times.
In this way, not only was the memory refreshed, but in depth contextual
understanding of the issues was achieved.
4.2.3. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Much reading of papers, books, and articles was undertaken and a framework
was evolved which relied heavily on the model of marketing strategy and planning
depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to 3.7 in Chapter 3. This framework involves:
• Japanese consumer behaviour
• Market opportunities and obstacle assessment
• Company responses
• Standardization versus adaptation
• Implication of marketing strategies in Japan.
Each of the transcripts was coded according to the framework and "cut" into a
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word processed data base. In this way, anything germane to any section in the data
base could be readily reviewed. Logic, continuity and cohesiveness were
maintained in order to bring the diverse elements of data together into a composite
whole.
In the previous chapter in which the focal theoretical boundaries of this subject
were outlined, it was demonstrated that there was a wide degree of debate on many
aspects of strategic management theory, the theory and empirical findings
sometimes being divergent. Questions emerged about the content of this research
and the process by which this study was to be conducted. It also highlighted the
difficulty of knowing which questions ought to be asked. So, in this chapter, before
reviewing the topics of: Classical approach, Quantification, Qualitative approaches;
Grounded theory, I shall review some previous research that I conducted (Reid,
1989b), and use this to help establish a basis for the methodology — based on
grounded theory — I finally adopted.
4.3. WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS SIMILAR RESEARCH
Previous research published by this author (Reid, 1989b, Appendix IV) and
others influenced both my expectations of the research findings from this current
study and the selection of the research methodology. This overlapping zone of
strategy and marketing is a field in which I have been working for some years, most
of it quantitatively based (Reid, 1972; Reid, 1980; Reid, 1981a; Reid, 1981b; Reid,
1982; Reid, 1984; Reid, 1985a; Reid, 1985b; Reid, 1985c; Reid, 1987a; Reid,
1987b; Reid, 1988a; Reid, 1988b; Reid, 1989a; Reid, 1989b; Reid, 1990; Reid,
1991; Reid, 1993; Reid and Hinkley, 1989; Reid and Lee, 1989; O'Rear and Reid,
1990; Reid and Schlegelmilch, 1990; Reid and Fung, 1993).
Quantitative studies tend to be focussed at more abstract levels. They are
particularly useful for gauging the overall level of fit to a model but often provide
little detailed insight into how shortfalls can be rectified. This raises the question as
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to how this research should be conducted. A quantitative approach was rejected
because of the danger of making detailed comparisons with models that might
represent an arbitrary standard with an ensuing paucity of insight that could be
expected.2 Instead, it will explore the issues that the interviewees deemed salient.
Although some of the later research I conducted (Reid, 1989b) concentrated
primarily on strategic management, the operationalized model that was applied
therein was that depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to 3.7. As was argued earlier,
marketing strategies are conceived and implemented in the context of frameworks
established by strategic and corporate policy so the relationship between marketing
and corporate strategy is of interest. In my previous research comparisons between
the model depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to 3.7 and the actual strategy formulation
process highlighted that:
• Plans were often not credible
• Strategic planning is frequently a sterile process
• Professional planners frequently hinder change
• Strategic planning is considered too complex (Reid, 1989b).
If according to Mintzberg (1990) thought does not exist independently of action
there would be little point in asking questions and probing the thoughts of
executives as these thoughts would have little effect upon their subsequent
behaviour. However that does not mean that the views of the "design school" are
invalid. For example, one of the problems in conducting research in the field of
strategy is exemplified by the Peters and Waterman (1982) study. "Excellent"
companies such as HP, IBM, and Digital suffered changes of fortune since
publication of "In Pursuit of Excellence". Moreover, according to Business Week
(1984) fourteen out of the forty-three companies cited in that book had "lost their
2 According to Foucault (1970) the normal distribution would be more
appropriately named Gaussian Distribution. It can be arbitrary, it is a prison,
a model of reality which is imposed, a contribution to ignorance.
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lustre" by November 1984 by breaking many of the so called "commandments" set
by Peters and Waterman. On the basis of the measures established for measuring
excellence by those authors, many companies performing well in the present would
not necessarily continue to be excellent in the future. By some measures, and on
the basis of a superficial comparison with the model in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to 3.7,
many of those lacklustre companies would excel in terms of strategic management.
However in many cases the planning process favoured by the "design school" can
be criticized because it frequently fails to include strategic thinking. Although this
is not a call to abandon strategic planning but to stimulate thinking (Porter, 1987)
and incorporate it into the process depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to 3.7.
Clearly, in many of the companies studied, strategic thinking was not
rewarded (Reid, 1989b). In many cases senior management regarded the thinkers
as irritations. It was argued that the evidence points to the need for the
organizational maverick. However such maverick behaviour would be frowned on
in the kaisha. Yet, if companies want the benefit of a better tomorrow or at least a
secure future, then it seems reasonable to argue that more ought to be done to
stimulate strategic thinking among all those capable of making such a contribution
and ways found which enable it to occur. Therefore since quantitative approaches,
as is argued below, have often produced conflicting findings and at best they have
generated little in the way of insight; a more in depth approach was favoured for
this study.
4.4. CLASSICAL APPROACH
According to Bailey (1987), the classical approach consists of three distinct
stages: Stage 1: Takes place at the conceptual level by defining concepts and
stating a relationship between them. Stage 2: Attempts to link the conceptual and
empirical levels. A means of measuring the concepts empirically has to be devised
and hypotheses ought to be formulated to link the empirical measures of two
210
concepts. Hypotheses at this stage mirror the relationship established at Stage 1
except that they exist at the empirical level. Stage 3: Involves data gathering and
analysis to enable hypothesis testing.
4.5. QUANTIFICATION
A great deal of research has been conducted which attempted to analyze and
quantify the effect of particular types of strategy. Certainly, the output of this kind
of efforts has been somewhat equivocal. For example, the difficulty of attributing
the plan to its results was highlighted (Grinyer and Norburn, 1975). Later one of
the same authors using multiple regression analysis suggested that market share and
barriers to entry are the principal determinants of profit margins but that tightness
of control of working capital and aggressive management style also have an
important effect (Grinyer et. al, 1988). It was also shown that return on investment
is likely to be improved if the scale of entry into the new venture is high (Kitching,
1974). Moreover a favourable relationship between planning and performance was
demonstrated (Karger and Malik, 1974). This author (Reid, 1989b) attempted to
use multiple regression to relate planning performance to the classification
characteristics of companies in a sample of 94 companies but was unable to
demonstrate a meaningful pattern.
One of the foremost influences of this type of work was that of Rumelt. This
influential work attempted to evaluate the effect of synergy. As was mentioned in
Chapter 3, he clarified the product/market concept by defining a business unit as
one that could be managed separately from firms' other activities and went on to
argue that "related/constrained" conglomerates are more consistent performers than
those without the constraint (Rumelt, 1974).
However such findings can be uncomfortably misleading. Montgomery (1979)
extended data for 128 (out of 246) of Rumelf s 1974 firms to cover the period
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through 1977. She found that market structure variables accounted for some or all
of the differences Rumelt observed between diversification strategy and economic
performance. She also showed that performance differences appear to be linked to
the characteristics of the markets in which they operate (Montgomery, 1979).
Subsequently she reclassified Rumelt's (1974) companies with a high degree of
reliability and demonstrated the validity of Rumelt's qualitative approach
(Montgomery, 1982). In a study of 305 large UK companies by using multiple
regression techniques Grant and Jammine (1988) disputed Rumelt's and other US
data by showing that diversified firms outperform specialized firms and thus agree
with Montgomery (1982) for using a quantitative SIC based index of diversification
in preference to the Wrigley/Rumelt strategic categories.
Pitts and Hopkins (1980) utilized the "business count" method to examine how
individual businesses in a corporation relate. They did this, as have many others,
simply by using SIC codes to identify individual businesses and then counting the
total. Such techniques have been unsuccessful in providing evidence of any
relationship between corporate diversity and financial performance. Bettis (1982)
examined 80 large Fortune 500 US firms for the 1973-77 period. He finds superior
economic performance for related business diversification but argues that it can be
explained largely due to industry effects; namely the presence of most related
diversifiers in high performing industries (Bettis and Hall, 1982).
In one of his later efforts, Rumelt (1982) presented a new seven category system
formed from the original nine category typology by combining two categories each
in the dominant and unrelated diversified groups. In addition the distinction
between constrained diversification and linked diversification was quantified by the
introduction of a new related-core ratio. He again showed a diversity/performance
relationship; related constrained firms being the best performers on a 5 year average
return on invested capital measure. Dominant-vertical and unrelated business firms
performed least well (Rumelt, 1982). Rumelt attempted to replicate his earlier
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seminal study and demonstrated empirically that the association between
diversification and strategy and profitability remains after removing the effects of
varying industry profitability. He argued (1982: 368) that 'it is time to consider the
diversification strategies of participants as an aspect of industry structure'.
In another attempt to build upon Rumelt's (1974, 1982) typologies, Capon et.
al. (1988) suggested that there was little evidence of any relationship between
corporate diversity, as measured by the business count method and financial
performance. Empirical data support that different markets require different skills
for success and firms that concentrate in one market area (consumer or industrial) at
given levels of diversification, should achieve superior performance. Geringer et al
(1989) looked at the performance differences between multinational corporations.
As research variables they selected diversification strategies and the degree of
internationalization. Among a sample of the 100 largest MNE's from the U.S. and
Europe, they found that diversification strategy was significantly linked to MNE
performance. In this way they claimed to extend the principles established by
Rumelt.
While not wishing to denigrate the foregoing research, one must conclude that it
has produced equivocal results and provided limited enlightenment.
4.6. QUALITATIVE APPROACHES
Qualitative research is a term that has been used rather freely to describe a
number of different research approaches, for example exploratory research,
unstructured research motivation research, depth interviewing, attitude and opinion
research. It is diagnostic. It is impressionistic rather than conclusive; it probes
rather than counts. It is intrinsically subjective; its findings do not draw on
statistical evidence. However, despite its limitations it is able to bring unique
insights and aid understanding of marketing situations (Chisnall, 1981).
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Qualitative research involves small numbers of carefully selected individuals. It
is akin to the last piece of a jigsaw in that it renders the picture to be more clear
(Gordon and Longmaid, 1990). Interpretation of phenomena relies on the
observer's ability to identify patterns between them. It is akin to spotting the tips of
informational icebergs and inferring the scale and significance of that which lies
beneath. It therefore calls for sophisticated and sensitive skills (Chisnall, 1981).
For example some of the difficulties in making interpretations of manager's views
of events in companies' histories and how they were determined were spotlighted
(Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). Certainly all research of this type will be limited by
what respondents can and wish to remember and reveal — this study is no exception
to the rule. However as, Jick (1979) noted, care needs to be taken to cross check
views among diverse sources of qualitative data.
4.7. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
In interpreting processes of organizational change it is necessary to rely on
participants and observers. In either case the investigator is hampered by the
observer's perceptual and cognitive limitations as well as the problem of the
observer not being aware of some key event (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). Both
problems occur whether the observer is the investigator or a participant in the
change process. Moreover each approach has unique problems. The investigator as
observer faces the problems of influencing the system being observed and of
correctly interpreting what was observed (Barley, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1990).
On the other hand, when using participants as "key informants", the investigator
faces the problem of identifying the best informants, ensuring that they correctly
understand his queries and that they provide truthful answers.
Daft and Lewin (1990) drew attention to the need to reorientate research away
from "incremental, footnote on footnote" approaches as the norm for the field.
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They argued that although current researches have made solid contributions they do
not seem adequate to the task when the subject is multidimensional and complex
(Daft and Lewin, 1990). Miner (1984) also suggested that the straitjacket on the
field ought to be loosened and its values be refocussed. Furthermore the needs of
practitioners are often ignored and there is a premature focus on a limited number





As Pettigrew (1990) put it, the problem is to catch a changing reality in flight;
and studying long-term processes in their context necessitates a return to
foundations as a principal method. Context refers to the outer and inner context of
organizations. Outer context refers to the external environment in which the
enterprise is sited, whereas inner context refers to the structural, cultural and
political environment through which ideas for change progress. The key points to
emphasize in analyzing change in a contextualist mode are, firstly, the importance
of "embededness" (sic), that is studying change in the context of interconnected
levels of analysis; secondly the importance of temporal inter-connectedness,
locating change in terms of past, present, and future time; thirdly, the need to
explore context and action, how context is a product of action and vice versa; and
finally the central assumption that causation is at the centre of the process
(Pettigrew, 1990). Such issues were well understood by Mintzberg who sought to
understand the complex process of strategic change over time and within the
confines of the culture of the organization (Mintzberg and Waters, 1983).
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4.7.2. MULTIFACETEDNESS
In their classic critique of the economic theory of the firm, March and Simon
(1958) cautioned against treating the firm as a "black box". The firm they noted is
a complex system of functional and administrative sub units pursuing their separate
commitments. They showed that "organizationally dysfunctional learning" is
responsible for consequences unanticipated by bureaucracy theories. Time after
time plans are subverted by sub systems within the total organizational structure.
Strategic decisions are complex. They do not easily allow reduction into common
sets of dimensions to arrive at a holistic view. This point was unambiguously made
in Chapter 7 "Cognitive limits on rationality" (March and Simon, 1958).
Another problem of conducting research of this nature was adequately illustrated
by Mintzberg. He indicated those descriptions of management functions such as
planning, organizing and co-ordinating stem from the work of Henry Fayol at the
beginning of this century. However, the reality of management behaviour is quite
different from that depicted by popular theory. Indeed, managers' descriptions of
what they do are likely to be quite different from what can be observed. He
maintained that in many ways we are quite ignorant of the realities of management
behaviour and attempted to break away from the descriptions introduced by Fayol to
a new reality of how managers spend their time (Mintzberg, 1975). Specifically
Mintzberg claimed to demolish the idea that managers are systematic planners — a
view propounded by much of the literature. His work showed that of the tasks
performed by senior management most last for only a few minutes at a time.
Moreover he argued that the emphasis being placed upon management information
systems as a key to better performance was not supported by observations of how
they spend their time, just as according to Burns (1963) managers favour
communicating orally and devote around 80% of their time to this activity .
In an earlier work, Mintzberg (1972) stressed that there are difficulties in
researching strategy. One must look at the actual emerging pattern of the
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enterprise's goals, policies and major programmes to see what its true strategy is.
In other words, one would find it difficult to find an a priori statement of strategy
which the passage of time shows is actually followed. He also supported the idea of
an incremental pattern of strategic development and stressed the need to
differentiate between "intended strategies" and "realized" strategies (Mintzberg,
1972). Realized strategy was taken as the observable output of an organization's
activity in terms of its positioning over time. As was mentioned in Chapter 3
intended strategy is the strategy which managers espouse (Mintzberg, 1978). In a
similar mode of thinking, he (Mintzberg, 1973) highlighted that each sub system in
the total organization has its own cognitive limits as well as its process limits. This
latter limit applies acutely to management behaviour to the extent that he compared
the manager with a juggler who constantly has to make small decisions whether or
not he is ready to make them (Mintzberg, 1973). This example is of critical
importance since the realities of management behaviour are conditioned by time
frames and agendas which are imposed from outside the "would be rational world"
which many management writers would like to see.
4.7.3. IMPLEMENTATION
Hirsch et al indicated that while the "formulation" or "strategy" side of business
policy has always drawn appropriately from economic theory; they caution that,
taken to its logical extreme, economic theory ignores the importance of
implementation, implies lack of choice in organization decision making, and makes
the organization a non entity (Hirsch et. al, 1990). Michael Porter's (1980)
conception of management and the process of placing one's company in a
favourable niche is among the most dominant in the fields of business policy and
strategy (Porter, 1980). Inspired by Porter's framework, a generation of scholars
has resulted which views industrial organization economics as the base discipline for
policy research. Similarly transaction cost economics to choices about the internal
217
structures of organizations have grown to hold a prominent position in business
policy research (Williamson, 1975; Ouchi, 1980; Teece, 1982; Leblebici, 1983;
Robins, 1987).
Porter (1980) argues that when assessment is made of strategy that full account
be taken of the need to incorporate the total situation. In doing so, it is essential to
understand the environment in which the industry operates and relate the company
strategy specifically to the environment. Like many writers, Porter highlights that
fit between the organization and its external environment is critical. Yet, in that
work, he gives scarce mention to strategy implementation or to the processes of
consensus formation necessary for policy to be effectively developed. How can an
organization go through the processes of observing markets, deciding where it
wants to be, and getting itself there if it does not involve some intra-organizational
convincing, coalition building, arm twisting, inter organizational fighting and
resistance by competitors.
4.8. GROUNDED THEORY
Many previous books on methods of social research have focussed mainly on
how to verify theories. This suggests an overemphasis in current social science
practice on the verification of theory and a resulting de-emphasis on the prior step
of discovering what concepts and hypotheses are relevant for the area one wishes to
research (Glaser and Straus, 1967), in this case the ingredients of successful
marketing strategies in Japan.
Glaser and Straus (1967) argue that the best way to generate theory is from the
data themselves and that the theory ought to explain the phenomenon being studied.
Most proponents of the grounded theory approach tend to utilize observations as
their basic data collection methodologies (Bailey, 1987). Unlike classical theory,
grounded theory blends stages 2 and 3 of the classical theory into a single stage.
218
The variables and hypotheses utilized flow from the data. Consequently only those
hypotheses that are verified are recognized and verification as a separate step is
unnecessary. In contrast to classical theory, grounded theory starts at the empirical
level and works backwards to the conceptual level.
Grounded theory has great relevance to this study. It was recognized that it
would be very easy to apply the model in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to 3.7 and look for
deviations or fit and to make sincere attempts to explain the deviations. However,
to do so would beg the question as to whether the key issues had been covered.
While the model might have relevance, it could also represent a shield via which it
would be difficult for important data to penetrate. So, the minimum of assumptions
was made. Although a topics list was prepared to enable the more obvious issues,
as highlighted in Chapter 3.7, to be discussed, the discussions were deliberately
kept open to enable a wide body of data to be collected3. In that way the responses
could be weighed and gauged to identify recurrent themes and issues which those
people running the foreign MNCs identified as concerns.
4.9. SELECTION OF METHODOLOGY
Quantitative approaches have their attractions but they also have their
drawbacks. For example, considered responses tend to be grouped with ill
considered, passionately held views tend to be grouped with those views not
zealously held. Analysis proceeds to consider unlike quantities as equals, so,
having considered the foregoing review of the literature in Chapter 3 and
highlighted the complexity of the issues, and in the light of previous research
experience in the field I determined to opt for a qualitative approach, one which
utilized grounded theory. This approach to studying planning issues in
organizations is to focus on normative or descriptive sequences of phases or steps
3 See Appendix
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(Delbecq and Van de Ven, 1971; Etzioni, 1967; Lindblom, 1959; Mintzberg et. al,
1976; Simon, 1957; Van de Ven, 1980). Certainly there are many reputable
precedents for this selection, not least of which Porter (1991:99) admitted to being
forced to turn to in depth case studies in order to identify significant variables and
to explore relationships among them.
4.10. SUMMARY AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
In this chapter a review was given of the optional approaches to researching this
topic of effective marketing strategies in Japan, a description and justification were
given of the methodology that was finally selected. The approach adopted was a
qualitative one and grounded theory was used as a guiding principle in the research.
The strengths of this approach are that it does not prejudge the situation and enables
the data to define at least some of the key issues.
In the following chapter the qualitative findings are presented in a number of
short cases encapsulated in boxes and supplemented by a quotations from executives
that were interviewed. In this way an enriched data set has been assembled which
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CHAPTER 5— FOREIGN COMPANY RESPONSES TO JAPANESE
OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS
5.1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 2 a variety of opportunities in the Japanese market were identified, as
were a number of obstacles and threats. It transpires that Japanese companies
compete aggressively for market share and the criteria they adopt forjudging their
success differ from those in the West. For a variety of reasons: primarily low
interest rates, low expectation of shareholders, keiretsu relationships, the motivation
to achieve growth has been absorbed into the Japanese corporate culture (Abegglen
and Stalk, 1985), and many other aims tend to be subordinated to this overall goal
(Kester, 1991).
In tandem with other evidence, in this chapter we will study the responses made
by the foreign companies in the sample that has been amassed and distil any lessons
that can be learned by the adaptations they made to the Japanese context. To a large
extent the structure of this chapter mirrors that of Chapter 2, which in turn followed
a pattern derived from the model displayed in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to 3.7, and as
was mentioned earlier, to fashion the data into a seamless whole, a great deal of
qualitative data, much of it based on interview material, is presented in boxes and
cross referenced to the text. These boxes are highlighted by a font change from
Times to Univers and shaded. Some case material derived from other sources is also
displayed in boxes with the source data displayed at the foot of the box. The
overall pattern of the chapter is to consider the foreign MNCs' responses to:
• Market obstacles
• Market characteristics and trends; then review:
• Key strategic responses; followed by a distillation of:
• Implications for marketing strategies in Japan.
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5.2. RESPONSES TO OBSTACLES
In Chapter 2.2 a variety of obstacles, perceived and real, were identified. By
using the structure of that section we will appraise the sample companies' responses
to:
• Unfair Japanese Practice
• Market acceptability
• Cultural difficulties




5.2.1. UNFAIR JAPANESE PRACTICE
Most of the consumer product MNCs interviewed indicated they had met few
barriers with which domestic Japanese companies must also grapple. They pointed
to the existence of certain freedoms in the Japanese domestic market that no longer
exist in other international arenas: cigarette advertising on television, for example,
is still permitted in Japan, although it has been banned for some considerable time
in many Western countries.
It was also mentioned in Chapter 2.2 that one of the few examples of restrictive
practice cited in the ACCJ (1989) survey was that of the Large Scale Retail Law
which was subsequently revised (in May 1991) by scrapping of the previous
requirement that retail outlets with more than 500 square metres of floor space
cannot open without approval from other local retailers. One now well publicized
case involved Toys 'R' Us, a large US retail chain; which entered the Japanese
market intending to effect a speedy expansion and immediately fell foul of this
lobby. In 1990, after a series of frustrating negotiations, the company announced it
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would reduce its initial plans from six stores to one or two. However, since the
announcement of changes to the law, the company has accelerated its plans and now
aims to open 100 new outlets over seven to eight years. By way of compromise,
Toys 'R' Us agreed to reduce its regular store size from 4,900-plus square metres to
just 3,500 square metres. 1 In return, the small shopkeepers are preparing to
become more competitive and specialist.
Many executives interviewed for this thesis referred to the lack of
"transparency" in Japanese laws. This term is often used in the context of the so-
called inaccessibility of the domestic market, implying that Japan has certain laws
that foreign companies find difficult to interpret. In this regard at least, Japanese
companies have a definite advantage: their familiarity with the market and possibly
knowing people in government organizations through amukadari2 enable them to
recognize which laws must be obeyed and which can be ignored on the grounds they
are rarely enforced. For example, the ACCJ (1989) survey showed that 18 out of
20 dealers in the electronics industry violated a law that restricts the way in which
products can be repaired, but none had been prosecuted. Naturally, if a less
knowledgeable MNC was to ask the ministry in question for advice, it would
probably be told quite simply to obey the law.
As an example of difficulties arising from lack of transparency, R.J. Reynolds
(RJR) met a number of problems when it first entered the Japanese market. The
context was a monopoly situation that remained unchanged until the late 1970s in
which Japan Tobacco Inc. (JT) was the dominant player: JT controlled all aspects
of the business— the importation of tobacco leaf, the manufacture, the distribution
of cigarettes as well as the issue of retail licenses. RJR had initially approached the
market as an importer, but it fell to JT to sell the product— which is where the
problems began. According to RJR's president:
1 The first Toys R'US store opened North of Tokyo on December 20, 1991.
2 Hiring of ex government officials
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Transparency was zero and we asked what the tariffwas on
cigarettes. They couldn't tell us what it was, and they couldn'tfind
the exact meaning in the book of words. They could only tell us what
it was because they had made adjustments to it —from 90% to 30%.
Even so, they couldn 't tell us what the local tax excise system was or
what the price mechanism was.
Importing tobacco companies were originally told they were not allowed to
advertise in Japanese media, nor were they permitted to promote their products by
other means. Around 1981, this situation began to change and advertising
restrictions were somewhat eased, but importers then learned of the complex local
customs and excise tax system, which required massive investments in computer
software.
Johnson & Johnson (Japan) is widely respected as a successful operation. It has
been in the market since 1961, but the path to the 1990s has not been without
difficulties. Most of the products the company sells— with the exception of Cotton
Buds and the Reach toothbrush — are licensed by the Ministry of Welfare under
"Pharmaceutical Affairs." Just as is the case for a pharmaceutical product,
formulations must be submitted to the ministry for licenses to be granted— a
previously long, protracted process that nowadays takes only three to four months.
The Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, restricts what can be said about products to what
is directly related to the company's license, in other words to its reason for trading.
Although Johnson & Johnson is a major world player in the feminine hygiene
business, it has launched only one hygiene product in the Japanese market—
Carefree Panty Shield, a product on the periphery of the feminine hygiene arena.
Governmental obtuseness in the mid-1970s was the reason for this failure:
Although Johnson & Johnson tried to persuade the Ministry of Welfare that the
product's function was different, the ministry insisted on listing it as a sanitary
napkin. Johnson & Johnson's advertisements attempted to convince women that
Carefree Panty Shield was a product that could and should be used every day as part
of their daily hygiene routine— a position it adopted in most advanced Western
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markets— but the Ministry disallowed the copy, since the product was licensed
only as a sanitary napkin. Another use of this product was as a backup to tampons.
However, again the Ministry refused to permit this advertising line; because, in its
view, this implied that tampons were ineffective. Johnson & Johnson was
understandably irritated by this, and after much bureaucratic battling, decided to
withdraw from that whole aspect of the business and, despite its international
position, to concentrate its investment on other products.
Such anecdotes have frequently been used to argue that obstacles have been
deliberately placed in the path of foreign companies; however, Johnson & Johnson
representatives remark that this situation had nothing to do with the fact that it was a
foreign concern. Other Japanese companies that had succeeded Johnson & Johnson
with similar efforts, received comparable treatment from the ministry.
While many interviewees complained of frustrating experience with laws and
government bureaucracies, several interviewees suggested that even during the
period when Japan justified its reputation for being an extraordinarily difficult place
in which to conduct business, progress could be and was made by adopting a hands-
on approach — particularly concerning procedure. In other words, those who
claimed to understand Japan believed that Japanese bureaucracy is responsive, if not
to face-to-face questioning regarding specific issues and problems, then at least to a
general consideration of the question if presented in the right way, and through the
right channels.
Generally, interviewees suggested that the Japanese market has opened up to
such a degree that MNCs now consider their treatment to be almost comparable to
that of Japanese companies, while Japanese firms, in turn, have become more
confident about their competitive capabilities. Combining this trend with pressure
exerted over the years by trading partners has engendered an easing of the overall
market situation — even if Japanese trade policies have not so much changed per se
as become more pliant in the face of considerable foreign persuasion. The key to
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the Japanese market may lie not with the Japanese, but with the MNCs: In short,
they simply must learn to adapt to the characteristics of the Japanese market. As
Eric Weber, former marketing manager of Friskies KK and currently a vice
president at Nestle USA, Inc. commented:
It's just the people who sit at home who complain that they [the
JapaneseI do not buy big 45" or 25" TVs like we do in America, they
do not drive big cars, they do not have big homes. Well, so what?
People all over the world are different. We Americans often just do
not recognize that. We are myopic; we think the world revolves
around Cincinnati.
Japan continues to change at a rapid pace. There is growing evidence —-
supported by interviews conducted for this thesis — that the Japanese consumer
products' market, far from being impenetrable, is relatively free from structural
impediments. According to Kneale H. Ashwell, former chairman of Johnson &
Johnson (Japan) and currently managing director of J&J's operations in Australia
and New Zealand, this liberalisation is not even recent.
I would think, that contrary to popular conception, or should I say
misconception this is a free market; and has been for many years.
There is nothing that we want to do here which is legal that we are
not allowed to do. In fact you are allowed to do some things here in
the promotional area that you wouldn 7 be allowed to do in the EC.
Although management consultants and some others suggested that Japanese
companies are inclined to "co-operate on pricing" matters, thereby sometimes
reducing one of the more destructive aspects of competition, most of the consumer
product MNCs interviewed indicated they had met few barriers with which domestic
companies must not also grapple. They also pointed out certain freedoms in the
domestic market that no longer exist in other international arenas: cigarette
advertising on television, for example, is still permitted in Japan, although it has
been banned for some time in many Western countries. However the permitted
screening time is being progressively pushed back so that now no cigarette
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advertising may be shown after 10pm.
Philip Morris is a foreign company that appears to be succeeding in Japan, with
its products commanding a 10% share of the Japanese market. In its recent launch
of Merit, a new brand, it found the limits within which it could operate rather
liberal, especially with the media choices available and what it could say. For
example, by exploiting the regulatory framework that permits the use of
comparative advertising, that company was able to claim "Merit tastes better than
Japan's leading light with 33% less tar". In this way, comparison was made to JT's
Mild Seven without naming it.
Foreign MNCs should note that Japanese companies operating abroad also
experience difficulties with restrictions that do not exist on their home territories:
for example, environmental restrictions in Europe and the US — particularly on the
discharge of pollutants— are currently stricter than those under which firms must
operate in Japan3.
5.2.2. MARKET ACCEPTABILITY
Above all else, quality is the factor that determines the acceptability of products
and services in the Japanese market. All companies in the sample testified to the
particular importance of quality and tailoring of products to the Japanese context.
In the words of RJR's president Keith McCulloch:
3 This situation may change with the early 1991 appointment of Japan's first
Minister for the Environment. A Diet committee is currently considering
legislation that would tighten regulations on the handling and disposal of
hazardous and other wastes - although details remain undecided. In addition, a
MITI-backed bill, approved in April 1991, aims to reduce industrial waste and
promote recycling of finished products. Manufacturers will be urged to design
with recycling in mind and supply details of merchandise content to facilitate
the process.
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Many companies still do not understand quality. Standards here are
far higher than they are in the States. It's something you have to
learn. We've learned that poor quality doesn't sell. Here we are in
the high priced part of the market, somebody may be smoking one
brand through the week and our brand on Saturday night so ifhe
buys a pack that has a lower quality than he's accustomed to through
the weekfor which he is paying considerably less, he is going to
complain.
The consumer doesn't have many choices here. It is very difficultfor
him to buy a house, the power of the consumer is in what he buys and
so ifhe doesn't like it, he complains and he threatens you. There is a
whole industry out there ofpeople complaining, ofexperts offering
advice on consumer complaints The quality standards we have in
Japan are higher than they are in the US Market.
It was RJR's experience that complaint rates were consistently higher than in any
other market.
People complain more here. We have to be sure we handle
complaints properly so that we don't lose consumers.
As an importer this issue of quality is one that requires much effort to educate and
persuade colleagues within the company that special endeavours are necessary.
From RJR again:
Two or three times a year I go back to the US and I go to the factory,
talking to the people that make the product, trying to get them to
understand why it's so importantfor this market, why quality
standards are so high, that it's a way of life here. You can't just
write letters about it; you 've to go and see them.
Several companies, Amway and Avon in particular, commented on the
particular emphasis they placed upon packaging design in Japan. This emphasis on
quality of packaging presentation applies to other types of business as well. Failure
to understand these crucial elements results in dockside rejections — even in the pet
food arena ship-loads of product are sent back to the country of origin— and the
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myth of Japanese obstinacy is thus perpetuated.4 In the words of Colin O'Halloran,
Vice President of Avon Cosmetics:
One of the mistakes that Western companies make is that, they don't
realize the quality here —everyone has it and it is ofa very high
standard and you can 7 get ahead ofyour competitor by making it just
a little bit better or making the bad a little bit less bad. The standard
is absolute, it is 100% quality and that is something which throws
them. They are not used to this relentless quality in product forms
and in packaging.
Our British education helps us separate benefits very clearly. That is
why we are quite happy to go to Sainsbury's and buy "own label"
water because it is bottled by Sainsbury's or Mark's & Spencer. In
other words, we differentiate between what is in the bottle and its
overall appearance, but in Japan the visual component is ofprimary
importance. Japanese prefer very good brands. They view the
entirety of the product concept, rather than merely its aesthetic
qualities or its functional performance.
Effecting these higher standards is a difficulty that cannot be overstated:
Ifyou are going to be significant in this market it's almost inevitable
that you will have to manufacture here, because that's the only way
to achieve Japanese standards. It's going to be almost impossible to
get American workers on the same wave length as the Japanese
consumer
James Conte — Vice President AS1
Quality was a major issue in Levi Strauss's experience. It attempted to serve the
Japanese consumer from a Hong Kong base^: Unable to match its styling
considerations precisely to a discerning Japanese public, it found it necessary to
relocate to Tokyo to be more responsive to the market.
4 See Box 5.11
^ See Box 5.1
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Box 5.1 Levi Strauss (Japan)
When Levi Strauss (Japan) began operations in 1971, it experienced a number of
growing pains; the period 1971-77 represented a learning curve, during which the
company realized it would be necessary to amend some of its initial practices. As a
result of changes it subsequently made, business has doubled in the last two to three
years.
A key variation was to have the product designed in Japan for the Japanese consumer,
by Japanese designers. Previously, Levi had been designing in Hong Kong for the
"Asian" consumer, and then shipping to Japan; however, the Japanese liked neither the
style, fit nor design of the product. Levi adopted a step-by-step approach to remedy the
situation. First, it began manufacturing in Japan; second, it hired Japanese and trained
them as product managers and designers. This move provided the quality expected by
the Japanese consumer and meant a fast turnaround time from product design to
manufacturing, and ultimately delivering to retail outlets.
The process of relocation and adaptation to Japan, begun in 1975, took from five to six
years and during this time the company developed its ability to work with the retail
community, Levi Strauss' s suppliers as well as the new Japanese staff it recruited;
thereby developing the employees' understanding about the company and the Jeans'
market. The period 1 984 to the present has also been an important time in the
company's development. Levi Strauss' Japanese sales started to expand in 1986, and
the company has been growing at an average of about 35% per annum since then, a
faster rate than that at which they are adding people to the enterprise.
Communications
Another crucial factor Levi Strauss adopted especially for Japan in 1978 was its
consumer communications: it started to advertise its unique heritage. Before 1978, Levi
Strauss used the same life-style advertising it had been projecting world-wide — insofar
as it would have been possible to replace the Levi logo with one of a competitive and the
advertisement would still have been applicable. There was, however, a preferable route
this advertising could take, and that was to evoke the history of jeans in the US: Levi
Strauss invented jeans in 1850, and most Americans equate jeans with Levi's.
Since 1978, Levi Strauss has changed its advertising message to convey the uniqueness
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of its product in terms of its origins and continuing heritage. While Levi Strauss has
traditionally highlighted American heritage in its communications, it has done so with
care, using "American" quality to emphasize the company's values and encourage
consumers to feel positive towards the brand. The intention is to avoid communication
of anything ephemeral, non-proprietary, or subject to rapid change. For instance, a
momentary silhouette or the snappy "right fit" image adopted by several of its
competitors represent values that are transitory. The Levi strategy was to look for
something of greater substance, an umbrella idea that could embrace the whole
company. In so far as Levi Strauss invented the blue jeans (and so could be considered
a proprietary asset), the company adopted the position: Thomas Edison very famous
inventor; Levi Strauss very famous inventor. Over time, the analogy has been developed
on this theme, the purpose being to share some of the unique factors of Levi's as a
brand and as a company with the world of invention.
The company stresses that while there are quality advantages to manufacturing in
Japan; this is not a key advertising message. Levi emphasizes the origin of the brand
and the different elements — original button fly jeans, the original tab, the two horse
patch; all factors that other companies have tried to emulate in some way. It is crucial
that the consumer understands that these elements began with and are unique to Levi:
Since 1977-78, consumers have been learning to appreciate that with Levi's they are
buying a piece of heritage and therefore getting added value.
Winning distribution
Until 1975, Levi Strauss used a direct sales force throughout Japan. Nonetheless, sales
in the rural areas did not grow as fast as anticipated; like many countries, the rural areas
are conservative, and once they build a relationship with suppliers, shopkeepers tend to
maintain those ties. Similarly Japanese consumers, once they have built up a
relationship with a brand, will tend to continue that relationship. Clearly, a revision in
Levi Strauss' distribution strategy was required. Relationship building is now a key
element in Levi's distribution strategy.
The relative importance of retailer versus wholesaler relationships changes throughout
the product life-cycle. Initially, Levi Strauss required the wholesaler to work with
retailers to encourage them to try their particular brand, providing the follow-up service
and the sales related efforts that were necessary. In Japan, the wholesaler may also be
responsible for the receivables, the extension of credit terms, all of which encourage the
retailer to try the product and to sell the product to the consumer. The consumers were
wary at first, since their purchasing patterns were already well established. It took time
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in the rural areas for those patterns to change, both at the consumer and the retailer
levels, so the first effort had to be directed at the wholesaler and retailer relationship.
Once those efforts were successful — and, on a parallel path, the manufacturers'
communication to the consumer was successful — then a very strong relationship
between the consumer and the Levi brand resulted. Since the consumer is purchasing
the brand via the retailer-wholesaler network, the relationship needs to be very strong
between retailer and consumer to get the product moving. The consumer relies heavily
on the recommendations of a shopkeeper to try the brand. As the Levi business grew, it
was possible to allocate more revenue to reinforce the image and the value of the Levi
Strauss brand. In that way relationships were fostered between the brand and the
distribution channel, as well as between the consumer, the manufacturer, and the
retailer.
Standardization vs Adaptation
While operating in Japan, Levi Strauss has successfully introduced some of its
international methods, and has been able to break some accepted norms of distribution.
It has also had to adapt some of its methods to Japanese expectations. For example,
the Levi Strauss policy of not taking back returns was very unusual, as was its very tight
credit policy. Any wholesaler agent wishing to do business with Levi Strauss would
have to persuade his retailer contacts to restructure their businesses substantially. Levi
Strauss also managed its inventory, production and sales relationship very thoroughly,
but since it was working through a wholesale agent who buys inventory from it, stores it
and then sells it on to the retailer, Levi Strauss had a vested interest in the wholesaler
managing its inventory properly; neither too much, nor too little. Too little means not
servicing the retailer properly. Having too much means the retailer will probably have
some old styles left over that are not going to be selling at top prices, causing the brand
image to suffer, and ultimately profits to decrease. Levi Strauss therefore became
involved in the wholesalers' merchandising process, i.e., the control process of
managing the purchasing, inventory and sales on a monthly basis. This was most
unusual in the Japanese context. Normally the wholesaler would decide and buy
accordingly. Levi Strauss, however, took a much more interventionist approach because
it was (and is) important to the company that the wholesalers remain healthy so that
they can represent the brand properly, and offer service to the retailers.
Source: Interview materia/
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As Kneale Ashwell, former chairman of Johnson & Johnson (Japan) and
currently managing director of J&J's Australia and New Zealand operations noted:
The Japanese are more discerning, more discriminating than the
British or Americans. It's got nothing to do with what they payfor a
product; it's part of their culture. They live in a society that believes
that service is important... the Japanese are quality fanatics. The
attention to manufacturing detail and quality starts way backfor the
Japanese in their own personal experience. They do not expect to get
a product that is about right, or just a little bit wrong; they expect it
to be totally right. That philosophy really isn 't just restricted to the
manufacturing environment; it's just the way of life here. They have
very high expectations ofquality.
Whether his attribution to the cultural connection can be justified is not the
point, what is important from the perspective of this thesis is the importance of
recognizing the importance that quality has a marketing ingredient. Even if it is
true that the concern for quality has no direct connection with the high price the
consumer has to pay, a high price tag will reinforce the desire to ensure that quality
is delivered. Foreign companies are well advised to ensure that their total quality,
product and service, is of the highest order if they are attempting to compete in
Japan, or against Japanese competitors anywhere. Jerry Rosenberg, the marketing
manager of Amway (Japan), made the point:
The Japanese are so ingrained that they are going to pay a lot, that
they just give up. They pay a lot but they want it to be perfect, but
you can justify what you charge people based on a service level that
makes them happy. We have found that true here in Japan.
Keith McCulloch, former president of R.J. Reynolds/M.C. Tobacco Co. Ltd,
endorsed this view:
You have to invest in quality. Quality is still one of those things that
many companies do not understand. Quality standards here are
much higher than they are in the States. It's something you have to
learn. We've learned that poor quality doesn 't sell. People do not
buy poor quality products.
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Japanese quality concerns extend into the pet food business, in which it is usual
for manufacturers to rely upon flexible formulations to guarantee high quality and
high palatability. In Japan, however, flexible formulations are likely to cause
complaints about colour and other variations.6
The companies interviewed for this thesis cited many instances of their "foreign"
products being accepted by the Japanese consumer:
• The tobacco industry illustrates the market acceptability of certain imported
products; when JT's monopoly was lifted in the late 1970s, it was surprised to
note how quickly import penetration grew. The importers' ability to introduce
products that the Japanese consumer wanted to smoke was demonstrated by the
rapidly growing market share of imported brands, which leapt from 2% to 9%
between 1986 and 1987— aided by the suspension of duties in April 1987—
and has continued to grow, albeit at a slower pace. To offset this loss, JT has
become involved with many kinds of new enterprise.
• Johnson & Johnson occupies leading market positions with its Baby Oil and
Band Aid products; Reach toothbrushes are also currently high in the rankings;
• Revlon has successfully carved out a market niche despite the indigenous
might of Shiseido and Kanebo;
• Coca Cola occupies a dominant position in a market that sees more than
1,600 new soft drink products launched each year;
• Bristol-Myers' analgesic Bufferin sits in the number one position in its
category, with more than 30% market share;
• Nippon Lever and Procter & Gamble are carving out significant positions in
the market against powerful local competitors such as Kao and Unicharm. In
the shampoo sector, in only seven years Unilever has exchanged positions with
Kao. Due to a critical boost from the Timotei brand, the group's market share
6 See Box 5.11.
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is now heading towards 60 per cent in 1993, up from 20 per cent in 1981
whereas Kao's has been reduced to 20.
• Both Avon and Amway have successfully built large businesses based on
Western business concepts.
The list is surprisingly long and covers a diverse product range. The message for
MNCs targeting Japan is a basic and obvious one: If they can understand Japanese
consumers, address their needs, and deliver acceptable standards of product quality,
Japan offers tremendous opportunities.
5.2.3. CULTURAL DIFFICULTIES
To an outsider Amway (see Appendix I) is a typical American concept.
Nevertheless Amway has utilized the Japanese group traditions in the development
of its network marketing approach to direct distribution, in particular it utilized the
tradition of Japanese housewives staying at home and making comparison of their
situation with the ten million females who have joined the work force in the last ten
years. In so doing Nihon Amway reached the number one position among the
fastest growing foreign owned companies in compound annual sales terms 1983-86
(Lacktorin, 1989). As the marketing manager for Japan explained:
Many of the cultural and social conditions do lend themselves to
Amway's business doing well here but the same thing could be said in
many other cultures that are very differentfrom Japan. Our concept
appealed to a highly educated group ofpeople who were at home, not
doing much. It provided them with an interest beyond just selling
products —getting togetherfor meetings and having a reason to
meet other people. The aura ofAmway, the ability to meet people
and venture out into new areas was very appealing so we had many
housewives who became Amway distributors.
Besides that we also found that we appealed to very young Japanese
who were interested in moving outside the traditional work area and
undertaking the challenge ofbuilding a business of their own, with
the hopes ofmoving to a level in this business at which they could
make a salary equal to that which they were making in a traditional
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Japanese company. The group aspects, the Americana that Amway
brings appeal to a wide spectrum ofJapanese.
Amway made the point that its approach to developing the Japanese business is not
radically different from that adopted in other markets. Culture is not seen as an
obstacle, it is merely something to master; it enables communication to be rendered
more effectively if it is performed considering knowledge of cultural sensitivities.
Rosenberg:
I don't think it's any different to any other country. I think ifyou go
to Hong Kong and were to visit Amway meetings there I think you
would find the same thing. Leaders are leaders throughout the
world. Obviously a Japanese leader might have a different way of
doing things but it's basically 80:20 ... 80% the same and 20%
might be different. I think the likeness between cultures is what
makes Amway's basic system so successful throughout so many
cultures. The ability for Amway management in each one of those
countries to know what the differences are in their culture and to
react to those differences and customize the basic Amway plan is what
makes us successful. When we go into a country we assume that the
basic Amway sales and market plan are going to work and it is up to
local management to make whatever changes need to be made to
accommodate the cultural, legal or whatever situations that arise. In
country after country it has proved to be successful. There's nothing
unique about Japan.
I think what you need to do is be sensitive, recognize that there are
differences. The more you can understand and identify the
differences the more you will be able to work within the system but
gaining that understanding does not mean that you will be able to
work in a Japanese manner. It means that you can understand the
interaction going on and you will be able to communicate your ideas
in a more meaningful way because you understand the differences.
Sometimes conventional wisdom regarding Japanese attitudes can be very wrong.
The Japanese culture can also be supportive to foreign businesses. Dick Bush, a
long time Japanese entrepreneur and currently manager of the Tokyo American
Club, described his experience of informing his creditors on his becoming bankrupt
after many successful years of trading in Japan.
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The amazing thing was I didn 't lose any friends. ... When I knew this
was going to happen I got hold ofmy bank and my attorney, an
American but ofJapanese decent and my accountant who was
Japanese, and we agreed it was inevitable. So I said I wanted to call
a creditors' meeting andface them, and they said you can't do that.
I said what do you mean I can't do that... ifyou call a creditors'
meeting they said when they leave that night they will take your
furniture, they will take everything in your office, they will strip you.
However I had my secretary call each of them and tell them that Bush
San wanted to meet with them at six thirty and we did not have good
news, but please would they come. They all showed up; there were
seventy eight-people at this meeting. I had my banker and my
accountant and my attorney sitting there and 1 explained the position.
The creditors informally appointed a spokesman for the meeting and
we talked for a couple ofhours. The up-shot was, they said Bush San
... we don't want you to close down and Mr Bush... we will forget
about your promissory notes (maybe a quarter ofa million dollars) at
that point and they all said collectively that they were not going to
put my notes out for collection, they would much rather try to help
me to keep things going as long as they could. "We don't think you
are cheating us in any way and we want you to keep trying and we
will work with you." So we triedfor six months and we could not
make it go so 1 had another creditors' meeting and I said "I think we
have just got to declare bankruptcy." They said, "No, Bush San, we
don't want you to declare bankruptcy"... they tore up their
promissory notes there and then saying "You just close down ifthat is
what you feel you have to do but we do not want you to go into
bankruptcy".
These examples are vivid illustrations of experiences that the sample companies
have with the Japanese culture. However the construct of culture does not exist in
isolation from other aspects of business experience; so other examples will be cited
at relevant points as this work proceeds. What emerges is a pattern that differs
from the nihonjinron propounded view that Japan is different school and which
highlight the similarities between Japan and other markets. Opportunities are based
on recognizing similarities and responding positively rather than being deterred by
perceived and sometimes imaginary obstacles.
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5.2.4. MARKET ENTRY MODE





In Japan, licensing has been favoured by a number of companies as a mode of
market entry. Philip Morris licensed its Marlboro brand to JT in the late 1970s,
when the market was closed to foreign importers, and is now competing against
Marlboro in Japan with its flagship brand, Lark. Ralph Lauren also entered Japan
via a licensing arrangement (see below), achieving a distinctive market presence
with its Polo brand.
Foreign manufacturers and marketers interviewed cited various products they
considered to have a high quality perception in their home markets, but which failed
to convince buyers for Japanese department stores (depato) of their ability to meet
the standards of the Japanese consumer. To complicate the "foreign" issue further,
clearly while foreignness may have some appeal to the consumer and can indeed
connote quality; at the same time the Japanese are so concerned with the highest
quality levels that they often have little faith in products manufactured elsewhere.
This creates a major obstacle for would-be market entrants, however licensing




While JVs have been shown to be a popular direct investment route into the
Japanese market, as Japan's markets open and as more people gain knowledge of
Japanese conditions, an increasing number of foreign companies is considering they
could go it alone.
Many foreign companies have entered the Japanese market by way of JV
arrangements with the sogo shosha. The primary reason for this is that the sogo
shosha are believed to offer both connections and entry points into what is often
depicted as a complicated, inscrutable marketplace. However, interviewees
suggested that this is an impression fostered by the sogo shosha to attract —
thereafter limiting, rather than promoting — foreign brands' market penetration.
Moreover, while excellent on mass market merchandise, the sogo shosha are,
according to the experience of some of the interviewees, weak on the handling of
items that require carefully planned sales policies.
In many cases, JVs are tenuous marriages of large companies, often from distant
lands, haphazardly joined for some single purpose. In many JVs, no one partner
has absolute control, and this inevitably creates tensions. Moreover, the owners
may disagree over matters of policy (if they can decide policy), and all too often the
relationship is not based on mutual respect: According to executives interviewed,
many JVs in Japan have failed simply because the foreign partner has abrogated its
responsibility; either it has not written into the contract specific mechanisms by
which it can provide serious input, or it assumes that whoever is the distributor or
partner will take its interests to heart.
On the other side, the nihonjinronists persuade the foreign partner that Japan is
unlike any other market in the world, as if for some mysterious reason one need not
pursue one's business interests to the full. However, if the Japanese partners do not
behave as the foreign partner expects, this is usually because the Japanese side
represents the interests of its total business holdings and these interests may conflict
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with the specific joint venture in question. As the President of Bristol-Myers
Squibb explained:
Providing he can do so without being dishonest, a Japanese partner
will consider his wider business interests ahead ofany joint venture,
which may well mean some reduction in the JV's outcome. Even for
the most senior ofmanagers, working in a JV company means going
to work every day to represent the interests ofhis own side of the
partnership.
Some pharmaceutical businesses are beginning to break up. One of the reasons
for this is the original contracts. JV literature abounds, but a key message drawn
from this research is that tremendous forethought must go into the JV agreement.
For example, what products will be within the remit of the JV? Will
all the foreign partner's therapeutic categories be covered, or just
certain lines? Ifall products are to be included, then the Japanese
parent has a legal right to them, thereby limiting the foreign
partner's scope forfuture development.
Mitchell Cybulski, President, Bristol-Myers Squibb
A typical scenario is that someone at corporate headquarters is given legal
responsibility for the JV. That person may relocate to Japan or, even more
unfortunately, he/she remains at the home office. Meanwhile, the Japanese partner
is carefully monitoring its own people in the JV, and will generally have a greater
influence over those players. This results in a management imbalance, so it is
inevitable that the arrangement comes under strain and one side seems to be far
more committed than the other. A JV is by definition only successful when both
parents have a vested interest in perpetuating the alliance. Generally, the joint
venture decision should be handled on a case by case basis.
Many of the major companies interviewed for this thesis are involved with JVs
or had originally started that way in Japan; and their experiences offer invaluable




Companies interviewed with previous or present JV involvement
Asatsu/BBDO
Bristol-Myers K.K.





Johnson & Johnson Japan
Kohler Japan K.K.
Master Foods K.K.
McCann Erickson Hakuhodo Inc.
McDonald's Company (Japan), Ltd.
Nippon Lever K.K.
Philip Morris K.K.
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Tobacco Company Limited
Roily Doll Inc.
Smith Kline Beecham
In 1983, Heinz entered Japan's frozen food's market by way of its frozen foods
subsidiary Ore-Ida and a JV with Mitsubishi8. From a US perspective, the
arrangement initially seemed very promising, however, when it failed to widen its
distribution base, investigations revealed that the JV was not actively pushing Ore-
Ida's products to fast-food outlets because it already had exclusive access to its own
— not insignificant— Mitsubishi businesses (Mitsubishi owns one of the largest
^ See Box 5.2
8 See Box 5.7.
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wholesale grocery companies in Japan), but had no vested interest in systematically
selling product to outlets owned by its competitors.
The way the issue was tackled by Heinz was to perform a marketing audit that
showed that 80% of Japanese households had toaster ovens. The subsequent
evaluation suggested that an opportunity existed for Ore-Ida to differentiate its
product by implementing a branding strategy, since the Japanese competitors treated
the product — frozen French fries — merely as a commodity.
In pursuing its strategy, Heinz was limited by its distribution arrangement
because it was tied to a team willing only to make a fraction of the potential
distribution coverage available to the Ore-Ida brand. When challenged, the JV
partner appeared uncomfortable and unenthusiastic about making efforts beyond the
Mitsubishi network. The Ore-Ida team conducted an attitude study of the retail
sector and was thus able to demonstrate to Mitsubishi that opportunities existed far
beyond its own network. The JV partner finally agreed to an extension of its
distribution coverage for the brand. However, many other interviewees indicated
that the major trading companies ran tightly controlled operations and did not want
to be pestered about possible changes by their partners.
Difficulties occur even with matching the behavioural expectations of the
Japanese and foreign partners. The Chairman of ICI (Japan) referred to the
problems in chairing a board meeting of their JV. The gaijin he noted tend to judge
their contribution by hogging the meeting, whereas their Japanese counterparts
gauge their's by their ability to stay silent with the occasional uttering of "few wise
words"; a balance must be sought.
JV situations are neither black nor white. There are circumstances where the
performance of foreign MNC brands deserves to be called a success, at least on the
surface. Occasionally, the JV partner will develop the brand to a certain point in
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the market and no further, as was true of Ore-Ida and Mitsubishi.9 On the other
hand, the foreign company may consider that its brand has broken through the
barriers and into the Japanese market. However, the success may be illusory, since
the Japanese partner probably used its own distribution leverage to circumvent the
barriers. If the foreign MNC tries to recover control of its brand to handle it
directly, it may soon learn that their product is nothing without the JV partner's
support.
Even when JVs are formed in Japan with global competitors from outside,
foreign MNCs become perplexed when the JV company loses money. Yet,
according to interviewees, the Japanese partner appears relatively unconcerned
about its own share of the losses; because, apparently, JVs are used by the kaisha as
devices to contain potential competitors. The Japanese believe that losing a few
million dollars on a JV arrangement may be much more economical for the Japanese
partner than having a major international company attacking their home market. It
is merely a commercial judgement.
Some interviewees used the above examples to argue that Japan remains
characteristically different from other markets in their collective experience.
However, what they miss is that the sogo shosha usually share interests in
competitive fields and to put their quandary into Western terms: if Campbell's
Foods approached Heinz in the US and asked it to distribute its soup products,
would it not be naive to expect 100% dedication? It appears that a number of
foreign MNCs have learned this lesson rather late in the day, and have perhaps
over-reacted by claiming that their Japanese business partners were dishonest,
whereas from the Japanese point of view, a JV appears to be a perfectly intelligent
arrangement to keep competitors at bay. From the MNC side, expectations can be
much too high, since the MNC typically commits very little, other than money, to
9 See Box 5.11
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the JV relationships it forms.
There was of course some praise for JVs. For example, Bristol-Myers Squibb
K.K. has achieved several market leadership positions; its success is based on two
50:50 JVs; Bristol Lion and Lion Bristol. Indeed, Bristol-Myers was unhesitant to
praise the contribution made by its Japanese partner, Lion. As Mitchell P.
Cybulski, the president of Bristol-Myers Squibb KK, outlined:
In the case ofBujferin it has been a long-term development process.
The keys to success in my opinion are: number one, hooking up with
good partners ... What Lion brought to the table was, 1 would say,
perfect manufacturing. They really developed a product—with a
very "low cost ofgoods" but also an impeccable product. Every
single Bufferin tablet is computer scannedfor conformity. I think we
have an even better product than in the US, and the US product is
flawless
The second thing Lion brought was a presence. And a presence in
the consumer business always brings distribution. Even today, when
we launch a new product within three months we get phenomenal
coverage.
Realities do prevail. As a method of entering the market, JVs have suited
various sizes of company at their respective stages of market entry. They were very
popular, and in many situations they are still valid, but several interviewees
suggested they are now falling out of favour. However, this unpopularity is
associated primarily with companies of a particular size and international position:
Nippon Lever, for example, negotiated to be released from its JV arrangement to
gain complete control of its Lipton business.^
When the obstacles to trading in Japan were more stubborn, many companies
found JVs essential; but with the market opening up, these companies recognize that
constraints have eased while their Japanese expertise has grown. In some cases, this
has resulted in a new-found confidence to go it alone: A recent Daiwa Securities
10 See Box 5.12
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study traced changes in Japanese ownership of Japan's JVs and found that in the
period 1982-89, at least 82 JVs switched to majority Japanese control, while 45
were taken over by the foreign partner (see Box 5.3). Since this survey by
Abegglen and Watanabe (1990), along with most statistics on acquisition in Japan,
is based on press reports, it includes only the most significant transactions; no doubt
it understates the level of activity.








1982 9 7 16
1983 9 7 16
1984 4 3 7
1985 - 15 15
1986 12 5 17
1987 9 1 10
1988 20 2 22
Year unknown 7 4 11
Total 82 45 127
Source: Abegglen and Watanabe, (1990)
The ratio of foreign and Japanese acquisitions remained approximately equal in
the period 1982-87, but since the yen's appreciation there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of buyouts by Japanese companies. Between 1986 and 1987,
there were at least 18 buyouts by the Japanese side and just six by the foreign
partner11. However, it is possible that a number of these were due to foreign firms
finding a combination of the yen's appreciation and Japan's booming stock market
11 For a list of JV buyouts by foreign partners see Appendix IV.
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an opportunity too tempting to pass up. In other words, they seized their chance to
cash out of arrangements that were perhaps sub-optimal.
On the other hand, a large number of foreign parties have been on the buying
side of JV transactions. ^ Three-quarters of those cited increased independence as a
motive for their action, indicating a desire to have a more active role in the parent's
strategy. The following reasons were also given:
• Changes in strategy;
• Expansion of Japanese activities;
• Integration of Japanese subsidiary following acquisition in the US;
• Establishment of a production base in Japan.
The available data shows the length of JV experience before buy-out averages
13.1 years. The acquisition of a JV with which intimate links have existed for a
long period is taken as a vote of confidence in the organization, showing a desire to
build on past relationships. This is a virtue held in high regard in Japanese society,
and in many cases the Japanese partner will not divest completely, viewing the shift
as a way of strengthening future co-operation. For instance, Yokogawa Electric,
Japan's leader in industrial process-control machinery, has been involved in two JVs
where the foreign partner increased its ownership in the 1980s: Yokogawa-Hewlett-
Packard (YHP); and Yokogawa Medical Systems (YMS), with General Electric
(GE) (Appendix II). Although the two buy-outs, according to Abegglen and
Watanabe (1990), occurred for very different reasons, the US partner in both cases
utilized JV experience to strengthen its overall position in Japan.
In the US and most other capitalist countries, ultimate control of the firm is
vested in the shareholders, who have the right to name the board of directors and at
least indirectly to determine management policy. If a majority of the shares are
owned by another firm, this is described as a "controlling interest", and the
See Box 5.4
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corporate owner may dictate policy to its subsidiary. In a strictly legal sense, this is
also true in Japan; however, in practice, the system functions quite differently.
In Japan, ownership may not be sufficient to guarantee effective control;
employees are treated much the same as shareholders (Abegglen and Watanabe,
1990). Unions are organized on an enterprise basis, and the secondary labor market
is underdeveloped. Moreover, with a plurality of shares collectively held by stable
shareholders who have little desire to manage the firm closely (except in
emergencies, to protect their interests as creditors), the largest shareholder may be
able to select most of the board of directors and make controlling decisions even
though holding as little as 20-30% of the equity. Corporate headquarters may not
appreciate this fact, but it is well understood by experienced executives such as
former Kodak president Albert Sieg, who commented.13
In Japan, you can have more control with 15% of the shares than you
would in the US with 100% of the shares —because of the
relationships. It's not necessarily based on who owns what, but
corporate lawyers cringe when they hear this kind of talk.
Many would-be foreign acquirers despair when they learn of these practical
barriers to gaining a majority position in a Japanese company; however, they may
be reassured when they realize that a minority position can work equally well to
achieve a specific business purpose. Japanese firms often take equity positions to
solidify long-term business relationships — a practice viewed as a sign of
commitment to a common purpose. The system of mutual share holdings,
commonly adopted by Japanese companies (but rarely utilized by their foreign
counterparts), facilitates a high degree of informal sharing of information and
business resources in a flexible organizational structure.
It is all the more curious that, although Japanese corporations have acquired
many other companies in world-wide arenas reciprocal acquisition by foreign
See Box 5.4
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companies in Japan is rare, the largest such move to date being that by Merck^.
This may be so, but few firms can muster the funds and expertise that are at the
disposal of certain international blue chip companies, and if there is any doubt that
an MNC has the singular products, knowledge or requisite funds to compete directly
in Japan, a JV is still the primary option.
A few significant moves were made in the early 1980s, with Merck's US$332
million acquisition of a majority 50.5% share in Banyu Pharmaceutical (1983) by
far the largest. Merck's move in 1983 was also the first foreign acquisition of a
Japanese firm listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. However,
the expected flood of foreign capital into Japanese corporations failed to materialize,
and until now, relatively few have followed in the pharmaceutical company's
footsteps.
5.2.4.3. Strategic alliances
A competitive alliance is one viable option for MNCs trying to set up
distribution. When US brewers Anheuser Busch and Miller's entered the Japanese
market, they tied up with major Japanese brewing companies to utilize their ready-
made distribution systems. However, at the same time, these Japanese brewers are
aggressively developing their own new products at a fast rate, thereby raising doubts
as to the concentration and effort they are likely to devote to the imported brands.
In other words, although such strategies are common in the brewing business in
international markets, alliances and tie-ups merely raise the question of why these
US companies are making such low-key efforts in a market that warrants a far more
aggressive approach.
Other major foreign MNC players have developed alliances that have stemmed
from their presence in the Japanese market. Nestle and Coca-Cola, for instance, are
See Appendix IV
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collaborating to distribute canned hot drinks through vending machines, a business
largely unknown outside Japan. Similarly ICI is to invest £25m in a joint venture in
Japan to make ozone-friendly refrigerants. Its partner is Teijin; the Osaka-based
fibres and chemicals' company. Moreover, J&J and Tokyo-based Olympus Optical
Co. have entered into an alliance, the first of its kind, in the market for endoscopic
surgical technology.
Olympus Optical and Ethicon have worked closely together in Japan on
expanding educational opportunities for surgeons in Asia and both companies are
similar in culture with innovative approaches to product research, marketing and
scientific development.
5.2.5. LONG TERMISM
Companies such as R. J. Reynolds say that in Japan they focus not on
profitability, but on volume. Such a strategy, which begs continued investing over
the long term requires faith at the corporate HQ level. The primary objective must
be to build market position; if this can be achieved, then profitability can be
expected to follow. Kodak represents a textbook example of this strategy in
practice.15
15 See Box 5.4
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Box 5.4
Acquiring a strategic position in the Japanese market: Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd
Despite a 100-year history of operating in Japan, when Kodak established its "1984
vision" that the company should "take charge of its own destiny", its "top-of-mind"
brand awareness stood at only 5%. At the same time, Fuji Photo Film had emerged as a
serious global competitor.
Government protection had enabled Fuji to develop an entrenched domestic position
from which to penetrate overseas markets, while Kodak's position was declining. The
Occupation authorities had persuaded Kodak to abandon the facilities it had been
operating pre-World War II to enable Japan's battered industries to recover. Subsequent
Japanese government pressure forced it to scale down its distributorships from around
20 to just two: Nagase for consumer products, and Kusuda for business systems. Until
the 1970s, tariffs for Kodak products remained high. Even today, although there are no
actual impediments remaining, former Kodak (Japan) president, Albert Sieg, believes the
company still suffers from "barrier hangover". During this time, Fuji managed to gain a
70% share of the Japanese market and had set out on an export drive to threaten
Kodak's global markets. Konica accounted for 20% of the remaining domestic sales,
leaving Kodak and some European firms to share the remaining 10%. In an attempt to
change all this, Kodak is now using a wide variety of methods to strengthen its position:
acquisition; minority participations; new JVs; wholly owned investments; aggressive
marketing; image-building; and recruitment.
Top management decided to invest for the long term, since they considered Japan to be
strategically critical for three reasons:
• Kodak was only a minor player in the world's second largest market;
• Without a strong presence in Japan, Kodak would be unable to influence the actions
of its chief global competitor, Fuji Photo;
• Kodak could not afford to miss out on the technological developments in electronic
imaging taking place in Japan.
• These considerations led Kodak to establish a separate Japan region, to bring over
high-level managers, and to launch a series of strategic moves that have enabled it
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to raise rapidly both its profile and its profits in Japan. Today, Eastman Kodak
(Japan) Ltd is not just a photographic company; it has developed a presence in:
Health sciences; specifically medical X-ray products. Kodak has developed its
Japanese medical imaging business into its number two market in world-wide terms
of revenue and earnings.
• Graphics imaging and the provision of services for architectural and engineering
applications, an arena in which Kodak claims to be gaining ground.
• Professional imaging; Kodak holds an overwhelming share of the professional colour
reversal film market, against heavy domestic competitive pressure. It is beginning to
regain a presence in the black and white market, with the T-Max product range.
• Pharmaceuticals; an arena that Eastman Kodak has entered on a world-wide basis,
the principle being that the basic technology offers synergy with its existing
chemicals' expertise. It has made a major leap in this arena by the acquisition of
Sterling Drug.
Kodak has utilized what it refers to as a multi-stage strategic push. Because it had
delegated key marketing responsibilities to distributors for decades, the first step was to
recover control of its distribution channels, and then regain management control of
planning, pricing, marketing and promotion. An example of this control recovery policy
was in health sciences (medical X-ray products), where it has successfully widened
distribution by making acquisitions. Under the previous arrangement, its distributors
would not have allowed the acquisition of other competitive distributors. In Kodak's
view, it is crucial to have the freedom to make decisions of this kind.
By securing control of the marketing channels and maintaining a direct dialogue with its
client base, Kodak argues that it is better able to place the right product with the right
customers, and is more effectively positioned to learn about buyer requirements. In the
past, its experience was that multiple-people, multiple-language channels delivered
unintelligible feedback.
Kodak's efforts to gain control of the distribution and processing of its products
therefore were spurred by the realization that direct feedback at consumer level would
assist the company to design marketable products and meet quality, packaging, and
delivery standards. "If we can meet the standards here, said Sieg, we can do so
anywhere in the world". By being here we force ourselves to be competitive in every
way".
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Acquiring a Division Japanese Style: Nagase
The first thing Kodak had to do was to gain control of the distribution and processing of
its own products; the direct feedback at consumer level thus obtained would assist the
company in designing marketable products and meeting quality, packaging, and delivery
standards. "If we can meet the standards here," says Sieg, "we can do so anywhere in
the world." By being here, we force ourselves to be competitive in every way."
Nagase Sangyo had been importing Eastman Kodak motion picture film since 1 922.
Kodak and Nagase Sangyo subsequently resumed their relationship after World War II.
In 1 960 the Japanese government requested Kodak to import via one point so that they
could track Kodak. So then Kodak selected Nagase as primary distributor in 1960. In
1984, Kodak decided to change its operating methods. It was satisfied with Nagase: it
handled most of Kodak's photographic business units. Unlike most other acquirees in
Japan, Nagase & Co. was not a company in distress or an obvious target for take-over.
As a major chemical trading firm with an annual turnover of US$5 billion, Nagase
provides its employees with lifetime employment guarantees, and company loyalty runs
deep. It is still majority family-owned, although shares are traded on the First Section of
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Kodak's products were important to Nagase — roughly
20% of sales and 40% of earnings — but Kodak was in no position to issue an
ultimatum. It required a year of painstaking negotiations (carried out largely on a one-to-
one basis) to persuade Nagase to sell out one of its most profitable lines. A sizeable part
of the pressure came from a credible underlying threat; Kodak was perfectly able to set
up a parallel competing organization that would cut directly into Nagase's sales without
compensation. Although details of the deal are not public, Kodak ended up paying a
significant premium, since Nagase was not a willing seller.
The execution of Kodak's successful deal had to be diplomatically engineered to avoid
the appearance that Nagase had sold out; this could have had a very negative impact on
employee morale and share price. Rather than going for outright ownership from the
start, Kodak was content to set up a 50:50 JV — Kodak Nagase — in August 1 986,
into which Nagase immediately transferred all the employees of its photo products
division — Kodak only gained majority ownership — 51:49 — in August 1 988 and
changed its name to Kodak Japan Ltd. Maintaining tatemae (appearances) was essential
to the success of the transaction.
Even after settling the substantive aspects of the deal, implementation has required
delicate salesmanship and management of integration. Although most of the employees
transferred to the Kodak JV had some loyalty to Kodak, having serviced the product line
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for years, it took six months of tough negotiations with the company union, and
considerable expense to bring employees around and assure their co-operation.
Generous bonuses were required to compensate for the dislocation and perceived
insecurity associated with working for a foreign company. To transform the organization
from a conservative trading and service company into the aggressive arm of a
technological leader, changes in management personnel were unavoidable, and after a
year of losses, Kodak is only now starting to reap the benefits of restructuring — these
should multiply as cost-cutting continues and sales grow on the back of Kodak's high-
profile advertising and marketing.
Buying a new product capability: Kusuda
Kodak was in much stronger position with its business systems distributor; in high-tech
office automation area, it was clear that a minor local company such as Kusuda would
not be able to make the necessary investments to develop the market. Kodak needed
new products for the Japanese market — such as copiers capable of handling standard
Japanese paper sizes — and Kusuda would have relatively little to contribute in applying
Kodak's world-class technology. Although Kusuda's employees were not overjoyed at
being acquired, Kodak met relatively little resistance; the employees generally recognized
that the company's (and their own) growth potential could only be enhanced. Indeed,
since Kusuda's integration into Kodak Information, growth has been excellent and new
records set each year.
This deal was also less expensive and Kodak paid only a reasonable market price plus a
small premium, although it acquired none of the company's fixed assets — these
included some very expensive real estate in metropolitan locations. Since these
properties had more value for the family owners, and leasing was perfectly adequate for
operational purposes, both sides were satisfied with the arrangement. Kodak was able
to limit its investment to the desired target, while the Japanese family owners held onto
cherished land and received a steady stream of rental income, rather than having to face
exorbitant capital gains taxation at the time of sale. This type of arrangement might set
a model for structuring foreign acquisitions in Japan in the future.
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Nurturing relationships by direct investment: Chinon and Nippon Systems House
To nurture relations with local suppliers and to gain a position in related businesses,
Kodak has also invested in two other companies:
• Chinon, a camera manufacturer, was formerly an OEM supplier. Kodak obtained a
15% stake through a third-party share distribution and open market purchases to
become the single largest shareholder. By placing a representative on the board and
a resident in the factory Kodak hopes to monitor and influence the course of
technological developments on the electronic camera front and to track Japanese
developments in manufacturing technology.
• Nippon Systems House, is a software producer. Kodak has taken a 10% stake in
this small (100 employees) unlisted firm, where they are co-operating on joint
development projects in medical diagnostics at the Kyushu facility.
"Multistrategic push"
While Kodak has successfully used both acquisition and equity participation to expand its
Japanese position, it has not excluded the familiar methods of operating new wholly
owned subsidiaries and JVs. Its full-court press has led the company to employ
techniques and organizational structures in a flexible fashion — any possible and proven
method is being attempted, including:
• Kodak Imagica, a 51:49 JV in photo-finishing, to ensure that Kodak's products will
not face quality problems or price discrimination at the photo-development stage;
• Strengthening the existing 50:50 JV between Kodak's subsidiary Verbatim and
Mitsubishi Kasei for the production of floppy disks in Japan; and
• A green field R&D centre, in which Kodak has built up a staff of 1 20, located at the
attractive new Kohoku new Town high-tech community near Yokohama.
Ultimately, Kodak would like to increase its capacity for manufacturing mainline products
locally. This would be valuable in learning Japanese production techniques and would
provide experience with managing a full business in Japan — from R&D and production,
to sales and service. Such ambitious projects will take money and a long-term
commitment at the highest levels, but given the surprisingly rapid turnaround in Kodak's
Japan position since 1984, Sieg expects these to be forthcoming.
Most acquisitions by both foreign and domestic firms in Japan begin with a period of
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minority participation; and despite a shift in management control, many never pass the
50% threshold. As has been discussed, an outsider acquiring a majority stake in a firm
with which it has no previous relationship invites a negative response from existing
managers and employees, who are in powerful position to block bids they perceive to be
unfriendly. For this reason, acquisitions that continue progressively, beginning with
small minority share, are more typical; once the acquirer's commitment to the firm has
been tested over a time, then additional shares, convertible bonds, or warrant bonds
may be issued.
According to Abegglen and Watanabe (1990) there is relatively little direct selling of
shares: with a large portion of existing equity in the hands of stable shareholders, it is
usually necessary to issue new shares if the "newcomers" stake is to grow without
driving up share prices. Following each increase in ownership, the acquirer's motives
are scrutinized and the relationship reaffirmed, a process which — with the exception of
urgent rescue circumstances — can take years, and even then may not culminate in the
outsider gaining a true majority stake.
Promotion
Although its competitors Fuji and Konica are committed to heavy promotional
expenditure abroad, Kodak has outspent both by three times over. It has erected huge
US$1 million neon signs as landmarks in major cities; the one in Sapporo, Hokkaido is
the highest in the country. The company has also sponsored sumo wrestling, judo and
tennis tournaments, not to mention the Japanese team in the 1988 Seoul Olympics.
Kodak also met Fuji head on by spending US$1 million on an airship, a tactic that had
previously been used widely by Fuji. The aircraft was rumoured to circle Fuji's
headquarters from time to time, and when the media picked up this story, Fuji deemed it
necessary to commit even larger sums to bring its own airship back from Europe to carry
out some face-saving publicity for its own communications strategy. As a result,
Kodak's brand has now attained immediate recognition with more than 50% of Japanese
consumers. Over a five-year period this has triggered increasing market share of 1 % per
annum—currently 15% of the amateur photographic market.
Corporate commitment
The payback of Kodak's investment in Japan is viewed as long term: None of Eastman
Kodak (Japan) Ltd's success would have been possible without corporate headquarters
commitment. This commitment was consciously directed towards overcoming
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parochialism, right down to the basic decision as early as 1984 to use Japanese and
English (as opposed to English-only) packaging. Nevertheless, it was not until 1988 that
Kodak could claim to have responded to Japanese consumer preferences by offering a
special product, Kodacolor Gold. The subsequent impressive results must be seen in
terms of the inertia that had to be overcome. As Sieg said, "I am not under pressure to
turn a bigger profit this year or next year, but I am under pressure to develop a strategy
that will improve Kodak's position here in Japan."
Sources: Interview material, corporate documents, corporate video, Abegglen and
Watanabe, (1990).
In many respects, Kodak is untypical of American companies, since most MNCs
are tied to the concept of reporting quarterly returns showing steady growth, and
this works against long-term market development. The key to the problem lies in
the way that overseas opportunity, and its exploitation, is prioritised. Frequently,
executives' remuneration packages are based on the quarterly review of performance
results; hence, managers find themselves tied to short-term financial objectives.
Moreover, in Japan, the major investments required to build businesses are unlikely
to produce rewards within the time horizons of the MNC's current president— they
are likely to be such a cash drain that they appear to be anything but rewards. So,
why should company presidents sacrifice bonuses to help their successors?
The answer is that to penetrate the Japanese market, companies must learn that
Japan places great emphasis on long-term relationships: Many of the major
consumer successes have occurred over long time periods, and enterprises such as
Nestle have been in the market for some 100 years (see Box 5.11). Nippon Lever
has had a manufacturing presence in Japan dating from 1910 (its new form dates
from 1963); Johnson & Johnson (Japan) has been operating in the Japanese market
as a wholly owned manufacturing business for 18 years, since buying out Cornes, a
subsidiary ofWheelock Marden. On the other hand, long-term presence is not
unique to Japan: The positions of Toyota and Nissan in the US have not happened
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overnight, but rather have taken them 20-30 years to develop. Only their mode of
entry has differed, since mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity in the US have
always been much easier than M&A in Japan, it not having been an accepted mode
of business practice; furthermore, most Japanese companies are not for sale
(Abegglen and Watanabe, 1990:8).
Interviewees confirmed that to develop consumer brands in Japan, a long-term
strategy is necessary: it is necessary to break into the relationship network, and
make the time and investment commitment to learn about distributors and their sales
forces, and to develop the crucial relationships between sales people and their
customer base. These ties are not made overnight.
5.2.6. DISTRIBUTION
Distribution is probably the most frequently cited obstacle encountered by
foreign MNCs in Japan. Japanese manufacturers and distributors place a great deal
of importance on developing their relationship with consumers to ensure both stable
prices and long-term supply; by contrast, Western companies generally rely on price
competitiveness and product performance. Some executives interviewed made the
point that the establishment of a distribution system should even precede the
existence of a marketable product; however, the balance of views lay in favour of
first ensuring that the product suits Japanese consumers, and then determining how
to win distribution. The basic maxim that products must be accepted by the
consumer is very true in Japan, and cannot be emphasized strongly enough. 16
As has been discussed in this thesis, strong interpersonal and commercial
relationships exist between intermediaries in the Japanese distribution channel.
Penetrating these structures is not easy. However, various foreign MNCs have
See Boxes 5.1, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.13
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successfully built their own networks.17 Western companies may rely more on price
competitiveness and product performance, but several foreign MNCs commented
that the difference in approach is not as great as many people believe. For
example, the chairman of Nippon Lever KK.
Good relations are extremely important and we try to foster good
relations but I've neverfound a wholesaler yet who handles our
goods for love or loyalty. He does it because it is a business
proposition.
As we saw in Chapter 2, there is a sound financial reason why the distribution
system is so relationship-based and that is that most Japanese companies operate
with little equity capital and much debt (Kanabayashi, 1978). In other words they
depend on each other for extended financing. Success Japanese-style owes much to
the close co-operation between manufacturer and distributor. Major retail chains
will use the wholesaler as principal warehouser and supplier (they rarely create their
own warehousing and replenishment facilities) and since a number of these
arrangements operate on an exclusive or semi-exclusive basis, the buy-in costs are
increasing to such an extent that only successful companies can afford to meet them.
However, information technology may create savings, cause some rationalization,
and ultimately reduce the mark-ups.
While it may be true that discounting has played a relatively less important role
in Japan in the retail quarter than in many western markets the situation is changing
as this thesis is being written. Japanese consumers are engaging in increasing
numbers of trips abroad, note is taken of the popularity of discounting concepts such
as Toys R'US; and, as a result, waves of change are being propagated. While
foreigners often moan about the cost of doing business in Japan, their chief
complaint usually concerns the country's retail system. It is true that Japan's
shopkeepers are small and weak; they are reluctant to stock the goods of newcomers
I7 See Box 5.5
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for fear of angering their principal Japanese suppliers.
Foreign firms that do break in often manage it by piercing these barriers with
irresistibly sharp prices. Now a small group of Japanese discounters has started
shaking up traditional retailing. Among the most aggressive is Bic Camera, small
and obscure but growing fast. Bic's president, Ryuji Arai, opened his first camera
shop in 1978. On his first day he took in only ¥730 (£4.30). Now his firm sells
¥300m-worth of goods every day (Economist, 1993b). His empire is controlled
from the ninth floor of a Tokyo store that did not exist until September 1992. Bic
has seven shops with more planned. The company has increased its floor space
five-fold in less than two years. This has been achieved in a city where traders from
Mercedes to McDonald's are encumbered with the world's costliest property. With
traditional department stores and supermarkets under pressure, a number of
mainstream retailers are starting to operate in ways that make Bic's style appear less
radical.
More traditional stores are beginning to adopt this approach as well. By
purchasing direct from manufacturers, Japan's more dynamic retailers are forcing
down prices. This is true even at Daiei (Japan's largest supermarket chain), which
stresses its big-company obligations to its traditional wholesale partners. Despite
that, Daiei imports a growing share of its goods direct from cheap foreign makers.
In October it even founded Japan's first wholesale club. For ¥3,000 a year, the
club's 98,000 members drive to Daiei's warehouse and pay wholesale prices
(Economist, 1993b).
Nevertheless, many foreign companies adopt an approach to Japan that Japanese
distributors term "export happy". As George Maruyama, the president of Chuo
Bussan Corporation explained:
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Frequently, principals approach me. They have statistics. They
come and talk to me and 1 say to them, "Why do you want to come to
Japan ? Do you intend to stay, or are you looking for short term
profit?" If it is the latter case, 1 say "forget it, it is not so easy." The
larger the country you go to then the more difficult it is. Because it
is the number one in their neighbourhood, they think it must sell
elsewhere.
Our companies will not deal with any export happy company. I say if
you want to do business with me you must tie for the long term, and
for me long term means 10 years.
This perception of "export happiness" is a significant restraint for foreign
MNCs, but the message is very clear. Western companies are expected to commit
themselves for what by Western standards must seem an interminable period, and
— to exacerbate matters— risk losing control of some key strategic marketing
variables. It is a "Catch-22" situation. Without distribution, products do not reach
the store shelves and consumers are unable to buy; however, on the other side of the
equation, an experienced distributor knows that establishing a new brand takes time
and effort, and returns are slow to develop.
Distribution is not an insurmountable problem, as is clear from the successes of
many of the companies interviewed. However, successful firms are often major
world players in their respective arenas; smaller companies with fewer product
advantages will not win distribution so effectively. One of the companies
interviewed, Amway, represents a good example of how a particular company
solved its distribution problem (see Box 5.5).
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Box 5.5
AMWAY: Winning Distribution in Japan
A company with no direct customers must have an excellent distribution system if it is
to succeed in selling its product— and this is precisely how Amway (Japan) Ltd has
boosted sales. Amway has over 1 million distributors world-wide, half of which are in
Japan. Since starting operations in Japan in 1979, Amway's has achieved great
success selling detergents, cosmetics, cooking-ware and nutrition products. This has led
to tie-up requests from other companies seeking to distribute their goods through
Amway's established channels.
Automated Fulfilment
Amway imports approximately 65% directly from its manufacturing plants in the US,
clearing customs and other paperwork before storing them in three computerized
warehouses in Tokyo, Kobe and Fukuoka. All its products are distributed from these
three warehouses to destinations across the country using a paperless pick-line and
order system developed entirely in-house.
Orders, received by letter, telephone, fax or computer modem, are sent on-line to the
warehouse computer, which translates it into a bar code printed on a pressure-sensitive
label and placed on each box. The box moves along a conveyor belt until it reaches the
correct warehouse storage area for the ordered product, where an operator reads the bar
code electronically and fills the box with the required quantity. The completed order
then moves along to the packaging area where it is dispatched to the distributor who
made the order. Packaged products are then sent from these distribution centres to
sales people known as direct distributors (DDs). Direct orders from the local Amway
office can only be made by DDs who then sell these products to their own customers
and groups of down-the-line distributors. Products are sold to consumers at about a
30% mark-up.
This successful formula was first used by Amway in the US more than 30 years ago,
and then taken to Europe, Australia and Asia. "Consultants told us we wouldn't
succeed in Japan," says marketing department manager Jerry Rosenberg. "They said
the closed nature of Japanese society was not suited to our selling methods. But we
have proved them wrong." By taking advantage of the so called "cultural" propensity of
the Japanese to create networks and with the majority of its sales going to middle class
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consumers that have high disposable incomes and savings, Japan has proved a lucrative
market for Amway: total annual sales in 1990 (ending August) stood at about US$680
million.
Key Role for Distributors
A major factor in Amway's strategy and success are the distributors upon whom the
company relies to spread its products throughout the marketplace. Described as "self-
employed independent business men and women," they are not conventional distributors
but people who sell consumer goods on an individual basis to friends, relatives and any
approachable buyers. Currently, there are some 700,000 distributors for Amway.
Distributors can achieve higher sales volumes by increasing the number of individuals in
their groups. They are also offered financial and travel incentives to encourage them to
enlarge their groups and increase sales volume. Distributors have the incentive of
becoming DDs and forming their own groups of secondary sellers. Since the firm has no
direct recruitment drive, distributors are responsible for attracting other individuals to
build the sales team. The company provides starter kits costing ¥8,240 (inclusive of
consumption tax and fully refundable) to those expressing interest in distributorships.
Different promotion techniques are used for different countries in Asia; however, Amway
likes to consider itself a family outfit and encourages a similar atmosphere throughout
the company. This fits well into Japanese society, where adherence to family principles
is paramount and the ideal of "family" is very strong. Thus, although an Amway
meeting in Japan to discuss company strategy might have a business-like atmosphere,
the air at new product introduction meetings is more family-like.
In Japan, Amway's own simple distribution system is greatly helped by the excellent
Takkyubin or small package delivery system available in the country. The Takkyubin
infrastructure is of "world standards" and Amway makes full use of it to ensure that
products reach DDs quickly. "This excellent delivery system," says Rosenberg, "has
made our life much easier in keeping costs down and getting the product to the end
customer cheaply and effectively."
Learning From Japanese Lessons
The Japanese market has had a great influence on how Amway has approached other
markets. Products have been reformulated with better multi-language packaging to meet
local demands and to broaden lines offered. Although Amway generally tests all its
products in the US first, Rosenberg notes that even their American offices have come to
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recognize that if you can satisfy the Japanese consumer there is a good chance the
product will succeed elsewhere. Lessons learned in the challenging Japanese market are
therefore being adapted into Amway's global marketing strategy: for example, use of
local companies when difficulties arise in meeting government regulations for certain
products. Amway used a Japanese company for consignment production when it met
with problems meeting local regulations on pigments and cosmetics. It has also worked
with major domestic manufacturers to expand its production lines. An electromagnetic
cooker was produced with Sharp Corporation and tumblers with Hoya Corporation.
Amway's sales method has two major advantages in market entry and penetration. The
first is the relative lack of marketing risk it must undertake with individual distributors
undertaking the burden of the cost and time required to increase sales and cultivate their
own down-the-line networks. The second is the harnessing of an unfettered distribution
system which is a great advantage in Japan where distribution has been the downfall of
many domestic and foreign companies.
Amway's success in Japan would appear to be the successful marrying of Japanese
"cultural" habit of networking with its simple but very effective sales methods. By
providing the right motivation to its direct and down-the-line distributors and pushing its
free enterprise principles, the firm has built an efficient operating method in a different—
and difficult— environment.
Source: Interview materia!
Many major foreign MNCs such as Procter & Gamble,18 Nippon Lever and
Nestle19 all work within the traditional Japanese system. Although presenting many
difficult challenges to foreign MNCs, the Japanese distribution system has its
positive side. For example, with the importance of small retail outlets in Japan
facilitating small-unit purchasing by consumers, retailers frequently need small
deliveries from their suppliers. This situation has brought about a highly efficient
small parcels' delivery service, one which Amway has harnessed to the full via its
350,000-strong, direct selling force, which makes the final delivery to the
18 See Box 5.13
19 See Box 5.11
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customers. Small-unit purchasing by consumers is one of the factors that has
enabled the vending business to grow as it has. Consumers are inclined to try
products when they are easy to obtain from vending machines. Japan boasts one
machine for every 22 people. The USA has one for every 46; the European
Community only one for every 200. With a virtual absence of vandalism and petty
crime in Japanese society, Japanese machines are also more productive. Sales per
machine are almost two thirds higher than in the USA, because the Japanese
machines sell high-value products, such as whisky, as well as the usual Coca Cola
and chewing gum. Vending machines are also used for more "off-beat" applications
such as flowers, pizza and matchmaking. If companies can win access to them,
such distribution channels are a convenient way for consumers to try out new
products.
Given that local knowledge will always be superior, MNCs must be prepared to
invest plenty of time, energy and resources in the Japanese marketplace. Market
Makers Inc., for instance, advises relatively small foreign companies about local
market entry strategies. One of its successes, a small US-based spices producing
company had no well-known brand on which to trade, but MMI matched it with a
Japanese food service wholesaler attempting to import Western goods without using
the sogo shosha. The wholesaler was expanding aggressively, steering itself away
from secondary or tertiary wholesaler status by acquiring other small distribution
companies in Japan, until it had finally built up a 52-branch network. After some
reformulation of the product and its packaging to suit Japanese tastes, a significant
route into the market was mapped out.
This distribution experience is quite typical. Each of the companies interviewed
had succeeded in forging functional distribution arrangements; either by traditional
or by unorthodox routes. The common — and key — factor is a willingness to
commit for the long term.
Nevertheless, as interviews confirmed, such obstacles that do exist are not
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necessarily discriminatory only to foreigners— but to any newcomer. Nippon
Lever offers a good example of successful distribution strategy. It has learned how
the Japanese distribution system works, and has attempted to get the best out of it
by using three distribution routes: one each for detergents, consumer foods and
industrial foods (primarily fats) for the extensive bakery trade. One of Nippon
Lever's major difficulties is that there are different wholesalers for each of its
brands. At the wholesale level there is a high degree of specialization and very
little synergy, even within the food sales force. For example, if a wholesaler
specializes in ice cream distribution, there is no point in the salesman talking to him
about margarine.
To serve its distribution system, Nippon Lever has three separate sales forces;
two consumer, and one industrial. Within the consumer foods' sales force, there is
a degree of specialization on a number of client companies, but the firm is taking
advantage of opportunities in the distribution sector to move towards a situation
where it eliminates specialization by its salesmen. In the retail area, there is a high
degree of synergy because salesmen can talk to any single retailer about most of
Nippon Lever's products, something that cannot be said of its wholesaler sales
efforts. The retail salesmen negotiate mainly with retail headquarters; but along
with that, Nippon Lever has a merchandising force that supports the sales effort
within supermarkets.
Nippon Lever has a commercial relationship with approximately 2,000
wholesalers but, like most other markets in Japan, personal relationships overlie the
commercial ties. Great efforts are made to formalize connections between Nippon
Lever and the people who work for it, and while the chairman cannot know each
person in the wholesaler network, links can be made. Under its company structure,
the president (who is Japanese) and the chairman (a European) exchange roles, in
other words they attend funerals, weddings, etc. The president concentrates on
external relationships by spending much more time with sales directors and on visits
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than would normally be the case for his counterpart elsewhere. For instance, if a
wholesaler's daughter gets married, the sales director and president may be invited,
and so on — personal networking is crucial.
Despite the differing routes and intermediaries through which Nippon Lever
deals, its consumer products are reassembled at the retail level, being sold primarily
in supermarkets. In the drive to offer more service there is, however, a slow
development of what could be called a general grocery wholesaler, that is, one who
handles a wider product portfolio to service grocery outlets. This development may
be accelerated as a result of the US Strategic Impediments Initiative (SII) and
resultant political pressures, but it is likely to be a long slow process.
In the food sector in the US or Europe, the distribution channels often go
directly from manufacturer to the retailer. Accustomed to this arrangement, some
foreign companies have therefore attempted to circumvent Japan's more lengthy
distribution channels, often with disastrous results. Moreover, many Japanese
consumer goods' companies have direct investments in the wholesale trade;
consequently, the dividing line between a manufacturer's regional warehouse and
sales office, and that of an independent wholesaler, can be blurred.
If a foreign MNC tries to build up its own sales force at the same time as it is
arranging physical distribution, it may be that the dual effort will tax its financial
and management resources, as well as damage the delicate balance of the
relationship with its wholesalers. In line with its practice in other markets, Gillette
established its own sales force in Japan around the mid-1960s. Then, the trade
accepted that move, but when Gillette reduced the number of A class wholesalers
through which it intended to deal, the firm ceased to enjoy "enthusiastic" trade
support.
This situation persisted through the 1970s and 1980s, making it very difficult for
Gillette to develop its business. It required a new president (Norman Roberts), with
considerable diplomatic skills, to persuade the trade that such short-term tactics
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played no part in the Gillette armoury of the future. Gillette then acknowledged the
wholesale trade as partners in the business, conveying the idea that Gillette wanted
to work with them, listen to them and learn from them. The recovery of Gillette's
distribution position was considered impressive by several interviewees.
An example of how a foreign distribution concept has been carefully Japanized
and positioned is that of Seven Eleven. It has developed its position by striking
synergistically at the heart of the Japanese distribution system: the "mom-and-pop"
stores.20
Box 5.6
SEVEN-ELEVEN: Convenience the Japanese Way
With some 13,000 outlets located in 22 countries around the globe, 7-Eleven is not only
the world leader in convenience stores, but also the standard by which other chains are
judged. The original 7-Eleven retail concept, however, which was founded by the US
company Southland Corp., has been taken to new heights of efficiency and profitability
by Seven-Eleven Japan Co. (the Japanese company spells out the digit 7) and offers key
lessons for foreign consumer MNCs targeting the Japanese market. Ito-Yokado Group, a
large Japanese grocery conglomerate, owns a majority of Seven-Eleven Japan Co. (SEJ).
SEJ originally operated under an area license agreement with Southland Corp. of the US,
paying royalties to the American company for the use of the Seven-Eleven name.
However, Southland has recently been so heavily in debt that it asked SEJ to make its
payments directly to the Japanese leasing company that was lending Southland money.
In 1990, SEJ acquired Southland's Hawaiian chain of 58 stores and in second-quarter
1991, SEJ and Ito-Yokado agreed to purchase 70% of the Southland Corp., bringing
more than 13,000 outlets world-wide under Seven-Eleven Japan's control.
The Japanese operation has thrived. Since its start in Japan in 1974, the chain has
opened 4,012 stores nation-wide (to February 1990) and is growing at a rate of more
than 300 stores a year. In the fiscal year ending February 28, 1989, Seven-Eleven's
made up only 6.6% of Ito-Yokado's revenue, but 34.9% of its operating profit. In 1989,
sales at Seven-Eleven Japan rose 14.5% to US$5.4 billion.
20 See Box 5.6
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Fundamentals of Success
The key to this success story is that SEJ has developed a franchise system to revitalise
Japan's "mom-and-pop" stores — the major Seven-Eleven franchise holders. The
franchises manage themselves independently under 15-year contracts (the first ones
came up for renewal in 1989), with SEJ providing management advice, as well as
technical knowledge and equipment. The company strives to raise overall profits by
using a system that calculates franchise commission based on individual store's gross
margin — the higher the store's turnover the bigger the commission the franchisee
receives. Seven-Eleven has also adapted to changing Japanese consumer needs by
reforming the traditional distribution and store information systems, as well as offering a
fast-selling selection of merchandise.
One of the principal components in the firm's success and rapid expansion has been a
distribution system that combines a market-dominating strategy with the latest in
technology. Seven-Eleven's fundamental strategy makes distribution more efficient by
eliminating distance between distribution centres and the stores. Clusters of 50 to 60
stores are opened together in relative proximity to a centralized distribution centre. This
organization gives Seven-Eleven a high-density market presence, preventing competitors
from entering an area. It also improves brand awareness, raises efficiency of franchise-
support services and advertising activities, and works well with Seven-Eleven's
centralized distribution system to keep delivery costs down.
New Attitudes to Inventory
In 1974, every store depended on the telephone to order stock, which required a great
deal of time and resulted in excessive paperwork and careless errors. This process was
improved in 1975, with the introduction of computers that read order numbers in bar¬
code form from ordering terminals. Data was then sent to a distributor's computer over
telephone lines. In 1979, SEJ established an on-line network linking the head office,
stores, and vendors — the industry's first value-added network (VAN).
In 1982, a point of sales (POS) system was introduced, complete with POS cash
registers and terminal controllers.The electric order booking (EOB) system, which
21 All stores have in-store Point of Sale (POS) computer systems to gather
information. These machines record when each particular item was sold, and
are equipped with keys that enable the cashier to input information on customer
buying habits, which products are fast sellers, and the times products
commonly sell out. All data is fed into an on-line information network, which
is used by head office to determine product sales patterns. The computers also
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features a computer linked directly to vendor and head office terminals, was also brought
into operation. In 1985, SEJ unified the POS system to assist in gathering sales
information on buying patterns throughout the chain. Since then, SEJ has also
introduced bill payment services for electricity, gas, and insurance policy payments, as
well as prepaid cards to make purchases faster and easier.
The backbone of Seven-Eleven's formula for retail success is that lower inventory means
higher sales and higher gross margins. Previously, the retail industry believed that from
a merchandising point of view lower inventory would result in fewer sales opportunities.
High inventory turnover was considered necessary to provide the best merchandise mix
of popular items. However, stock overflows prevented optimal merchandising and made
accurate sales and trend analysis difficult.
Retailers used to demand perfect quality from suppliers, and so accepted sky-high prices.
Prices now matter more, so retailers are less inclined to reject a bruised fruit or a suit
with one stitch missing. Armed with point-of-sale computers that track customer habits,
bigger chains as Seven-Eleven Japan now believe they know precisely what will sell and
when. So, like the discounters, they can release suppliers from the obligation to take
back goods in exchange for keener prices. More traditional stores are beginning to adopt
this approach as well. In 1991 Seven-Eleven's parent Ito-Yokado became the first big
general-merchandiser to switch entirely to 'risk merchandising'.
Seven-Eleven has implemented a scheme that allows staff to determine quickly which
items are slow-moving, enabling the chain to minimize total stock. This is achieved by
an item-by-item control basis on a computer network. By recording the sale of every
item immediately, the store, the combined distribution centres, the head office and
suppliers all know the exact inventory of each outlet. This system also permits Seven-
Eleven to merchandise a fast-selling product in reaction to strong consumer demand -—
for example, at a certain time of the day. As proof of this strategy's success, Seven-
Eleven points to the fact that average per-store inventory has dropped ¥2.8 million over
allow store staff to make ordering decisions based on extremely accurate
information. Moreover, head office can use it to develop chain-wide
merchandising and distribution policies. Vendors and suppliers can also assess
demand and make up realistic production, inventory, and distribution plans to
fit in with the new information.
Staff at the store use a graphic personal computer to interpret the information
gathered by the POS system and show which items are low in stock. The
employee then places orders into the on-line information network through the
Electric Order Booking (EOB) system.
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the last 10 years (from V7.74 million per store in 1 980 to V4.96 million in 1 990), while
average daily sales per store have soared by ¥130,000. This indicates a corresponding
improvement of 3.6 points in average gross profit margin.
Getting Product to Market
As with most convenience stores, SEJ's outlets average a mere 100 square metres of
floor space and carry almost 3,500 various items. Obviously, little space is available for
storage. Turnover is brisk: Seven-Eleven is Japan's largest food retailer and had more
than 1.2 billion customer visits in 1 990. SEJ has tackled the problem of distributing
products to its chain of stores by developing the first small-lot, frequent delivery
distribution system in Japanese retailing. The main steps in the strategy are as follows:
• Major suppliers deliver products, based on the overall requirements of the stores
clustered in a certain area, to one of several regional combined distribution centres.
They can then forward items to individual stores from any number of the suppliers
simultaneously. Before this plan, Seven-Eleven stores had to order from an average
of 70 suppliers who delivered items to individual outlets — a system that kept
supplier costs high. Major suppliers now deliver products to one of the distribution
centres, which then deliver to several individual stores in one trip. Seven-Eleven
outlets now deal with less than half the number of suppliers they used to.
• The four main categories of products are: chilled, frozen, medium-temperature, and
room-temperature products. A four-temperature delivery process ensures that each
type is fresh when it arrives at the stores. Four kinds of truck, each with storage
capabilities to match the relevant distribution centres, are dispatched with the
desired stock.
• Deliveries are carried out three times a day: before 3:00 am in preparation for the
morning rush, before 11:00 am in time for the lunch hour peak time, and before
7:00 p.m. ready for the evening rush after other stores have closed.
Seven-Eleven Japan recently introduced more new equipment to provide improved
merchandising data that will assist stores to place orders more efficiently. Introduced in
the November of 1 990, the hand-held Graphic Order Terminal (GOT) is the pillar of this
system. Store staff use the GOT, which has the ordering capabilities of the present EOB
system, plus the added function of ordering advice presented as text rather than
graphics. Additional plans for the digitisation of the network circuits linking individual
stores, the head office, and suppliers, will further improve the speed of data processing.
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The efficiency of the distribution system has not only lowered delivery costs, but has
also allowed Seven-Eleven to cut down on required storage space at outlets and utilize
the space to display more items. An average SEJ store is half the size of its American
operation yet sells twice as much.
Source: Reid (1991)
The manufacturer level sees fierce competition for distribution. Moreover,
according to McKinsey and Boston Consulting Group, if an opportunity is too big
for any one firm then subsets of Japanese competitors tend to regroup to tackle the
market opening collectively. Overall, distribution costs are high, since the players
compete aggressively on the advertising and sales promotion fronts to support their
hard-won positions. According to Nippon Lever's Chairman, distributor rebates,
small lots and high frequency deliveries are all characteristics of this competitive
situation. Most interviewees stressed that while many foreign marketers are
undoubtedly familiar with these elements as individual factors, the intensity of
competition in each of these spheres produces a combined effect that is not only
unfamiliar; it also translates into a high end price for the consumer.
One major problem regularly encountered by MNCs is that foreign imports are
often channelled through the sogo shosha (Japanese trading companies), which in
many cases take sole distribution rights for the product and then appear to stifle its
development. Consequently, the sogo shosha are much criticized for making
promises to promote products, and then reneging. On the other hand, there are few
agents or distributors anywhere in the world who do not promise more than they
deliver to add a desirable line to their portfolio. This perspective renders somewhat
naive the ACCJ's (1989) argument for government intervention to force the sogo
shosha to behave differently to distributors world-wide.
Strategies, discussed in detail later in this chapter, show that distribution—
although difficult— is definitely not impossible. An example follows in Box 5.7 of
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a company that struggled and adapted its distribution opportunities.
Box 5.7 Heinz Ore-Ida
Setting up a Consumer Products Operation
Ore-Ida is the frozen food division of Heinz. This company was established in Japan
around 1983. By its own admission the original team of two, according to its Ex-
President, knew nothing about this market except:
It looked like there was a real opportunity to sell our products here.
The major product was frozen potato products — chips. When the management landed
they assessed the market and observed there was no branding in the product category,
there was no company trying to turn what there seems to be a commodity into a brand
and create brand differentiation. Even some differentiated products in that category had
a lowly image, except those participating in the fast food industry. By that time, the fast
food business had started to grow very well and was quite focused. The Japanese
consumer appeared to like fast food. It was a high interest category and when Ore-Ida
researched consumers they found that fast food was a product that appealed to
consumers of all ages. The key issue for Ore-Ida was to differentiate the product. After
exploratory research Ore-Ida concluded that the distribution system was not at all
complicated. It had expected 3 or 4 layers of distribution but the frozen good industry
was still relatively new so it was more straightforward than it had anticipated.
We found as most people do when they come to Japan everybody tries to tie your
hands, they say "I can do everything for you". You know Heinz had been working with
Mitsubishi Trading Co. for many years before / ever got into the business and they
were our trading partner here. They had exclusive rights to our food service business
and we were supplying Kentucky Fried Chicken of which they own 50%, so as Kentucky
Fried Chicken's business grew Ore-Ida's business grew.
Corporate management at the US end was happy about that but it had no idea what
other businesses were doing in Japan and they couldn't understand why Mitsubishi was
not really going out and pushing these products to other fast food outlets. Mitsubishi
felt that it had the exclusive rights for its own business and they had no vested interest
in establishing the business with the competition no matter how good the product. In the
distribution business Mitsubishi own one of the largest wholesale grocery companies in
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Japan — Rioshoku. Mitsubishi had been selling Ore-Ida's product through that channel
and failed to comprehend the causes of Ore-Ida's complaint. The Ore-Ida Ex President
made the point that:
We had been doing business for 8 or 10 years on the retail side and the business was
still very small so when we first came to the market to investigate whether there was a
good opportunity in Japan we had to establish product differentiation. We had to look at
the distribution system which turned out not to be a problem but we were tied to a
group of people [Mitsubishi] that would only offer a portion of the available distribution
We had stumbled on to a cooking method that made sense and determined that
everybody had a cooking appliance; a toaster oven in their homes, so we identified a
very simple distribution system and visited the retailers. The retailers told us who their
suppliers were. We approached them and said "if we come with a multi-million dollar
advertising programme differentiating the product, an aggressive sales force, other sales
promotional activity and pricing that is reasonable what's your reaction?" Big
wholesalers and retailers replied "Of course I'll buy your product."
Most people come to Japan and they do it the other way around by starting with the
trading company. It says we can do this and that but they are limiting their contacts in
spite of what the sogo shosha tell you, but they are not advertisers, marketers, or
promoters with a sales force. They are essentially a way of financing businesses for
other people. They can only get you so far.
Ore-Ida's management maintained that it could not tolerate that situation. After further
consultation with retailers it determined that it needed more wholesalers. We went to
Mitsubishi and said "Look guys the retailers are telling us that you can't handle it all in
spite of what you tell us. The retailers are telling us a different story." So eventually
they capitulated and said "Well maybe you're right maybe you do need more". So we
wound up with wholesalers that were related to Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sanwa,
all the major trading operations. We appointed six primary wholesalers in the Tokyo area
and we had a network of about 25 to 30 secondary wholesalers and that was as far as
we had to go and they were readily identified for us by the retail trade. It worked out
very well.
Most Americans or other foreigners when they come to do business in Japan are
unwilling to take the time to dig into all of this stuff. If they did they might find out
where the power is. Here, the retailers control an awful lot of what going on in spite of
the trading companies telling you how well connected they are. It is really the retailers
that are running the show.
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According to the same source, the trading companies' stock in trade is secrecy and
deliberately create confusion by telling everybody how different it is in Japan
[nihonjinron) and thus prolong their ability to control whatever category of products that
they are trying to deal in.
The key problem is those new companies attempting to gain entries into the Japanese
market are not usually willing to set up an affiliate business in Japan and they are
attempting to conduct it from an expatriate perspective with control from their own
country. They will encounter difficulties since there are very few trading companies that
are willing to invest their own money to make a business grow. If you want to have a
successful business you've got to come here and do it yourself, dig into it and find out
what's going on and so from there. It took us, / suppose, 2 years of initial research and
then 1 year in Japan before we even launched our product so we didn't just walk off the




As was alluded to in Chapter 2, obtaining high calibre staff in Japan is an acute
problem faced by all foreign MNCs. Interviews confirmed that attracting first-class
Japanese personnel is one of the biggest problems facing foreign companies
operating in Japan, even though they often offer salaries 20-50% more than their
Japanese competitors. "Lifetime employment" is not absolute, it applies primarily
to an elite group: primarily male, managerial and university educated. However,
employment relationships in Japan are long-term and this long termism in
employment has been underpinned by the virtual continuous growth of the Japanese
post war economy. As a result, job-hopping is not common. High premiums must
therefore be paid to lure qualified workers away from their career positions, and for
some individuals no price is sufficient when compared to a job with guaranteed
security.
The priority in Japan is to favour local companies; in fact, many Japanese are
suspicious of foreign MNCs, and these must therefore concentrate on persuading
their potential recruits that they have a long-term commitment to Japan and to the
employee. According to David E. Schmidt, the president of Levi Strauss:
It is difficult to get good people; one has to take time and be very
selective. Similarly one has to offer a broad perspective to the
candidates, you can 7 just say here's a job and here's your salary.
In his experience, the Japanese candidate looking at a company is evaluating it
as an environment in which to live, work and spend the balance of his or her
professional career. Such recruits are going to appraise the personality and
character of the company; they will consider the opportunities that exist for
themselves; and they will gauge whether the company will not just survive, but
grow. If there is a perception that it is a non-growth industry, or that the company
itself will not grow within the industry, it is doubtful that candidates will choose it.
A key factor in the case of Levi Strauss is that it is 140 years old — a company
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pedigree that connotes heritage, continuity, and in turn security.
Levi Strauss makes the point that growth is very important in attracting
employees. To support growth, there has to be commitment by the company to
developing the employee— that is to say training both on and off the job, and
education. Such things are very important, and although compensation and benefits
carry a certain weight in the prospective employee's mind, they will not in
themselves be decisive: decisions are made on the overall package. In other
words, a comprehensive package must be made available so that the candidate can
evaluate the total working environment on offer. As many of the companies
interviewed, Levi Strauss discovered that staff, once hired, will almost certainly
stay (turnover rates were down to 1-2%).
Nevertheless, it remains difficult for foreign companies to attract the right sort
of employee and firms often have to rely on hiring staff who, for one reason or
another, is unhappy working for Japanese firms. This group largely consists of
people who do not like the way they have been treated, or the way a company
works, and of those who are simply not succeeding within Japanese organizations.
Foreign MNCs often encounter problems in persuading expatriates to work in Japan
— where living conditions are perceived to be difficult. The interview sources
suggested that a source of talent more frequently used is that of locally hired
foreigners, who receive roughly the same benefits as local staff, but often couple
the expertise of the expatriate with superior language skills.
Foreign MNCs possess an advantage over Japanese firms in that they will
recruit people in mid-career— an option, until recently, Japanese firms have rarely
considered. Moreover, several Japanese companies have out placement departments
dedicated to finding new jobs for staff leaving their firms, and this can be a source
of recruits for foreign MNCs. Some firms claim to have reaped success in
recruiting second-generation Japanese Americans from US universities
(linguistically capable as they are, these, as we saw in Chapter 2, may well feel
280
culturally isolated), and of course the contact network can also bring rewards.
Philip Morris, for example, has systematically and successfully hired staff known to
its existing employees.
One of the most distinctive contrasts between Western companies and those
owned or run by managers from an Asian background is the reliance upon family
values: employees assume that their company is a corporate family in which their
roles may be only vaguely defined; or perhaps not at all. This corporate structure
relies upon group effort to solve problems, unlike Western companies' reliance on
job descriptions, operating manuals, and control standards. However, there are
some signs of change: an increasing number of Japanese is switching companies in
search of increased salaries and benefits.
Nevertheless, most changes of job occur within companies and such a tight
recruitment situation calls for ingenuity from foreign MNCs operating in Japan,
since they cannot expect to compete on the same basis as top Japanese companies.
One of the companies interviewed — Heinz Ore-Ida is a good example of a
management that took its own initiative and challenged the conventional approach to
lifetime employment (see Box 5.8).
Box 5.8
Heinz Ore-Ida's Recruitment Experience
Heinz Ore-Ida management sought the advice of McKinsey and Co. to assist the
company in the recruitment of a sales manager. The company was advised to find
someone who understood consumer products and could speak English; he would be
required to communicate well with the home office and expatriate management. As a
result, Heinz went to three of the largest head hunting operations in Japan then and
briefed them accordingly.
Heinz was uncomfortable with the available choices. The majority of the applicants had
experience with one or more foreign companies, but these encounters had been failures,
and even if the applicant spoke good English it was unlikely that he/she had any
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knowledge of the frozen food industry — a necessary criterion. Eventually, Heinz
decided to change the job specification and asked one of the recruiters to locate a frozen
food specialist, regardless of whether he could speak English. In the event, a candidate
with 23 years' experience in the business was identified in a fishing company that was
in decline and who, quite by chance, also had a background in the frozen food industry.
Once hired, he was able to raid his previous company and recruit five or six of the most
talented young people. In this way, Ore-Ida acquired a virtually ready-made sale force,
but also the less welcome reputation of being a corporate raider.
Subsequently, the managing director of the fishing company called the managing
director of Heinz Ore-Ida and requested an interview. The meeting that ensued
crystallized some of the key cultural differences between US (Western) and Japanese
management. The Heinz Ore-Ida version is:
I went to talk to him. He was perplexed and said, "What are you doing?" I said, "I do
not understand. " And he said, "Why are you taking all my people? / have spent years
training these people, / have built them into qualified managers and you just come in and
take them away." / said, "Well you know / have a problem. / have got to build a
business and / have to build it fast in order to get the returns my company needs to
justify the expense of setting up this business. If / come in here and hire all the young
people and spend 10 years having them go through the learning process, what good is
that going to do me? / am not going to be around here to justify my own existence. "
He could not understand how / could come and steal his people, even if his business
was in decline and his company was paying on the 30th Percentile of the food industry
at the time. / obtained good people and / gave them a chance to run a branded business
with a big marketing budget. These guys that had been frustrated for so long all of a
sudden had an opportunity to have some independence and freedom. That was 1984;
and now there is an awful lot more personnel movement. Young people are finding out
that with the [Japanese] seniority system working the way it has in the past, bringing a
group of people in from the same university class at the same time, doesn't give them
[the students] anything really responsible to do until about 15 years after they have
joined the company. They let the stars rise to the top. That's a tough system; people
do not want to wait that long. Within 15 months from the time that we launched our
business, we had with a 38% share in the product category. Furthermore, we were
driving the category at double digit annual growth.
Source: Interview materia!
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Executives interviewed made the point that staff difficulties also occur at the top
level of MNC management: major corporations have their own list of priorities,
and frequently the home markets — whether they be Europe or the US — are
where the glamour positions are located. Fast-track executives are often reluctant to
step outside what they consider to be the mainstream career lane. This can be a
significant weakness when cast against the strategic potential of the Japanese
market. Yet, major MNCs such as Unilever do not suffer greatly from these
problems. Formerly unable to attract the best graduates, it now receives a steady
flow of applications from young people prepared to devote their lives to the newly
esteemed Nippon Lever. This trend is facilitated by its corporate creed that no-one
can manage a market like a local, the "locals" see expatriate management being
withdrawn and re deployed elsewhere which enhances the company's attractiveness.
Interviewees frequently mentioned cases of managers that had been required to
run foreign MNCs in Japan whose previous experience did not involve the scale of
investment decisions common to that country. As the company president of SKB
explained:
Someone who has made good in the US by worrying about a US$2
million advertising budget may not be capable ofwinning corporate
commitment to invest the US$20 — 30 million that may be called for
to develop the Japan business.
Without doubt, the scale of the Japanese market requires substantial management
talent, and persons with real influence in the corporate world are essential. If there
is any single success factor for foreign MNCs in Japan, it is head-office
commitment both to the huge investments that are usually necessary, and to patience
awaiting returns. Managers who head foreign MNCs in Japan must have a "hot
line" to the top echelons in the corporation, and an overall vision of what could
eventually become a major overseas enterprise. It is not effective to post people
who are either insufficiently senior, or who have only experienced responsibility for
part of an investment budget but not for any major strategic decision making.
283
It is also a gross error to make the number one position in the Japanese office
into a two or three-year posting. When this does occur, MNCs should be warned
that the Japanese support staff will recognize the limits of short-term appointments
and simply find ways of limiting the damage the individual might inflict. The point
cannot be reiterated too frequently that relationship building is one of the key roles
of the corporate president in Japan: if distributors and potential business partners
and associates feel they are talking to a company president who has only a year or
two of his term to run, they will have reduced faith in the lasting effect of his
policies. It is well know that in Japan much of this relationship building centres on
networking by way of business entertaining: company presidents of successful
foreign MNCs remarked how they initially found it difficult to dine with customers
and suppliers almost every evening; however, without exception, they soon
recognized the crucial importance of doing so.
The image lingers on that the Japanese market is permeated with invisible
obstructions although restrictions have eased. Different interest groups and industry
sectors inevitably present different perspectives. Clearly, the sort of view taken by
the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan is likely to be well removed from
that of US companies that want to do business in Japan but are not yet at stage one.
The view is typically taken by foreign concerns already operating in Japan, that
having achieved success by working their (usually difficult) way through the
system; the problems and barriers of the Japanese market are no greater than those
in other Asian countries. It is largely the US-based firms aspiring to secure a slice
of the Japanese pie that are currently exerting pressure on the US government to act
against Japan under Super 301. It is ironic that these companies are behaving in a
similar way to the companies they are complaining about.
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5.3. RESPONSES TO MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS
In this section we will examine the responses of the sample companies to the
singular characteristics of the Japanese market.
5.3.1. RESPONSES TO THE JAPANESE CONSUMER
Chapter 2.1 outlined the apparent attractiveness of the Japanese market with
Japan's macro economic performance relative to its major trading partners. It was
mentioned that the wealth of Japan had not, so far, translated to the same extent,
into economic benefit for all of its citizens but that the future intention ofMITI was
that it should. Despite that, it was shown that the Japanese are relatively wealthy
and exhibit a propensity to consume on a grand scale and the market for consumer
products exists on a scale that deserves consideration by any serious global
marketing concern. Yet the view was often expressed by those executives
interviewed that foreign MNCs tend to treat Japan with similar importance to that
which is accorded Third World markets.
Nevertheless, despite the multiplication of potential payoffs, rising to the
challenge of Japan's markets does not come cheap: investment in Japan requires
substantial resources and a willingness to commit to long-term relationship-building
and market development. This observation was supported by a recent report by the
Wednesday Group, a Republican Party congressional body which released details of
a study of 340 American companies that showed Japan has the lowest levels of
foreign investment per capita of all industrialized countries. The main reason, it
concluded, was not the informal barriers but simply the high cost of Japanese land
(Economist, 1993a:67). The data gathered for this thesis has illustrated that
forward-looking firms that have responded to the Japanese opportunity and have
established an early presence in the Japanese market are those now reaping the
rewards, although they have often waited a long time to harvest satisfactory returns.
It was also shown that while Japanese consumers may share a propensity to
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consume many different varieties of product, they are highly discriminating.
According to interviewees, they are probably the world's most discerning
consumers. This is a lesson which foreign companies have been forced to learn,
irrespective of whether they are involved in marketing fast moving consumer goods
or luxury durables. However, foreign companies, far from being disadvantaged,
have some inherent advantages. Foreignness has historically and still can connote
quality. Consequently it is in the luxury good's sector where some of the more
obvious successes have been reaped. According to its advertising agency Asatsu,
Alfred Dunhill achieves 60 per cent of its world-wide sales from Japanese people.
Many other companies and labels in the same sector have developed major
positions, viz: Ralph Lauren, Hermes, Donna Karan, Louis Vuiton, etc.
Numerous examples of foreign brand successes are presented throughout this
chapter.
There is a litany of cases in which foreign companies have seriously misjudged
the Japanese consumer and her relationship with products. An appropriate example
is when the Morinaga-General Mills JV launched Mary Baker cake mixes in Japan
under the brand name Cakeron, the product sold well in the retail outlets but then,
despite the demonstrable consumer benefits, sales stopped. The Japanese are heavy
consumers of bought cakes, but they have no tradition of home cake-baking (cake-
baking was perceived as a specialist skill). The Cakeron concept sought to
overcome this perception by offering the consumer a chance to imitate the
purchased product at a fraction of the price: using advertising that, in terms of
advertising volume, outspent the rapidly emerging "me too" competition, Morinaga-
JM stressed convenience and the ease with which cakes could be created by using
the mix. Although, in the past, the average Japanese home did not have an oven,
the marketers believed that consumers could be persuaded to use its rice cookers for
cake baking. Yet the consumer still did not buy. Post-mortem research established
that the Japanese would not consider introducing anything else into the rice cooker
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for fear of contaminating the flavour of the rice (Fields, 1983). Clearly, customer
views had not been adequately researched, and failure to uncover problems until
after the costly product launch ultimately meant the withdrawal of the product.
Johnson & Johnson expected that more frequent diaper changing would lead to
higher talcum powder consumption; but this was not so. More frequent changes
leads to fewer rashes but, more importantly, the preferred method of talcum powder
application is with a puff, since it provides a more focused application and causes
less mess in the space available. However, when Johnson & Johnson (Japan)
attempted to persuade corporate management of the need to package its product for
puff application, it was an uphill struggle: the mentality of "if it is good enough for
the US and Europe, then it is good enough for Japan" hung on strongly; a
fundamental error.16 Eventually J&J headquarters approved the request.
Interviewees frequently cited examples of foreign companies that had cried foul
because their top selling products in their home market failed to proceed beyond the
starting gate in Japan. They stressed the requirement for opportunities in Japan to
be determined from and only from a Japanese perspective. For example, despite
the Japanese preoccupation with cleanliness and tidiness— a trait reinforced by
small living spaces — the market for furniture polish is smaller on a per capita basis
than it is for similarly developed markets. Why? Those space restrictions mean
that there is little room for furniture. As a result of this reduced living space in
small-scale housing, the Japanese consumer often sleeps within smelling distance of
the kitchen surfaces. According to Unilever, the selection criteria for surface
cleaning products are conditioned accordingly. Product fragrance is a critically
important consideration. Nippon Lever, which adapts almost all its products to
Japanese tastes, claims for example that the Japanese consumer shows preferences
for orange, fruity perfumes.
Nippon Lever's Chairman, Mike Schofield offers this advice:
16 See Box 5.13 for an example of P&G's folly.
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Do not regard a difference in market conditions as an opportunity
unless you have established the reasons for the difference. Be
absolutely committed; spend the money necessary to make the
required impact.
If the marketer is to address successfully the Japanese consumer's needs, it is
essential to understand the relationship the consumer has with the product— and
how this relationship may differ from product relationships forged elsewhere. For
example, the use of a bath only to soak and the sharing of clean water has
significant effect on the use of, and motivation to purchase, bathing products.
Commodity items such as toilet soaps are purchased primarily as gifts, are hoarded,
often for years, then passed on. Consequently these products must be manufactured
with a longer shelf life. This has key implications for packaging formats, and in
particular packaging quality, since the sealing must be sufficiently secure to
constrain perfume loss.
Another example of the impact cultural differences can have on product strategy
is in the area of skin care. According to research conducted by Nippon Lever, the
whole beauty and cosmetic process have developed in a singular way in Japan.
Japanese women spend considerably more time than their Western counterparts on
their early morning beauty preparations (this effort is currently directed toward the
cultivation of a natural look). A more basic example of this learning process is
that, until the last few years, there was no tradition of buying processed fresh fish
in Japan: preparation and coating of fish were performed at home. This is because
the market for fish is so well developed — the distribution system provides good
quality fresh fish all over the country. Nevertheless, frozen fish with or without
batter is now being sold in large qualities in supermarkets and elsewhere— not
least to provide fish fingers for the daily lunch box (o-bento), which Nippon Lever
cleverly marketed in a formulation that allowed for cold consumption. Clearly,
issues are changing even in the fresh fish market, and convenience cooking in
microwaves and food processors is assisting this change.
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Japanese advertising can have an individualistic emotional style which frequently
confounds westerners, although during the last five years there has been some
convergence between Japanese methods and US hard-sell techniques, each
borrowing from the other. There are many freedoms which exist in Japanese
advertising which no longer apply in other major markets. In the cosmetics' sector,
where mood advertising has an obvious place, Revlon commented that a shift
towards product oriented claims has become evident. Two directions are involved:
first, a shift from corporate advertising (for example "From the House of Kanebo")
to brand advertising; second, according to Revlon, the consumer has become more
sophisticated and is demanding to know more about the product behind the brand
name.
It was argued previously that product planning must reflect Japanese consumers'
criteria for selecting goods, and since these criteria are subject to rapid shifts, a
continuous market presence is crucial. Although Procter & Gamble was the first to
introduce a disposable diaper in Japan, attaining the leadership position in a small
but growing market, it was subsequently forced to cede its position to Japanese
manufacturers Kao and Unicharm.17 Those Japanese outfits out-manoeuvred P&G
by producing products that performed better than the US company's Pampers
product in areas of crucial importance to the Japanese consumer: diapers for
outings, and for overnight use. The Japanese diapers, which were better fitting and
more absorbent, almost drove Pampers out of the market. Nevertheless, P&G has
telescoped four generations of development into three years to produce a diaper that
by 1990 had regained the number one position. The lesson: it is insufficient
merely to export what is available and may have sold well elsewhere; with Japanese
technological supremacy, it can easily be out-performed by local companies that
understand the Japanese consumer.
Previously it was emphasized that one of the Japanese female consumer's
17 See Box 5.13
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distinguishing characteristics is that she is used to products that have come from a
zero-defect production system. She therefore expects excellence with both quality
and value.18 The need for Western marketers to focus special attention on product
quality was underlined by Heinz J. Sinniger, chairman of Nestle KK (Japan):
When there is a complaint anywhere in Japan, we send two or three
people to apologise to the housewife and try to explain what caused
the problem. There is a salesman, a PR man and there may be a
factory employee. I do not think we would send people to a
consumer who complained anywhere else in the world.
The single female was cited as being particularly important. Several large
manufacturers have targeted their design efforts at these groups, and with some
success19.
Box 5.9
Designing for single females
Sharp, the electronics company, realized that while many of its products were being
developed for women, the development was being done by men. Sharp's response was
to establish a special task force, the LED (Ladies Eye Development), which comprises
female graduates in their 20s whose brief is to provide female user insight. The role of
the designers is then to meet the LED brief. Many new products have emerged from
this process, including a washing machine that can be programmed to wash clothes
overnight so they can be hung out to dry in the morning. To put this into context, it is
traditional for Japanese housewives to wash early in the morning, to take advantage of
the sunshine for outdoor drying; hence, this machine frees up an extra half hour in the
morning. To Western eyes, there is nothing revolutionary in such a product concept,
but the majority of Japanese washing machines are comparatively basic, functional
affairs, without much sophisticated technology.
Mitsubishi followed a similar procedure, producing a mini clothes' dryer about the size of
a thermos flask, priced at ¥1 5,000. The target market was young females, who liked to
wash their underwear at night, but do not like to hang it out to dry for fear of attracting
See Boxes 5.11 and 5.13
See Boxes 5.5, 5.11 and 5.13
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male attention (Kilburn and Wilk, 1989).
Another team, this time at Matsushita Electric, determined that young women
encountered problems removing cooking smells from their clothing after visiting yakitori
restaurants, but they did not wish to have their clothes dry cleaned each time they ate
out. Matsushita's solution was the "Brushing Steamer"; an electric clothes' brush that
steams out smells and wrinkles simultaneously. Such is the power of this group of
consumers that the Matsushita "Begin" product line, originally intended for singles per
se, has been re-targeted on single females; in other words more emphasis on the female
point of view has been included in product criteria and within the communications
platform.
Over the last 10 years, the number of women holding driving licenses has increased by
250%. They now account for one third of all driving licenses, and about 50% of new
licenses, creating a new segment within the automobile industry. The result is the kei-
jidosha (light car), which is not merely a designed-for-women basis of transport, but also
a fashion accessory that can be personalized and matched to different moods and
wardrobes. The Honda "Today" features light pastel colours and comes with a 22-page
accessory catalogue, including not only pastel and floral seat colours, but also matching
umbrella holders, tissue box covers, shopping bags, and a convenient storage bin for
high-heeled shoes. Computer technology has also been brought into the female arena.
Shiseido, the Japanese cosmetics giant, has introduced computerized make-up
simulators in their beauty salons. With the aid of electronic cosmetics' brushes, the
demonstrators can simulate the effect of different products on the consumer before she
commits herself to a purchase. Sony too has entered this market with hair-style
simulators. Customers are able to assess the effect of superimposition of a variety of
hair-styles before making a decision.
Source: R. J. Wilk, Interplan, Interview materia!
The point was made in the last chapter that foreign products sometimes connote
positive qualities, and at a very simple level, the image of a foreign brand, even its
packaging (translating the foreign pack data with sticky labels), can be attractive to
the Japanese buyer. This inclination towards things foreign also underpins the
production of nonsensical text in English on clothing and other items. Such slogans
promote image-consciousness and have a visual suggestion of mystery in the same
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way that Chinese characters can appear exotic to Westerners. Little wonder that in
such a mix of expectations, there is much debate how a foreign product's properties
should be best promoted and utilized in the Japanese context.
Revlon's president, Paul Hughes, devoted a great deal of time to discussions
with his local people on the Japanization of the Revlon product. The staff argued
that foreign was good and should be retained, especially since Revlon was
competing with Japanese giants such as Shiseido and Kanebo.
I wanted to get more and more Japanese. But they argued our key
point ofdifference is that we are foreign , so keep it foreign. That is
the only way to compete with giants like Shiseido.
Foreignness, to Revlon KK personnel, represented a genuine point of difference,
without which competition would have been impossible. This view seems to have
been vindicated: major players Shiseido and Kanebo have lost a significant share of
the department store business because, according to Revlon, the department stores
want foreign brands in their cosmetic departments. Indeed, foreign products now
account for 60% of the depato cosmetics' market. This willingness to buy foreign
goods is evident from trade statistics (see Figures 2.5 and 2.9). Imports have been
rising in recent years; and within this category, the ratio of manufactured products
to total products has now reached 50%.
Makudonarudo (McDonald's) restaurants are a great success in Japan, and have
rapidly become Japan's largest restaurant chain. The local franchisees of
McDonald's changed little of the restaurant's concept except the transliteration of
the name. However it did not stress its American heritage. As Tatsuki Kubo,
senior manager of the public relations department of McDonald's Co. (Japan) Ltd,
informed:
Japanese consumers have been copying the American lifestyle since
World War II, but when it is pushed they hate it.
So successful was the process of Japanization, there are many Japanese who believe
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that McDonald's is a Japanese concept. Kubo told the story of some Japanese boy
scouts on holiday in Chicago, who remarked that Makudonarudo had reached the
United States. They were proud that Americans enjoyed Japanese hamburgers.
Yet, when McDonald's opened its first restaurant in the Ginza in the 1970s, many
detractors thought it would not succeed because the Japanese preferred better food,
and had a "cultural" reluctance to eat in the street.
Conventional wisdom regarding products the Japanese will take to is lacking.
Several executives commented that: on one hand, the Japanese are negative about
suggestions that what works elsewhere will work in Japan; on the other, foreign
companies that heed these warnings often find that when a Japanese company adopts
the same idea, it has done so successfully. The same applies to communications.
When, for instance, Coca Cola suggested that the male actor in a commercial
should be seen drinking directly from the bottle, Coca Cola style, it met with
resistance. Coca Cola insisted and young consumers accepted it. This may or may
not have been a case of Japanization, but it demonstrates how all products in Japan
require a platform that convinces Japanese consumers that the product is right for
them, as it is now.
5.3.2. RESPONSES TO GIFT GIVING
The importance of gift giving was highlighted in Chapter 2. One company that
has been successful in building its concept around gift giving is Roily Doll. The
founder of this high-profile operation, Joseph Dunkle, described his philosophy as





Roily Doll: A Marketing Philosophy
Joseph Dunkle is regarded by some analysts as one of the best marketers in Japan.
Dunkle maintains that to understand the Japanese marketing opportunity one has to look
back to the post-war period. After 1 945, when the Japanese were at a low ebb, they
were glad to acquire almost any consumer item, but as the country became more
wealthy, their tastes developed and became more sophisticated, moving towards luxury
goods and services. A cycle of mass market consumption was embarked upon, during
which time consumers wanted radios, refrigerator, washing machine, televisions and
other consumer durables. Moreover, just as in the US when television was a new
product, Japanese consumers were unconcerned about product form: For instance, they
merely wanted televisions and did not worry about brand.
Cars became a sought-after possession: when consumers accumulated sufficient excess
cash, they bought a car. Again, they were not too concerned about product form as
long as they possessed a vehicle. Only when consumers had achieved their basic
acquisitive goals did they begin to become more discerning with brand and product
differences becoming increasingly important. The Japanese consumer was ready to
move onto something else, and that something else was segmented consumption or
consumption by class — something that had existed in Japan before 1939.
Dunkle points out how the war had made everyone poor: landowners had a little more
money than others, and consumption was based upon mass processes. Japan arrived at
consumption by class only about eight or nine years ago, at which point the upper
middle class had enough savings and disposable income to buy whatever it wanted; it
therefore moved towards the best in the world. French designer goods such as Flermes
neckties, retailing in Japan at ¥15,000 (US$115) became very popular. The Japanese
consumer has therefore ascended quickly from the bottom of the consumer ladder all the
way to the top. But such a heady ascent begs the sobering question: once the
consumer has four Hermes neckties, what will he buy next?
Consumption by class in Dunkle's terms means that high-class people eventually want
the opposite of what the masses have. Fine silk has its opposite — a tweed, perhaps a
rough herringbone or a twill. Dunkle sees this play of opposites as a trend. In the world
of interior design, the opposite of chrome, mirrors and high-tech lighting are wood and
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other natural materials. Natural is associated with health. In Dunkle's case, this meant
taking the opposite position from that of other cookie companies, which produced
beautifully packaged and individually wrapped products that in Dunkle's mind invite the
consumer's touch. Dunkle decided he was going for a more rugged (that is to say
rustic) profile, and so his Aunt Stella's cookie is a home-made product, fresh and
natural.
There is a tremendous market for cookies in Japan because of gift giving; 63% of Roily
Doll business is gift related. Whenever someone visits a friend's house, they will give a
gift, and Dunkle believes food is the most appropriate choice: it is something the whole
family can enjoy, and if it also has a story attached it will give people something to talk
about at family gatherings. Realizing this, Dunkle drew on his home state in the US:
Pennsylvania Dutch county; the home of the Amish people. Since his Aunt Stella was
Amish, he used some of her recipes as well as those of his mothers, and the rest he
designed himself. Despite no previous experience in the bakery business, Joseph Dunkle
developed 27 different varieties of cookie, thus expressing his view of the segmented
market. He attempted to appeal to the family unit, the grandmother, the grandfather,
the son, the daughter, the mother. By providing a range from which they could choose,
he was able to offer a diversity that would confound a large confectioner. Most bakers
use one basic kind of dough to which nuts, fruit or some other ingredients are added;
however, the Roily Doll concept is that each cookie is home-made, different and made in
small batches. On this basis, when developing the product, Dunkle was able to adjust
the traditional recipes to accommodate Japanese tastes, changing the American soft
texture to adapt to the Japanese preference for crispiness; thus he successfully
Japanized his product.
Source: Interview materia/
Joseph Dunkle built a chain of cookies and cakes shops under the Aunt Stella's
brand by being adept at spotting opportunities and building on personal strengths.
He believed that the high level of literacy and intellectual curiosity of the Japanese
could be utilized by building an Amish country theme around cookie shops. He
exploits this curiosity on the cookies packaging by including information on the
social history of the Amish people. At the same time he harnessed the widespread
nostalgia for furasato— in other words the rustic birthplace existing deep in the
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Japanese imagination — to adventures in travel, and arranged group holidays to
rural destinations, especially to Pennsylvania. Dunkle is still exploring the
countless domestic and international possibilities for product development.
5.3.3. RESPONSES TO MARKET SEGMENTATION
If the consumer is spoiled for choice and can afford to buy most things, in what
ways can marketers approach Japan as a market opportunity? The answer, as
Joseph Dunkle found, is to develop an intelligent basis for segmenting the market
and target the consumer accordingly (see Box 5.10). One must be able not only to
identify consumer groups, but also to communicate with them effectively. As
Johnson & Johnson's Kneale Ashwell explained:
Our target consumers are usually females among 15 and 23, and
housewives ofany age. We are essentially selling to women, talking
to women. You are looking at a huge number ofwomen 's magazines
to get a decent reach. Even baby magazines, when you're talking to
mothers to be or new mothers, there is a proliferation unlike you will
find in the UK or the US.
This issue of market segmentation has attracted the attention of some of the most
sophisticated market research companies operating in Japan. ASI Market Research
(Japan) Inc., for instance, have a division called Trendtrack that scrutinizes
consumer changes, and which has confirmed the growing importance of unmarried
males in their 30s. Single males have more free time than family-centred males,
and thus represent attractive targets for leisure products and for high-tech appliances
designed primarily to support their lifestyles. Almost one third of female singles in
Tokyo is noted to be living alone— especially true of university-educated people.
These singles are white collar workers with high disposable incomes.
Infoplan confirms the importance of vacations, and finds a lucrative segment in
the "silver market" (that is to say older age groups), segmenting it further into the
high-, middle- and low-income groups. Since most market competitors are aiming
at the rich silvers, opportunities exist to serve the less well off groups with
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appropriate product offers. In its study on the "silver market", a tracking study that
has been ongoing since 1984, Infoplan discovered an increase in pet ownership (and
thus spurred some companies to enter the pet food business), and a new
youthfulness on the part of the older generation. These are mature consumers with
sophisticated tastes; they demand quality, whether it be in travel clothing or
anything else.
In 1989, Shiseido organized an international forum on successful ageing. When
comparing the lifestyles of four major cities— Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, London and
Paris— some major causes of complaint were discovered; the Tokyo data revealed
for example that 69% of these "silvers" were dissatisfied with their home
furnishings and interiors thus offering a huge market opportunity.
5.3.4. RESPONSES TO MARKET OPPORTUNITIES
Despite escalating costs, in particular media costs, indicated in Chapter 2, there
have been some major success stories such as Nippon Lever's launch of Timotei
shampoo in 1984, a product manufactured to the highest of Japanese quality
standards. Market research was initially used to establish that naturalness was
valued by the consumer. Brand advertising (mainly television) registered those
properties with the consumer and a massive sampling programme was implemented,
during which the product was distributed free. The programme and the acclaim that
followed resulted in Timotei becoming the number two brand in the hair products
market. This was achieved not by any mystical formula, but by the implementation
of rigorous, textbook marketing of the kind that has marked Unilever's successes in
other markets world-wide. The product introduction was planned well in advance,
and supplemented every three to six months with new versions of the basic product
that harnessed the same theme. By planning in advance and rapidly introducing the
product variants, Nippon Lever was able to forestall encroachments on its line.
Many corporate interviewees regarded Timotei as a significant landmark in
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MNC brand marketing. Nippon Lever delivered a product: a mild, natural
shampoo to which the market responded. However, the shampoo market, although
stable in size terms, is not so stable in other respects and is characterized by a
continuous stream of new product entries. Timotei's real success lies not merely in
winning market share (around 12-14% for all items under the Timotei umbrella),
but in holding on to that share after the initial excitement of the launch had
subsided. A relatively unusual success story has been that of Nestle's pet foods'
operation, Friskies KK,21 which seized an opportunity based on a fairly low level of
pet ownership, and on owners whose buying behaviour involved infrequent product
usage.
Box 5.11
Nestle's Commitment To The Japanese market
Investing ahead of status
Nestle KK (Japan) is capitalized at ¥35 billion. Besides marketing coffee, the company
has developed and now distributes more than 100 products, including coffee creamers,
malt drinks, cocoa, cereals, culinary products, frozen foods, and the food products used
in catering and vending machines. Nestle is also aggressively promoting other new
projects such as roasted and ground coffee and pet foods. Its commitment to the
Japanese market can be gauged by its tendency to make relatively high capital
investments in relation to the size of its current business. It employs over 2,300 people,
currently operates four factories (reduced from six, without encountering any labour
problems) and has more than 20 co-packers, in other words contract manufacturers that
produce Nestle goods to specification.
Long-term process
Nestle has a long history in Japan; its products were sold there as early as the 1880s.
In 1913, the company opened a branch office and in 1933, it commissioned its first
21 See Box 5.11
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factory. Subsequently, a manufacturing operation was established but its position has
not always been secure: During the late 1940s and 1950s, the management in
Switzerland regarded the Japanese market as more of a distraction than an opportunity
and considered closing the Japan branch. Local management persuaded headquarters to
change its mind, but even in the 1960s Nestle was still a relatively small 300-400
employee company. Only later did it develop operations on a large scale.
Market acceptance
During the last two decades, as a result of the internationalisation of lifestyle, Japanese
consumers became more receptive to Western concepts and products — food and drink,
travel, consumer goods. The number of supermarkets and chain stores also grew— a
phenomenon which Nestle KK was able to take advantage of by pioneering point-of-sales
merchandising activities; a practice it has since used extensively. At the same time,
coffee shops were becoming popular meeting places for young people. Nestle KK was
fortunate to be in the right place at the right time, and its relatively long presence in the
marketplace meant that it could build on pre-existing trade relationships to take
advantage of these rapid developments in Japanese consumer tastes.
The firm was also fortunate that with competition relatively weak then; it was able to
pursue its goal of becoming the leader in the instant coffee market within five years of
the market opening. To this end, Nestle undertook extensive market research to
determine consumer preferences, and hence the products it sells in Japan today are
different from comparable goods sold by Nestle in Europe and the US. Nestle build on
its strong product position in Japan by using TV advertising to underline its message of
superiority.
Nestle has always been quality and brand conscious. It always attempts to stay ahead of
the market by being innovative. The company has the biggest research budget for food
companies in the world. It is more people and product oriented than systems oriented, it
adopts a long-term policy which it executed via a decentralised approach.
Distribution strategy
Nestle's strategy was simple: to fully integrate into the Japanese system using the sogo
shosha, wholesalers and retailers. Apart from merchandising (one of Nestle's
strengths), it introduced many Western promotional methods into Japan. It tailored its
sales promotions to certain types of distribution channels and groups of wholesalers.
These efforts helped Nestle develop close relationships with its trade partners — a factor
which the company believes is the key to its success. Nestle also developed a strong
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group of Japanese workers and Japanese middle and senior management. It uses the
Japanese personnel approach in every way, although its chairman believes that a more
balanced fusion of Western and Japanese approaches would be preferable. Training is
paramount: At any one time, Nestle KK has about 10 Japanese staff working overseas
for periods more than one year.
Diversification
One of Nestle's problems is how to diversify away from coffee— in particular instant
coffee. At its peak, instant coffee accounted for more than 80% of the total business of
Nestle KK; it is now 65% and declining. The principal growth products targeted are
cereals, pet foods, regular coffee, Italian food specialities and chocolate, while a new
area is the cosmetics' business via partner L'Oreal, which sells Lancome and Helena
Rubenstein through JV companies. It is also in the pharmaceuticals' business via Alcon,
one of the largest eye-care businesses in the world, and in mineral waters via Vittel.
Nestle KK has entered a joint venture with two Japanese associates under the name
"Nesfit KK," which concentrates on the health foods' sector, while acquisitions by the
Swiss parent company have involved the firm in Italian pasta and chocolate. In addition,
with imported products now representing a significant growth area, a separate company
has been formed to deal with them exclusively. Many of these new fields in which
Nestle KK has become involved demand high technology. This need for high technology
is reinforced the company's belief that every product offered to the Japanese consumer
must be something the consumer does not already have. In support of this strategy,
Nestle has invested in the construction of local development facilities which will work in
parallel with its international research efforts.
Nestle's Pet Food Marketing Foray
Background
Pet foods are at the end of the supply chain of meats and grains. When a beast is
slaughtered, the gut and some of the organ meats go towards human consumption and
the rest — offal — goes to the production of pet foods. There are a number of trends
that affect supply: the slaughter count has gone down and beef prices have increased,
and pet food has expanded world-wide. Each year the supply of raw ingredients
diminishes as more and more offal is used for human consumption; some of the major
restaurant and food processing chains have started using offal to reduce the overall cost
of beef in ground beef patties, etc. It is therefore becoming increasingly more difficult
and expensive to deliver the same product, but of course the consumer continues to
demand quality.
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The problem requires significant research efforts on processing techniques and supply
chain management, the objective being to devise alternative products that utilize flexible
formulations and enable the company to be a low-cost producer of a consistently good,
high-quality, high-palatability product. Pet food companies across the world operate
with this flexibility, selecting the formulation that best utilizes the ingredients available
each day. The result of this process is, of course, inconsistency, and while consumers
in the US are prepared to tolerate this because they are paying only 35 cents a can for
the product, in Japan the result is unacceptable. Japanese consumers currently pay the
equivalent of US$1 per can, which reinforces their tendency to be discerning. As a
consequence, Friskies is forced to bear the costs associated with little variation or
flexibility in their formulae.
Japan is a consumer, not a supplier country, of pet foods. The US and Australia are
producer countries, since they have very large beef stocks. Moreover, pet foods are a
common item in these markets. There are a large number of factories and support
systems to supply the offal, grain, and packaging. Cans, bags, and other packaging
materials, are also all cheaper in these countries. It is therefore much cheaper to supply
from the US or Australia than to source in Japan, which means the foreign importing
firms in Japan such as AGF, Masterfoods and Nestle have a competitive advantage
because, no matter what, their costs are lower, especially if they are supplying some
other domestic markets and the Japanese export market simultaneously.
Friskies started out as a JV in 1985, but when this JV was dissolved, Friskies took
some major brands — including Mon Petite — from the break-up. The company adopted
a step-wise approach to building up a sales and marketing organization of 120 people,
acknowledging that it could not increase its sales without more salesmen, and it could
not pay for the salesmen without achieving more sales. Its goal was to build a ¥20-30
billion company over the long term, with an appropriate sales force to sustain that
performance. With Nestle's investment and support, it expanded its sales force before
achievement, repeating this process in the three years from 1987-1990, and it will
continue to do so until further costs of expansion are no longer commensurate with
returns. In that way, it will match the coverage that is being provided by its
competitors. Friskies has achieved a 20-30% growth every year for the last five to six
years.
Market opportunity
Friskies believes that Japan is one of the major world opportunity areas for pet food in
the long term; however, prices are expensive and consumers expect consistently high
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quality. Without consistency, the product will fail in Japan. For this reason, Friskies has
frequently rejected product shipments on grounds of colour or aroma variation, reasons
that in the US would never be causes of refusal. Almost every shipment into Japan is
inspected.
According to Eric Weber, the former marketing manager of Friskies and currently a vice
president at Nestle USA, Inc., the sourcing company must be educated about Japanese
standards:
When / first started here / used to go overseas by myself, but now / always take my
Japanese team with me and they listen, they understand, they explain. / take time in
meetings. I'm asking the parties whether they understand, how they want to deal with
each particular issue. If you send the Japanese by themselves, they drive everybody
insane. They're good people, their share the same intention but they say things like
"This is completely unacceptable." In an English translation that means, not only do /
disagree but I'm not budging.
Distribution
Japan has some very special attributes, of which the distribution system is one. The pet
food business is controlled primarily by pet food wholesalers who then distribute the
product to supermarkets, pet shops, home centres and convenience stores. The
business has changed over time, starting off in the pet shops, then expanding into
supermarkets, and it now continues to develop further as the pet shops decline at the
expense of home centres, which are growing in overall importance. Although pet food
wholesalers are somewhat fragmented distribution operators, they entered the business
when most of the volume was going through the pet shops, and now have a
stranglehold on the business.
The supermarkets want to purchase direct, but such is the premium put on service and
supply that there is very little likelihood that the market will really evolve in the same
way it has in Europe or the US (with the manufacturer supplying direct to the major
retailers). However, the margins taken in the distribution channel are huge: the trade
takes 20%, i.e., what a supermarket would normally take in the US and in addition, the
supermarkets take 30%. As a result, consumers are forced to pay a high price for the
product because of the enormous overhead incurred under such a specialized distribution
system, especially for a relatively low-value product. If the consumer buys a can for
¥100 yen, Friskies sell it to the wholesaler for ¥157. It is difficult for a manufacturer to
control prices when there is a 42% margin between manufacturer and the consumer.
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Advertising
Advertising in Japan is expensive, and given the numbers of pet owners, advertising of
pet foods is directed at only a small group of people. In any case, most purchasing is
done while the consumer is already shopping (unlike cars, electronics, etc.), and
purchases are made on a weekly, or even daily basis. Constant reinforcement is
necessary — which is the premise on which Friskies strategy is based. Before 1988, the
company had been advertising at what is considered to be below par rates and its
competitors had been advertising at what Friskies believed to be about the right levels.
Since that time, Friskies has changed its approach and now matches or exceeds its
market share with overall spending: It believes that it is not possible to make market
share grow without being willing to spend in a ratio of twice advertising share of voice
to market share.
Source: Interview materia! and Tajima (1989)
Once this status in the competitive Japanese environment is reached, the issue
becomes how to hold share and claw back cash. Companies experience problems
when they attempt to reap rewards by cutting back on advertising expenditure: they
find that the fight for share is always fierce because their competitors are market
share driven. MNCs should be aware that any decision to reduce advertising
requires the support of sound marketing research data, verifying that a strong brand
franchise has been established.
Now we proceed to examine, in greater detail, the nature of the responses of
MNCs to the competitive environment.
5.3.5. RESPONSES TO COMPETITION
All the MNCs interviewed for this thesis have developed positions in the
Japanese market. However, the situations they encountered in Japan are far from
identical; each was faced with a variety of obstacles (either perceived or real),
calling for differing responses. For example, the opportunities offered by the
Japanese market are not the only reason to develop a Japan-based strategy. In
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Kodak's view, for example, Japan is a quality market similar to Switzerland, and a
logical site for the ¥10 billion research centre it has recently opened near
Yokohama. Kodak believes that products developed in Japan for Japan will enable
it to compete with Japanese competitors anywhere in the world. A key element in
this strategy is its attempt to influence the behaviour of its competitors— primarily
Fuji— and participation in the world's second largest market comes second to
forcing Fuji to devote more time and resources to competing in its home market.
Kodak now admits it was a mistake to wait so long before taking an aggressive
stance in Japan.22
What these successful foreign companies share is an accumulated experience in
Japan's markets, they have all made an effort to learn about Japanese business
practices, and have developed their positions from within Japan. Such foreign
companies are now entering the Japanese market directly, without relying on sole
agents, not only because they attribute greater strategic importance to Japan but also
because they are using the country as a basis for both learning and honing their
quality and "imagination" standards. These direct entrants are recording major
successes and are well positioned to take advantage of the rapid changes in Japanese
consumer preferences.
Similarly Japanese companies are acquiring foreign based companies which
besides supplying their extant markets they use these companies to supply Japan.
Before doing so they elevate quality standards to Japanese levels and in this way the
quality expectations of consumers in other markets are enhanced. For instance, to
source product for Japan a Japanese company may buy an orange juice company in
California. Having made the acquisition it will seek ways to leverage its
investment. It will probably invest in new technology to elevate the quality of the
US product to the standards demanded by the Japanese consumer, which
simultaneously raises the quality expectations of the US or European consumer.
22 See Box 5.4
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Companies that remain mere onlookers to this process risk being excluded from
future competitive arenas.
5.4. KEY STRATEGIC RESPONSES
In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that there are a number of theories about
Japanese companies that attempt to explain why they have been so successful and it
was shown that Japanese corporations account for 17 of the world's 30 largest
firms.23 in this section of Chapter 5, following the logic of Figures 3.3 and 3.5 to
3.7, we will explore the foreign companies' reactions to the idea proposed by
Keegan (1983) that Japanese harness their "group" culture to:
• Carefully formulate corporate philosophies;
• Manage intelligence gathering.
5.4.1. RESPONSES TO CORPORATE PHILOSOPHY
The issue of the importance of corporate philosophies to Japanese companies
was explored earlier in Chapters 3 and 4. The interviews conducted in this research
study showed that successful MNCs also think about their corporate missions, but
— contrary to expectations fostered by some authors (Doyle et al., 1986; Keegan,
1983) — foreign competitors in the Japanese market considered Japanese corporate
aims to be more "fuzzy" than their own. They claimed that individuals in Japanese
companies certainly had a view of what kind of company they were part of, but that
this view had come about by osmosis rather than by reading and remembering a
two-sentence mission statement. In other words, Japanese corporate philosophy is
part of the air the employees breathe from the day they join the corporation.
What is this "fuzzy" view that foreign companies have identified? It may not be
fuzzy at all, but simply that Japanese companies operate on a different model to that
23 See Figure 2.22
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of Western companies. McKinsey & Co. assert that the Western model is primarily
financial, in other words the company profitability is underpinned by the net sum
profitability of its component parts. If options and opportunities can be shown to
deliver high financial returns, the onus is on individuals to demonstrate why such
options should not be pursued regardless of any other consequences. In such
debates, semi-qualitative judgements on topics such as synergy— or the lack of it
— comes into play. For product-line profitability, a product that is losing money
will be dropped unless justifications to the contrary can be provided. Debate will
be largely focused on the financial model, and under such a scenario an alternative
product shown to be in need of funding might well be the beneficiary.
Another example of this "fuzziness" in strategic matters is the Japanese tendency
to stress qualitative, even abstract factors. Japanese company philosophy often
focuses on the people, rather than the products or technology. Why? In
conversation with the president of one Japanese company, it transpired that workers
were not called employees: they were called shain, which roughly translated means
corporate member. The company president said he often joined in company
celebrations, to the astonishment of some of his Western counterparts, drinking beer
and singing with the warehousemen. "Why not?" he asked. "After all, we are
shain."
In such a company, divisional managers can act like company presidents
because they have full access to company performance data. If shain want to earn
more, the onus is on them to evaluate how productivity gains can justify the
increases. Long-term employment being the goal, the underlying assumption is that
enhanced efficiency will cause people to be re deployed elsewhere. Brands and
products, it was said, are merely commodities; the important thing is the operating
philosophy, and that is "to achieve an enjoyable life working together." This is the
way the company lives up to its fundamental and enshrined position in Japanese
society as an extension of family life.
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In the case of Japanese companies, according to Trevor Jones of McKinsey, the
overall financial model is not the principle by which they overtly work. Without
this flag around which to rally, Japanese managers seek recourse in a solution or
option that they all agree is the best they can think of based on consensus. The
Japanese method — if it can be called such — is to take three options that everyone
agrees are the best ideas that can be generated. As long as those ideas are in line
with the general view of the business environment and with what it is believed the
players want to achieve (neither of which may have been explicitly articulated), a
decision is reached on the basis of so-called consensus. One might ask, given these
conditions, whether they could choose anything else. It is only from the Western
perspective that this process appears to be irrational corporate behaviour. Japanese
competitors often invest in a fight for market share beyond what seems rational to
the Westerner (this is also discussed below). It could be argued that this is actually
their financial model insofar as profitability follows, according to the PIMS study,
market share eventually.
No wonder that Japanese companies tend to behave differently, since their
primary goals are not linked to profit, but to the longer term. Winning is of course
crucially important to them, but it seems to the Western eye they are often
attempting to win market share regardless of cost. Whereas the Japanese perceive
market share as a worthy objective. For a Western company to compete in the
same arenas as a Japanese company, it must have the wherewithal to withstand the
ammunition that its Japanese competitors will inevitably fire at it. Wherewithal also
means the possession of some product differentiation that represents consumer
value, access to the consumer via a proven distribution channel, funds to withstand
the rivalry, and a realistic expectation of returns— given that the Japanese
competitor may be content with much less. We shall see later in this section that
Coca Cola has successfully traded on this formula. However, the explanation
offered by RJR's President of his company's approach is:
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The objectives are quite simple. This is a major market of
opportunity. As such we have to get into the sort ofposition where
we have some leverage. We have 2% market share at the moment
but 3% to 5% will make us much more viable. When we have the
necessary distribution backed by the resources to support it,
profitability will follow. Achieving a certain size will give us
leveraging, just as Suntory has about 10% of the beer market, but in
its view it doesn 7 have a viable position yet. We are niche oriented,
focused on urban segments and our business is more premium priced.
For each ofour three brands we're looking for 2% to 3% ofmarket
and ifwe can achieve that, we can start to build distribution. Ifyou
have a brand that's selling well at retail, you will always get retailers
to stock the brand. It's good business for you, that's when you 're in,
that's when it's solid.
Keith McCulloch, President RJR.
From the viewpoint of a foreign MNC manager in Japan, relying upon his
Japanese team to achieve key matters in hand, this system of consensus building can
at times be frustrating — mainly because it is so tormentingly slow. Some of the
more cynical interviewees wondered whether anything was ever achieved, since
they claimed that the Japanese were not slow per se, but were slow in making any
decision they did not want to make. Whatever the truth, however, MNC executives
in Japan have learned that there is no other way than to accept the practice, since
failure to appreciate these crucial differences in emphasis is likely to lead to false
expectations of Japanese competitor behaviour.
5.4.2. RESPONSES TO INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
In Chapter 2 the traditional view of Japanese companies importing ideas which
are appraised through formalized group processes, with resultant company focus on
the development of those that pass the appropriate test (Doyle et al., 1986; Keegan,
1983). This international "poaching" strategy may have had some basis before
Japan achieving technological superiority, but without exception interviewees
argued that as a contemporary model it ignores the massive technological and social
leaps that have occurred in Japan. Such a sophisticated country as Japan does not
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need to import ideas from other areas of the globe technologically and socially more
backward than itself. These days, the West is beginning to place just as much
emphasis on the Japanese market as a source for new ideas and technologies as the
Japanese have hitherto placed on the rest of the developed world. Some
interviewees acknowledged that one of their aims in entering the Japanese market
was to become members of the Japanese technological and scientific community. In
a similar way, the Coca Cola - Nestle strategic alliance formed (mentioned earlier)
to exploit world-wide vending opportunities was conceived as a direct result of the
intelligence gathering activities of these companies in the Japanese market.
Some of the experts interviewed while conducting this research felt that
Japanese marketing was an area of weakness, and that expertise and flair were
lacking in this regard. They claimed new products stemmed from a process of trial
and error, rather than of market evaluation; however, this factor has not passed
unnoticed by the Japanese. Japanese companies recognize that consumer marketing
expertise and the ability to read the consumer are major factors behind the success
of companies such as Nippon Lever and other foreign MNCs. Consequently, these
companies are now taking a greater interest in consumer market research and are
beginning to incorporate some of these Western methodologies into their own
approach.
5.4.3. RESPONSES TO PRODUCT PLANNING
One of the issues which has to be dealt with is that major corporations must
learn to educate the tastes of consumers in their subsidiary markets to conform more
closely to those in their major markets. Japan being a market which it has been
argued has received some degree of neglect is now being taken into account insofar
as Japanese consumer tastes are being considered in the development of world
brands. As explained by Dermott Gatenby, Director - Planning and Corporate
Affairs, of Philip Morris: In the UK people would like to smoke Marlboro because
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they find the imagery appealing, but British smokers are accustomed to Virginia
cigarettes which have a completely different taste. Therefore, the major importers
into Japan adapt their cigarettes and produce world brands suited for sale in Japan
— not by using Japanese tobacco — but by taking account of the Japanese taste.
The "passionate" approach to product planning described in Chapter 2 and the
rapid pace of product and technological innovations are peculiarities of the Japanese
market that MNCs grapple to cope with. In the soft drinks category alone, new
product launches ran at approximately 1,200 in 1990. Typically, after a new
product is brought to market, it is quickly followed by many other entrants in the
same category. A battle ensues in the media and in the stores for a while— and
then many drop out as rapidly as they entered. Distribution channels are so hungry
for the new goods their competitors are handling that wholesalers will demand the
same of their suppliers; hence, even before the products have won a consumer
franchise, entrants are lured into the fray to comply with distributor demand. Coca-
Cola (Japan), for example, has a very powerful marketing channel. The company
consigns production and sales of its soft drinks to 17 Japanese bottling companies
owned by local beverage manufacturers and trading firms. Coca-Cola (Japan)
distributes its products via this network to over 1 million retail outlets; it also has
access to 700,000 vending machines (one-third of the nation's total). As a result, it
is the market leader and commands around 35% of the Japanese soft drinks' market.
If products are introduced as late brand entrants into an established category, it
is usually the case that major advertising cost penalties are incurred so that
consumer inertia may be overcome. However, the powerful position enjoyed by
Coca-Cola (Japan) means that if new products are introduced by others it can take
its time to gauge, emulate and even improve on them. By leveraging its distribution
situation, it can still win market share despite being perhaps second or third to enter
the new product category. As testimony to the effectiveness of this approach,
Coca-Cola (Japan) generates higher profits than its US operation and has a product
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portfolio decidedly different to its US parent or any of the other associated
companies within its world-wide organization: The greater proportion of its
revenues is based on canned coffees (Georgia Canned Coffee is one of the nation's
top-selling drinks) and teas, which are distributed via its extensive vending network.
Ideas for these products were not imported from Coca-Cola operations elsewhere,
but rather were procured from the Japanese market.
The success of Coca-Cola has stimulated its competitor, PepsiCo, to experiment
with distinctively Japanese concepts. For example, in February 1990, it launched a
carbonated tea called Jazzinn, which was positioned as a very new type of soft drink
to maximize its introductory impact. Products such as soft drinks must gain
distribution through key retailers like Seven-Eleven and Lawson, for only when
these chains adopt the product will the smaller stores carry the line. In Jazzinn's
case, the combination of unique product properties and positioning, together with a
strong selling effort based on test market data, enabled PepsiCo to win distribution
in the key outlets. Such a fundamental — and very straightforward— marketing
approach worked insofar as, in the first year after its launch, Jazzinn outsold
comparable newly introduced products five- to six-fold, thereby achieving sales of
some three million cases.
Furthermore, in 1982, Japanese sales of Contac 600 cold medicine began a
decline that amounted to 25 % of its market share in the next three years. The
primary cause was competitors which mimicked SKB's advertising and increased
the number of cold symptoms that their products would treat while Contac neither
changed its formula nor improved its product. SKB adopted a strategy to
differentiate Contac from other products. A new product, Contac Sogokanboyaku,
was developed to treat more symptoms. Adding Vitamin C to the cold capsule
provided a value added dimension no other competitor possessed. A new package
design used colour and graphics to increase its visibility. Sales terms were
developed for the new product to encourage pharmacists to recommend it. Three
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creative TV commercials were developed, and billboard and train posters followed
up on scenes from TV. After only three months on the market, Contac Sogo
claimed a 2% share of the ¥47 billion cold medicine market. Contac 600 and
Contac Sogo achieved sales growth increases in 1986-87 of over 20% compared to
Contac 600's sales in the previous year.
Japanese companies excel in applications development; however, in some
Western countries like the UK, development is often thought to be a mundane
activity; and it suffers against the pure sciences in the race to attract talent. In
contrast, the Japanese are able to continuously develop new and enhanced products
because of their R&D base; thus the range of their technology also grows, spurring
entry into new arenas. For example, Kao is predominantly a consumer products
company that competes in many arenas, several of which it opposes Unilever, and
yet it views itself as a chemicals' manufacturer. (As a result of its mastery of
surfactant technology, it has now entered the field of computer floppy discs).
Although Unilever possesses comparable technologies, these days it chooses to
focus almost exclusively on the fast-moving consumer goods' sector. This contrasts
with Kao and other Japanese companies which tend to use the technology developed
to solve consumer problems to leverage moves into other product fields24.
According to McKinsey & Co. and the other management consultants
interviewed, Japanese companies are financed in such a way that their inherent
competitiveness is sharpened. They operate on what might be described as an
implicit cash flow model. Although they do not necessarily use that terminology,
companies clearly assess what returns they are making on sales; the bankers simply
tell them how much capital they can use, and even if the bankers thereby impose a
financial limit, they do not provide a financial performance measure for the
24 Kao has now reached the stage of marketing its computer floppy diskettes.
It is using the positioning theme..."From the surface technology scientists."




Being so quick off the mark to respond to opportunities, Japanese companies are
capable of entering interesting arenas, but to which they are complete newcomers.
They will then fight it out they win one of the first three or four positions. If at
some point the board agree that they are not going to succeed in procuring a place
among the winners, they are just as capable of cutting their links and withdrawing.
Foreign MNC competitors have suggested that the decisions taken by their Japanese
counterparts to enter an arena are often emotionally based. In other words, in a
situation where a Westerner may not consider it sensible to enter a certain field,
Japanese companies may attempt to go in anyway, without requiring objective proof
that such a course is warranted. The impression has been conveyed by Japan
watchers, for example Keegan (1983), that Japan's long term vision is a key to its
success, whereas, some of the foreign managers interviewed suggested that analysts
are far too emphatic about Japanese companies pursuing long-term objectives, when
the Japanese follow as many false trails as do their Western counterparts. If they
meet trouble (as even they do from time to time), then the lead bank is likely to
intervene and call the management to account.
Several of the foreign MNCs interviewed, complained that Japanese corporate
behaviour, at times, appears irrational, but what is likely is that to the Japanese it
has been entirely purposeful. However, this apparent irrationality does have
fundamental strategic implications. Before entering any field, an MNC should
carry out its research carefully to identify the competitors it is likely to come
across. Having done so, a proprietary positioning should be developed, new
variants prepared, for example, Nippon Lever with Timotei; Bristol-Myers with
Bufferin and so on, or the logic of its current positioning defended, for example
Johnson & Johnson with Reach.
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5.4.4. RESPONSES TO NEMAWASHI
Some of the managers interviewed said they learned to manipulate the process
by building their own obligation system, but this was a painful process. Although
in Japan the strategic directions are determined from the top down, the
determination of strategic execution is often a group decision at lower levels. If the
group makes a decision, everyone remains supportive of it. The problem is getting
through the transitional phase; after that, the implementation is very fast.25
Box 5.12
Nemawashi: Slow Preparation Fast Execution
Before 1983, the Lipton business in Japan had been a fairly complex JV, managed by
Nippon Lever's JV partners. During 1983-84, Nippon Lever conducted arduous
negotiations with its partners on the reorganization of the Lipton business, the outcome
of which saw Unilever take over the management. Nippon Lever emerged from the
process maintaining positive relationships with their partners.
Negotiations were concluded around the beginning of September 1984, and the
immediate Japanese response was that, since agreement had been reached, speedy
efforts should be made to execute the details of the plan. They indicated that everything
could be completed by the end of the year, obviating the need to run two sets of books
— one for the old business and one for the new. To the Japanese partners, this seemed
the most obvious and sensible way to approach the problem. In contrast, in the West
this could have been the point at which the lawyers came in to reap the gain from
adversarial misunderstandings. In this case, agreement was firm: no sooner had hands
been shaken on the deal than the lawyers were available to do what they were asked —
execute the terms quickly.
This was because the Japanese side had consulted a very wide base of interest during
the negotiations, and had already won agreement from all its associates. In contrast,
the Unilever negotiator was suddenly faced by an apparent reversal of the earlier
situation, in other words the Japanese were showing frustration at the potential delay
involved in obtaining ratification from the Unilever board in London. As Michael J.
Schofield, chairman of Nippon Lever, commented:
25 See Box 5.12
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It is a different style of negotiation. The nemawashi process represents a more natural
style of management. In exactly the same way, as chairman of the business, / get to a
point at which / say: OK the discussion has to stop, let's get on with it, we're going to
do X. From time to time that is totally acceptable; but if / tried to run the business like
that full time I would have a revolution on my hands. That's not the way the business is
run. That degree of consultation goes on to a greater degree in Japan than in America.
Indeed American industry is more top down than most European industry.
Source: Interview material
Many interviewees noted that an important factor related to nemawashi is not
surprising the Japanese team; if surprises must be sprung, one should let the team
know in advance, and then explain what created the surprise. Unexpected situations
can easily cause confusion. According to Richard J. Findlay, president and general
manager of Smith Kline Beecham's consumer brand operations in Japan:
Ifyou wain to implement change you have to signal ahead that
change is going to come and get them committed to change ... You
walk our ofhere 10 o'clock one night and you come back in at 8
o 'clock the next morning and everything has changed. You have got
to avoid confusion. Being in a different culture, ifyou are not
sympathetic or empathetic to their culture, that 's where foreigners
managing here foul up. In Japan you have to maintain consensus.
Once you get confusion, everything just freezes up.
The view was also expressed that elsewhere in the developed world— in the US
or in Europe— people may rush around feeling confused, even admitting being
confused when the occasion warrants it, and someone will usually sort out the
chaos. In Japan, however, once confusion is introduced into the system, it is very
difficult to nullify it.
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5.4.5. RESPONSES TO LONG TERM ORIENTATION
The level of commitment facing a foreign MNC in Japan is much higher than in
Europe or the US: The initial investment itself is likely to be much larger in
absolute terms than in major European markets, and not much smaller than going
national in the US. Companies also must be prepared to wait longer for a return on
their money, payback periods are longer (at least five to six years) and even if they
have a successful product, they should expect and plan a response to the two or
three Japanese competitors that will be in the market within six months offering
"me too" products— at a much cheaper price.
Foreign MNCs will find it impossible to compete if they are targeting a return
on investment of 8-10% after tax, since Japanese companies expect less— probably
half of Western levels of return on investment. Johnson & Johnson's investment
return world-wide, after tax, was more than 10% during 1989; however, its
Japanese competitors may be content with about 1.5 — 3.5%. Part of the reason
for this is the support given by the keiretsu system, but another more likely
explanation is that for many years interest charges were very low so companies
could survive with a much lower yield on capital and could then reinvest in the
business, and as a result grow faster. With this mentality now subsumed into
corporate culture, growth is the prime objective. Even Japanese subsidiaries in the
UK were found to be much more market oriented; more single minded in their
pursuit of market share, and more alert to strategic opportunities (Doyle et al.,
1988).
Moreover, as has been noted, unlike its Western counterparts the Japanese
competition is not bound to show ever-increasing quarterly results — "quarteritis",
as it is termed in the financial press. Only those foreign companies large enough to
absorb investment costs in their reporting statements can usually consider entering
the Japanese market. Nevertheless, not all interviewees believed the that 90 - day
performance measures are an overwhelming constraint on the success ofWestern
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MNCs in Japan. Smith Kline's Richard Findlay, for instance, opined:
I don't think that being successful in Japan is different to being
successful in any other major market. You have to be committed ...
even in the US ... Yes, we work to 90-day numbers in the US but if
you work to a 90-day number you need a long-term objective, if
things start getting too hot we restructure and we can redefine the 90-
day position in relation to the long-term objective.
However, to succeed in Japan, foreign MNCs agree that they must be prepared to
play the Japanese game in reverse, which means looking beyond short-term
horizons. A better alternative may be to modify headquarters and shift the relevant
parts of the head office operation to Japan to force top corporate management to
understand Japan from close quarters.
RJR is a company that appears to have accepted the Japanese financial model,
its President indicated:
We are not focused on profitability here; we are focused on volume.
We are in a company that has just taken on $25 billion ofdebt. So
persuading such a company to keep investing long term in a market
like this is really an act offaith. Size ultimately delivers profitability.
Such long-term orientation reflects the operating style of many kinds of Japanese
and successful foreign MNCs. It confirms in itself the absolute necessity that
foreign MNCs demonstrate long-term commitment, the sincerity of which is judged
by the quality of relationships that its key executives form in Japan. One MNC
president remarked that many Western companies delude themselves that they are
really committed to Japan, but go no further than making a statement about it and
subsequently manifesting behaviour that negates the statement. MNCs must
continuously evaluate what can reasonably be expected from Japan, with what
amount of effort, and what time.
This thesis has continued to stress that top-level corporate support is essential.
To win this support is difficult because the time horizon for returns may exceed the
time span of a particular chief executive. The companies doing well in Japan are
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those such as Procter & Gamble and Bristol-Myers, which have had a Japan
presence for a considerable time and have pursued a vision that has transcended the
tenure of several CEOs.
Long-term commitment is also judged by the quality of relationships. It is
frequently stated that Japanese business is relationship-oriented rather than being
transaction-oriented, for example Japanese executives are hesitant to talk business
immediately, and devote considerable time to assessing the kind of people with
whom they may be doing business. According to the president of R. J. Reynolds,
Keith McCulloch:
It's not something that takes two minutes and a hand-shake, a cup of
coffee or a couple ofbeers. Especially with a foreigner, they (the
Japanese) want to know: Is he the sort ofperson who will actually
will look us in the eye and tell us the truth ? Do we like the sort of
character that he has? They are always peeling back the layers to see
what 's down there. There is no obvious formula to relationship
building. It's about what sort of reaction you get when you go into
different places, how you handle yourself, a combination ofwhat
other people think about you. It builds over time, but they either like
you or not, quite early on.
Foreign executives, new to Japan, are often, surprised that relationship building
is so important in Japan; salesmen will spend an inordinate amount of time calling
on existing customers and devote very little effort to opening new accounts.
Although the relationship is important, business strategies are essentially similar in
Japan as to other countries. Retailers in Japan are retailers: They work on very
similar lines, and the fundamentals of their business are similar; the players merely
operate in different types of environments.
All interviewees thought these crucial relationships in Japan were more
complicated than in the West, because of the difficulties they had met, as
Westerners, to enter. However it is not possible to separate their Western identity
problems from their language impediments. Even so, Japanese business
relationships are likely to have been built over years; people attend the same
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university, enter the same company at the same time, and so on. However, this is
not so very different from the coterie networks that exist in other countries, and it is
therefore not impossible for MNCs to build their own relationships in Japan. A
good starting point is a willingness to participate and imitate. If a foreigner is in
Japan for a long time, and if he is successful and manages to do many the little
things correctly (such as to follow the rules of etiquette), he may be able to build
his own network.
The importance of relationships has been clearly testified to in this research;
however, it is also clear that the transactions themselves are no less important than
in other markets. Products still have to perform; pricing must be competitive;
deliveries must be reliable, and so on. Of course, deals will fail or agreements
cease not only because of lack of good relationships, but because the transaction is
faulted in some way. For example, a distributor may tie up with a new supplier if
the existing supplier fails to cover a new product on the market; a wholesaler may
lose a retail account if he fails to make a small, uneconomic emergency delivery.
Blanket statements about the Japanese dealing on the basis of relationships rather
than transactions are gross oversimplifications, since both are important. Expatriate
management often becomes frustrated because it says it can competently deal with
transactions, but not with the relationships, when the fault lies in its inability to
transact according to accepted form.
US or European companies operating in their home markets may be less
dependent on the existence of a prior relationship, and they may also be more
inclined than their Japanese counterparts to seize the benefits offered with product
performance and/or price by an unfamiliar company — a factor that may work to
the advantage of Japanese companies operating abroad. However, a number of
executives interviewed perceived that the Japanese (especially large Japanese
companies) are regarding it as their international responsibility to become more
open — and to be seen to become more open — to straightforward business
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opportunities unrelated to previous relationships. It will be a difficult change to
make, given the traditional Japanese respect for long-term "binding" and for proper
business form.
On the foreign MNC side, a willingness to grapple with relationship obstacles
will remain crucial: formalities such as business cards, invitations, punctuality,
tours, lunches, receptions, are all part of a series of courtesies to be observed. In
both business and social terms, they are not obstacles at all; they are merely
sensitivities to be registered and acted on. For example, when signing a first
tentative agreement, a Japanese company may organize a comprehensive tour to
introduce its new partners to the entire warehouse and distribution team (all dressed
in the same uniform, all sporting the company logo). This tour is an important
concession; a sign of a new "family" involvement. It may be a bore, but it signals
the beginning of an all-important relationship— the essential lubricant to Japanese
market entry.
The group effort (and often collective co-operation) of Japanese companies at
home and abroad provides them with a clear sense of strategic direction.
Interviewees have learned that it is therefore more imperative for foreign companies
to have a strategy for Japan, and a strong commitment to whatever path is selected.
The lesson learned by many of the MNCs interviewed was that in true Japanese
style, everyone in the company must form "consensus" about what the strategy
comprises and where the company intends to go. To fail to do so may result in a
lack of focus which will ultimately fail to make the necessary impact on the market.
While this may sound generic the reality is that it often surprising fails to happen in
western markets, an observation made earlier by this author as well as others (Reid,
1981; Reid, 1982; Reid, 1989; Reid, 1990), without corporate extinction taking
place, but to fail to do so in Japan, it was generally agreed, is to invite disaster.
This principle was harnessed by the majority of the companies in the sample.
For example according to Richard Findlay, president of Smith Kline Beecham's
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consumer brands operations in Japan, its strategic aim is to become a top 10
company.
All members ofour operations know our ranking and the companies
immediately in front ofus. Our representatives when making sales
calls to pharmacies can immediately relate their sales objectives to
our targeted competitors. He has to make sure we have more shelf
space than the companies immediately ranked above us. Ifall our
representatives do the same on a micro level, then in the total
marketplace we will move up the rankings. Once we have progressed
to the limit ofour increase ofcompetitive edge, we can make further
gains by introducing a whole range ofnew products in new
categories.
5.5. IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKETING STRATEGY IN JAPAN
There is nothing radical in the above prescription, just as little evidence has
emerged to support the view that marketing in Japan — as far as consumer goods
marketing is concerned — is fundamentally different from any other "foreign"
market. However, in the longer term, marketing strategy in Japan requires the
perfecting of fundamental marketing principles and in doing so requires that
foreign MNCs diligently:
• Probe consumer fundamentals via marketing research;
• Determine the optimum mode of market entry;
• Formulate responsive competitive strategies;
• Formulate an aggressive and dynamic product strategy;
• Manage the communications process;
• Develop a suitable distribution strategy.
5.5.1. PROBE CONSUMER FUNDAMENTALS BY MARKETING
RESEARCH
As was shown in full discussion with foreign MNC executives, Japanese
consumers — as those elsewhere— produce responses to marketing efforts that
often cannot be predicted without a clear understanding of their needs and special
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features. To reach this understanding means questioning many of the prevalent, and
often contradictory, assumptions: for example that the Japanese market is unique
and culturally distinct but that many Japanese live a Westernized lifestyle; that they
drive cars with which Westerners are familiar; that they all choose Western designer
labels which makes them similar to Western consumers. This last assumption is the
most misleading.
Over the years, many major errors have been made by MNCs that should have
known better and would have been better positioned had they conducted some
fundamental marketing research, not merely statistical but insightful qualitative
research.26 Research that explains the "why" of consumer behaviour rather than
merely the "what." One such company is Kellogg's, which first entered Japan
around 30 years ago with its product, Corn Flakes. Kellogg's did not realize— or
rather, did not research the market to find out— that the average Japanese family
did not normally keep milk in their homes; hence, Japanese consumers thought the
product to be snack food and were eating it dry. The situation has since changed,
and after application of fundamental marketing principles to develop the cereals'
category; Kellogg's is now very successful.27 Its initial error is a classic example of
the type of mistake that companies still make.
Many more such examples of shattered myths can be cited: Avon learned that
Japanese consumers are far more interested in skin care, whereas US consumers are
more interested in cosmetics; Avon's response to these findings resulted in 30% of
its total Japanese sales being derived from skin-care products. Unilever uses its
world-wide expertise in marketing research to determine the exact way in which the
Japanese use their baths, how and when they wash their hair, hands, face, what they
eat for Western as opposed to Japanese breakfast, and so on, before making any
26 See Box 5.13
22 Although invited to participate in this study, the Japanese president of
Kelloggs declined. The above data was obtained from McKinsey & Co.
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attempt to position its brands. It learned that if the marketer has a product that is
successful in a category in other countries, it must still be researched and Japanese
opinion sought before being launched in the Japanese market. It should not be
assumed, for instance, that Sato-san will understand what the product is or what its
benefits are in the same way as would Mrs Smith or Frau Schmidt. The Japanese
home often comprises a mixture of east and west, redefining consumer necessities
and preferences. Hence, the onus is on foreign MNCs to establish where the
product might fit into the life of the Japanese target customer. This logic runs right
through the product spectrum. Before selling household cleaning polish, the
marketer must understand how a Japanese housewife cleans the house (she uses
several cloths to clean and polish different surfaces and items; she sleeps within
smelling distance of kitchen surfaces, etc.). This naturally influences her attitudes
about cleanliness and product fragrances.
As discussed in earlier, Japanese distributors avoid "export happy" companies,
largely ignorant of specific opportunities, but which claim to be interested in the
Japanese market. They argue that such "export happy" firms do not approach Japan
with the same seriousness that would accompany a bid to enter the US market, even
though the scale of opportunity in Japan is second only to the US and, in terms of
geographical compactness, it can be more efficiently serviced. Unfortunately, it is
common for foreign companies to believe that because the product is a major seller
elsewhere, it must sell in Japan. Both distributors and MNC executives interviewed
said that Americans, in particular, are frequently conceited about their products,
insofar as they display an extraordinary lack of knowledge about other markets.
Even a number one product in the US will not necessarily perform well in Japan,
especially if the market is already served by entrenched Japanese brands.
However, dedication to marketing research is one of the key factors shared by
the successful MNCs involved in the pet food business, soap, shampoos and
detergents among others. All have succeeded in the development, positioning and
i
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further processing of products to the point that the consumer now prefers the
foreign item to the Japanese alternatives. Similarly, United Airlines have conducted
market research data by way of a variety of channels such as questionnaires and in¬
flight surveys by service representatives or interpreters. This feedback includes
spot checks that reveal all kinds of information — from certain items that need
stocking, to general observations about mix of menu items and their relative
popularity on various legs of the flight routes, down to "we didn't have enough
women's magazines on the flight to Honolulu today." Robert Leu, the North Pacific
communications manager of United Airlines, illustrates:
Our research findings suggest that we should load more beef than
chicken from Japan but we should load more chicken than beeffrom
the United States, because when they 're going to the United States
they're hungry for beef. When they're coming back they've probably
had too much beefalready.
Similarly, meticulous research is also undertaken by the tobacco companies. RJR,
for example, uses sophisticated, almost scholarly market models to gauge the
progressive success of product launches.
Product excellence does not stem from a single action; it results from doing
many small things right. There must be strategic direction, focus and dedication to
detail, and in this sense Japan is no different from any other market. All that is
required is an insistence on fundamental marketing principles and taking nothing for
granted. In so far as the Japanese themselves lack the skills of marketing research,
this is one area in which foreign companies have an advantage. According to James
T. Conte, chief operating officer of ASI Market Research:
Foreign companies are much more sophisticated than the Japanese in
research terms, but the Japanese are moving up quickly because the
market is so competitive. It's too expensive to fail with products.
In 1984, Nippon Lever used its research strengths — in other words its ability
to develop, test and refine a product beforehand — to launch Timotei, the most
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successful consumer product launch to date by a foreign company. It identified a
positioning and concept that no Japanese competitor had previously recognized, and
then minimized the effects of any competitive response by limiting the scope of the
test market. Even though the results of the test were disappointing, it had the
interpretative skills in-house to make a judgement to proceed to a national launch
very quickly.
During the launch period, free samples were distributed to three-quarters of all
households in Japan (25 to 30 million). This was the largest sampling campaign
ever conducted in Japan and was co-ordinated with a major TV campaign and sales
force efforts to ensure higher profile product presence in the all-important stores.
The collective effect was not only the speedy success of the product but, two years
after the launch, Timotei was still in the number one position with a 15% brand
share. Since the initial launch, Nippon Lever has engaged in a planned program of
product extensions, designed to fill all potential applications and niches, even
though heavy competition soon arrived. By 1988, 40% of the product category was
occupied by brands created after Timotei. For example, in that year, Procter &
Gamble introduced a revolutionary concept in hair care: Rejoy, a combined
shampoo and conditioner. Since the hair of Japanese is thick and more difficult to
manage than most Western hair, P&G focused its technological expertise on the
problem and was soon able to claim Rejoy's success in dealing specifically with
Japanese hair, in contrast to the stress on all-round naturalness that Nippon Lever
had adopted. By the end of 1989, Rejoy had therefore gained 7% of the market,
and Timotei's share had dropped to 5.2%. Nippon Lever is now having to maintain




Procter and Gamble's Learning Experience
Procter & Gamble (P&G) met with many difficulties in its early days in Japan. Despite
some successes, such was the adeptness of its competitors that the company very
nearly joined the ranks of failed foreign MNCs in the Japanese market. According to one
source, in the period between 1973 and 1986 P&G wrote off US$300 million
(Huddleston, 1991), although when invited to do so, Procter and Gamble refused to
confirm this figure. What was less easy for it to deny was that it abandoned KK status
(equivalent to pic or Inc.) in order to avoid having to make public disclosures regarding
its disastrous financial performance.
Marketing research
It took years for P&G to turn the financial corner, its eventual success was based upon
the recognition that winning in Japan could only be achieved by knowing more than its
competitors about the markets, consumers, and trade — the entire business
environment. P&G realized that knowing the consumer requires an understanding of
their habits, attitudes, penchants and dissatisfactions, which in turn called for an open
mind, free of in-built Western biases. When the company first entered the Japanese
market, it was fully armed with statistics, but it admitted that it had no in-depth
understanding of local consumer needs. Only qualitative research can explain not only
what consumers are doing, but why they are doing it.
P&G subsequently learned that the target consumer for most of its products, the
Japanese housewife, was very different from her Western counterpart in so far as she is
uncompromising in her demand for excellent quality, value and service. Growing up in
an environment where virtually every company manufactures products to a standard of
zero defects means that the Japanese housewife expects the same high level of quality
in every product she buys.
Tailoring the product to Japanese needs
The second step in the success process was to tailor the product to the needs of
Japanese consumers, and it was here that P&G learned the fundamental shortcomings
of its export-based strategy. It had entered Japan with exports of products
manufactured for other markets, only to discover that these goods were out-performed
by Japanese competitors. P&G may have been the first company to market Pampers,
the disposable diaper, very quickly dominating what was a small market, but competitors
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such as Kao and Unicharm quickly analyzed the product and found that it did not
perform well in two important situations in Japan — during outings and overnight.
These competitors then introduced better fitting, more compact, super absorbent
polymers that were designed for the Japanese baby and its diet. Mothers responded
positively to the new products, because they were tailored to the Japanese situation.
P&G responded by focusing its efforts on R&D, embarking on a major program to
develop four generations of Pampers products in three years, rolling each new version
out in one area, and progressively expanding the geographical scope of its distribution as
manufacturing capacity came on-stream. When the next generation of product—
greatly enhanced for the Japanese market — came on-stream, P&G re-launched, and as
a result of its dedication, managed to increase its share from 7% to 28% in 30 months.
Eventually it regained leadership of a market that had grown four times in four years,
and in which virtually 100% of mothers use disposable diapers for their babies.
Distribution strategy
Another area of learning was distribution. In the early 1980s, P&G had dealt with
around 2,400 wholesalers, but with so many geographical overlaps, it suffered from
volume dilution that— coupled with its then limited product line — resulted in a serious
lack of leverage, especially given the numbers of wholesalers involved. Furthermore,
P&G had failed to develop close relationships, which the company now takes care to
foster as a vital key to doing business in Japan. Besides servicing the 5,000 largest retail
outlets in Japan, P&G's relatively small sales force had been trying to deal with 2,400
wholesalers and clearly could not function effectively.
Realizing this, the company carried out a sales and distribution strategy review in 1985,
which assessed emerging industrial trends, both in the wholesale and retail trade, and
the performance of its competitors. The review revealed that in the retail area the large
supermarkets were growing in importance. P&G responded by establishing a National
Accounts Division within its sales force to provide retail coverage from corporate
headquarters to the retail store, with direct linkage to the supplying wholesalers. It also
increased the call frequency to the largest outlets, while working through its wholesalers
to manage the balance of the retail trade.
The new sales and distribution strategy had retail and wholesale focus, and P&G's
greatest effort was devoted to the rationalization of the wholesaler network. Its strategy
was to select a small number of about 50 core wholesalers to be given geographical
priority, supplemented by an additional 90-100 specially selected firms to round out the
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geographical coverage and ensure that all major chains and trade types were covered.
This "second tier" group would work operate by way of several hundred wholesalers to
deliver the broadest possible store count distribution. P&G now works very closely with
its network of chosen wholesalers in what it calls a "strategic alliance", a partnership
that provides the basis for a highly efficient distribution network— one that can
compete on equal footing with the distribution systems harnessed by all its competitors
in Japan.
Eventual success
By 1990/91, P&G's Pampers was the leading brand of diaper, and its product Colac, the
number one laxative. The company also has market leadership in liquid laundry
detergents and fine fabric detergents, medicated soaps, acne treatments, catamenials
and adult diapers, all as a result of its hard-won knowledge and the same kind of
product strategy that gave impetus to the resurgence of Pampers.
Source: Interview
The underlying message that is derived from the above is that the most
fundamental assumptions about Japanese consumers must be questioned. It is
rudimentary but essential. Japanese consumers do not necessarily approach a
consumption practice from the same perspective as their western counterpart and it
is the role of the marketer to uncover their motivations. To fail to do so is to court
failure. This message may appear so commonplace as to be banal yet it is a
principle that was overlooked by the so called "World number one marketing
company" at a cost of US$300 million.
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5.5.2. DETERMINE OPTIMUM MODE OF MARKET ENTRY





• Joint Ventures; and
• Direct investment (Kilter, 1988).
As a result of studying these foreign MNCs, no blanket approach can be
advocated. The choice of entry mode depends on several factors such as company
resources, technological or product differentiation, and the scale and nature of the
company's objectives.
5.5.2.1, Indirect Exporting
This is an option for high-value, low-bulk density items as part of a niche
strategy. The downside is that the exporting company relinquishes a great deal of
control over its brand and its subsequent marketing. Agents and other
intermediaries should be chosen with extreme care, since in Japan a long-term
agreement is likely to be necessary— and once the contract is signed, it will be
difficult to develop another opportunity.
5.5.2.2. Direct Exporting
This calls for a higher investment than indirect exporting, and is suitable for
companies trying to enter the Japanese market. However, its main sphere of
application is commodity-type products on the fringe of consumer markets, and
high-value branded goods with proprietary qualities. It is imperative that the brand
possess qualities that have intrinsic value in Japan, in other words the brand must be
perceived by Japanese consumers to have stature; otherwise burdensome advertising
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support may be required. This would have to be funded by the owners of the
brand, and they would be wise to oversee it. MNCs should be prepared to spend
heavily to position and sell the product effectively.
5.5.2.3. Licensing
This entry method involves high opportunity costs, in other words the difference
between a measure of gain from licensing and the much greater gain of promoting
one's own technology or brand to the full. It provides for only a limited form of
participation, and has advantages only when a company does not have the resources
or the will to muster a more aggressive entry strategy. Licensees can easily become
future competitors, and the Japanese have great skill in applications development
once patents have expired and manufacturing processes have been mastered.
Agreements can often be circumvented by substitute technologies, and although
some protection may be afforded by trademarks, that protection is only as strong as
the consumer franchise that has been established.
5.5.2.5. Direct Investment
This is the longest-term and highest-cost entry method, but one that can result in
significant progress if care and dedication are applied.27 Eastman Kodak (Japan)
has built up its operation in Japan to sales of more than US$1 billion— all within
five years of its initial direct investment. Others, as we have seen, have taken much
longer. Clearly, for certain companies, direct investment can make enormous
strategic sense.
27 See Boxes 5.4, 5.11 and 5.13.
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5.5.2.4. JVs
Once the JV is established, it is essential to understand what recourse exists
should problems arise. The financial implications should be considered, as must the
legal position. If the Japanese partner is responsible for major functions such as
distribution and manufacturing, what audit functions should the foreign partner
have? How ought strategic direction be decided and through what process?
Frequently, however, many of these fundamental matters, were not well defined in
the beginning when the JV was established. Reports were received of the parties
involved being highly enthusiastic about the opportunity, with the result that
agreements ended up being rather loose and vague, and the partners then found
themselves locked into rigid sets of unfavourable rules. These situations are further
complicated by the fact that Japanese management remains more static than that of
their Western, in particular US, counterparts.
According to most of the executives interviewed, JVs have become less popular
as a mode of market entry — especially with those companies that have acquired
Japanese market expertise and have the financial means to go it alone. Most of the
foreign executives interviewed believe that a wholly owned presence is the best
approach for the Japanese market. The majority see JVs as a transitory phase, often
an unhappy one. Eric Weber, the former marketing manager of Friskies KK,
Nestle, advises:
Don 7 go into a JV. Don 7 ever JV in Japan ifyou 've got a strong
position world-wide. The JVpartner has an interest in keeping you
out; it never has the same orientation as you do or the same
objectives.
He argued that employees of the JV are in effect on secondment from the JV
partner and have its interests at heart. The key employees in the JV are likely to
return to the parent should it be disbanded; something to be considered when
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attempting to negotiate out of a JV arrangement.
This view does not, of course, cover all circumstances. The best advice for
companies contemplating the JV route is to do adequate homework and preparation.
Firms lacking a strong product line, adequate size, expertise and/or funds to fight
their corners in the market have few options open to them. Japan offers a myriad
of opportunities, but it is also an extremely competitive environment. The costs:
of offices, staff, distribution, and so on, of merely starting up in Japan can be
astoundingly expensive. Hence, for those companies without the resources to go it
alone, a JV is a vehicle that intelligent management should consider— but with
extreme caution.
5.5.3. DEVELOP SUITABLE DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY
What then should the foreign MNC consider when setting up a distribution
arrangement? It depends on the size of the company. The distribution option for a
single-product US$50 million sales value company is quite different from that of a
major international company similar to Bristol-Myers or Procter & Gamble. There
may be sound reasons why the latter companies should distribute directly, but
similar reasoning would not apply to smaller companies. Strategies must fit the
company's situation; selection depends on the product opportunity, the competitive
situation, financial capability, on management abilities, and on the amount of time
that can be devoted to the Japanese market.
Ultimately, distribution strategies depend on the product and the competitive
situation. With prestige products, for instance, sales are often limited to
concentrated markets and for this the brand image is crucial. Obviously, as foreign
manufacturers attempt to expand their consumer franchise, they come into more
frequent and direct confrontation with their Japanese competitors and, if defeated,
the image of the foreign product may be tarnished. This was the experience of
Scotch whisky in its efforts to take market share from Suntory.
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Companies attempting to circumvent Japan's lengthy distribution channels will
generally meet with disastrous results. General Foods, for example, attempted to
sell directly when it first approached the market, but even in the instant coffee
sector, in which it is a giant elsewhere, it was singularly unsuccessful and was
forced to cede position to Nestle. Eventually GF entered into a JV with Ajinomoto
Co. Inc. (forming AGF), and when Ajinomoto's distribution connections were
harnessed to its own outfit, GF's share of the instant coffee market jumped
dramatically.
In contrast, when Coca-Cola entered the Japanese market, it successfully built
on its proven method of using bottle delivery trucks. While this was a concept new
to Japan, Coca-Cola skilfully organized the idea to fit with the Japanese way of
doing business, setting itself up as a franchiser and avoiding direct sales
involvement. The franchisee bottling companies— all independent companies in
which Coca-Cola had no direct investment— effectively became Coca-Cola's sales
arm; they carry out all the bottling and sell the product directly to restaurants and
retailers by way of delivery trucks.
Many foreign companies have succeeded in the Japanese market by tapping into
existing distribution connections. Sears Roebuck, for instance, co-operates with
Seibu Department Stores Ltd; Whirlpool, the electrical appliance manufacturer,
uses the Sony distribution system; Warner Lambert chose Seiko as its partner to
distribute Schick products, the net result since Schick has dwarfed Gillette by
gaining 78% market share.
Such relationships offer both attractions and disadvantages. On the positive
side, depato groups for instance Seibu, Tokyu, Tobu, Odakyu and Keio occupy
prime positions above and near mass transit locations. As a result, they are capable
of offering prime exposure to both local and foreign products. The opportunity to
gain such high-quality coverage while limiting one's own financial exposure is
attractive in the short term. The negative side is that the Japanese retailing business
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does not provide access to massive concentrations of purchasing power such as
those found in other countries. Since most depato chains have fewer than 30 stores,
there may be some short-term success, but it will be difficult to expand beyond this
level once exclusive agreements are signed.
There is no absolute solution to distribution strategy. Unilever is currently
comfortably dealing with up to 2,000 primary and secondary wholesalers, while
Procter & Gamble found it impossible to develop an in-depth relationship with the
2,400 wholesalers it had previously. Its solution, as has been discussed28, was to
create a restricted hierarchy of core wholesalers.
5.5.4. FORMULATE RESPONSIVE COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES
Japanese economic and corporate performance across the globe is adequate
testimony to the fact that Japanese competitors are formidable. These companies
have massive financial and technical resources at their command. Nevertheless,
companies, for instance, Nippon Lever and Procter & Gamble are successfully
competing with major corporations like Kao; Revlon is confronting formidable
operations such as Shiseido and Kanebo; and Nestle has carved out its own
position.29 Clearly, foreign MNCs can compete in Japan, but they have had to





• Modes of distribution;
• Offensive strategies; and
• Niche marketing.
28 See Box 5.13
29 See Box 5.11 and 5.13
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5.5.4.1. Competitive Monitoring
Competitive and market monitoring is a critical activity, whatever the market
concerned. A lack of knowledge about competitors' activities is likely to leave a
concern vulnerable to rapid erosion of its market position. Certainly, Japanese
companies devote great efforts to monitoring their domestic competitors and
preparing a speedy response. If MNCs make a similar effort to understand their
Japanese competitors, they too can identify viable opportunities and begin to
leverage their own strengths. The manifest difficulty of monitoring competitors
from a distance has been a key influence on the decisions of companies to make a
direct entry into the Japanese market and/or to develop their research capabilities
within Japan: Bristol-Myers Squibb is seeking to develop an R&D facility
independent of its US parent company; Kodak, ICI, P&G, Unilever and others are
all active in R&D within Japan. Kodak wanted to monitor its competitors' —
primarily Fuji — in Japan, taking particular note of how they reacted to Kodak's
attacks in their home market. In this way it can form an appreciation of
competitive reaction both within Japan and world-wide.30
Marketing is another aspect of competitive behaviour that needs to be
monitored. Kodak's previous monitoring of scientific and development activities in
Japan was limited to conference attendance and perusing scientific papers. By
establishing direct entry into Japanese scientific circles, it is now able to have a
more direct understanding of key issues. If these understandings are to have any
relevance, however, such insights must be followed by decisive responses; this
thesis cites many examples of foreign MNCs that have capitalized on the direct
knowledge they have gained.
30 See Box 5.4
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5.5.4.2. Strengths Leveraging
If a foreign company is lacking in some strengths in relation to its Japanese
competitors or does not possess some element of product or technological
uniqueness, it would be unwise for it to attempt "me too" strategies. Such
approaches are unlikely to garner interest from either distributors or consumers. To
succeed in Japan, a foreign company must possess some advantages it can leverage
— whether they be product, technology or marketing expertise. There are many
examples of companies that have successfully built on their strengths. For example,
Johnson & Johnson has an enviable presence in Japan, and it is functioning with a
number of J&J franchises; it possesses technological superiority over its competitors
in the hospital wound-closure business (through Ethicon); it is a market leader at the
sophisticated end of the surgical market, as well as being involved in infection
control (by way of the Surgikos franchise) and pharmaceuticals (by Janssen); it is
also involved in diagnostics (through Ortho). Although Japanese companies are
trying to emulate its success, clearly most competitors do not have the world-wide
influence, experience or technology that J&J possess. This makes it difficult for
them to combat J&J in these technical arenas, although in the general consumer
arena the local Japanese companies are more than able to compete.
Other examples of strengths' utilization are Nestle's expertise with in-store
promotions, Unilever's harnessing of market research and product conceptualization
skills, and Coca-Cola's utilization of its extensive distribution presence. Almost all




Toiletry goods' manufacturers admit that almost any low-tech producer can
bring out a shampoo, but that does not necessarily enable them to build brands.
J&J admits that the Japanese consumer market is extremely difficult to compete in,
but nevertheless it has over a period of 30 years established a thriving business,
based on brands and the development of brand positions: Baby Shampoo (world¬
wide); Band Aid, Baby Lotion, Baby Oil (all number one market leaders); Reach
Toothbrush (number two).
As MNCs in Japan know, when a new product is successfully launched in
Japan, it is a virtual certainty that there will soon be Japanese "me too" products.
They may well compete on price and as was indicated earlier Japanese expectations
of investment returns tend to be much lower than those of a foreign MNCs, but the
acid test of whether a new product is successful is whether the consumer buys it at
prices yielding satisfactory margins. Marketing research data can give guidance and
perhaps some insight into likely consumer responses, but it is the consumer who
ultimately decides. However, Japanese manufacturers are inclined to continue
directly to the acid test. They act quickly, fuse their marketing and engineering
efforts, and speedily put products on store shelves. Often the only marketing
research performed by Japanese manufacturers is to launch a product and observe
subsequent consumer reactions.
If some proprietary element can be established, it is possible for MNCs to
succeed, even as late entrants to the Japanese market. Amex, for example, was
neither well known nor associated with a sense of prestige in Japan (six card
companies were already operating in the country). Amex's usual market entry
strategy was to lead with its green card and follow with the gold; however, for
Japan, it opted to go in with the gold card. While in retrospect, Amex believed it
would have benefited from entering the Japanese market earlier, giving it more time
to create awareness of what the company stood for and to adjust the product to
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Japanese consumer needs. Entering with the gold card turned out to be the right
policy, building on a proprietary sense of the quality and prestige associated with
the American Express gold card (Firestone, 1988).
Once developed, a meaningful brand identity is a valuable property. Amway
and Avon successfully built upon awareness of their brand names to enter new
business fields, in particular that of nutritional products. Nippon Lever introduced
a variety of compatible products under the Timotei brand name. Moreover Nippon
Lever provided much of the impetus for Unilever to harness its mature Lux brand
and apply it to other categories such as shampoos and body lotions, so that in Japan
Lux shampoo now outsells Timotei. Bristol Myers has applied its Bufferin brand to
other formulations such as liquid analgesics. Coca Cola has harnessed its brand by
applying it on coffees. Johnson & Johnson has extended its Reach brand to both
toothpaste and mouthwash. Roily Doll used its Aunt Stella brand by applying it to
furniture and holidays.
5.5.4.4. Distribution Capability
As we discussed above, the building up of an effective marketing and
distribution channel is a time consuming and onerous business. Novel methods of
distribution should be explored such as Direct Marketing31 or network marketing32.
However, once achieved, an effective distribution arrangement is a great
competitive strength. For example, Coca-Cola has developed such a powerful
distribution capability that it was able to use a late entrant market strategy to great
advantage. In other words, it used the same approach developed so successfully by
many Japanese companies. It monitors the new product initiatives of its competitors
and then focuses its R&D and market research skills on formulating fine-tuned
products even more suitable for the target consumers. Finally, to compensate for
31 See later section on Direct Marketing for example of Washington Wine.
32 See Box 5.5.
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its, often planned, late entry, it has harnessed its powerful distribution position to
ensure that the product is within easy reach of consumers.
5.5.4.5. Offensive Strategies
Although MNCs such as Bristol-Myers, Kodak, P&G and Nippon Lever and so
on have entered the Japanese market with major investment programmes, and by
meeting formidable competition head-on, the majority of foreign companies
targeting Japan are not in their league and could not sensibly fund such strategies.
Therefore, these concerns must assess the scale of operation and modes of entry that
they can support long term. Failure to do so means that foreign companies may
well alert Japanese competition to their products — and these competitors, armed
with abundant resources and superior distribution coverage, may easily capture the
market.33 Clearly, there is no one way to operate a marketing strategy in Japan.34
5.5.4.6. Niche Marketing
Japanese competitors are formidable, not least in their competition with each
other. Moreover, the products they generate all come from the same national
source, so to that limited extent they lack differentiation. How can MNCs best
compete with them? One answer is to avoid the rather direct head-on competition
mentioned above (this is better left to heavy-weight MNCs with large investment
budgets) and engage in niche marketing. This can also be done by harnessing
strengths— such as the property of being foreign.
Niche-market strategies have been successfully implemented by many of the
companies interviewed during the preparation of this thesis. Heinz's frozen food
operation, Ore-Ida, set up in 1983, let it be known that it did not want any conflict
33 See Box 5.13
34 See Chapter 2 and box 5.1 and 5.13 for the contrast between P&G,
Unilever, Gillette and Levi Strauss
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with domestic competitors and hence would always price at a level 15% above
domestic brands. This position was supported by substantial advertising and
promotional expenditures. The strategy was so successful that when Heinz reduced
its prices, as did all companies in response to government exhortations, all the
domestic suppliers within 24 hours dropped their prices by that percentage, thereby
retaining the 15% differential.
Roily Doll has been extraordinarily successful in adopting this niche marketing
idea,35 building its whole business around the Japanese value offurusato (rural
birthplace, home-on-the-farm myth); Nippon Lever has developed a major brand
concept from the natural properties of its shampoo; Coca-Cola, besides its world-
famous soft drink, has built a major business around canned teas and coffees
dispensed through vending machines. With infinite levels of distribution, these
machines supply iced canned coffees in summer and dispense the same cans hot in
winter.
5.5.4.7. Formulate Aggressive Product Strategies
MNC managers confirmed that new product development happens at a much
higher rate in Japan than elsewhere in the world. Japanese producers bypass many
of those phases identified by Western companies as leading to successful new
product development— evaluation and screening, business analysis, testing and
commercialization.36 These processes are underpinned by traditional support
services, for example marketing research, ability to segment markets conceptually,
product testing. These functions were considered by many interviewees to be
Western firms' strengths and Japanese companies' weaknesses.
Japanese manufacturers favour a product development style that is more
obviously "incrementalist", which does not necessarily mean, as some interviewees
35 See Box 5.10
36 See Box 5.14 and Figure 5.1
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suggested, hit-and-miss product planning. "Incrementalism" in this context simply
means that large, innovative Japanese companies tend to behave like small
entrepreneurs, in other words they accept the necessary improvisation involved in
development. They observe their users' needs closely, and avoid detailed marketing
or technical plans at a too early stage; they are quick to develop new products with
follow-up versions and "me too" goods, and in this regard Japanese management
appears slick. Most Japanese products have emanated from R&D efforts rather than
from prior analysis of market segmentations. Japanese companies favour taking a
technology; incorporating it into a product format and then launching it, rather than
asking what the market is and what the consumer is precisely looking for. Market
targeting is subsumed into the development process as are assumptions of market
requirements. Little wonder they maintain such a rapid pace of new product
introduction. With manufacturers exploiting their inventiveness in this way, the
Japanese consumer is flush with choices.
Marketers without genuine proprietary positionings are therefore extremely
vulnerable to emulation by others, and they must be well prepared to respond to the
high rate of product activity engaged in by their competitors.
Box 5.14
Product Strategy In Japan
Innovation
Japanese companies have a reputation for identifying product trends, specifying the
technologies required to improve on these products, and then turning them out in
massive volumes. They offer competitive price levels to the consumer as a result of
their economies of scale, thereby winning market share. The past reputation of
Japanese companies was that they scanned the world for ideas and imitated them,
adding an extra value to the product in the process. However, this characterization is no
longer entirely accurate. There are numerous examples of foreign companies entering
the Japanese market with a three- to four-year technical lead; only to find their products
quickly matched — and just as quickly left behind — by superior Japanese innovative
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effort. The key Japanese weapon today is not the ability to emulate, but the
wherewithal to innovate — an ability illustrated most clearly by Japanese attitudes to
their own domestic competitors, for example the current camcorder market. Kevin
Jones of McKinsey offered the following example. Sony's best selling CCD-TR55, a
miniaturised video camcorder that weighs only 790g, required Sony to "shrink" 2,200
components into a space occupying one quarter of their previous size. To achieve this,
a massive technical effort was required. Yet, within only six months of its introduction
in June 1989, Sony had acquired direct competition from Matsushita and JVC. Sanyo,
Canon, Ricoh and Hitachi were also selling palm sized camcorders within one year.
Product covering
Product covering is a form of insurance. Instead of relying on an overview of the
potential market, in other words by using marketing research data, the Japanese simply
ensure that they can cover their competitors' activities, taking products apart to find out
how they are constructed. This limits risk in so far as a product planning process based
upon concept development frequently requires untried technologies to make a concept
operational.
Me too products
The launch of "me too" products is as essential ingredient for the product-covering
process, but does not always meet with success. In the pet foods business, for
instance, Japanese concern Yosaki attempted in 1990 to enter the arena dominated by
Mars' Pedigree Petfoods and Nestle's Friskies, but it was forced to withdraw because of
its inability to secure a top position in the sector. The Tohado confectionery company
made a foray into pet foods and backed out. According to Friskies, both failed to
develop suitable products, met quality problems, did not advertise for long enough, and
had too little experience of the business to appreciate the difficulties involved. These
Japanese competitors did not communicate to the purchaser in a way that took account
of the cat's position as "family member" in the Japanese familial unit.
The "me too" Japanese competitor-led strategy has both attractions and dangers. On
the plus-side it enables the Japanese to develop a market presence very quickly, and
should this happen to be in a category that turns out to have growth potential, they are
well poised to take advantage of opportunities. On the downside, the same logic could
take a company into arenas that offer neither consumer benefits nor commercial
prospects. For example, Coca-Cola reported some 1600 new product introductions in
its field during 1 990 alone — and the vast majority of these failed to establish a market
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position. To the outsider, huge sums appear to be wasted on advertising these new
products on grand scales; however, advertising is just one of the promotion costs
incurred. Such a scale of product activity would be impossible in the West because the
conceptual development and testing phases usually included by Western companies (see
below) impose heavy burdens on scarce, expensive resources. It is unfortunate but
understandable that when foreign MNCs find themselves dealing with a competitor that
appears to be acting irrationally, they immediately fall back on what they perceive as
their own rational, proven way of doing business. The point is that while it may be
difficult for them to accept that things do not necessarily work their way in Japan,
understanding Japanese consumers from a Japanese viewpoint is critical to success.
Parallel development
Japanese companies are extremely adept at parallel development. The benefits of
problem solving and learning are immediately incorporated into the product's successor
while developing the Mark I version of a product. Only a matter of weeks after
Matsushita and JVC launched their camcorders, Sony was able to respond with two
improved new models — a lighter one, and another with a collection of advanced
technical features. Another aspect of product covering is product "churning". The
classic Western marketing approach is to generate a concept tested for value on target
groups of consumers; attempts are then made to translate the concept into a viable
product. During this process, the consumer is frequently consulted to determine
whether the ideas are being faithfully translated into customer-sought value. The actual
process can be long, and may involve a high degree of attrition, with some 60 ideas or
concepts being required to yield a successful product in the market, since technical
issues frequently compromise the original consumer-based concept (see Figure 5.2).
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Ideas/concepts
Japanese companies ignore this process and, instead of first testing ideas or concepts
by way of market research, they simply make up a batch of the product and then gauge
its viability by the way it sells to the consumer. One-third to one-half of the time is
required to get new products into the market as a result of the streamlined development
process. It also eliminates much of the marketing costs so not only can products be
taken to market quicker than by their Western counterparts; they do so at a quarter to
one-tenth of the cost. Significantly less is invested per product, and smaller product
changes are made at three times the pace of Western concerns (Jones and Ohbora,
1990). Three major factors contribute to this success:




Japan has made massive investments in engineering and technical training. Although
technology and science are unpopular subjects for study among some of Japan's trading
partners, technical literacy in Japan is more diffuse than anywhere else in the industrial
world. Japan boasts 5,000 technical workers for every one million people, in
comparison to 3,500 and 2,500 per million in the US and former West Germany
Figure 5.1 New Product Planning
Source: Booz Allen and Hamilton





| Robots■ 219.667 36.977
Source: Japan Robot Association, Anzai (1990)
Japanese engineers harness their creative skills to construct effective products from
standard catalogue components, and are reluctant to specify bespoke components. In
this way the costs are drastically pruned.
Japanese companies enjoy close relationships with their suppliers, sharing secret
information regarding product plans and delegating the manufacture of sub-assemblies
and -systems to them. Staff may also be shared to ensure efficient technology transfer
for specific ventures. However, the Japanese have not been able to transplant this new
product development performance to their foreign operations, and clearly the structures
and close manufacturer-supplier relationships that exist and operate so effectively in
Japan do not exist to the same degree elsewhere, or are less effective.
The high rate of product churning activity confuses foreign MNCs. While it makes sense
to the Japanese, to Western observers it appears that Japanese companies are wasting
vast sums on new products, the vast majority of which fail to match market





respectively. Moreover, the degree to which Japan has added industrial robots to its
resources far outpaces the rest of the world combined.
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expectations. Foreign firms commonly expect Japanese product development costs to
be higher, but they are lower than for comparable activity in the West, a confusion that
is partially explained by the fact that Japanese companies are motivated primarily by
market share and growth rates rather than profit. MNCs involved in joint operations or
projects should be warned that this critical difference frequently causes problems
between JV partners: Rather than increase prices and generate greater profits, the
Japanese JV partner would be more inclined to forego the increase to improve market
share.
High speed response
On all fronts, Japan is a country of rapid change: Japanese companies develop their
technology faster than Western firms (are accustomed to); hence, to hold position in
Japan requires great initiative and effort. The swift pace of new product activity means
that the Japanese customer is one of the fastest new product adopters and rejecters in
the world. Market penetration rates for new products are much higher in Japan than in
Europe or the US: new goods introduced tend to record high consumer trial rates, and
any new product successfully introduced and subsequently able to hold its position
frequently reaches its peak within two years. Although Japan also has a higher product
failure rate, if a new product becomes commercially viable, the rate of penetration is not
only high but significant levels can be reached two to three times more quickly than in
the US or European markets.
This shifting market scenario serves to hone Japanese creativity and reinforces the
product development focus. Product innovation combined with high consumer trial rates
results in short product life-cycles, for example zero to peak and back to zero again
within four years. Western companies exhibit a much slower reaction time. When they
see an opportunity worth reviewing, they typically go through a two- to three-year
development process; during which time the Japanese strategic window may close.
MNCs must remember that product success is also dependent on being able to establish
wide distribution coverage for a new product — and to do so quickly. Premature
exposure without a fully operating distribution network will act as a magnet for domestic
Japanese competitors.
Successful foreign MNCs have therefore recognized the need to commercialize new
products quickly in Japan, and are focusing on ensuring rapid distribution coverage. As
long as exposure is small, there is less likelihood of the product being picked up by local
competitors. However, if volume grows and the foreign company is unable to expand
its distribution coverage at a comparable pace, requests from potential distributors could
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draw formidable competitors into the arena. Moreover, having established its product
presence, the foreign company will find it more difficult to develop or even hold its
position; since by that time any unique positioning will have been eroded by the entrance
of others carving out brand and distribution franchises.
Source: Interview materials
A key message of this thesis is that product strategy must focus on proprietary
concepts and/or positionings that can be developed dynamically. Once brand values
have been established, the concept must be extended and plans put in place for the
speedy introduction of brand extensions— all of which calls for huge investment
and attention to quality. Obtaining an understanding of the standards required of
production management in the originating country is a major task frequently
commented on by MNCs interviewed; the most effective solution being to develop
direct relationships with plant managers.
Marketers should also consider harnessing their "foreignness" where
appropriate, focusing on product-specific, or at least product-origin specific
concepts, for example Swiss detail, German quality engineering, French
sophistication, Italian flair and so on. In some areas this may be the only point of
difference, but it should not be underplayed. Both Shiseido and Kanebo, for
instance, have lost a significant share of the department store business to foreign
products, which now constitute about 60% of the depato's cosmetic sales.
5.5.4.8. Manage The Communications Process
As in any other developed market, considerable attention must be devoted to
communications in Japan. It is particularly important for advertising to speak
effectively to the consumer, to present a corporate image promising quality, and to
bond the company with communities of various types. Direct channels of
communication with the consumer are also necessary.
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5.5.4.8.1. ADVERTISING
All communications are worthless without the logistical support of
distribution. When Asatsu Inc. was appointed by Apple Computer Corp. to handle
its advertising in Japan, the agency's international director flew to California and
requested that Apple delay any further Japanese advertising for two years until its
distribution position had been strengthened. This is unusual in the advertising
business, since agencies frequently have difficulty persuading new clients to spend
their declared advertising budgets. However, Asatsu was concerned that advertising
then would do more harm than good to the Apple image; it would be counter¬
productive to build awareness and favour with consumers if these consumers were
likely to meet difficulties in locating Apple distributors (or if suppliers were
inadequately stocked and supported).
Interviews with advertising agencies and their clients confirmed that the
Japanese seem often to prefer emotion-based advertising. A self imposed cultural
restriction discourages Japanese advertisers from being comparative, naming
competitors, and generally adopting the more scientific techniques used elsewhere.
Nevertheless, according to Asatsu Inc., during the last five years there has been
some convergence between Japanese methods and US hard-sell techniques, each
borrowing from the other. However in May 1991 that agency developed problems
in placing US originated Pepsi advertising. Tokyo's 5 major television networks
refused to continue airing Pepsi's M. C. Hammer spot, claiming that Japanese
consumers feel uncomfortable with its comparative advertising approach.
Comparative advertising is often unpopular with major Japanese advertising
agencies that tend to have more than one client per industry. The implication is that
Pepsi's spot will jeopardise network relations with Coca-Cola, which spends a
considerable amount on television advertising. TV Asahi decided not to air the spot
because it feared viewers would interpret the spot as slander.
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The importance of using advertising in Japan as part of a global strategy is well
illustrated by the experience of Alfred Dunhill, the up-market male clothing
retailer. With 80% of Dunhill world-wide sales made to the Japanese, little wonder
that when Dunhill selected a new advertising agency it began the selection process
in Japan. Asatsu, the Japanese agency, was chosen and Dunhill then set about
determining the world-wide agencies with which Asatsu was to be networked. In
this way, BBDO, one of the world's largest advertising networks, was eventually
retained to support the Japanese concern.
The execution of advertising strategy is crucial to overall strategy. The
differentiated positionings it establishes can help fend off competitive threats.
Bristol-Myers (BM), for example, produces a brand of antiseptic lotion called Sea
Breeze that dominates its product category. Sea Breeze is based on a very simple
formulation containing 43% alcohol, quite capable of being easily imitated by any
serious competitor, which is what several major Japanese competitors have done.
However, the domestic companies have thus far failed to make an impression in the
marketplace, where effective advertising (see below) has established Sea Breeze in a
proprietary position. It still dominates its sector, with more than 70% market
share.
In the US, Sea Breeze is used primarily as an astringent to clean the face and is
advertised as such. In Japan, the product is positioned differently, and as a result
the product is purchased mainly by young people, especially males, as an after-sun
skin cooler. To support this positioning BM developed a unique advertising style
that it has used consistently for a number of years. The advertisement features a
young male on a surfboard and wind surfer jumping the waves; the execution was
described as highly dynamic, with a very distinctive voice-over by a well-known
disc-jockey. Japanese consumers may not have heard of BM, but research and sales
figures indicate they frequently recall the name of Sea Breeze.
Another example of an effective positioning strategy is Polaroid, which
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languished for 15 years with a 5-6% market share— primarily because it was being
squeezed by consumer comparisons with Fuji, Konica and Kodak products.
Moreover, the production speed offered by the new processing companies was
diminishing Polaroid's "instantaneous" value. Asatsu proposed amending
Polaroid's positioning to focus on "imaging stationery" for business— which
moved it away from direct confrontation with Fuji et al. The notion of a visual
memo underpinned the new Polaroid communications program, and this Japan-
originated concept was subsequently so successful in turning the sales curve sharply
and quickly upwards that it has now been adopted outside Japan — which again
shows that strategies can transplant from one market to another. However, as was
true in this case, whether the direction be from outside Japan to inside or vice-
versa, strategies must be tested in and/or adapted to the market concerned.
Communications, it was stressed by respondents, like all aspects of marketing,
must fit the Japanese context. They tended to emphasize, and perhaps over
stressed, that Advertising in Japan has some interesting features, especially
concerning its heavy emphasis on images, using the symbolic and highly visual
rituals that play a major role in Japanese social, cultural and religious events. On
one hand, daily life, sports events, parties, even honeymoons, have a formal,
ritualistic content on which advertising makes great play; on the other, the unclear
connection between words and images (or between form and content) had
experienced marketing executives saying that if they turned down the sound on the
television set, they had difficulty guessing what type of product was being
advertised. Yet what is also true is that products are being churned out at such a
high rate and experiencing a high attrition rate so that much advertising is quickly
discontinued and without repetition there is no reinforcement of the connection
between words, meanings and images.
This oblique approach to advertising is not, however, unique to consumables
and has been employed in other sectors, such as cars. For example, when a major
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Japanese car manufacturer (Nissan) attempted to enter the luxury car market in the
US with its "Infinity" model, it ran a series of teaser advertisements showing
haystacks, birds flying over the horizon and beautiful country lanes with leaves
falling down. Consumers may have been totally confused what it was selling, but
nevertheless the strategy worked in that both the product and its advertising were
successfully differentiated from the rest of the market. However, it must be
stressed that occurrences such as these are events that people tend to remember and
in repeating these events on this page I am in danger of aiding the process of
Nihonjinron. To counter this bias, it must be said, that analysis of everyday
advertising spots reveals a great deal, if not more, tedious, non creative output than
appears even on US television.
This emphasis on placed, by respondents, on distinctive Japanese mood
advertising makes it very difficult, they claim, for expatriate MNC managers to
make meaningful contributions to the advertising debate; they often have as little
expertise in making the correct creative judgements as a non-industry outsider. Is a
subtle or visual pun the best way to make a communicative statement? A sure
answer, as MNCs pointed out, requires a high level of appreciation of Japanese
language and culture. The Japanese advertising industry spawns some extremely
good creative output, which results in impressive award-winning advertising. Since
both content and form are subject to rapid change, with zany off-beat humour often
playing just as important a role as image and aesthetics, it is difficult to summarize
precisely on what this creativity is based. Obviously, as a general advertising rule,
a pitch towards "the newer the better" continues to hold, but foreign MNCs should
understand that corporate formula advertising of the kind that is successful in the
West does not necessarily work in Japan (even though Japanese examples may have
worked successfully outside Japan).
In this context, long-term relationships in the creative field pose a major
difficulty in Japan. The consumer market is changing so fast that some MNC
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managers believe they cannot afford to build a long-term relationship with one
creative department because they perceive that it produces a certain style that may
not keep pace with product changes. Of course, long-term relationships are
beneficial in any aspect of doing business in Japan, but the onus is on the agency to
keep its creative output fresh. Fortunately, the agencies themselves are alert to this
problem (after all, it is not limited to Japan), and organize their creative teams to
work on different types of accounts; in that way they spur creativity.
Philip Morris, for example, has produced some successful advertising for l^ark,
its flagship brand in Japan. The tag line for the Lark campaign was "Speak Lark,
the password for mildness" and featured a cops-and-robbers movie starring the US
actor James Coburn. Coburn was pictured in numerous life-threatening situations,
and each time he would succeed in getting through a heavily guarded door by giving
the password and producing his cigarette pack. This sort of advertising is effective
in Japan because it is both product- and image-driven; in other words by associating
the product with both success and Western imagery it manages to convey several
positive things about the brand.
The emphasis on mood and theme advertising, perhaps overstated, is not a rigid
requirement; as Japanese advertisers have expanded their international experience,
they have taken account of how US-style "hard sell" advertising works. Industry
experts interviewed believed that the last six years have seen some convergence
between Madison Avenue and Ginza styles of advertising: Japanese advertising has
experimented with hard sales; American advertising has been more image-driven.
Whatever the approach, the advice for MNC advertisers remains: first, know the
consumer and understand the relationship that the consumer has with the product,
second, try to appreciate how the consumer process advertising and uses associated
imagery to support the product and brand choice.
Most of the interviewees agreed that to build market share, advertising
expenditures should generate a share of advertising voice twice that of market share,
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thereafter it is necessary to maintain a share of voice equivalent to market share. It
was their experience that as soon as they attempted to milk their brand positions by
reducing expenditure below this level, market share fell away quickly.
Conclusions on advertising strategy are fundamental:
• Understand the consumers' relationship with the product
• Understand the consumers use of advertising in the context of the product in
question
• Select a style of advertising that addresses the marketing problem and sets the
brand apart.
5.5.4.8.2. CORPORATE IMAGE
A key lesson for major MNCs entering the Japanese market is there is a
major difference between Japanese advertising and that of other markets just as
there is between the importance of corporate image and its interrelationship with
brand advertising. For example, in most Western markets, consumers are unaware
from which corporate source their preferred brand originates. In Japan, however,
the consumer expects to know what kind of company manufactures the brand,
because the consumers' perceptions of the organization form a major part of their
brand evaluation criteria. This vital point was mentioned by Clark (1979), who
emphasized the predilection of the Japanese consumer for status and ranking. In
other words, if the consumer buys a brand from Kao, he/she understands that it will
be of outstanding quality and reputation, but if manufacturers push individual
brands and neglect the image of the corporation from which they derive, the quality
perception will not be conveyed to the consumer. For example, when P&G began
operating in Japan, it promoted individual brands, as it had in the US and elsewhere
without mention of corporate ownership.37 It learned, however, that the consumer
37 See Box 5.13
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was interested in the type of company from which the brands originated, and
nowadays its Japanese brand advertising signs off with the information that the
brand is owned by Procter & Gamble, displaying the P&G corporate logo in full
screen. P&G found this a difficult lesson to learn: Being so enmeshed in the
Cincinnati way of doing business, its US-style advertising was yet another way in
which it seriously retarded its progress in the Japanese market.
This issue of corporate image cannot be over-stressed. Companies are
becoming more image-conscious: During 1989, according to the PR company
Cosmo, some 2,000 companies in Japan changed their logos to enhance their
corporate images. In particular, large companies that previously experienced few
problems recruiting staff now find it difficult to recruit the desired calibre of
people; hence, they are spending time and funds trying to address their image
problems.
5.5.4.8.3. SPONSORSHIP
Given the premium consumers place on the corporate image, sponsorship—
of television programs, and a variety of events and activities — are popular.
However, since these deals are so expensive, marketers must be careful how
sponsorship plans are implemented. Much of the sponsorship in Japan inevitably
involves major corporations (the consumer appreciates that almost any company can
advertise; with sponsorship, it is the company's reputation that is being
highlighted). Associating corporate image with a television program or event
means the company must be confident that the program and its underlying message
is transmitted appropriately. Of the MNCs interviewed, both P&G and Amway in
particular are heavy users of television sponsorship. According to marketing
manager, Jerry Rosenberg, Amway places great importance on its image as a direct
selling company.
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We try to show what kind ofcompany we are, what kind of image we
have, what we are doing for society. We do this not only through
television advertising and media advertising, but also through a very
active corporate sponsorship program.
Amway's intention is to create as positive a public image as possible; it has
therefore sponsored such events as The Cleveland Orchestra concerts in 1990, and
over the years has also been active in sponsorship of ballet and sport. On the
environmental front, it is setting up an Amway nature centre in support of various
environmental activities throughout Japan, and its distributors sell products that
specifically generate money for this effort.
Individual brands account for very little sponsorship activity, the problem with
brand sponsorship is that it is necessary to find a sponsorship opportunity that aids a
brand's positioning. Companies therefore have to assess whether a certain event
can be advertised, whether footage from a sponsored television show can be
harnessed in any way, and what kind of television ratings the programs are likely to
get. It is much more complicated than simply buying advertising on the basis of
GRPs (gross rating points) or how many consumers are likely to see the campaign
in a given period.
5.5.4.8.4. MEDIA
In some respects, Japanese advertising is less restricted than in comparable
developed markets. For instance, cigarette advertising is still possible on Japanese
television (see Chapter 2) but as was mentioned in the previous chapter, the
numbers of slots are being reduced, competition between JT and imported brands is
fierce, and as a result, tobacco company advertising rates are escalating much faster
than industry norms (45% during 1990; 34% the year before). As far as tobacco
advertising is concerned, the media operate in a sellers' market. Between 1985 and
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1989, for instance, cigarette companies experienced an increase of 220% in actual
media costs.
Since they are restricted in what time slots they are allowed to buy; tobacco
companies are unable to engage in L-shaped buying, in other words buying over the
weekly schedule off-peak and on-peak. Sometimes the relevant target audience can
be reached by buying into a particular television program with a known following,
but the benefits of such a choice are likely to decay with time and it is probable that
the advertiser will have to expand its reach by combining program buying with spot
buying.
Many MNC managers considered television advertising expensive, and— along
with radio— less effective than it used to be. Part of the reason for this is the
sheer amount of advertising clutter in the Japanese market. As discussed in Chapter
2, one hour of programming contains seven-minutes of advertising which is
distributed according to the type of programme. In these advertising breaks most
advertisers buy 15 seconds of time with the result that cigarettes, cars, alcohol,
household products, whisky, tobacco and so on appear in the same slot, and with so
many commercials in a single slot, some interviewees said they did not— or could
not— object to competitive brands being shown in the same slot, provided they are
not in sequence (note that Japanese agencies can work for competitors without the
usual arguments about account conflict). In any case, the length of the advertising
breaks allows many consumers to divert their attention to other things, so they are
unlikely to see competing ads in sequence. The advertiser must focus more on the




Sales promotions are highly localised in Japan: Companies will run
promotions for, say, a five or 10-store chain in Osaka. Since promotions can be
scheduled at any time in Japan, unlike in the US, foreign firms have learned to
minimize the overall cost of these tailored events. However, regulations govern
what can and cannot be offered.
In the US, offers, premiums and other give-aways are commonplace. In Japan,
either open or closed lotteries are permissible, but there are limits on how much
prize money can be offered, based on the level of sales expected during the lottery
period. Moreover the value of premiums is limited by law up to a maximum of
approximately 20-times the value of the purchase is allowed. Couponing is a
massive business in the US, but is impossible to implement in Japan: newspapers
do not accept them; consumers have no habit of using them; and no redemption
mechanism exists.
Japanese regulations limit the amount of money that can be spent on promotion
by controlling the relationship between prize bonuses and the value of the product
that is being promoted. While manufacturers avoid very high-cost promotions, the
restriction on trade inevitably makes the industry less competitive. Some loss of
trade may be recouped by price discounting, but in the long term this is bad for
brand development. A typical way of promoting frozen foods products in Japan is,
at the end of each month, to cut prices by 50% for three days. In this way the
stores clear out inventories. However the inevitable response to these practices
(both in Japan and elsewhere) is for the consumer to delay buying until the 28th of
the month.
In a bid to avoid this, Ore-Ida asked the trade to remove its frozen food
products from display during these promotional periods. There was some
resistance, but in the main the request was complied with and Ore-Ida have either
taken the product off the shelves or simply not marked them down at month-end.
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Heinz executives at Ore-Ida were surprised at the compliance, but their aggressive
promotion of good quality, backed up by television advertising, helped to generate
considerable retailer interest in the product, which, in turn, generated sales.
5.5.4.8.6. PUBLIC RELATIONS
Foreign MNCs must also learn how to forge good relations not only with the
consumer but with a variety of constituencies, be they business partners,
government, or the business community generally. In each case, it is necessary to
assess whether the company is communicating or building the relationship in the
most effective way. In this respect, public relations is becoming an increasingly
important element in the communications mix. Increasing numbers of
manufacturers are approaching consumers directly by way of the media, but the
relationship between the actions of the consumer and the presentation of a good
corporate image is an equally important— if less tangible— factor in business
success, since the Japanese consumer is so aware of a brand's corporate origins.
There are many aspects of public relations harnessed in the Japanese market.
Companies such as Coca-Cola and IBM have good reputations in Japan not only
because of their products, but because they are major players in corporate affairs
and render themselves attractive to organizational buyers as well as consumers. As
anywhere else in the world, PR executives must develop close relationships with the
media in Japan to ensure the press is well briefed on their client companies and
products. However, MNCs should remember that communications address only
communications-related issues: clients of PR companies, both Japanese companies
as well as foreign MNCs, often confuse communications with background substance
and make unrealistic requests of the agency. The agency is then obliged to point
out that the client's problems may stem not from image, but from an inappropriate
strategy for Japan.
Public relations can do little to correct fundamentals such as pricing,
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distribution, and lack of a strong team of people to execute programs. PR comes
into play only when companies decide they must speak up and tell the public who
they are or explain a difficult situation or strategy. Japan is no different to the rest
of the world in that business is finding it increasingly necessary to speak out. When
an oil company is involved in a major pollution incident, the public wants to know
who the management is and what corporate philosophy is followed. All major
foreign MNCs in Japan want to be recognized as good corporate citizens, corporate
citizenship being closely linked to social responsibility.
Public opinion can have effect a company's fortunes, but spending money alone
will not guarantee that the company becomes a corporate citizen. It is not
sufficient, for example, simply to make a donation to a business school or some
other worthy institution. The issue must be handled more intelligently and through
a range of approaches, United Airlines (UA), for instance, has strengthened its
claim to corporate citizenship by taking a long-term approach. Each year since
1984, it has given away 78 flight tickets to scholars on the Fulbright Scholar
Program, its premise: one day these winners will be important in Japan, and
benefits will accrue to UA.
5.5.4.8.7. DIRECT MARKETING
Direct marketing is an optional supplement to mainstream marketing
activities. It can be independently used as a basis for market entry, and it has
limited exposure to investment risk. As such, it has been used in Japan for
approximately 100 years. The first organizations to do so are still the largest
players in the arena: Mitsukoshi, Seiyu— the Japanese department store
equivalents of Sears (they have also adopted a Sears-type catalogue).
Japan's direct marketing industry has been growing at roughly 15% per annum
for the last five years. It currently generates revenues of US$5-8 billion and
growing. However, a number of factors hamper its development. For example,
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direct marketing in the US and Europe has stemmed from magazine publishing,
with publishers assembling large databases of subscribers to use as mailing lists,
whereas in Japan, few magazines are sold by subscription and, since most are sold
by kiosks, news stands and book stores, mailing list activity is limited. Databases
do exist in Japan, but the infrastructure for support and development is not as
sophisticated as in the US or Europe. Moreover, database companies have
developed their data from scratch, which means they do not possess accurate reader
profiles against which to match advertising targets; market segmentation is therefore
difficult to pinpoint.
On the purely technical front, other drawbacks are Japan's extremely high postal
and telephone rates. Because of a reluctance to offer volume discounts, not only is
postage at net rates between four and six times higher than elsewhere in the West,
but free dial (1 800-type telephone numbers) does not receive bulk discounts as in
the US (where it garners up to 80%). The issue is currently under negotiation with
the Ministry of Postal Services, and while some changes may be proposed, the
maximum discount under negotiation is still a modest 25%.
In the US, companies such as AT&T and the US Mail encourage direct
marketing. Their discounts have increased the number of companies using the mail
system overall, even though there is a certain loss of revenue per unit of mail.
While this view is not yet accepted by the Ministry of Postal Services in Japan,
many companies are becoming involved with direct marketing, not only in the
consumer arena, but also in the area of direct business to business communications.
These firms are becoming more interested in the potential of customer lists and even
renting their own lists to non-competitive companies.
However, MNCs should be aware that these lists may still be difficult to access:
Many computer databases in Japan have been built on the phonetic rendering of
Japanese names and it is difficult to link the phonetics with the proper characters.
Moreover, since many Japanese names can be read in more than one way, it will
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take some time for software development programs to solve the problem of
personalization. Similarly, fax marketing, although much cheaper than using the
mail, is slow to develop in Japan; and, to date, only two companies are using a fax
market system — sending "broadcast faxes" to the numbers in its database.38
The best opportunities in direct marketing are undoubtedly the short-term ones,
especially for those companies that have not yet established a traditional distribution
arrangement. Direct marketing can be an immediate and effective option in the
general spectrum of marketing choices: It encourages flexibility and allows the
company to engage in various types of price testing and market research before
fixing its marketing formula.
In 1990, Philip Morris launched its campaign for Merit, its new cigarette brand.
Advertising was placed in newspapers and magazines inviting consumers to send the
name of their preferred brand to Philip Morris, and in return they would receive a
free pack of Merit. In this way, Philip Morris built up a 900,000 person database
over a two-month period. The Washington Wine Industry is another example.
Since the group had no business in Japan before 1990, Market Makers Inc. linked it
with a firm organizing sales promotions for car companies. Together they
developed a gift-giving program, in which customers who bought a car from the
dealer were then mailed a bottle of wine to remind them that the dealer had not
forgotten them. This was Washington Wine's first step into the market, and its
effectiveness is still being tested.
38 Since it is theoretically possible to communicate with 10,000 potential
clients overnight, this may prove to be a significant facility for stores and retail
businesses with an overstock of items, for special sales offers, or for short-
term seasonal discounts.
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5.6. SUMMARY— FOREIGN MNC RESPONSES
We looked at some of the obstacles which foreign marketers have faced in
attempting to develop their positions in the Japanese market and the alleged
obstacles to its penetration were considered. Considering the amount of publicity
that has emanated from the US and its Strategic Impediments Initiative, it was
expected that much evidence of unfair practice would emerge, but this was not so.
Although instances were located of past malpractice, in many cases they were
dispelled as historical phenomena— at least for consumer products markets— but
the obstructive image has lingered.
Obstacles such as were identified are not insurmountable but they do represent
serious difficulties that would deter the feint hearted. They are primarily financial,
relating to the immense cost of doing business in Japan, but these are not selectively
aimed at foreign companies and equally applicable to Japanese companies.
• Many instances have been cited of companies that have succeeded in
overcoming the difficulties presented in the Japanese market. Foreign
companies have penetrated at the luxury end of the consumer goods business,
just as they have succeeded in winning consumers of everyday consumables.
They have done so primarily by determining approaches that suit the contexts of
their products and organizations. To make their entries into the Japanese market
has required imagination and commitment to deal with the difficulties that
confronted them, but they have successfully entered and are carving out
significant positions in the marketplace.
• Entry strategies are rather crucial and what may be appropriate in the early days
may soon be outlived. Hence the advantage of having a strong supportive
corporate effort that is able to take a long term view is a factor brought into
sharp relief. If the company can see ahead to where it wants to be, then it may
be wiser to consider direct investment even though the road to pay backs may be
painstakingly slow. Some MNCs believe that a Japanese presence is so crucial
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as to condition their corporate behaviour world-wide. They assert that if they
can compete in Japan then they will be able to compete anywhere, if they cannot
compete in Japan then they will be vulnerable to attack in other markets that
Japanese companies choose to enter.
• Winning and maintaining distribution coverage is a crucial activity in Japan just
as it is elsewhere. Yet, instances have been cited of foreign companies which
are grappling with the difficulties and are performing gallantly. However, their
modes of entry had to be tailored to resources, ambitions and opportunities and
of course nothing could be achieved without being able to hire the staff that are
essential to drive the business. In so doing, cognition had to be taken of the
expectations of Japanese employees and recruitment and payment packages be
determined on a realistic basis.
• A MNC's Japanese distribution strategy depends on the nature of the company,
the level of resources it can commit to the market, and the time horizon it
envisages. Looking for a quick entry via the sogo shosha is often not
recommended. If a market opportunity exists for the product, and if an MNC is
prepared to back that product with adequate communications support, then
distribution is possible. On the other hand, if a company is merely looking for
a "quick hit", establishing a viable distribution arrangement will be much more
difficult to achieve; as this thesis has indicated, distribution agreements in Japan
are usually more long-term than foreign MNCs are accustomed to. The
Japanese distribution system tends to favour long term relationships. So,
foreign companies will be pressurised into long term commitments. Hiring and
firing of distributors brings with it a bad reputation that will work against the
foreign company in the longer term. Therefore foreign MNC managers are
urged to continue with caution, since any long-term commitment also carries the
risk that commitment to a poor distributor will result in stifling of the brand's
potential.
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• While many foreign MNCs had entered the Japanese market through JV
arrangements, some of these relationships were wrought with frustrations that
accompanied the benefits. The major benefits which JVs do extend are
manufacturing and distribution; the latter being a difficulty for many foreign
MNCs. Recruitment of high calibre staff is a key problem as foreign companies
are regarded lower in the pecking order than are indigenous employers.
• Often the decision to enter the Japanese market has involved the shedding of
some hitherto fixed assumptions such as the discarding by Levi Strauss of its
belief that all Orientals must be similar and that Japan could be serviced
adequately from Hong Kong. Yet marketing in Japan involves two-way traffic
and many of the practices which foreign companies have imported into Japan
have been proven to be successful such as the interventionist approach of Levi
Strauss to wholesaler inventories and the research driven approach of Nippon
Lever.
• Above all the vast array of products coupled with the rate at which new products
are being introduced onto the market means that marketers cannot remain
complacent about their market share positions. It is extremely difficult to
"milk" successful products by cutting back on advertising expenditures because
rapid decline in market share sets in very quickly. Because of this there was
general agreement that advertising share of voice should at least equate with
market share.
• One ingredient that deserves to be stressed often is the necessity to research the
fundamentals of consumer behaviour in the Japanese market. Many instances
have been cited of companies that have done well by understanding the
consumer; for example Nippon Lever approached the market in this way by
questioning all of its fundamental assumptions about the consumer. Unilever
attributes much of its success in Japan to this rigour. Instances were also
highlighted, Procter and Gamble for example, of how companies had performed
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badly as a result of neglecting to understand their consumers.
Foreignness, in many cases, was harnessed as a positive force, especially where
it was associated with quality, because if there is one overriding requirement for
marketing in Japan then quality is the one. The Japanese consumer is, above all
else, fanatical about quality. One way this quality concern is manifest is in
packaging standards that are far and beyond superior to those which apply in
western markets, and, as is true in many markets, packaging is frequently even
more important than content. This is especially true in the huge gift giving
segment. Some businesses have been built around this practice while others
have adapted product forms to accommodate it. This is just as true in everyday
consumables businesses as it is in the luxury sector. The Japanese market offers
immense opportunities for creative expression with product concepts and
communications. However it is essential to relate strategies to Japanese values.
JVs have offered many foreign MNCs opportunities to gain experience in the
market but frustration with the Japanese partner is common and often followed
by attempts by the foreign companies to wrest control from the JV companies to
execute their strategies without, as they perceive it, encumbrance. Perennial
concerns such as distribution and staff can be dealt with, but they are likely to
test even the most talented MNC managers.
Competition from Japanese companies in the form of product emulation is
fierce. Me too products are likely to appear sooner rather than later. Efforts
must be made to plan line updates to maintain leadership when it exists.
Although Japanese advertising is generally regarded to be more mood -— and
image-based than in the West, much Japanese advertising is purely commodity-
oriented. Neither is necessarily more successful, but MNC managers are
strongly advised to discard their home-market assumptions about effective
advertising. Japanized advertising approaches, i.e., advertising and sales
promotion campaigns that emulate Japanese methods, should be considered
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alongside other potentially suitable models. Moreover, MNCs must recognize
the importance of corporate identity; brands alone do not necessarily convey the
level of quality and tradition necessary to win consumer support. Japanese
consumers appear increasingly concerned about learning about the corporate
stables from which brands emerge. Direct marketing offers limited
opportunities to test the water while limiting financial exposure. It also
represents a powerful vehicle to be included in the communications mix.
• Meeting Japanese quality expectations is a problem to many foreign companies
choosing to import into Japan, as they come across difficulties in persuading
their production teams that home market specifications fall below Japanese
requirements. The ability to successfully create quality standards goes hand in
hand with viewing the entire business from a Japanese perspective. This is true
of manufacturing just as it is of advertising. What is required is a recognition
that Japan is just not "another export market" and that Japanese standards and
tastes are often of a higher order and expectation. To gear up to meet them is
often to gear up to develop competitive advantage for other markets along with
the company's own domestic market. This recognition must be made to pervade
all areas of the enterprise.
• Despite the multiplication of potential payoffs, rising to the challenge of Japan's
markets does not come cheap: investment in Japan requires substantial resources
and a willingness to commit to long-term development and relationship-
building. Research conducted for this thesis illustrates how forward-looking
firms that have established a significant presence in Japan are those now reaping
the rewards.
One of the issues that has emerged in this chapter is the degree to which
Japanese marketing is different from marketing elsewhere. It has been illustrated
that the differences are subtle rather than discrete. The issue has been introduced of
how companies have had to adapt their methods and to what degree they could
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successfully import their expertise into the Japanese context. This topic of
standardization versus adaptation is well known in the literature; so in the next
chapter an attempt will be made to appraise the companies, against a literature
based framework (Quelch and Hoff, 1986), on which the qualitative findings
presented in this chapter were based. Before doing so, an attempt will be made to
draw some strategic management implications from the study. This will be done by
comparing the companies' approaches toward the gaining of competitive advantage
by using a framework derived from one of Porter's (1990) more recent works.
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CHAPTER 6 - ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES OF THE SAMPLE COMPANIES
6.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, as was mentioned in Chapters 1 and 3, two analytical
frameworks will be harnessed against which the companies in the sample will be
appraised.
These assessments are based on overall impressions gained from the interviews
together with other supporting data that was collected. Obviously the usefulness of
such a view is limited by the fact that interviews— even depth interviews— based
on one point of contact with a business can at best only give a limited view of a
multidimensional situation. And, while such an approach can be criticized for its
lack of scientific substance as well as its inherent bias, any such bias is likely to
apply across all the judgements. Furthermore, (as is mentioned elsewhere), there is
little in the sphere of the social sciences that is value free (Foucault, 1970).
However, a consistent bias does not necessarily defeat the purpose of the
assessment, which is to structure the qualitative findings on these different
companies presented in the previous chapter within the context of recognized
frameworks.
Nevertheless, to attempt to minimize inherent personal bias, this assessment was
shown to the consultants that were included in the sample of interviewees and their
views were sought of the judgements that had been made; in the main consensus
was obtained, but in some instances reappraisal of the classification was made.
The first framework is concerned with the approach that the sample companies
adopted toward achieving competitive advantage and is based on a template
presented in The Competitive Advantage OfNations, (Porter, 1990), a work in
which he argued that the competitiveness of the nation is based on the collective
competitiveness of its industrial and commercial concerns. This work was
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considered particularly apposite due to the contemporary interest that the Japanese
economic success has attracted. Given that, according to Porter (1990), Japanese
success has stemmed largely from the competitiveness of the kaisha, there is
considerable potential value in lessons that might be drawn from this study of
foreign MNCs: companies that have, in the main, been successful in competing
with the kaisha in their home market.
The criteria of how competitive advantage is achieved (Porter, 1990) are listed
in section 6.3 below and a subjective assessment of the sample companies is
presented in Tables 6.2 to 6.10. In this way, the sample companies have been
subjectively assessed on the priority that they appear to assign to innovation and
change. Although the sample companies were categorized High, Medium and Low,
these classifications do not imply evaluations of merit; they are merely nominal
labels.
In the previous chapter it was mentioned that when MNCs engage in global
marketing one of the critical decisions they have to grapple with is the issue of
standardization of methods and products versus adaptation to foreign market
requirements. Moreover, in the literature, much stress was placed on the need for
Japanization, an alternative term for adaptation to the Japanese market context, so,
after appraising the sample against Porter's criteria an effort was made to appraise
and classify the major companies in the sample by drawing on a framework
established in a major work on this topic (Quelch and Hoff, 1986). This was
achieved by using qualitative judgements to allocate the companies to the respective
categories established by Quelch and Hoff (1986). As with all such categorizations
the boundaries between one category and another may be blurred and involve some
degree of overlap, similarly there is some overlap between the examples that are
used to illustrate the findings.
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6.2. THE COMPANIES
Of the companies about which data was collected, those that were actively
marketing products, i.e., excluding facilitators such as consultants, advertising
agencies, distributors, and so on, have been selected for analysis and coded as




b Avon Products Co. Ltd.
c Bristol-Myers K.K.
d Coca Cola (Japan) Company Limited
e Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd
f Nestle/Friskies K.K.
8 Gillette (Japan) Inc.
h ICI Japan Limited
i Johnson & Johnson Japan
i Kohler Japan K.K.
k Levi Strauss Japan K.K.
1 Heinz/Ore-Ida.
m McDonald's Company (Japan), Ltd.
n Nippon Lever K.K.
0 Philip Morris K.K.
P Procter and Gamble Far East Inc.
q R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Tobacco Company Limited
r Revlon
s Roily Doll Inc.
t Smith Kline Beecham
u United Airlines.
6.3. PORTER'S (1990) FRAMEWORK
As was fully explained in his previous work (Porter, 1990) and reviewed in
Chapter 2, the following framework was identified as a potentially valuable basis
for structuring some of the qualitative findings of this exploratory research study:
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• Competitive advantage grows out of improvements, innovation and change
• Competitive advantage involves the whole value chain
• Competitive advantage is sustained only through relentless improvements
• Sustaining advantage demands that its sources be upgraded
• Sustaining advantage ultimately requires a global approach to strategy.
Furthermore, Porter (1990) asserted that companies should actively seek out
pressure and challenge rather than try to avoid them. In doing so he proposed that
companies ought to:
• Sell to most sophisticated and demanding buyers and channels
• Establish norms of exceeding the toughest regulatory hurdles or product
standards
• Treat employees as permanent
• Establish outstanding competitors as motivates (Porter, 1990).
As was mentioned earlier, although the assessment that follows is largely
impressionistic, the results were shown to the consultants that were included in the
sample of interviewees and their views were sought; in this way consensus on the
judgements was obtained.
6.3.1. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE GROWS OUT OF
IMPROVEMENTS, INNOVATION AND CHANGE
What is apparent from the interview material is that those foreign companies that
appear to be making some success out of their efforts to penetrate the Japanese
market have learned that it is necessary to innovate and be prepared to continue
doing so. For example, of those companies that were assessed as "High" in Table
6.2, both Amway and Avon Products had launched into an arena new to both and
which was also new to Japan: nutritional products. They were both bringing a
variety of new products to market. Bristol Myers was especially concerned with
maintaining an innovative edge, it was attempting to obtain its own Research and
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Development facility to ensure that the Japanese operation became independent of
the parent in this regard. This was mainly because, at the US end, their colleagues'
unfamiliarity with the Japanese market represented a buffer.
No matter how much explaining we do. We always feel they really
don't get it.
Tom Thomson — President
Consumer Products Group Japan and Korea
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
Coca Cola Japan, also rated High, had responded to opportunities that it had
identified in Japan and while it was often deliberately slower to enter new fields in
the market it had successfully developed a product portfolio quite unlike any other
within the Coca Cola world-wide organization. Its major product in the Japanese
market is canned coffee dispensed through vending machines— hot in winter and
cold in summer.
Eastman Kodak has invested in Japan with the express intent of developing its
innovative ability (Box 5.4). It saw itself as buying its way into the technological
community in Japan where it perceived many of the major world developments were
occurring. By so doing it envisaged that its worldwide innovative talents would be
enhanced. Only in that way would it be able to face off its competitors in other
markets. Gillette had effectively invested its future in the development of its Sensor
blade and was attempting to redress its position (in Japan it held only a minority
market share, it being dominated by Warner Lambert's Schick) by launching Sensor
in Japan immediately after the US launch, but before the European introduction and
a long time before launching it in any other Asian markets.
The relationship between competitive advantage with innovation and change was
clear from the successful experience of Nippon Lever. It had developed its position
with Timotei by queuing up a series of line extensions. In that way, it was able to
capitalize on the success of its newly developed brand awareness and fashionable
product concept. It responded to competitive threats by leveraging its traditional
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brands by introducing them in new formulations and formats.1 In that way it was
able to hold off its potential competitors.
Likewise, similar commitment to improvements, innovation and change was also
evident from the success that Procter and Gamble subsequently reaped in the same
sector with the introduction of its combined shampoo and conditioner concept:
Rejoy. Similarly, to hold its position in that category Nippon Lever was quick to
respond and utilize its Lux brand in the shampoo sector with the result that it
surpassed the previous success it had achieved with Timotei. On the other side of
the account it could be seen that P & G had suffered as a result of its own failure to
progress its diaper products quickly enough and thus became vulnerable to the
innovative activities of the Japanese competition. To restore its position required it
to develop four generations of improved Pampers products within eighteen months.
Nestle possessed a worldwide product policy to innovate on a product basis and
in this regard the Japanese market was no exception. Its aim was to provide the
Japanese consumer with something new. It has recently ventured into health foods
and leveraged its Swiss connections to develop its pasta business. Roily Doll Inc.
based its existence on being innovative, especially in the way that every item in its
range was carefully crafted and packaged to meet the nuances of taste presented by
the Japanese consumer.
1 For example Lux was translated from a bar soap into hair and body
shampoo as well as body lotion formats.
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Table 6.2 Companies Assessed for innovation priority
High Medium Low
Amway X
Avon Products Co. Ltd. X
Bristol-Myers K.K. X
Coca Cola (Japan) Co. Ltd. X
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd. X
Gillette (Japan) Inc. X
ICI Japan Limited X
Johnson & Johnson Japan X
Kohler Japan K.K. X
Levi Strauss Japan K.K. X
Heinz/Ore-Ida. X
McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. X
Nestle/Friskies K.K. X
Nippon Lever K.K. X
Philip Morris K.K. X
Procter & Gamble FE Inc. X
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Ltd. X
Revlon X
Roily Doll Inc. X
Smith Kline Beecham X
United Airlines. X
Levi Strauss, rated Medium, was not a major innovator in the Japanese market.
Its products originated in the US but it went to great efforts to adapt them well to
the Japanese market. This dedication to fine tuning promulgated the relocation of
its Asian Headquarters from Hong Kong to Tokyo. Also in the medium category
RJR management claimed it was an uphill struggle to persuade its US manufacturing
resource to gear up its standards to meet Japanese requirements. Where it was
innovative was in adapting its strategies area by area and conurbation by
conurbation. SKB (rated Medium) was also marketing products based on concepts
derived from other markets. Even on this "Medium" basis it had improved its
position from number 20 to 13th position in its key arenas over three years.
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However, continued improvement toward its stated aim of a top 10 placing may
require more bespoke innovation for the Japanese market.
Kohler was rated as having a low innovation priority because it was not
originating anything for the Japanese market. In some ways it typified the worst
approaches to international marketing. It had the number one product in the US and
assumed that there was a place for it in Japan. It did have something that was
different— pretty colours and different shapes that were not readily obtainable
through Japanese manufacturers. It also had some major minuses with unusual sizes
and eccentric (to the Japanese) installation methods, etc.
6.3.2. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE INVOLVES THE WHOLE
VALUE CHAIN
The value system is the entire array of activities employed in a product's
creation and uses, encompassing the value chains of the firm, suppliers, channels,
and buyers (Porter, 1990). The value chain is another name for the enterprise's
business system. The examination of individual "value activities" can result in an
improved understanding of existing or potential sources of advantage over
competitors. The value chain, encourages a company to break down the
competitive process into its various steps and then seek to add more value at each
step than the competitor does (Robert, 1991). Earlier it was indicated that the
business system involves two kinds of value activities: primary and support.
Primary activities are directly involved in the transformation of inputs into outputs
and in delivery and support after the sale. The typical business system has five
types of primary value activities: input logistics, operations, marketing and sales,
and service. Support activities maintain primary activities — as well as each other
— by procuring inputs, managing personnel, developing technology, and providing
general administrative functions.
As experience is gained with applying the value chain to a given company,
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successively finer disaggregations may be found to be appropriate for some
activities, while others may be safely combined (Reimann, 1989). Examining the
value chain shows how processes are linked and there are opportunities for quality
improvement by the examination of these linkages (Ballantyne, 1990).
Since this study was concerned primarily with marketing strategy insufficient
data was collected to make detailed comparisons of the overall value chains of the
sampled companies but the impression was gleaned that all of those companies were
attempting to be competitive in overall terms and in so doing were apparently
showing a high degree of commitment to maximizing their performance over the
entire value chain.
One element of the primary value activities that deserves special mention is the
extension of credit. This was a key tool in the marketing mix. In most cases
invoicing was done through the primary wholesaler who acts very much like an
agent of the manufacturer. That primary wholesaler actively supports the sale and
distribution of the manufacturers' products. Primary wholesalers have a network of
related wholesalers operating in a secondary role. The retailer is given pride of
place and appears to be served regardless of the cost. Wholesalers offer standard
stock holding, frequent delivery and credit financing and in turn expect extended
financing from its suppliers.
One way of adding value to the distribution operation has been the application of
information technology to speed up response and secure high levels of service as
efficiently as new technologies allow. As was mentioned in Chapter 5, there is
much talk of the emergence of Value Added Networks (VANs) in the distribution
context. These involve electronic reordering systems (EOS). Retailers participating
in these VANs, according to a March 1990, survey numbered about 43,000 in
1989, appear to have doubled (Asano, 1990).
The foreign MNCs in the sample were appearing to add value and establish
advantages against their Japanese counterparts by the application of marketing
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principles. The leveraging of these strengths may be regarded as a downstream
zone of the value chain.
Some examples follow of the thrusts the sampled companies were making on
various dimensions of their value chains: Amway and Avon Products (rated High)
were both evolving Japanese perspectives and product positionings then working
backwards to ensure that their suppliers understood their aims and were capable of
delivering the required packaging and product formats. Both companies were
leveraging their individualistic delivery systems.
Bristol Myers, as mentioned earlier, was negotiating with its HQ to get total
control of its R&D effort to be able to deliver more focused products to the
Japanese marketplace. Coca Cola was working synergistically with its bottler and
vending networks to put its varied product line "within arm's reach of thirsty
consumers." This synergy involved flows of information and ideas in both
directions— from and to its bottlers. This has resulted in a highly distinctive
product line with a character that reflected the requirements of the Japanese market.
Eastman Kodak was placing great store on becoming an integral part of the Japanese
scientific community and looking to these efforts as a source of new thinking and
ideas that could be fed into the worldwide corporation. Nestle/Friskies had always
been strong in the "in store" promotional area and was able to secure high levels of
co-operation from retailers of its products. In this way it enhances its value.
Nippon Lever scrutinized every aspect of its value chain. It questioned each
assumption no matter how fundamental it appeared. It this way it has achieved
major successes in its market sector.
Value chain efforts are not synonymous with total harmony of view between
suppliers and receivers, Levi Strauss had difficulty in getting its retailers to adopt its
financial and inventory control systems and found that flexibility was essential: in
some cases its policies were adopted by its distributors and in others Levi Strauss
was persuaded to adapt its ways to the Japanese mode. Roily Doll was thoroughly
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interconnected at all levels of its business value system whether they were suppliers
of ingredients for its cookie dough, furniture, or travel for its tours to Amish
country (see Box 5.10).
Table 6.3 Companies Assessed for value chain effort
High Medium Low
Amway X
Avon Products Co. Ltd. X
Bristol-Myers K.K. X
Coca Cola (Japan) Co. Ltd. X
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd. X
Gillette (Japan) Inc. X
ICI Japan Limited X
Johnson & Johnson Japan X
Kohler Japan K.K. X
Levi Strauss Japan K.K. X
Heinz/Ore-Ida. X
McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. X
Nestle/Friskies K.K. X
Nippon Lever K.K. X
Philip Morris K.K. X
Procter & Gamble FE Inc. X
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Ltd. X
Revlon X
Roily Doll Inc. X
Smith Kline Beecham X
United Airlines X
As an example of the Medium category Heinz/Ore-Ida (Box 5.7) offered a
largely American product line. It exhibited a strong US bias toward US business
approaches. Its efforts to deliver value were limited to leveraging its existing US
products in this foreign market and exploiting its US marketing expertise. Yet some
of its initiatives were successful, in particular its attempts at recruitment (poaching
from competitors) resulted in minimizing of training costs and an extension of its
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trade influence (Box 5.8). Its resistance to supermarket discounting practices was
accepted by the trade with the result that its retail selling price (RSP) was
maximized. Revlon was also assessed in the Medium category. This evaluation
was influenced by its lack of commitment to a positioning strategy. Revlon was
undecided whether to leverage its foreignness or adapt its approach to become more
Japanese; as a result it was to some extent finding itself "stuck in the middle"
(Porter, 1979). It is not possible to deliver the best value if it has not been
determined what value constitutes.
Kohler was assessed in the low category and as such it deviated from the overall
pattern. Its experience was that it was finding it difficult to nest in the Japanese
marketing system and as a result was unable to develop the added value that stems
from management of the value chain. It did not integrate its standards. Its
installation requirements were alien to Japanese plumbers. It demonstrated little
feel for the Japanese way of doing business. Its product was American and its
corporate management resisted adaptation to Japanese market demands.
6.3.3. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IS SUSTAINED ONLY
THROUGH RELENTLESS IMPROVEMENTS
There are few genuine competitive advantages that cannot be quickly emulated
by competition. Lower order advantages such as basic factor costs, company
procedures, proprietary technology, product designs are easily replicated. More
durable are such higher order advantages as brand image and the differentiation that
they can bring with consumer choice; in the Japanese context executives observed
that this characteristic was especially true. Japanese companies learn and react very
quickly indeed. Those foreign companies in the sample that were succeeding were
doing so by continuously searching for new ways to do things and for new things to
do. Often they met resistance from corporate headquarters in their quest. The
attitude that if it was good enough for their home markets then it should be good
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enough for Japan was pervasive, although progressive change was occurring by
market learning and the reverse education of headquarters people.
Table 6.4 Companies Assessed for relentless improvements
High Medium Low
Amway X
Avon Products Co. Ltd. X
Bristol-Myers K.K. X
Coca Cola (Japan) Co. Ltd X
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd X
Gillette (Japan) Inc. X
ICI Japan Limited X
Johnson & Johnson Japan X
Kohler Japan K.K. X
Levi Strauss Japan K.K. X
Heinz/Ore-Ida. X
McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. X
Nestle/Friskies K.K. X
Nippon Lever K.K. X
Philip Morris K.K. X
Procter & Gamble FE Inc. X
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Ltd X
Revlon X
Roily Doll Inc. X
Smith Kline Beecham X
United Airlines. X
Table 6.4 shows that most companies were gauged as showing the highest
concern for relentless improvement. Those that were not tended to demonstrate a
Medium level of dedication. It is worth repeating that these assessments can only
be impressionistic and in making any assessment care has to be taken to discriminate
between the efforts (self reported) that were being made by foreign management in
the Japanese market and their reported perceptions of headquarters response.
Moreover, headquarters responses might have differed had they been accessed.
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Of those noted above as having a Medium level of dedication to this issue,
Amway, for example, was constantly recruiting new distributors and streamlining
its distribution channel. Bristol Myers was ever examining the way that it
conducted its business and the management of that business within the context of its
JVs. Coca Cola was constantly monitoring opportunities and ever receptive to
suggestions and reports from its bottlers. RJR, was aware of the need to improve
overall performance but was also acutely aware of the uphill struggle to persuade its
colleagues in its US manufacturing plants of the necessity to upgrade quality. The
same was true for Nestle Friskies.
A lesser degree of concern was noted concerning Revlon, SKB and even less
with Kohler. Kohler by its own admission was unable to offer an adequate after
sales service. Whereas, before it started trading in a foreign market, a Japanese
operation would typically set up its service operation. And, in this foreign market
(Japan) Kohler is competing against Toto — the largest company of its kind in the
world — a company that dominates its home market with a 60% share.
6.3.4. SUSTAINING ADVANTAGE DEMANDS THAT ITS SOURCES
BE UPGRADED
Competitive advantage can grow out of any activity in the value chain of the
enterprise (Porter, 1990). As was mentioned in 6.3.3, lower order advantages such
as basic factor costs, company procedures, proprietary technology, product designs
are easily replicated. Higher order advantages such as brand image are more
durable. More durable competitive advantages usually depend on possessing
advanced human resources as well as internal technical abilities. Differentiation
strategies based on high product quality with advanced features and high service
followed by a continuous stream of product innovations are likely to be more
successful than cost based strategies. To sustain advantage companies are advised to
upgrade their advantages as quickly as is feasible (Porter, 1990).
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Table 6.5 Companies Assessed for
upgrading sources of competitive advantage
High Medium Low
Amway X
Avon Products Co. Ltd. X
Bristol-Myers K.K. X
Coca Cola (Japan) Co. Ltd X
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd X
Gillette (Japan) Inc. X
ICI Japan Limited X
Johnson & Johnson Japan X
Kohler Japan K.K. X
Levi Strauss Japan K.K. X
Heinz/Ore-Ida. X
McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. X
Nestle/Friskies K.K. X
Nippon Lever K.K. X
Philip Morris K.K. X
Procter & Gamble FE Inc. X
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Ltd X
Revlon X
Roily Doll Inc. X
Smith Kline Beecham X
United Airlines. X
An example of a company in the High category is Bristol Myers. To upgrade its
advantages it has continued to invest to strengthen its position — often at the urging
of its JV partner Lion. Yet on its own initiative it is pressuring to instate an
independent R&D facility in the Japanese market. This is seen to be necessary
because almost every product has to be reformulated to meet Japanese standards.
For example, BM is not permitted to use the same dyes as it does in the US. Semi
permanent dyes for hair colouring products are not permitted. Virtually any new
product introduced from the US has to be reformulated. Although some products
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were "grand fathered" in, that is to say that when the Japanese established new
standards they took cognizance of products already on the market and accepted
certain dyes. In that way they are "grand fathered" into the regulations. Very little
in the way of new products developed in the US today would be permitted.
I can't think ofanything that does not have to be reformulated.
Tom Thomson - President Consumer Products Group Japan and
Korea
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
There can be nothing fixed about these classifications. For example Procter and
Gamble was categorized as Medium in this regard because of its history of
"dumping" US originated product into the market with the result of gifting the
diaper opportunity to Kao and Unicharm. However, it subsequently learned from
its failings and no doubt would behave differently given a second run at the market.
Revlon is graded as Medium largely because on its own admission it failed to move
quickly enough to obtain and create sufficient numbers of foreign products to meet
the demand from Japanese department stores.
Shiseido and Kanebo have lost a significant share of the department
store primarily because the stores want foreign brands in their
cosmetic departments. Foreign brands now probably represent 60%
of the market. We didn't do it well enough.
Paul Hughes, President
Revlon
As with any market, companies were limited by the availability of higher order
resources. For example, the Japanese market is the largest single market for
external sanitary protection. Yet J&J (graded Medium), despite being the world
leader in the external sanitary protection business has no position in Japan
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Ourfailure to crack the sanitary protection market here is largely a
result ofnot having tried, rather than not having had the right
products. We always felt that there were other opportunities to be
pursued more profitably than that. It's always been a frustration to
us that this is the largest unit market in the world.
Kneale Ashwell
Chairman —Johnson & Johnson Japan Inc.
It is worth repeating that the companies in the sample were in the main
successful. Hence it is not surprising that they almost all warranted a High or
Medium rating. The exception was Kohler. However it would be unfair to suggest
that everything was wrong about that company. It was going through an investment
stage having changed its marketing approach which had hitherto been by way of
sole distributors in Japan. This previous arrangement had achieved small volume
with commensurably small profits. Since setting up its own affiliate, its sales had
increased little, its costs had increased dramatically and the company had become
extremely unprofitable. Yet it was attempting to grapple with the "step function"
(Lipsey, 1963) and should be given recognition for doing so. Having made that
point the company was not bullish about its advantages nor did it have any major
initiatives in play to upgrade any it may have had.
Kohler must decide which opportunities it is going for and determine
where those opportunities lie and how it can minimize the hurdles in
its way and that's really the phase it is at now. What do we have to
offer this market ifanything. How should we go about promoting
and selling it. We should have done this earlier.
Whatever criteria you are using to describe success, Kohler wouldn 7
get into many of them. Not even into an awareness measure. In
certain segments it would but they would be architects and designers
for example. At the consumer level zero.
Kenneth G. Boston, President
Kohler Japan K. K.
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6.3.5. SUSTAINING ADVANTAGE ULTIMATELY REQUIRES A
GLOBAL APPROACH TO STRATEGY
An enterprise cannot sustain competitive advantage in international competition
in the long run without exploiting and extending its home-base advantages with a
global approach to strategy. A global approach augments home based advantages
and helps counter home-base disadvantages (Porter, 1990). Advantages drawn from
a global network add to home-based advantages and make them more endurable.
Scale advantages from distributing globally may allow a higher rate of R & D
and/or international brand development.




Avon Products Co. Ltd. X
Bristol-Myers K.K. X
Coca Cola (Japan) Co. Ltd X
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd X
Gillette (Japan) Inc. X
ICI Japan Limited X
Johnson & Johnson Japan X
Kohler Japan K.K. X
Levi Strauss Japan K.K. X
Heinz/Ore-Ida. X
McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. X
Nestle/Friskies K.K. X
Nippon Lever K.K. X
Philip Morris K.K. X
Procter & Gamble FE Inc. X
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Ltd X
Revlon X
Roily Doll Inc. X
Smith Kline Beecham X
United Airlines. X
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While it may be true that the adoption of a global approach to strategy may
confer advantages that may be translated into other markets, this process is often
unidirectional and it does not follow that what has been learned in a global context
would confer advantage in every market. This is very true in the Japanese context.
According to the reports from foreign business people in Japan, the Japanese market
is one in which it often appears more possible to acquire exportable learning than to
import lessons learned elsewhere. While some of the above companies have been
allocated to the high category, it does not necessarily represent a positive
evaluation, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
Although Amway and Avon have benefited by adopting a global approach to
their strategies, it has been Kohler's (graded High) undoing. Bristol Myers has
made its strategy more bespoke to Japan and has also achieved a high degree of
success. However the result of funding of R&D from its global presence has
ensured that many of its brands exist.
No attempt will be made to interpret degrees of success since few companies
have started equally and the competitive situations that they met in their respective
arenas differ. Procter and Gamble (graded High) has suffered because of its
attempts to adopt a global approach whereas its key competitor Unilever (graded
Medium) was more inclined to design approaches for the Japanese market. Roily
Doll Inc. was graded Medium and was hugely successful in Japan. Its attempts to
become more global were largely embryonic and linked to initiatives by the Seibu
department store to develop stores outwith Japan. An essential ingredient of
achievement appears to be "glocalization" (Peak, 1991), whereby international
conglomerates are able to take advantage of local expertise and apply their imported
expertise accordingly. These issues of globalization versus adaptation are dealt with
in greater detail later in this chapter in the context of the Quelch and Hoff (1986)
framework.
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6.3.6. SELL TO MOST SOPHISTICATED AND DEMANDING
BUYERS AND CHANNELS
Knowledgeable and demanding consumers will stimulate speedy improvement
from suppliers because they set standards for the enterprise to reach. The ability to
satisfy such groups of consumers avails the enterprise of the ability to choose which
standards of product to offer in other markets (Porter, 1990). To that extent all the
sampled companies were selling to what are arguably the most sophisticated buyers
in the world— the Japanese consumer. In so doing they were learning lessons that
could potentially aid their parent organizations in a world wide context.
When I first came here, Japanese looked on imported goods as being
ofhigher quality than Japanese products. They were therefore more
critical than they were perhaps towards their own domestically
produced product. But in the twenty odd years that have elapsed in
the meantime it's interesting to see that the situation has been
reversed. The Japanese expect a higher level ofquality from their
own products.
Kneale Ashwell
Chairman —Johnson & Johnson Japan Inc.
Most of the sampled companies cited instances of learning, viz.: Procter and
Gamble received a severe lesson in the necessity of offering only superior quality,
Bristol Myers discerned that success could be reaped from US originated products
provided that proprietary brand positionings could be established, Coca Cola learned
that it was necessary to develop unique product concepts. Levi Strauss learned that
it was essential to fine tune its styling. Nippon Lever discovered it was necessary to
establish mastery of the value chain, especially downstream marketing activities.
The same was true of Nestle. In its pet foods' business it deduced that that its
"flexible formulation" method of production could not be applied readily to product
that it shipped to Japan (Box 5.11). Batches of product had to be re-graded and
carefully selected to minimize appearance variation. McDonald's determined that it
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was wise to listen to the Japanese consumer, as a result it introduced new products
and adjusted its world-wide menus as a result of this input.




Avon Products Co. Ltd. X
Bristol-Myers K.K. X
Coca Cola (Japan) Co. Ltd. X
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd. X
Gillette (Japan) Inc. X
ICI Japan Limited X
Johnson & Johnson Japan X
Kohler Japan K.K. X
Levi Strauss Japan K.K. X
Heinz/Ore-Ida. X
McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. X
Nestle/Friskies K.K. X
Nippon Lever K.K. X
Philip Morris K.K. X
Procter & Gamble FE Inc. X
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Ltd. X
Revlon X
Roily Doll Inc. X
Smith Kline Beecham X
United Airlines. X
There were examples of wider organizational learning from participation in the
Japanese market. Kohler, for example, (graded Medium) was exporting the impetus
to fuse electronics with its traditional plumbing products.
390
At one time we had significant product advantage —about 10 years
ago — but it has been eroded rapidly. And in some areas we are at
a distinct disadvantage. Many Japanese companies have introduced
electronics into plumbing products. To such an extent they are
almost unrecognizable to an American audience. Americans
[Kohler's US management] understand this and they are trying to
catch up.
Kenneth G. Boston, President
Kohler Japan K. K.
Heinz Ore-Ida, graded Low, appeared to learn little that was of value to its
parent that was of use elsewhere. Although it did acquire a rich store of
information about what could and could not be achieved in the Japanese market.
This statement is in no way intended to denigrate that company. Its management
questioned many of the fundamentals and conventional wisdom about doing business
in Japan and successfully secured change in its distribution arrangements and
marketing practices at retail level.
6.3.7. ESTABLISH NORMS OF EXCEEDING THE TOUGHEST
PRODUCT STANDARDS
Tough regulatory standards are not a hindrance but an opportunity to upgrade
products and processes. Older models can be sold elsewhere (Porter, 1990). In
Japan the standards expected by the consumer and set by competitors are of the
highest standard; in the interviews, executives generally showed a high degree of
recognition of the importance of this issue
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Table 6.8 Companies meeting toughest standards
High Medium Low
Amway X
Avon Products Co. Ltd. X
Bristol-Myers K.K. X
Coca Cola (Japan) Co. Ltd. X
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd. X
Gillette (Japan) Inc. X
ICI Japan Limited X
Johnson & Johnson Japan X
Kohler Japan K.K. X
Levi Strauss Japan K.K. X
Heinz/Ore-Ida. X
McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. X
Nestle/Friskies K.K. X
Nippon Lever K.K. X
Philip Morris K.K. X
Procter & Gamble FE Inc. X
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Ltd. X
Revlon X
Roily Doll Inc. X
Smith Kline Beecham X
United Airlines. X
Mention has been made of Bristol Myers' attempts to grapple with the
differences in Japanese standards — both with consumer quality expectations and
regulatory constraints. Coca Cola operates in an arena that saw 1600 new soft drink
products launched during 1990. It carefully selects from this array and focuses its
resources on those that best match market standards of taste, packaging style and
distribution.
Most of the products that J&J sells, with the exception of Cotton Buds and
Reach Toothbrush are licensed by the Ministry of Welfare under Pharmaceutical
Affairs, so it has to have a product license just as it would for a pharmaceutical
product. J&J has learned to gear up its standards to meet both regulatory and
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consumer requirements — both of which are high.
Nestle/Friskies adapted its quality standards but struggled to win co-operation
from its Australian sourcing company. RJR cited how consumers would complain
about minor defects such as misalignment of the seams on the cellophane outer
packaging on cigarette cartons. ICI worked very closely with its customers in a
parallel development mode to determine what they wanted and simultaneously
develop it. Avon Products stressed the importance of Japanese influence on its
packaging standards and was beginning to share these ideas among its other
markets.
6.3.8. TREAT EMPLOYEES AS PERMANENT
When employees are treated as permanent, pressures are created that work to
upgrade and sustain competitive advantage. New employees are added with care
and continuous efforts are made to improve productivity to support competitive
advantage (Porter, 1990).
Most of the companies recognized the issue of staff recruitment and retention as
crucial to the development of their positions in the Japanese marketplace.
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Table 6.9 Companies citing concern for
staff recruitment and retention
High Medium Low
Amway X
Avon Products Co. Ltd. X
Bristol-Myers K.K. X
Coca Cola (Japan) Co. Ltd. X
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd. X
Gillette (Japan) Inc. X
ICI Japan Limited X
Johnson & Johnson Japan X
Kohler Japan K.K. X
Levi Strauss Japan K.K. X
Heinz/Ore-Ida. X
McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. X
Nestle/Friskies K.K. X
Nippon Lever K.K. X
Philip Morris K.K. X
Procter & Gamble FE Inc. X
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Ltd. X
Revlon X
Roily Doll Inc. X
Smith Kline Beecham X
United Airlines. X
Few of these companies espoused the goal of lifetime employment although none
adopted a hire and fire mentality. Kohler, the company that received more low
ratings than any other was particularly aware of the difficulties involved in staff
recruitment and retention. Kohler was pleasantly surprised at the people it was able
to attract.
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They come out ofcuriosity initially; they see the showroom which
looks attractive. It's interesting to work for a foreign company,
possible foreign travel, etc. That's what has caused them to look
further.
You don't have to have too many disadvantages these days to find
that you don't get any one at all; ifyou're too farfrom the station, if
the neighborhood is too industrial then females will not come. The
assembly ofall the factors is becoming more intense. More pressure
is put on rates, etc.
Kenneth G. Boston, President
Kohler Japan K. K.
According to interviewees, Japanese companies are building expensive
condominiums plus resorts in several areas to attract and retain staff. So for a
company that is entering the Japanese market it will never be able to attract the elite
from the best universities.
You 'll have to settle for second raters except maybe a first rater who
has somehowfallen off the track or is eccentric.
Kenneth G. Boston, President, Kohler Japan K. K.
6.3.9. ESTABLISH OUTSTANDING COMPETITORS AS
MOTIVATORS
Those competitors that most closely match the competitive advantages of an
enterprise or have exceeded them become the relevant standards of comparison
(Porter, 1990). As was shown in Chapter 4 Japanese competitors are among the
most formidable in the world. Time after time executives mentioned that learning
to compete prepares them to compete well anywhere else. Of the companies rated
High, Procter and Gamble recognized the salutary lesson it received from Kao and
Unicharm. Nippon Lever expressed the highest respect for Kao and other Japanese
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competitors. Bristol Myers had the highest praise for the quality standards of its
competitors and attempted to emulate them. Eastman Kodak's thrust into the
Japanese market was predicated on tracking and wrong footing its primary
competitor Fuji and gaining insight into the thinking of the Japanese technological
community (Box 5.4).




Avon Products Co. Ltd. X
Bristol-Myers K.K. X
Coca Cola (Japan) Co. Ltd. X
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd. X
Gillette (Japan) Inc. X
ICI Japan Limited X
Johnson & Johnson Japan X
Kohler Japan K.K. X
Levi Strauss Japan K.K. X
Heinz/Ore-Ida. X
McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. X
Nestle/Friskies K.K. X
Nippon Lever K.K. X
Philip Morris K.K. X
Procter & Gamble FE Inc. X
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Ltd. X
Revlon X
Roily Doll Inc. X
Smith Kline Beecham X
United Airlines X
Of those companies awarded a Medium rating, Gillette tended to be quietly
confident and tended to regard the untypically high market share of its competitor
Warner Lambert as an accident of history, that company having been approached by
an unknown untried distributor that subsequently was instrumental in helping
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develop its business in the Japanese market. Gillette's position was untypical
because its major competitor was another foreign company2. Heinz Ore-Ida tended
not to rate its competitors highly as they were ostensibly marketing similar products
as commodities and in so doing lacked its marketing flair. With the exception of
these two companies the sampled companies were inspired by the competitiveness of
their Japanese counterparts.
6.4. STANDARDIZATION VERSUS ADAPTATION
As was mentioned in the introductory paragraph to this chapter, the work of
Quelch and Hoff (1986) — a major work on this topic— has been drawn on to
classify and appraise the companies in the sample. As was mentioned briefly in
Chapter 2 they identified four dimensions of global marketing: business functions,
products, and marketing mix elements. The sampled companies are classified along
each of these dimensions according to the degree of standardization that is imposed
or the degree to which the companies have adapted their operating standards to the
Japanese context. These are depicted in Table 6.11 according to the coding listed in
Table 6.1.
2 Much of Gillette's lack of success was attributed to its clumsy handling of
distributor relationships.
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Table 6.11 — The Quelch and Hoff Framework Applied
Adaptation Standardization
Full Partial Partial Full
Business
Functions
















































































































































In many cases the following comments are cross referenced to other chapters
and boxes in which the context of the findings is fully represented.
6.4.1. BUSINESS FUNCTIONS
In this section the companies will be compared on the basis of research and
development, manufacturing and marketing. Where pertinent, comments will be
made about the companies. In some cases the classifications will be allowed to
speak for themselves.
6.4.1.1. Development
In the consumer products arena most of what is called Research and
Development (R&D) is primarily development work, for example Nestle
concentrates its basic research in two centres in Switzerland, but product
development is decentralized.
6.4.1.1.1. Adapted
Repeatedly in Table 6.11 we see evidence of Roily Doll demonstrating a higher
level of adaptation to the Japanese approach. At the outset it must be made clear
that this company is atypical for reasons other than its tendency to excel in the
Japanese market.1 While its founder Joseph Dunkle is an American, his company
1 See Box 5.10
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has been absorbed by the retailing group Seibu. He reports into the Seibu main
board along with other company presidents in the group. So, except that he is a
non Japanese and the concept is on the surface American; the company behaves in
many respects like any other Japanese company.
Of those companies portrayed as being partially adapted, Bristol Myers K.K. is
striving to achieve total R&D independence from its American parent. It is making
these efforts so it can maximize its flexibility in the Japanese market and respond to
market requirements without interference from its corporate parent. This it
perceives to be an absolute necessity for its future market development. Although
in their original article (Quelch and Hoff, 1986) Coca Cola was considered to have
standardized its methods much more than had Nestle, this study has revealed that
Coca Cola (Japan) has made tremendous strides to ensure that it is responding to
Japanese tastes, its R&D efforts had succeeded in giving Coca Cola (Japan)
Company's product line a very different complexion to its American parent or any
other operation in the group. Most of its revenue is being generated from canned
teas and coffees. Its number one brand is not Coca Cola but Georgia Coffee in
cans. These successes could be directly attributed to reading the market which, as
was discussed earlier, is heavily biased toward vending machine consumption, and
ensuring that the development efforts serve the opportunities that were identified2.
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd has established a major R&D facility3 employing
120 people, precisely to participate in the Japanese scientific and technological
community. Whereas, Nestle has been in the market for around one hundred years
and has become successful simply by harnessing ideas that emanate from various
domains in the international corporation4. ICI (Japan) is another example of a
foreign company that is attempting to Japanize itself. It has also established a
2 See Chapter 5
3 See Box 5.4
4 See Box 5.11
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major technical department with a planned establishment of 300 scientific and
development staff. The company is positioning itself as an international chemical
company based in Japan.
Even Levi Strauss Japan K.K. which outsiders would expect to produce a highly
standard product relocated in Japan to hire Japanese designers who would be better
equipped to respond to the subtleties of Japanese consumer tastes5. Nippon Lever
has demonstrated a vivid research based understanding of the Japanese consumer,
backed by a willingness to formulate all of its products to suit the requirements of
the Japanese market6. After painstaking research, the cod formula was rejected if
favour of pollack, the coating made less salty and the texture changed. The product
was launched as Fish Oh! Finger, Captain Birdseye became Captain Iglo, and Fish
Oh! Finger became a brand leader. On the other hand, its arch competitor Procter
and Gamble was rather slow to appreciate what many of its competitors took at face
value. However after much mistake making with its export to Japan of US
manufactured product, it has put new vigour into its Japanese development efforts7.
In particular it has been very aggressive in the way that it has improved its Pampers
product by sequentially introducing a succession of new product versions.
Amway and Avon Products have been classified as being partially standardized.
The majority of their products emanate from the United States. However in the
arena of personal care products their acquired knowledge of the Japanese consumer
has influenced Avon in particular to place selective emphasis on skin whitening
products and other Japanese consumer led items. Many of Johnson and Johnson
Japan's products also emanate from elsewhere in the group. Although in its earlier
days Johnson and Johnson Japan found it was an uphill struggle to persuade its
American parent to develop products in dedicated formats for the Japanese market,
5 See Box 5.1
6 See Box 5.14
7 See Box 5.13.
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the company is now much more responsive8, for example Reach toothbrushes are
made with a shorter handle with a hole. Also in the partially standardized
classification are McDonald's, Revlon and United Airways. McDonald's and
United Airways both have highly standardized products, although in each case some
efforts have been made to adapt to the Japanese consumer. The Japanese
opportunity evaluation was based on the recognition that the ingredients of the
product were common in the Japanese diet, it was the assembly of the ingredients
that differed. In fact some of McDonald's products have originated in Japan. Iced
coffee for instance is included on the McDonald's repertoire in many countries and
is thought by many consumers to be an American inspired item whereas it was
introduced as a result of Japanese initiatives. Moreover, while the restaurant
designs are influenced by the American model, the Japanese have had to work
within different structural constraints in so far as few Japanese restaurants are free
standing, as they are in the USA, and have to be incorporated into major property
developments. Similarly United Airways attempts to adapt its product and service
by fine tuning of menus based on in flight consumer research and a knowledge of
where consumers are travelling to and from.
6.4.1.1.2. Standardized
Gillette, Heinz, Kohler, Philip Morris, RJR and Smith Kline Beecham have
been classified as fully standardized in terms of Research and Development effort in
that few or no concessions were made to the Japanese market. Of these the least
successful was Kohler, a large American manufacturer of bathroom fittings. In this
market sector the major Japanese manufacturers led by Toto, the world's largest
manufacturer of such products, have successfully fused electronics with plumbing
products. However, Kohler was endeavouring to drive its Japanese business from a
8 An error also made by P&G, see Box 5.13.
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United States perspective and was finding it an uphill struggle with products that
were non standard and perceived to be backward. The managing director was in the
process of leaving the company and spoke of a total failure to understand the needs
of the Japanese market by the American board.
Gillette was marketing its standard products with only minimal consideration
having been given to the differences in Japanese facial hair growth and no plans
were in evidence for a bespoke Japanese initiative. Heinz has a standard product
and was operating in an export mode. It was also making no particular dedicated
Japanese development initiative. Philip Morris and RJR are marketing international
cigarette brands and by definition are somewhat standardized. They fit into the
partial category because they are undertaking some modification to tar formulations
for the Japanese market since the Japanese smokers are consciously reducing their
tar intakes. Both companies have to devise ways to ensure that Japanese quality
production emanates from a production system that has lower standards of tolerance
than their Japanese competition; whereas, on the consumer side of the Smith Kline
Beecham business is mainly marketing standard international brands such as
Aquafresh and thus the R&D effort is largely standard.
6.4,1.2. Manufacturing
In this section the sample companies are classified by the degree to which their
manufacturing has been adapted to the Japanese market or standardized globally.
6.4.1.2.1. Adapted
In manufacturing terms the company that had most fully adapted its
manufacturing process to meet the exacting demands of Japanese consumers was
Bristol Myers. The company president spoke of flawless production quality for
which it had to thank its JV partner Lion. Others such as Avon, Coca Cola,
Eastman Kodak and Johnson & Johnson had established its manufacturing
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operations for many years and had adapted well to the Japanese environment. Levi
Strauss, McDonald's, Nippon Lever, Procter & Gamble had also well established
manufacturing arrangements. Roily Doll and United were likewise well adapted.
Nestle/Friskies, ICI, and Revlon were coping with the process of adaptation but
only with some difficulties. They were however, successfully resolving their
problems.
6.4.1.2.2. Standardized
McDonald's were partially standardized in the sense that the structure of its
supply operation was influenced by the methods applied elsewhere but in Japan they
were customized to that market which is not to say they were particularly
Japanized. The distribution function is performed by a distribution company that in
turn was established by its bread supplier. Manufacturers supply to the distribution
company that operates separately from McDonald's, and the distribution company
marks up its suppliers selling prices by 20% and supplies the restaurants.
McDonald's revenues are a straight percentage of its restaurant revenues. While
there is only one distribution company, to spread supply risks it contracts out the
manufacturing of its major items such as the beef patties to two manufacturers and
appears to be operating successfully with this policy. Similarly, Amway confessed
its adherence to its US methods: it manufactures in the US and with its position as
the fastest growing (compound annual growth rated sales) foreign company between
1983-86 (Lacktorin, 1989), it is difficult to be too critical of its policies. Similarly
Heinz (Box 5.7) carved out a niche by importing US product, Philip Morris has
built a successful business by achieving a 60% share of the imported cigarette
sector, RJR is building its business around volume but struggling to ensure its
foreign production meets Japanese quality expectations. Smith Kline Beecham is
developing its position albeit with standardized manufacturing policies.
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6.4.1.3. Marketing
The marketing approaches of the sampled companies are classified according to
the degree of adaptation or standardization.
6.4,1.3.1. Adapted
Bristol Myers was fully adapted with its marketing efforts. During its
involvement in the Japanese market with its JV partner it had learned to adapt to the
Japanese way and had coped with the constraints of working with a JV partner.
Despite the often differing aims of the partners the marketing of this company was
set secure. Similarly Nippon Lever had succeeded in melding its expertise with its
understanding of the Japanese consumer and was able to adapt its international
product concepts to fit the Japanese marketing opportunities with uncanny skills; as
mentioned earlier Roily Doll was perhaps the most adapted of all companies.
Amway and Avon had both adapted their traditional geographical franchise
systems and were harnessing network marketing. In this way several different
agents or distributors could have been operating in the same territory but serving
different social groups or networks. Other than that, however, their concepts were
not broadly modified. What was altered was a recognition in both cases of the rich
opportunities that were presented by understanding the Japanese consumer well and
supplying the products she requires. Moreover, Coca Cola has a high profile
marketing and product planning group dedicated to identifying market trends as well
as gaining an appreciation of which concepts are worth investing in heavily. Coca
Cola (Japan) is sufficiently powerful that it has successfully applied a market
follower strategy and has been prepared to invest disproportionately to offset the
effect of its late entry into key new product categories (see Chapter 2). In other
words it has successfully picked up on trends that were in evidence in the market
and then refined and developed its own versions which it then supported with
massive advertising investment coupled with its distribution leverage.
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Eastman Kodak recognized the extent of the Japanese market opportunity and
has been prepared to invest heavily around the key arenas in which it foresees its
future9. Johnson and Johnson like many of the others has had a presence in the
market for 30 years and as a consequence has learned its lessons well. It has
brought its foreign based methods and carefully trained its Japanese staff to cherry
pick the best among Japanese and Western business systems. However its consumer
business really does not have the critical mass to compete on level terms with the
consumer giants such as Kao, Lion and Shiseido. In the consumer business there
are no patented processes or technological leads that are meaningful so Johnson and
Johnson concentrates its major marketing energies on the professional health care
arena. Hitherto, Levi Strauss attempted to operate from Hong Kong and export to
Japan by designing for the collective Asian consumer. This strategy was shown to
be too unfocused for the sophisticated Japanese market so it moved manufacturing
and marketing to Japan which provided the quality it required and a faster turn
around time from the product design stage to manufacturing and shipment into
retailing outlets.
Kohler, Heinz, McDonald's, Philip Morris K.K., Procter and Gamble Par East
Inc., RJR, Revlon, SKB and United Airlines were all partially standardized in their
marketing approaches. Kohler was operating at a low level of market achievement
as mentioned above. Heinz's systems and policies were based on US career
considerations. Its executives were "posted" to Japan for relatively short periods of
three years and were effective to some degree in introducing American approaches
in the market, but not without meeting some cultural obstacles en route10. In
Heinz's case it had productively introduced some US marketing orientation into
what was apparently a sleepy sector— frozen foods. It introduced branding into an
arena where commodity products prevailed (Box 5.7). Also, it identified its
9 See Box 5.4
10 See Boxes 5.7 and 5.8
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position as a premium priced outsider and communicated that position to the trade.
In so doing it avoided price wars, when the trade reduced prices it maintained its
differential and when prices increased the same was true. In other circumstances
such as recruitment it chose to ignore the need for trade consensus and adopted
more aggressive tactics11.
McDonald's is using similar marketing approaches in Japan as it is elsewhere.
Philip Morris K.K. and R.J.R. have also been classified as partially standardized.
They are marketing imported products in the main and have successfully applied
their standard style of thinking to the cigarette sector. However they have had to
adapt to many of the Japanese business mores. Recognition of the importance of
the trade in their sector is crucial as is the role of distribution per se, in particular
that of vending machines which tend to dominate the cigarette business. Procter
and Gamble also fit into this category of partial standardization. They have been
reluctant to move toward the Japanese way of doing things, mainly with negative
results. However it has latterly shown some signs of adaptation. Specific instances
will be cited below. Revlon, SKB, and United were operating their marketing
operations with little concession to their Japanese location and were succeeding
relatively well. Nevertheless Revlon was harnessing the property of being foreign
to its advantage.
6.4,1.4. Products
In this section the companies are rated corresponding to whether they were
dealing with products that had high or low cultural grounding. According to
Quelch and Hoff (1986), products with high cultural grounding require more
precise tailoring to the specific mores of individual markets and thus afford smaller
production runs and/or a reduction in the transfer of relevant skills and technologies
11 See Chapter 5 and in particular Box 5.8
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between those markets. Low culturally grounded products thus enable higher
efficiencies to be realized, the converse being true for high culturally grounded
products. All such judgements must of course be relative, there being no
immutable laws. Variation exists even within product categories. For example, in
the food sector, a category that is usually regarded as highly culture bound, haggis
may be culturally grounded to Scotland but hamburgers not so, which as a result of
the efforts to market them, are an international product. The same is true for sushi
and sashimi which at one time may have been culturally rooted to Japan but because
of a growing international exposure of these food products they are more widely
acceptable. Given time and effort a culture-bound food product such as suba
noodles may achieve international acceptability; similarly in the clothing sector
kimonos may be rooted in Japanese culture but men's shirts not so.
The use of the term "culture-bound" implies there is inertial resistance to change
because the beliefs and associations that prevail are highly central (Rokeach, 1968).
However such mores should be seen not as immutable obstacles but as fences,
which with effort can be cleared, as they have by many of these companies. In the
classifications that follow, a broad classification of the sample companies' products
has been attempted. It is admittedly impressionistic. Most of these companies have
many products, some of which are likely to be more culturally grounded than
others; so to forcibly highlight any differences the assessment has been restricted to
their most prominent lines.
6.4.1.4.1. LOW CULTURAL GROUNDING— HIGH ECONOMIES OR
EFFICIENCIES
Following the precepts of Quelch and Hoff (1986), it can be seen from Table
6.11 that several companies: Amway, Gillette, ICI, Johnson and Johnson, Levi
Strauss, Nippon Lever, Procter and Gamble and United Airlines were operating in
low culturally grounded sectors. It is worth repeating that this is a relative
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statement. For example Amway is engaged with home care, houseware, nutritional
products, gifts and personal care items. Most of these are American derived
concepts and have been shown by the success of this company to be capable of
marketing internationally without significant cultural obstacles. However, personal
care products may be more culturally grounded.
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd, the major world-wide photographic company has a
presence in a number of arenas including pharmaceuticals. Its main photographic
business involves products that are not culturally grounded but that is not to say that
the Japanese market does not manifest distinctive preferences. It demands more
vivid colours than its traditional markets.
Gillette (Japan) Inc. is a dominant player in the shaving and personal care
business. Its brands are international and consumption is relatively unencumbered
by cultural sensitivities. ICI Japan Limited is owned by the major British
chemicals' company, but positions itself as an international chemicals' company
operating in Japan. Its products are designed to meet technical and functional
specifications and have low levels of cultural grounding. Johnson & Johnson Japan
is a health care and consumer products company. It has 33% of the baby toiletries'
market, 10% of the adult lotion market, 32% of the adhesive bandage market, 10%
of the toothbrush market, and over 30% of the cotton buds' market. J&J like Levi
Strauss Japan K.K. the internationally famous manufacturer of denim jeans and
other fashion wear has had to overcome difficulties in the interpretation of its
concepts but neither have been daunted by problems of cultural grounding.
Nippon Lever K.K. an Anglo-Dutch owned MNC, is one of the world's largest
manufacturing concerns. Highly diversified, its business spans six primary product
groups — detergents (22% total sales), edible fats (20/%), food and drinks (18%),
frozen foods (12%), speciality chemicals (8%), others (10%). It has more than 500
operating companies in 75 countries. Its strategy is to establish high value adding
operations inside local markets and maximize responsiveness to the markets it
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serves. Its arch rival Procter and Gamble Far East Inc. manufactures and markets
and wide range of laundry and cleaning products, disposable paper products
including diapers, personal care products including pharmaceuticals. In Japan P &
G currently manufactures and markets a wide range of packaged consumer goods
including laundry and cleaning products, disposable paper products, personal care
and OTC items. It has 11 % of the Japanese dish soap market and has regained a
leadership position in the diaper business. While it has incurred cultural problems,
its mainstream products have found acceptance with Japanese consumers.
6.5.4.1.1. Adapted
Nippon Lever was making a great success out of translating and tailoring its
international product concepts into the Japanese setting12. Above all it is the care it
takes in interpreting the consumers' motives and translating its strengths into the
Japanese context which confers advantage. Levi Strauss, was taking great trouble
to adapt its product with fine points of design. In this way it was attempting to
fulfil the expectations of the Japanese consumer13.
6.5.4.1.2. Standardized
The majority of companies in the sample were in the category of partial
standardization. Amway was successfully marketing a product line that was
partially common across many of its markets, although it was sensitive to the need
to respond to particular Japanese opportunities and was introducing a range of
nutritional supplements, a growth area in Japan. In many instances it is true that
Johnson and Johnson are operating in some low culturally grounded areas, but it
also true that it shares some common ground with Bristol Myers. Therefore those
12 See Box 5.14.
See Box 5.1.
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comments made below about Bristol Myers apply in part to Johnson and Johnson
Japan. However many consumer products are standardized for good reason. For
example a decision which J&J considered making that involved adapting its Band
Aid product to make it smaller for the Japanese market would have involved many
hidden additional costs as J&J's machines were set up for high speed mass
production to meet fixed sizes that applied to most markets. That process is
inflexible would have required non standard machines with additional separate sets
of spares to be created and held, all adding to the cost of its Japanese operation.
That the McDonald's concept is so international is testimony to Quelch and
Hoff's (1986) low cultural grounding thesis. In this regard the company is highly
successful in marketing its product globally. In the Japanese setting the company
was doing so with only minor modifications to its standard product and those were
seen as adaptations of the international product rather than an attempt to Japanize.
Previous comments made concerning Philip Morris and RJR are equally applicable
to this heading.
It was precisely for reasons of inept standardization that Procter & Gamble
allegedly wrote off $300 million in its attempts to develop its market position in
Japan (Huddleston, 1991). It mistakenly attempted to foist US quality product on
the Japanese consumer, only to cede its position as the market leader to Kao and
Unicharm as the Japanese consumer retreated from the Pampers product in
droves14. Much more investment and development time were required to regain its
position as market leader. However Procter and Gamble Inc. is beginning to
benefit from its Japanese operations. By witnessing, at first hand, the launch of the
compact detergent with one quarter the weight and package size of its predecessors
that was a major success for its developer— Kao Corp. Both P&G and Nippon
Lever appraised the significance of this development. As a result of identifying
14 See Box 5.13
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products that were gauged as essential to success in the Japanese market, they both
moved swiftly to launch super concentrated detergent products in key European and
US markets.
6.4.1.4.2. HIGH CULTURAL GROUNDING— HIGH ECONOMIES OR
EFFICIENCIES
Avon Products is engaged with a similar portfolio to Amway — but with a
heavier concentration on cosmetics, and more recently has added nutrition and
personal care products. It is famous for its direct selling approach to distribution.
It too has been able to generate large sales volume without encumbrance by cultural
barriers. Coca Cola (Japan) Company Limited has won over 30% of the Japanese
soft drinks' business and avoided major cultural roadblocks. Besides acquiring the
pet food interests of Carnation, Nestle has 70% share of the Japanese instant coffee
market and 40% of the instant creaming powder market. The bulk of its
mainstream products is Western concepts and their very success in Japan is
testimony to Nestle's success in overcoming problems or demonstrating the
irrelevance of cultural grounding (Quelch and Hoff, 1986) problems. Roily Doll
Inc. owns a chain of "Aunt Stella's" cookie stores and has extended its rustic appeal
into furniture and travel.
6.4.1.4.3. Adapted
Roily Doll was the most fully adapted with its Japanized American cookie
concept. Coca Cola, while building on its international expertise was deriving
much advantage from the application of its product planning expertise to develop




Avon was in a broadly similar to the situation facing Amway— even to the
extent of introducing a range of nutritional supplements — although it was
modifying marketing mix elements to a greater extent as will be explained below.
Nestle operates in many fields in Japan and many of these are international product
concepts with little cultural grounding. Much of Nestle's success has stemmed
from the rapid growth of the instant coffee market, in which it was particularly well
positioned to take advantage with its Nescafe brand, but the coffee market has
become much more sophisticated, and that leaves Nestle with the problem of how to
differentiate itself in a market where single brands do not pack such power. In
some ways it appears that the coffee market in Japan has become too sophisticated
for Nestle's approach. Moreover, coffee now occupies a more important position
in the Japanese culture and Japanese companies such as UCC and Hario set the pace
and are now becoming major exporters of coffee and related items.
6.4.1.4.5. HIGH CULTURAL GROUNDING— LOW ECONOMIES OR
EFFICIENCIES
Only two of the companies were classified in this category, they were Bristol
Myers and Kohler; both of which were operating standardized policies. Bristol
Myers learned that the attitude toward analgesic application and usage was quite
different in Japan from its home market. The Japanese are less inclined to take
drugs orally and tend to favour therapeutic pads that are attached to the skin,
relying on osmosis to infuse the painkiller through the skin. Body pains are dealt
with by body rub lotions. This external treatment market is much larger than the
oral market. Oral analgesics are considered a radical treatment by Japanese. So, in
those instances when Japanese do take pharmaceuticals orally they are prepared to
tolerate higher levels of pain before resorting to a treatment that, to them, is
considered radical. Japanese consumers will take only the precise recommended
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dosage whereas the US market is built on the consumer practice of overdosing on
pills to solve the most minor of ailments. To develop the number one market
position with its Bufferin brand has required a great deal of cultural sensitivity on
behalf of Bristol Myers. The communications emphasis is based on safety and
reassurance rather than pain killing power.
Kohler's products— bathroom and plumbing wares— are to some extent
culturally bound. Japanese standards are different. Toilet seats and bowls are
smaller. As was mentioned briefly above, Japanese manufacturers are harnessing
electronics in their products with auto flushing electronic toilet seats and urinals.
Electronic toilet seats are big business in Japan. In comparison Kohler's US
product appears primitive.
6.4.2. MARKETING MIX ELEMENTS
In this section the elements of the marketing mix will be reviewed against the
Quelch (1986) framework highlighted in Table 6.11.
6.4.2.1. Product Design
Companies are now classified according to the degree which their product
designs are adapted to the Japanese context or standardized.
6.4,2.1.1. Adapted
Although the product concept— Aunt Stella's Cookies — is seemingly
American, it was designed for the Japanese market. Original recipes were adapted
to suit Japanese tastes and others invented. The business is a triumph of Japanese
packaging technology16. In certain aspects of product portfolio construction
Amway is standardized and Avon has moved in an identical direction to Amway.
16 See Box 5.10
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Avon claim that Amway followed it into the nutritional supplements' business.
Moreover, Avon has several dedicated Japanese products, including the Cleawhite
skin whitening products referred to above. Coca Cola (Japan) Company has
adapted its product line to suit Japanese tastes and distribution opportunities. It has
not modified its Cola products to suit Japanese taste preferences, nor is it believed
to be encumbered by not having done so.
In response to its market audit, Ore-Ida reduced the size of its product to one
third of the US standard size (in other words from 900g to 300g). All the
packaging data was translated into Japanese and the product modified primarily in
terms of its salt content. The Heinz approach was to highlight the superior nature
of its product, emphasizing that it could be prepared in a toaster oven instead of
with messy deep-fat frying; it then charged a price premium.
While the format of jeans is particular well defined, Levi Strauss have sought to
refine the design of its product to match Japanese tastes, size and shape
requirements.
Although McDonald's have operated to the overall standardized restaurant
design format it has successfully incorporated a singularly Japanese demure
ambience in many of its outlets. Nippon Lever is essentially marketing
international brands but it researches the consumer mercilessly and reformulates to
fit its brands into the structural constraints of Japanese living and repositions
according to consumer demands. As was mentioned by the Chairman of Nippon
Lever, the consumer frequently sleeps within smelling distance of her kitchen
surfaces and prefers tangy citrus fragrances. Such research based findings are
leveraged to the hilt in Nippon Lever's product formulations. As a result of
difficulties it met, Procter and Gamble have also accepted the precondition that
products must be formulated for Japan. Its diaper product has been forced through
several phases of development. Similarly, to fine tune its service, United Airlines
attempts to research its flying customers to assess reaction to "in flight" menu items
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and magazines it offers.
6.4.2.1.2. Standardized
Avon, Bristol Myers, Eastman Kodak (Japan) and Nestle were considered to be
partially standardized with their product design. As mentioned above, Amway has
adapted its product line to capitalize on a growing trend toward nutritional
supplements. However the bulk of its product line was based on international
formulations. Bristol Myers has achieved its market position not so much by
changing the formulation of its products but rather by attending to quality
considerations. The President of Bristol Myers K.K. commented that the Japanese
Bufferin product is probably superior in quality terms to the US product and that
the US product is flawless. Eastman Kodak (Japan) suffered because of its lack of
sensitivity to the Japanese market. It is relatively recently that Japanese packaging
was introduced, however it has made great strides recently17.. The Kodacolor Gold
product was formulated to meet Japanese tastes before being marketed in the rest of
the world. Apparently the Japanese prefer more gaudy colorations to consumers in
the US and Europe. This was one instance of where Japanese market considerations
represented the tail that wagged the dog that was the rest of the world.
Nestle have made few concessions with product formulations in many product
areas but some in others. Its primary skills are in positioning and promotion.
Where it has found it necessary to compromise is with product quality. This is an
especially acute problem in the pet food business because they traditionally work on
flexible formulations which means they modify the ingredients that go into the
product according to a set of pre-defined formulations, depending upon what offal
is available on a given day. However, the Japanese pet owner expects a pet food
product to look the same and smell the same irrespective of commodity market
17 See Box 5.4
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prices. Revlon is in a somewhat different situation. Its evaluation is that foreign is
a positive factor. Its president talked of conflict between himself wanting to
Japanize its products while his Japanese staff insisted that foreignness had more
cachet.
Smith Kline Beecham was making its way by making only minor concessions
toward adaptation; it was not giving much dedicated focus to the Japanese market at
all. Japan is classified as part of "Rest of the World" in terms of its operating
businesses. In its 1989 accounts Japan warrants a short entry: "Consumer Brands
starts with a sound base in Japan, especially in OTC medicines with Contac and oral
health care Aquafresh."
Gillette, Kohler, Heinz, Philip Morris and RJR are classified as fully
standardized. Its products and brands are designed elsewhere to meet a myriad of
market situations and thus they tend to suffer from a lack of focus. In Japan,
Gillette, for example, is a minor player to Warner Lambert's Schick brand, a
situation that is reversed in almost every other world market. Kohler's situation
was discussed in the previous section. Heinz unashamedly markets standardized
brands in Japan with a degree of success. However, Philip Morris requires a
special mention here. It does not market its major brand Marlborough in Japan.
This was licensed to JT many years ago when the market was closed to imported
products. Although, some years back Philip Morris bought the Lark brand from
Liggett, and, that brand had been nursed and developed with the Japanese market in
mind. Today Lark is a major force in the imported sector.
6.4.2,2. Brand Name
It is necessary to preface this section with a few comments on branding in Asia.
It is common for international brands to be given "local" names that are sometimes
merely transliterations of the international brand name sound, and on other
occasions new names are constructed that optimize the similarity of sound yet
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embody favourable meanings and connotations. What is at issue here is not that
process but whether branding decisions are taken in the market and to what degree
standardization applies.
The Roily Doll brand name Aunt Stella was determined with the Japanese
market opportunity in mind. The remainder are merely standardized brand names
offering in parallel, in a number of cases, a transliterated version of the
standardized brand. These transliterations would commonly be used on the
Japanese packaging format and in the advertising. However this is not universally
so, especially in those instances of where foreignness is held to be positive, e.g.,
Revlon.
6.4.2.3. Product Positioning
The approaches that the sampled companies adopted toward product positioning
are classified according to the degree that they are standardized or adapted.
6.4.2.3.1. Adapted
Bristol Myers K.K. and Roily Doll stand out as those companies that have
adapted their positionings to suit the Japanese market context. Bristol Myers K.K.
for instance has read the way that consumers perceive the use of analgesics and
reacted carefully by maintaining a consistent positioning based on safety for its
Bufferin brand. Similarly with its Sea Breeze product — an alcohol rub with no
proprietary properties — it has entrenched its association with sun bathing and
water sports. The product is used mainly by males to splash on for its cooling
effect after being in the sun. Competitors have copied the product but Bristol's
position appears unassailable. Yet again, the Roily Doll positioning was developed
for the Japanese market.
Amway, Avon, Coca Cola (Japan) and Nestle have demonstrated their abilities
to reposition their brands in accord with opportunities presented by the market.
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Similarly, Levi Strauss, McDonald's, Nippon Lever, and Philip Morris have
demonstrated a comparable level of prowess in this regard. Levi Strauss state that
Levi's jeans are about American heritage and by stating that it is the inventor of the
jeans, it makes a proprietary statement. McDonald's stresses quality, service,
friendliness, low cost nutrition and value and Nippon Lever adjusts all of its
positionings to suit precisely defined target consumer segments. Philip Morris has
consistently established a clear positioning for its Lark brand, having successfully
steered its transition from full flavoured to one based on mildness. Lark is now the
major imported brand.
P&G may have been the first company to market disposable diapers, very
quickly dominating what was a small market, its vision however, was limited.
Originally, the company viewed the product for usage on special occasions and
distress situations only. Competitors such as Kao and Unicharm quickly analyzed
the product and found that it did not perform well in two important situations—
during outings and overnight. These competitors then introduced better fitting,
more compact, super absorbent polymers designed for the Japanese baby; and
positioned them accordingly. Mothers responded positively to the new products,
because they were tailored to the Japanese setting. The net result was virtually 100
per cent penetration of the diaper market by disposables. Procter and Gamble was
slow to respond but eventually adapted its positioning. Revlon is pursuing its
foreign positioning with success. Foreign cosmetics' brands are eagerly sought
after by Japanese depato cosmetic buyers.
6.4.2.3.2, Standardized
Eastman Kodak (Japan), Gillette, Johnson & Johnson Japan, Heinz and United
Airlines are operating with various degrees of success with partially standardized
positionings. It is dangerous to over generalize since these companies have wide
product portfolios; however some examples can be offered. Eastman Kodak has a
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very wide product portfolio (see Appendix) but is offering standard photographic
benefits to Japanese consumers. Gillette has been much less successful than its
junior rival Schick which holds most of the Japanese wet shaving market. Heinz
has successfully standardized its quality positioning in the frozen foods' arena (Box
5.7), and United Airlines talks about routes, networks hubs and gateways as it does
elsewhere. Kohler showed the highest degree of standardization but was struggling
in the marketplace.
6.4.2,4. Packaging
Japanese packaging has had a long and prestigious history. The department
store wrapping often means more than the gift that is inside. In this regard the
packaging of a foreign consumer product needs to undergo restructuring.
6.4.2.4.1. Adapted
Nippon Lever and Roily Doll were the most adapted on this important criterion
of packaging, but for different reasons. Nippon Lever had studied product usage
and attitudes to the finest degree. Many of its soap products such as Lux find much
of its purchases are made in the gifting seasons. Apparently many gifts are given
and recycled, i.e., passed on as gifts to others. They are stored between gift giving
seasons and thus require a much longer shelf life than in the West. Packaging has
to be sealed perfectly to inhibit fragrance loss. Roily Doll exemplifies the Japanese
preoccupation with elegant packaging. Many of its product sales are linked to gift
giving and are rendered in a variety of gifting forms. Avon, for example, was
proud of the fact that its Japanese packaging was superior to anything anywhere else
in its worldwide network.
Those considered to be partially adapted were: Bristol Myers K.K., Coca Cola
(Japan), Eastman Kodak (Japan), Johnson & Johnson (Japan), McDonald's, Procter
and Gamble Far East Inc., Revlon and SKB. All of these companies are
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particularly attentive to detail in their Japanese packaging.
6.4.2.4.2. Standardized
Amway, Nestle, Gillette, Johnson and Johnson, Heinz, Smith Kline Beecham,
and United Airlines were partially standardized. What they shared was that their
standards were high and that they are up to date with the most sophisticated trends
in world wide packaging technology. Kohler was the most standardized.
6.4.2.5. Advertising Theme
In this section the topic of translating copy and message is not dealt with, what
is, is the evolvement of communications strategies that address the Japanese market
as opposed to being part of a standardized global campaign. For example a major
advertising campaign — Visa International — handled by one of the companies
interviewed BBDO/ASATSU has common elements everywhere except Japan. Its
international theme of "Everywhere you want to be..." uses exotic locations to
confer emotional appeal by associating the product with aspirational settings. That
is valid in many markets where such cards are also credit as well as charge cards.
However the situation in Japan is different where cash transactions are more popular
and cards have not so far been issued with rolling credit. While the use of such
cards is acceptable for travelling they are not largely acceptable for domestic use.
So, the Visa creative approach was adapted in Japan to demonstrate that the use of
Visa opens up a more vibrant life style. It worked by depicting a restaurant on a
boat in Kyoto that was juxtaposed on another shot of a yacht sailing around
Manhattan looking at the island from a new perspective. In this way two core
Japanese values were harnessed: the pleasure of fine food and experience of the
unusual with the message "Whether at home or in New York, Visa is the key to a
more vibrant life style."
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6.4.2.5.1. Adapted
The most well adapted advertising themes were those of Bristol Myers, Nippon
Lever and Roily Doll. In each case they were so well adapted because they were
carefully developed considering knowledge of the consumer together with a
carefully constructed plan of what the companies could attempt to achieve with their
advertising. One departure in practice that occurs in Japan is that the Japanese
consumer is not merely interested in brands, he/she is also concerned about the type
of company that produces those brands. As a consequence the major brand
advertisers such as Unilever and Procter & Gamble actually tag their TV
commercials with their corporate logos and a line which says..." a product from
Nippon Lever", etc. Moreover, Nippon Lever's advertising themes are bespoke for
Japan stressing dedicated positionings that have meaning for Japanese consumers as
demonstrated by their marketing research.
Amway and Avon are partially adapted. The former places much emphasis on
event management such as the sponsorship of the arts. Coca Cola and Nestle are
also partially adapted with campaigns evolved purely for the Japanese market.
Nestle has successfully run the same campaign for its Nescafe brand since 1967.
The campaign, developed by its agency McCann-Erickson Hakuhodo called "City
of the World" concentrates on marketing the culture that surrounds the product. In
establishing that this was the most warranted campaign at the outset and consistently
stressing the same idea has been partly responsible for Nestle winning a 70 per cent
market share in the sector. On the pet food side of the business, Nestle has
successfully utilized its understanding of pet owning consumers and communicated
to them in a tone of voice that regards the pet as a member of the family.
McDonald's offers a mixture of theme and tactical advertising just as it does in
many other markets. Heinz's thrust is educational and stresses the quality features
of its products. Philip Morris uses its advertising freedoms aggressively as does
RJR.
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A factor that Levi Strauss changed on its move to Japan was its consumer
communications — they started to advertise its unique heritage by stating that they
were the original inventors of jeans in 1850. Previously they were using life style
advertisements. By consulting the Japanese consumer it learned that it could have
removed the Levi's logo and replaced it with that of one for a competitive product
and it would have worked perfectly well. Since 1978, the advertising that Levi
Strauss Japan K.K. has produced is quite specific to its heritage, its origins and the
origins of jeans in particular18. Revlon stressed its foreign connection but did so
deliberately.
6.4.2,5.2. Standardized
Gillette and United Airlines showed the highest levels of standardization in this
category. Gillette had recently launched a major new brand Sensor using creative
approaches that originated in the US. United Airlines diligently submitted creative
and copy
6.4.2.6. Advertising Copy
Theme is one thing, copy another. Common advertising themes may be made
more specific by adjusting the copy strategy.
6.4.2.6.1. Adapted
Amway, Avon Products Co. Ltd, Bristol Myers K.K., Nestle, Nippon Lever,
Philip Morris and Roily Doll were fully adapting their copy to the Japanese context.
Coca Cola (Japan), Eastman Kodak, Johnson and Johnson and Kohler were less
adapted, relying upon headquarters and or international advertising agency input to
some degree. The same was true of Levi Strauss (Japan), Heinz, McDonald's,
18 See Box 5.1
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Procter and Gamble, RJR, and Revlon.
6.4.2.6.2. Standardized
Gillette, ICI and United Airlines were the most standardized in this respect. All
the companies were interfacing with advertising agencies in Japan and were able to
greater and lesser extents influence treatments and tactics even when international
advertising campaigns were being implemented. The impression was gleaned that
the degree of latitude that was given, was linked, among other things, to the amount
of perceived Japanese expertise that existed in the subsidiary company which in turn
was a function of the amount of time and experience that executives had gained in
the Japanese market.
6.4.2.7. Pricing
Pricing decisions were most devolved in Avon, McDonald's, Nippon Lever, and
Roily Doll. Having made that point, it is important to highlight that there is always
a tension between the returns that subsidiary companies are yielding and their
freedom to operate pricing strategies that maximize their longer term market
development potential given that long term profitability tends to follow the
expensive acquisition of market share.
Amway, Bristol-Myers K.K., Coca Cola (Japan), Eastman Kodak (Japan),
Nestle, ICI, Kohler, Levi Strauss Japan K.K., Philip Morris, Procter and Gamble,
RJR, Revlon, SKB and United Airlines were all partially adapted in pricing terms.
Bristol-Myers was often forced to adapt as a result of its JV relationship since the
partner Lion was insistent in growing the business and constantly arguing for
investing in greater market penetration by holding down prices. Coca Cola (Japan)
was returning more profits than the American corporation and was thus allowed a
large degree of freedom how it ran its affairs, pricing being only one of many
policy latitudes. Eastman Kodak (Japan) was charged with the remit to develop the
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market and its pricing strategies were not subject to detailed overseeing by the
parent in Rochester. Nestle maintained a great degree of autonomy as to its pricing
policies. The same was true of Levi Strauss Japan K.K., its headquarters company
was more interested in returns and progress rather than the mechanics of how it was
achieving them. The same was theoretically true of Philip Morris K.K. and Procter
and Gamble Far East Inc. but in the latter case after writing off approximately
US$300 millions the Japanese company offers a great deal of explanation on points
of detail, whether Cincinnati requests them or not. R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Tobacco
Company Limited operates on a similar basis to Procter and Gamble. It has
received massive influxes of investment and its management tries very hard to
ensure that the details of its plans are blessed by its parent. United Airlines fits this
pattern also.
Revlon and Smith Kline Beecham are slightly looser in their reporting of detail.
Their corporate style tends to be "hands off" unless problems arise.
6.4.2.8. Distribution
The approaches of the sampled companies toward distribution are now classified
according to the degree to which they are adapted or standardized.
6.4.2.8.1. Adapted
Bristol-Myers K.K., Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd, Nestle/Friskies K.K., Johnson
& Johnson Japan, Nippon Lever K.K., Roily Doll Inc. are all operating through
traditional distribution channels. In Bristol-Myers K.K. case it has bought into the
traditional channel via its JV partner Lion. It was part of Eastman Kodak (Japan)
Ltd.'s declared strategy to control its distribution direction. Nestle has had over
100 years of operating in Japan to develop its connections although it is during the
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last twenty years it has leveraged its connections to the full19. Johnson & Johnson
Japan has forged close relationships with the trade and places a great deal of
emphasis on trade relationships. The same is true of Nippon Lever K.K. The
Chairman and President of the company spend much time being seen to care about
cementing relationships with their major wholesalers. Since they are dealing direct
with over 2000 wholesalers the amount of individual attention they can give must be
slight. When Coca Cola (Japan) Company Limited, entered the Japanese market, it
built on its proven method of using bottle delivery trucks, that was a concept new to
Japan. However they skilfully organized it to fit with the Japanese way of doing
business. It set itself up as a franchiser which did not involve itself directly in
sales. The bottling company that franchised the Coke business became its sales arm.
These companies do the bottling and sell the product direct to restaurants and
retailers via its bottle delivery trucks. The bottlers are all independent companies in
which Coca Cola has made no direct investment.
Heinz, ICI Japan Limited, Kohler Japan K.K., Levi Strauss Japan K.K., Procter
and Gamble Far East Inc., R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Tobacco Company Limited,
Revlon, Roily Doll Inc., Smith Kline Beecham are all partially adapted. They all
look more toward the Japanese way of achieving distribution than they look back
toward home country models. Levi Strauss Japan K.K. is attempting to work
within the traditional system20 but attempting to fuse its standard methods into that
new context. In some ways it has made progress on other occasions it was forced
to compromise21. Procter and Gamble Far East Inc. has moved away from its
status quo in which it was operating in a similar vein to Unilever with 2,400
wholesalers in favour of a system which involves 50 core wholesalers
complemented by another 100 to round out geographical coverage22.
19 See Box 5.11
20 See Box 5.1
21 See Box 5.1
22 See Box 5.13
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6.4.2.8.2. Standardized
Amway, Avon, Gillette, McDonald's and United Airlines were all using similar
standardized approaches to those employed in other markets.
6.4.2.9. Sales Promotion
The sampled companies approaches toward sales promotion are classified
according to the degree to which they are adapted or standardized.
6.4.2.9.1. Adapted
Bristol-Myers K.K., Coca Cola (Japan) Company Limited, Eastman Kodak
(Japan) Ltd and Nestle/Friskies K.K., Levi Strauss Japan K.K., Nippon Lever K.K.
and Roily Doll Inc. are fully adapted with regard to Sales Promotion. Of these
companies one in particular stands out — Nestle/Friskies K.K. The company
believes that its sales promotional expertise has enabled it to tailor promotional
programmes for distributors and retailers alike and this has been largely responsible
for it forging close relationships within its distribution channels. Frequently it
might develop, execute and tailor sales promotions for as few as five stores.
Gillette (Japan) Inc., ICI Japan Limited, Johnson & Johnson Japan, Kohler
Japan K.K., Philip Morris K.K., Procter and Gamble Far East Inc., R. J.
Reynolds/M. C. Tobacco, Company Limited, Smith Kline Beecham and United
Airlines are all partially adapted.
6.4.2.9.2. Standardized
Amway, Avon Products Co. Ltd., Heinz/Ore-Ida, McDonald's Company
(Japan), Ltd., Smith Kline Beecham are all partially standardized. That is to say




In general the methods applied to customer service by all companies tend toward
adaptation. This is because successful companies have learned that customers of all
types of products expect quality to be unsurpassed and they demand retribution if
there are any shortfalls. Nestle commented that it had sent three key employees to
apologize to a housewife who had made a complaint. In no other country in the
world would it do that. RJR commented on the fact that consumers complain about
detailed packaging flaws that would go unnoticed in other markets and that
complaining was developing into a self standing industry. Unilever had learned that
its products were sometimes hoarded for years and the consumer expected those
products to perform as if they were new, as a result Nippon Lever had engineered
higher packaging standards to suit. A key theme manifest in almost every company
interviewed was that the consumer had high expectations on every dimension and
successful companies gear up their operations to respond accordingly.
Avon and Amway direct sales personnel were the vanguard of their customer
service interface. Bristol Myers relied heavily on its JV partner Lion to execute
high standards of customer service. By way of the delivery sales personnel of its
franchisees, Coca Cola was forging direct service connections with hundreds of
thousands of retailers. Eastman Kodak had bought out its distributor which gave it
a direct connection. McDonald's was in daily contact with its franchisees via its
computer systems and management follow-up systems. Companies such as Nippon
Lever and Roily Doll accorded customer service with the highest priority. Of
course this is not a static situation. Gillette was making purposeful strides to
reassure its distributors that it had only the highest degree of concern for the well
being of their business but this was something that was forced upon it as a result of
its past mistakes. Similarly Levi Strauss was very concerned about this issue but
again there was a large measure of compensation for past errors propping its current
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behaviour.
6.5. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Two analytical frameworks were utilized in this chapter against which the
companies in the sample were appraised. The first framework was concerned with
the approach that the sample companies adopted toward achieving competitive
advantage (Porter, 1990). This involved nine dimensions. The dimensions against
which the companies were assessed are coded as follows:
1. Competitive advantage grows out of improvements, innovation and change
2. Competitive advantage involves the whole value chain
3. Competitive advantage is sustained only through relentless improvements
4. Sustaining advantage demands that its sources be upgraded
5. Sustaining advantage ultimately requires a global approach to strategy
6. Sell to most sophisticated and demanding buyers and channels Establish norms
of exceeding the toughest regulatory hurdles or product standards
7. Treat employees as permanent
8. Establish outstanding competitors as motivators (Porter, 1990).
By way of summarizing the previous Tables 6.2 to 6.10, they are represented in
Table 6.12.
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Table 6.12 — Summary of competitive performances
Dimension of Competitive
Advantage
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Amway H H H M H H H H H
Avon Products Co. Ltd. H H H M H H H H H
Bristol-Myers K.K. H H H H H H H H H
Coca Cola (Japan) Co. Ltd. H H H H H H H H H
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd. H H H H H H H H H
Gillette (Japan) Inc. H H H M H H H H M
ICI Japan Limited H H H H M H H H H
Johnson & Johnson Japan H H H M M H H H H
Kohler Japan K.K. L L L L H M H H H
Levi Strauss Japan K.K. M H H H H H H H H
Heinz/Ore-Ida. M M M M M L H H M
McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. M H M M M H H H H
Nestle/Friskies K.K. H H M H H H H H H
Nippon Lever K.K. H H H H M H H H H
Philip Morris K.K. H H H H M H H H H
Procter & Gamble FE Inc. H H H H H H H H H
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Ltd. M M M M M H H H H
Revlon M M M M H H H H H
Roily Doll Inc. H H H H M H H H H
Smith Kline Beecham M M M M H H H H H
United Airlines M H H M H H H H H
It can be seen that all of these companies tend to score high and medium in the
main, with the exception of Kohler. Considering that they were chosen to represent
companies that by reputation were succeeding in developing a presence in Japan this
is unsurprising. However this shows one of three situations: that these sample
companies are successful at developing competitive advantage vis a vis Porter's
(1990) framework, or that Porter's framework is shown to be a valid descriptor for
successful companies, or both.
However, what is clear is that no single dimension is necessarily associated with
success as defined in this study. In other words the dimensions of the framework in
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the way that it was applied, cannot be used as discriminating variables to highlight
degrees of success. A clear example of this can be gleaned from dimension 5 which
related to globalization. Kohler was rated high and was struggling (it was in an
investment phase however) and Heinz was graded Medium but was relatively
successful. There are several reasons why these anomalies may exist, not least of
which is the competitive situation that each company faces in its key arenas.
However, the operationalization of success was by peer group evaluation and may
have been too unspecific. Alternatively, discrimination may have been impaired
due to insufficient variance in the sample, since the companies were all selected as
representative of successful companies. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of
compliance of these successful companies with the framework does suggest that it
includes an intelligent set of precepts.
Following the categorization against Porter's (1990) framework, an attempt was
made to classify and review the key companies in the sample against the Quelch and
Hoff (1986) framework. That framework embodied three dimensions of global
marketing: business functions, products, and marketing mix elements. Along each
of these dimensions the companies were classified according to the degree of
standardization that is imposed by the central organization or the degree to which
the companies have adapted their operating standards to the Japanese context. It
was illustrated that most of the companies studied were either operating in arenas
where the degree of cultural grounding was low, or they had succeeded by
positioning their products in such a way as to make it irrelevant. Bristol Myers was
focusing on some products that were more highly culturally grounded but it was not
at all encumbered. It offset any potential disadvantages through its relationship
with its JV partner Lion or by adapting its marketing message while reaping
economies by standardizing its products. Kohler was meeting with difficulties. Its
products were based on US standards and US thinking. Its managing director was
discouraged and in the process of leaving the business at the time of interview.
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What was clear about these successful companies was that they all operated with
a high degree of autonomy (Kohler appeared to be an outlyer in this regard) and in
the main were focused on the Japanese market and producing dedicated innovations
for that market. These findings were consistent with those of Yoshihara (1991).
The majority of managers interviewed regarded the advantages of globalization
as being applicable only in so far as they believed that other markets had much
more to gain by learning from their Japanese experience. An exception to this rule
was the area of marketing which was still regarded as a western strength. Common
problems cited included:
• Industry standards remain diverse and even higher Japanese standards are not
necessarily acceptable or economically justifiable in other markets.
• Japanese consumers demand differentiated products, primarily on quality
• Being an insider remains critically important especially in terms of distribution
and marketing networks
• Global organizations are difficult to manage and most had problems in gaining
what they perceived to be appropriate support from corporate HQ
• Globalization often circumvents subsidiary competencies.
These summary observations are also largely supported by Morrison, Ricks and
Roth (1991).
In the next chapter the overall conclusions to the study will be drawn.
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CHAPTER 7— CONCLUSIONS
Nihonjinron perpetuated myths referred to in Chapters 1 and 2 suggested that
there are many misunderstandings regarding what makes Japan successful, just as
there is little appreciation of what is involved for foreign companies to become
successful in the Japanese market. This later point is one on which little published
research exists (Grossberg, 1990). To compensate for this shortcoming the
objectives of this exploratory research study were to explore the reality of this
situation by studying a representative sample of foreign companies, all of which had
developed their market positions in Japan, and to distill out the implications for
marketing strategy based on their experience. In so doing the study aimed to:
explode or support many of the "myths" surrounding the Japanese market and
develop a synthesis based upon the recent experience of those foreign companies
that have reaped success in Japan.
Chapter 2 offered an appraisal of Japanese opportunities and threats widely
believed to be present in the Japanese market. This appraisal, included a macro
economic view of Japan, a review of the market obstacles including the background
to the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks between the US and Japan and
the findings of the first report (Anonymous, 1991). It was followed by a review of
the Japanese market characteristics and trends with particular focus on the consumer
and the features that enable broad opportunities to be charted. After appraising the
market, the corporate environment was studied and review made of the role of
corporate philosophies, intelligence management and the overall pattern of
corporate behaviour. Following this appraisal a structure was established based on
these headings. That structure was then harnessed to present the responses of the
sampled companies to the market situation they faced. This followed later in
Chapter 5.
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From the literature review in Chapter 3 flowed a suggested structure to the
thesis that was also conditioned by the assessment of the data according to the
principles of grounded theory (Bailey, 1987). These findings were presented in a
qualitative format, mainly in the form of mini case studies that were encapsulated in
boxes and cross referenced throughout the text. It is in the richness of this data that
one of the strengths of this thesis lies.
Foreign MNC responses to the obstacles and threats they faced were presented
in Chapter 5. This covered the responses that were made to the Japanese consumer,
as well as to market obstacles, Japanese market characteristics, competition and
other strategic situations. In that chapter strategic implications were outlined for
marketing research, market entry modes, competitive response, product
development, communications and distribution.
Chapter 6 included an analysis of the sample companies that drew upon two
apposite theories drawn from the literature search. They were Porter's (1990)
framework of competitive advantage and to address the "Japan is different" debate;
the standardization versus adaptation framework published earlier by Quelch and
Hoff (1986).
This final chapter first covers a number of specific conclusions that are drawn
from the data. Of course any such conclusions will be limited by the specificity of
the situations that faced these sample companies and blind generalizations should be
discouraged. In presenting these conclusions, some observations will be made
regarding the nature of the Japanese market opportunity. Finally the study will be
related to the background and focal theory, much of which lies in the interface
between strategic management and marketing.
The presentation of the specific conclusions follows the pattern:
• Japanese business environment
• The myth exploded
• How foreign MNCs have coped.
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7.1. JAPANESE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Research and interviews conducted during this research have indicated that
Japan does indeed offer myriad attractive opportunities for the foreign investor.
Clearly that with few structural obstacles in place, in what has hitherto been viewed
as a complex and prohibitive market, non-Japanese consumer goods' companies can
succeed. What foreign concerns cannot ignore is that it is essential to apply
fundamental principles of marketing and product positioning. While this may
appear to be a generic statement, it is of great import. Frequently marketers make
implicit assumptions about facets of the marketing concept and how it ought to
apply. Only infrequently do they revert to fundamental analysis of the sort used by
Nippon Lever by starting with basic research to understand the consumer and the
way that products fit into her life. Indeed, P&G admitted that the major cause of its
problems (US$300 million write offs) stemmed from a failure to do so (Box 5.13).
P&G focused on matters of detail without first asking more fundamental questions,
unlike Levi Strauss which moved its operational base from Hong Kong simply to
get closer to the Japanese consumer (Box 5.1). Of course there were cases where
products or ways of doing business simply struck a chord with the Japanese
consumer, for example Amway (Box 5.5) and the benefits were realized without the
levels of prior research exemplified by Unilever.
The Japanese consumer market can best be characterized as possessing the
following attributes:
• Highly segmented;
• Comparatively rich consumers;
• Consumers fascinated by newness;
• Limited living space for consumers;
• Quality conscious consumers;
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Other key issues are:
• Tough Japanese competitors
• Japanese approach to product planning
• Barriers to entry.
7.1.1. HIGHLY SEGMENTED MARKET
The Japanese market is large but highly segmented, reflecting many subtle
shades of taste and preference many of which may be accessed by highly specialized
media. Direct marketing is a growing medium that may offer increasing scope in
the future as technology advances and if the postal service becomes sufficiently
enlightened by extending discounts for commercial volumes of mail. Market
segments in Japan are often made by creative interpretation and action based
marketing. As shown in Chapter 5, they are seldom latent. Therefore the
attractiveness of the hugeness of the Japanese market is offset somewhat by its
heterogeneity, in the sense that it is composed not of one huge group of buyers but
many smaller groups with distinctive expectations and needs.
7.1.2. COMPARATIVELY RICH CONSUMERS
While with international measures, the Japanese consumer is comparatively
wealthy; the reality is that many consider themselves to be deprived, especially
concerning their housing conditions. Many argue that the country's dramatic
economic achievements have not been passed on to the consumer in full; but
nevertheless, yen incomes are sufficient to support the mushrooming luxury
imported goods' markets. Consumerism is buoyant— a scenario likely to continue
into the 1990s as the yen and Japan's economy hold strong, thus making this market
an opportunity too promising to ignore.
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7.1.3. CONSUMERS FASCINATED BY NEWNESS
Although Japanese consumers are intrigued by newness, they are both
sophisticated and discerning, and unlikely to be satisfied — at least initially— with
"me too" offerings. It is therefore essential that foreign companies clearly
differentiate their brands and ensure that "newness" claims are authentic.
7.1.4. LIMITED LIVING SPACE FOR CONSUMERS
It is true that many Japanese consumers in heavily populated areas occupy
restricted living space, a constraint that have obvious implications for product
design and marketing emphasis. Producers must be well-versed on the impact of
living in close quarters — everything from limitations in scope for furniture and
investment in household items to cleaning product fragrances. It is not surprising
therefore to find enhanced emphasis on product replacement, luxury items and
travel.
7.1.5. QUALITY CONSCIOUS CONSUMERS
Japanese consumers' preoccupation with quality means that standards considered
satisfactory in other markets may be unacceptable in Japan. Foreign companies are
therefore advised to manufacture in Japan and/or strive to gear their foreign
production quality to meet Japanese standards. Product strategies that harness this
"quality" factor offer the opportunity of adding yet another element to the armoury
of corporate competitiveness, an element that may be of critical value in other
markets in the present or later.
The dynamism of the Japanese consumer market is a critical factor of which
foreign companies should be aware. Change occurs rapidly and constantly. One
development in particular that merits special attention, and on which investors
should ensure they are well briefed to position themselves to take advantage of new
opportunities is Female Consumerism. Young, single, female Japanese consumers,
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in particular, represent a lucrative market segment in so far as they generally live at
home and have large disposable incomes that they are not averse to spending on a
range of consumer products. This growing group is targeted by a variety of
different industries and is the mainstay of many designer goods' producers.
7.1.6. TOUGH JAPANESE COMPETITORS
Japanese competitors constitute some of the world's largest and most formidable
corporations. They typically adopt a long-term orientation and, if deemed
necessary to capture market share, are prepared to invest to levels that would create
havoc among western shareholders; if foreign companies are to compete they need
to clearly determine consumer opportunities, be prepared to withstand fierce
competitive struggles and focus on specific areas of expertise that harness their
strengths.
Moreover, Japanese companies compete ferociously for market share, but are
not averse to forming co-operative subsets on specific ventures to capture a market.
In addition, they are often prepared to plough gains back into advertising and
product improvement and/or diversification to further extend their market positions.
They have, according to Abegglen and Stalk (1985), as well as the interviewees,
usually been satisfied with much lower returns on their investments than their
western counterparts, but this is also a function of company structure. As a
consequence, the Japanese shareholder is accustomed to a tiny return; the western
counterpart is not and is more likely to respond vociferously to small dividends.
Foreign MNCs must therefore select opportunities wisely; focusing on those that
offer a high likelihood of success and which can be funded adequately.
Another feature of Japanese companies is their ability to assemble resources and
respond to opportunities very quickly— particularly in the production of "me too"
offerings. Not surprisingly, new products and "uniqueness" have only a short life
in Japan. Having introduced new goods to the market; foreign companies should
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plan to continue the innovation and improvement process to maintain their market
position.
Fiscal 1991 earnings' reports being unveiled by Japan's biggest companies
during 1992 were well down on the previous year. During the six months ending in
September 1992 companies' pre-tax profits plunged by an average of 36%.
Manufacturing firms fared worst. Matsushita, the world's largest maker of
consumer electronics, saw its pre-tax profits tumble 66%; NEC's crashed 71% and
Mazda's fell 72%. Nippon Steel's were down 74%. Japan's second-biggest car
maker, Nissan, lost ¥14.2 billion (US$114m) before tax, its first loss since it listed
on the stock exchange in 1951. Across Japan, production lines are being
mothballed, wages frozen and bonuses paid in unsold goods instead of cash. Even
the unmentionable— sacking lifetime employees — is being discussed. The word
'restructuring' is being used. For the third time since the second world war,
Japanese business is facing massive and painful readjustment (Economist, 1992).
All this leads to the question: Is corporate Japan vulnerable at last? Maybe.
However, many economists say the Japanese challenge will not end anytime soon.
Never mind that Japanese companies are deprived of the cheap capital that once
galvanised investment abroad and at home, they are afraid to increase exports
because of trade tensions and, in some key industries like electronics, are stumped
for bold new consumer products. Largely, they are so far ahead of the rest of the
industrialized world in capital investment and research and development that it
hardly matters. That was the message Kenneth Courtis, an economist with
Deutsche Bank in Tokyo, gave to the congressional Joint Economic Committee in
Washington on May 8, 1992. He forecast that Japan, fuelled by capital
expenditures twice those of the United States as a proportion of gross national
product, would enter 'a new period of explosive expansion' after the recession. He
predicted Japan would surpass the United States as the world's largest economy
soon after the turn of the century (Hirsh, 1992). Thus the Japanese market is likely
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to remain a major opportunity area as well as, and will be argued later, a key
influence on consumer behaviour world-wide.
7.1.7. JAPANESE APPROACH PRODUCT PLANNING
DIFFERENTLY
To a large extent the product planning approaches of Western and Japanese
companies are quite different. Yet the two share some common features. The
Japanese approach has been almost entirely technically led but is showing some
signs of becoming less so (Box 5.14); whereas the Western approach does not
always follow that pattern shown in the box and is sometimes technically led with
marketing appraisal following that lead. In the drive for market responsiveness
greater convergence between these two schools of approach appears likely.
7.1.8. BARRIERS TO ENTRY
If there is any one obstacle to entering the Japanese market it is the cost of
entry. For example the Wednesday Group, a Republican Party congressional body,
recently released details of a study of 340 American companies that shows that
despite Japan being the world's second largest economy, it has the lowest levels of
foreign investment per capita of all industrialized countries. The main reason, it
concluded, was not the much heralded informal barriers but simply the high cost of
Japanese land. High cost was cited by 55% for non development of the Japanese
market whereas only 22% cited non-tariff barriers. Only 3% said the market was
closed to them (Economist, 1993).
Land, people and learning experiences— all of these are expensive in Japan —
and a long-term payback period is the norm. Foreign companies must therefore
ensure that their commitment to the Japanese market is well founded: there is no
point starting unless the strategic commitment to continue exists. To underfund
such an exercise may serve only to signal the opportunity to Japanese competitors.
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Stories abound of high-technology US products that have flopped in Japan for
unaccountable reasons. In 1976, for example, when Cray came out with the
world's first super computer, Japan said it didn't need them. Then in 1983, Fujitsu
produced its version, and suddenly Japanese universities and government-funded
research labs started to buy super computers (Hirsh, 1991). Cray, like IBM, has
dominated the world market but still holds a minority share in Japan, though it is
growing steadily. This pattern of exclusion is one that US trade negotiators, with
an eye to America's own high-tech future, have long discerned. Today, with most
tariffs, quotas and unfair import regulations out of the way, they are trying to probe
the murky area of informal market barriers under the Structural Impediments
Initiative. According to S. Linn Williams, the Deputy US Trade Representative for
Asia (Hirsh, 1991):
We tried to hit the market access issue in every way we could, so it
couldn 7 run and hide some other place.
The problem is in finding a 'smoking gun' — evidence that the government is still
quietly making market access difficult.
No one single theory has a monopoly of applicability to the Japanese consumer
market context. However, the industrial network theory (Hakansson, 1982;
Turnbull and Valla, 1986) would appear to have particular pertinence to major parts
of Japanese consumer marketing strategy and distribution in particular. As Ford
(1979) indicated, relationships develop through interactions in which the
collaborators build mutual trust. This issue is particularly salient with winning
distribution in Japan. Frequently distributors, sogo shosha especially, will restrict
attempts to trade to within their networks, an issue with which Heinz took issue in
its collaborative venture with Mitsubishi.
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7.2. THE MYTH EXPLODED
At the commencement of this project, the researcher was working with an
operating assumption that it was difficult if not nigh impossible to penetrate the
Japanese market. If there is one overriding finding emerging from this study it is
that this myth has been dispelled. Penetration of the Japanese consumer market is
an entirely plausible aim. Companies such as Amway, Avon and Roily Doll have
been singularly successful in penetrating the Japanese market with concepts and
ways of doing business that are decidedly American. Others have achieved similar
status with less overt foreign approaches. It is true however that the myth of
impenetrability had some substance at some stage, but as far as the consumer
products market is concerned the myth has lingered too long.
7.2.1. NIHONJINRON AN INVISIBLE BARRIER
The reason it has lingered is primarily due to the support rendered by the
Japanese to give succour to that myth and has been reinforced by inadequate efforts
on behalf of foreign companies to try to disprove it. A primary reason is that the
parties, upon whom it has fallen to explain Japan, are businessmen such as Morita,
Honda and so on (Yoshino, 1992:164), and they, have, on their domestic side of
the equation, a vested interest in keeping foreign companies at bay. There is a
danger however that this myth could rebound on those companies that have learned
to cope with the Japanese business arena as protectionists [mainly US] continue to
cry foul and further sour trading relations between Japan and its trading partners,
especially during this current recessionary era.
An additional explanation for the widespread belief that the Japanese market is
characteristically different may be helped by invoking a musical analogy. An
adagio is a piece of music designed to be played slowly and gracefully. Yet if it is
played quickly, although retaining the same structural characteristics, it will on first
listening no longer resemble a piece that is well known in its adagio form. It is
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likely that it would require an accomplished musician to recognize the structural
content; and, so it is with consumer marketing in Japan. It is fast, in musical terms
allegro, more precisely allegro con spirito, not adagio. That is to say, it is so fast
and requires the skills of accomplished fast moving goods' marketers who are
skilled in recognizing the structural similarities shared between markets who can
bring the appropriate skills to bear on the Japanese situation.
This study has shown that the Japanese consumer market responds similarly to
marketing initiatives that have been successful in other major sophisticated markets
and that there is no structural marketing mystery, with distribution perhaps being an
exception, to unravel. Yet, even distribution issues can be coped with. However,
it is a very fast moving marketplace, and according to the executives interviewed,
far more competitive than any other markets that they had experienced; and these
executives were highly experienced international marketers.
Foreign companies in Japan have at last identified another problem: the 'head
start' phenomenon, a topic dealt with in the literature (Reid, 1980).
Perhaps the biggest difficulty ofbreaking into the Japanese market is
that decades of targeted development by the Japanese government
have yielded corporate giants: What's happened is that because of
the protectionist environment of15 years ago, ... most of the
companies we 're competing against would be nowhere near the size
that they are today.
S. Linn Williams, Deputy US Trade Representative for Asia (Hirsh,
1991)
The research identified that a number of foreign MNCs have successfully
developed strategies which when executed fastidiously have resulted in success in
the Japanese market. Attention to the detail of assembling the marketing mix has
resulted in positive outcomes. Market share has been won and consumer franchises
established.
However, if, as Japan contends, tariffs and other formal trade barriers no longer
exist, why are so many US companies still complaining? If, as the US government
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contends, formidable barriers remain, why are so many other US and Foreign
companies succeeding in Japan? As in the fable of the blind men and the elephant,
the answer usually depends on which part of the Japan market is being reached for.
Some experts say there has long been a pattern to who succeeds; the only question
is to what degree it persists.
On the whole, 'strategic' industries targeted by the Japanese government for
development, such as automobiles and semiconductors, have been harder for
foreigners to break into than low-tech areas Japan doesn't much care about (Hirsh,
1991). Having said that, a clear body of support emerged, from those companies
interviewed, for the view of Abegglen and Stalk (1985); that Japanese companies
have been protected from foreign investment by foreign companies' "indifference,
ignorance and unwillingness to pay the price with effort and patience" to succeed in
Japan. The converse of those criticisms applied in those successful companies that
were included in the study. Apt labels to use as their descriptors were patient,
vigorous, committed, wise, curious.
7.2.2. FOREIGN COMPANIES CAN EXCEL
Despite its formidable reputation for complexity and difficulty, foreign concerns
can succeed in the Japanese market. As the research for this thesis has illustrated:
• Several foreign MNCs are market leaders
• Access to distribution can be gained.
7.2.2,1. Several foreign firms are market leaders
During the research a number of companies were identified not only that had
successfully developed positions in the Japanese marketplace but were occupying
leadership positions.
For example Coca-Cola has, as have other consumer products companies
surveyed in this research, succeeded. It controls nearly 60 percent of the
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carbonated soft drink market in Japan. However:
Companies that break in such as Procter and Gamble, Schick, and
Amway tend not to be strategic industries. In certain areas where
Japan wants to create its own industry, it's difficult for American
companies to compete.
Glen Fukushima, former top US trade negotiator
The prize industries are coddled with low-cost capital and other encouragement
and have tended to add value at different stages of production, passing on expensive
products to the consumer. The auto sector, for example, comprises a range of
cottage industries. It accounted for three-quarters of 1990's US$41 billion trade
surplus with the United States (Hirsh, 1991). America is not likely to erode much
of that surplus by selling low-priced goods like frozen potato products or soft drinks
back to Japan.
Of those that have succeeded, in the majority of cases, success had taken a long
time and was hard won. Procter & Gamble— regarded by many as the world's
finest marketing company won a leadership position in the diaper market then lost it
only to win it back again. In developing its market position it was forced to learn
that its "Cincinnati model" had to be discarded. This lesson required it to write off
US$300 million.
Foreign companies must be prepared for a sustained, rigorous effort to ensure
that the essential competitive ingredients exist and enable them to leverage their
strengths to win over both distribution and consumers. Not only are they
succeeding, those that are surviving, according to The Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, in a recent annual survey of foreign businesses in Japan, the
foreigners' operating margins, at an average 6.1% were nearly two-and-a-half times
as high as those for Japanese companies (Economist, 1989). Moreover, as was
detailed throughout the text many of the sampled companies had achieved leadership
positions in some of their business arenas: Coca Cola in soft drinks, Bristol Myers
in oral analgesics, Johnson and Johnson in baby powders, Nippon Lever in the
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shampoo sector, and so on. Other examples of leadership were presented
throughout the text. Many of the best foreign success stories in Japan date from the
immediate post war period, when there were no restrictions on direct foreign
investment in Japan if companies were prepared not to repatriate profits. Coca-Cola
was one such 'yen company' that has reaped the benefit of staying for the long haul
and today it earns more in Japan than in the US.
7.2.2.2. Access to distribution can be obtained
Distribution is widely regarded as a serious obstacle to marketing in Japan;
however, MNC experience shows that coverage can be won by ensuring there is a
market for the product (product differentiation is a minimum requisite) and by
demonstrating a willingness to develop a long-term relationship with potential
distributors.
External political influences, combined with internal recognition, are likely to
open the Japanese market further. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), for example, has determined that the Japanese consumer should be the
primary beneficiary of the country's economic success during the coming decade
(Palmer, 1990) — a dictum that will undoubtedly have an impact upon Japan's
"notorious" distribution system (Smith, 1990; Economist, 1991; Rowley, 1991). In
addition, the easing of the Large Scale Retail Law, the spread of information
technology, restructuring, mergers and acquisitions' activity among distribution
companies, coupled with the sheer growth in consumer activity and the responses to
it are likely to increase distribution opportunities.
Removing the restriction in the Large Retail Store Act will probably not result
in dramatic reductions in distribution costs. The most profound organic change is
in putting more power into the consumers' hands. The most serious deterrent to
changing the Japanese distribution system is the lack of consumer representation and
the lack of realization by the consumer that this is what keeps distribution costs
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high, a point reinforced by Fields (1989). With over 10 million Japanese travelling
abroad each year a strong prime mover to such change is provided.
7.3. HOW FOREIGN MNCs HAVE COPED
We have seen throughout the text that foreign MNCs have succeeded in the
Japanese consumer products' market. These successes have clear implications at:
• The corporate level
• The subsidiary marketing strategy level.
7.3.1. THE CORPORATE LEVEL
Success in Japan is not assured but it is a worthy aim to strive for, both with its
potential revenue yielding ability and in terms of its strategic influence.
Several issues have emerged:
• Marketing strategies and corporate aims
• Transnationalism
• Strategies are often incremental
• Home market advantages are transferable
• A clear sense of vision
• Many foreign MNC successes have their origins in JVs
• Marketing is an under exploited western strength
• Porter's framework for competitive advantage is valid
• Important to perform across the value chain
• Strategic decision taking.
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7.3.1.1. Marketing Strategies And Corporate Aims
This research has highlighted that feasible marketing strategies are conditioned
by overall corporate aims and the levels of support that are forthcoming to
subsidiaries in their market development efforts. That corporate political contexts
(Livingston, 1971) were extremely important was seen to be very true. For
example, interviewees were asked to cite one success ingredient above all others.
The most salient cited by far was top level headquarters support. Besides, the huge
costs of operating in Japan require nothing less than total commitment at the
corporate level. Even though P&G made many fundamental mistakes it was
committed at the corporate level to bringing about a successful resolution to its
venture. That those time horizons for investment pay back extend beyond the
tenure of any one company president requires that the commitment is corporate
rather than individual, a pattern that is rather typical of the Japanese approach to
market development.
7.3.1.2. Transnationalism
The mode of behaviour which Lacktorin (1990) described as transnationalism
appears to fit the model set by many of the sample companies. Unilever, ICI,
P&G, Nestle and several others were moving their investment patterns to reflect the
relative importance of the members of the Triad of USA, EC4 and Japan in
proportion and were developing their ability, as he put it, to capture "insider
responsiveness advantages." They also have multiple identities and local
management performs a significant part in strategic decision making.
7.3.1.3. Strategies Are Often Incremental
In Porter's (1980) work he stressed the necessity to achieve fit between the
enterprise and its environment (Porter, 1980), although he largely neglected the
process of strategy implementation. In this work, a different emphasis has been
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taken. Efforts were made to probe the issue of fit but much effort has also been
placed on collating detailed case materials across many areas of strategic marketing
activity and of implementation in particular. In this way an enriched data set has
been established which, I believe, yields insight into the Japanese consumer
marketing context met by foreign MNCs.
Various management approaches have been highlighted as has the way that
management attitudes were conditioned by experiences in the Japanese market.
Negative experiences, for example Kohler rendered the company less sanguine,
whereas in the case of P&G, negative experiences resulted in greater determination
to succeed and be seen to succeed. Other companies' successes resulted in more
positive perspectives. Several were attempting to wrest control from their JV
partners others were attempting to build their businesses faster. Moreover, although
Porter (1980) argued that the mere sum of all activities that result in a competitive
strategy — either explicit or implicit— is rarely the best way to achieve success
and Quinn (1980) proposed that much real strategy was formulated incrementally,
in this study it was found that while many of the MNCs had formulated strategies
according to Porter's precepts, their successes just as often resulted from
incremental patterns. For example, when P&G was striving to regain its position in
the diaper's business it reformulated its product and re-launched it three times in
eighteen months. Bristol Myers modified and re-modified its original positioning
for Sea Breeze until it found a winning formula that it adhered to. The success of
Roily Doll was based entirely on incremental movements. Nippon Lever developed
new positions and opportunities for its traditional Lux brand, eventually applying it
in the Shampoo category with the result that it surpassed its earlier success with
Timotei. The list is long with details provided in the text and boxes.
While those processes, advocated by what Mintzberg, (1990) referred to as the
Design School, self identified as represented by Ansoff, (1991), exist; they
represent only a part of the process of strategy formulation. The approach toward
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product planning adopted by the kaisha was incremental in the extreme. Much data
was gathered to support the view of Lindblom, (1979) that while stratagems may
not withstand scientific scrutiny, what is important to the managers is that they feel
comfortable with them. And, as Mintzberg, (1977) has previously indicated, it has
been shown in this work that incrementalism is very much an intelligent
management learning process.
7.3.1.4. Some Home Market Advantages Are Transferable
Porter's (1990) view that competitive edge is determined as a result of having
competitive skills in the home market was supported. The Japanese market is above
all highly competitive and Japanese companies do compete ferociously for market
share. In the Japanese market the decisions to enter arenas are often based on
qualitative factors such as wanting to win or to achieve a leadership position. That
the costs of participation are so high and the financial gains of the kaisha have
frequently been so slender has often attracted accusations of irrational behaviour
from foreign MNCs.
There was an overwhelming consensus among interviewees that the Japanese
market is the most competitive of all those of which they had knowledge or
previously experienced. This intensity of competition renders it difficult to
penetrate the Japanese market with erstwhile successful products from home
markets unless they possess some advantage in the Japanese market. The most
likely advantage that can be transferred into the Japanese market is marketing
expertise. With marketing flair positioning opportunities can sometimes be seized.
Furthermore, several of these foreign MNCs in the sample were reaping benefits in
other markets as a result of their participation in the Japanese market, for example
Nippon Lever with carbonated tea in Europe, Kodak (see Box 5.4), P&G with
compact detergents, Coca Cola and Nestle with their strategic alliance on vending
machines and so on.
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7.3.1.5. A Clear Sense Of Vision
Corporate mission was deemed by the respondents to be an important factor
with developing their Japanese business operations. However, unlike Japanese
companies in which missions are often not formally stated but, according to
consultants and others interviewed, are absorbed from the ether in a process of
osmosis, the Japanese subsidiaries of these foreign MNCs tended to have clearly
stated missions that were communicated formally in the Western way as well as
through their corporate acculturation processes. The foreign MNCs in the main had
clearly defined goals, as evidenced by the spontaneous, lucid responses made by the
interviewees, and were attempting to build on relevant common thread. In some
cases the common factor was based on product or brand, in others it was process
based, or on marketing wherewithal. Although this is cited as an observed
characteristic of foreign MNCs operating in Japan, great care must be taken in
generalizing on these observations since these foreign MNCs were subsidiaries that
were competing against home based Japanese corporations. As a consequence it is
more likely that these foreign MNCs would be expected to prepare statements of
philosophy and goals as part of their processes of reporting to headquarters.
To bring the elements of the marketing mix together in the Japanese consumer
marketing context requires the foreign MNC to form a clear picture of the
consumer. Armed with this knowledge, only then can the positioning be fine tuned.
7.3.1.6. Many Foreign MNC Successes Have Their Origins In Joint Ventures
Many of the interviewees testified to the importance of their JV arrangements as
contributory to their success. JVs however, are two sided coins and the recent
break-up of several co-operative projects is part of a wider trend that is seeing an
increasing number of foreign MNCs choosing to go it alone; several examples were
given in the text of acrimonious break ups. Other stresses and frictions were also
453
alluded to among the sample companies: for example Bristol Myers, ICI. In some
cases, the advantages of the JVs have become outweighed by non complementary
goals and cultural misunderstandings.
7.3.1.7. Marketing Is An Under Exploited Western Strength
While Japanese companies are quick to react to threats and opportunities and are
capable of impressive technical innovation, they have been less impressive with
theoretical and conceptual marketing. Western marketing approaches can be
applied successfully as some of the case studies have demonstrated. Western firms
in Japan can take advantage of this disparity by focusing on building their
understanding of the consumer and following with product concepts that offer a
high likelihood of success and marshal their resources accordingly. This relative
strength may provide a temporary advantage since Japanese companies are
understood to have become more alert to the need to sharpen their marketing skills.
7.3.1.8. Porter's Framework For Competitive Advantage Valid
The framework which Porter (1990) advanced as a basis for establishing
competitive advantage was shown to be a valid descriptor, in the main, for the
successful companies in the sample. The overall pattern of compliance of these
successful companies with the framework does suggest that it includes an intelligent
set of precepts. However, caution must be advanced regarding the sample and how
it was used. These companies, although notionally successful with how success was
defined in Chapter 4, had developed their positions in the Japanese market after
varied but usually quite long periods in which they had experienced both learning
and making of mistakes as well as successes. Their positions were thus based on
the accumulation of wisdom from successful as well as unsuccessful ventures.
While attempts were made to probe their failures some respondents were
transparently reluctant to reveal insights (this was particularly true of P&G) and
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consistent with findings that executives are much more inclined to recognize
strengths than they are weaknesses (Reid, 1989).
7.3.1.9. Important To Perform Across The Value Chain
In selecting arenas in which to focus, Porter (1985) offers the value chain as a
basis for the enterprise to gauge its relative performance. This was one of the
factors included in the framework against which the sample companies were
assessed for competitive advantage. The majority of the executives interviewed
were at pains to express that success in Japan relied on performing well on as many
of the elements in the value chain as is possible. To fail to do so was in the
terminology of Hamel and Prahalad (1989) to leave a "hole in the wall" that their
Japanese competitors would mercilessly exploit.
7.3.1.10. Strategic Decision Taking
Strategic decision making involves looking to the long term. This is not new,
but taking a long-term perspective of developing the Japanese market has been a
difficult lesson for many MNCs to learn. Entering the domestic Japanese market is
expensive, time-consuming, it requires patience, and a preparedness to learn about
and understand the complexities of the Japanese consumer coupled with the tenacity
to maintain a long-term commitment. Foreign MNCs and their subsidiary company
general managers would do well to heed the advice of these long-time Japan
investors in this regard. Short-term, opportunistic approaches are simply
incompatible with the Japanese way of doing business. This is the unequivocal
view of those interviewed; a view supported by the Wednesday Group survey
(Economist, 1993). Its study showed that 70% of the 340 US respondents said the
Japanese market was open to them provided a long term commitment was made.
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7.3.2. SUBSIDIARY MARKETING STRATEGY LEVEL
While interviews conducted in preparing this thesis suggest there are few
structural obstacles applied solely to foreign MNCs; the Japanese market remains
difficult from a competitive viewpoint. Some factors to consider are: Generally,
Japanese prefer to work for Japanese corporations and the concept of company
loyalty, lifetime employment. The role of the firm in the lives of the Japanese
people has been the subject of many books, articles and reports, for example
Alletzhauser, (1990); Redding and Baldwin, (1991). The difficulties foreign
companies encounter in attempting to recruit high-calibre Japanese staff were noted.
As a result, non-Japanese concerns have found it essential to link brand success with
their corporate profiles; target more adventurous prospective employees;
demonstrate a long-term commitment to Japan; and provide for long-term career
development.
If foreign companies are to succeed in the Japanese market, it is essential they
adhere to and observe the following:
• Strategic windows highly relevant
• Harness fundamental marketing principles
• Strategic segmentation of crucial importance
• Monitor competitive activity
• Make marketing strategies Japan specific
• Ensure marketing mix differentiation.
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7.3.2.1. Strategic Windows Highly Relevant
In Japanese consumer marketing the concept of "strategic windows" (Abell,
1978) is highly relevant. As was illustrated, time horizons for exploitation of
competitive advantage are especially short. The threat of rapid emulation requires
foreign MNCs to plan to stay ahead. Planning of line extensions even before the
Mark I version is launched is a virtual requirement. This ferocity of competition
means that it is extremely difficult to milk a brand's position as to cut back on
investment in the communications mix is usually accompanied by a more rapid fall
off in market share position than the respondents had noted in other markets.
Although this is to some extent a generality it requires radical thought about the
thresholds at which investment should be made and the rates of returns that can be
expected.
7.3.2.2. Harness Fundamental Marketing Principles
In two lessons, this means (a) understand the Japanese consumer; and (b)
tailor the products to Japanese needs. Analysis of success stories in the Japanese
marketplace indicates that foreign companies have developed strong positions
simply by the application of textbook principles.
7.3.2.3. Strategic Segmentation Of Crucial Importance
One of the key elements of the marketing approach about which mention was
made in Chapter 3 is segmentation. The principle of market segmentation is based
on splitting markets into sub components that share similarities within, yet
maximize the reaction to the modified marketing mixes presented to them. It tends
to be most frequently used at a tactical marketing level and less at the strategic level
advocated by Abell and Hammond (1979).
The research has highlighted just how valid the segmentation approach can be.
For, in this market that as stated above, is superficially homogeneous concerning
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racial stereotyping, hair and skin colour, and self perceived with social
classification; market segmentation, strategies were shown to be highly influential
on market success. That is to say that the apparent homogeneity would appear to
mediate against segmentation strategies but this apparent homogeneity masks a wide
variety of tastes and expectations. Segmentation has been shown to be of most
crucial importance at both strategic and tactical levels. It was shown that the
Japanese market is far from homogeneous and segmentation opportunities abound.
Several instances were cited of businesses that had been build around this
recognition.
An observation worth noting regarding segmentation as it is applied at a
strategic level is that Japanese companies appear, superficially at least, to be less
restricted in choosing their business arenas. Kao, the World's largest consumer
products company, for instance, viewed itself as a chemicals' manufacturer and was
prepared to leverage its technology in a variety of fields in which its marketing
synergy was questionable. Conversely Nippon Lever and Procter and Gamble
possess similar technology to Kao, but perceive their synergistic interests to be
defined by their consumer marketing expertise rather than their technologies.
It is always problematic in making comparisons between subsidiary operations
such as Nippon Lever with in this case Kao since the former is an operation in a
foreign market and the latter is the major force in its home market, although
attempts were made throughout the research to distinguish "branch plant" effects.
However, this limitation on the business boundaries of Nippon Lever and P&G was
an understanding that stemmed from both of their overall corporate strategies and
was well understood in London, Cincinnati and Japan. It was not a "branch plant"
phenomenon. Furthermore, it is not possible to say that Kao is right or wrong,
merely to observe that it has a different way of viewing the same issue. Perhaps
this difference may be attributed to the more generalized approach to management
in Japanese companies and the under-development of marketing, as it is understood
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in the West, as a separate management discipline in Japan.
7.3.2.4. Monitor Competitive Activity
This may be done by preempting where possible and adopting the Japanese
strategy of reacting quickly. Competitive reaction in Japan is so rapid that a
successful product is likely to be emulated within a few short months. This requires
that foreign companies prepare themselves for the inevitable ricochet market
responses by queuing up line extensions, diversifications and improvements to
maintain their competitive edge.
7.3.2.5. Make Marketing Strategies Japan-Specific
This may be achieved, for example, by adopting a gift-giving positioning.
As was mentioned in the text, gift giving attracts high levels of consumer
expenditure and even everyday consumables, for example Lux toilet soap as we saw
in Chapter 5, can find a niche in this gift giving market.
Japan's domestic market boasts as varied an array of products as is available
anywhere in the western world. Since products that do not satisfy their needs are
likely to be ignored, the onus is on the foreign concern to understand the Japanese
consumer and the way he/she uses products, and then develop products that are
"Japan-specific", for example in the way Unilever has "Japanized" the formulation
of many of its major international brands. Positioning is a key to success in the
Japanese market.
7.3.2.6. Ensure Product And/Or Marketing Mix Differentiation
To stand any chance of success, foreign companies must differentiate their
efforts by offering product uniqueness: for example a singular delivery system
(such as Coca-Cola with its vending system; Avon and Amway with their direct
distribution methods). It may be a viable option to harness the quality of
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"foreignness".
Two issues must be stressed:
• Adaptation Versus Standardization
• Differentiation.
7.3.2.6.1. Adaptation Versus Standardization
Some foreign MNCs were marketing brands that exist in many other markets;
which in terms of Dunning's (1988) eclectic theory means they are harnessing
"internationalization" advantages. The lesson that these successful companies
deliver is that brand positionings must be adapted to suit the Japanese context. As a
result an international brand in Japan is likely to have a different consumer meaning
from that which it has in Europe or the US. A useful example of this was Visa
which had an entirely different positioning than in other major markets. Other
illustrations were given in the main body of the thesis.
There is no specific pattern to the issue of standardization versus adaptation,
according to this assessment, for the business functions. However, for the Quelch
and Hoff (1986) analysis, most of the companies studied were either operating in
arenas where the degree of cultural grounding was low, or they had succeeded by
positioning their products in such a way as to make it irrelevant. For example, two
companies that were operating in high culturally grounded arenas were Bristol
Myers and Kohler. BM offset potential cost disadvantages through its
manufacturing relationship with its JV partner Lion and by adapting its marketing
message while reaping economies by standardizing its products. Conversely,
Kohler appeared to be meeting difficulties. Its products were based on US
standards and failing to make the desired impact; its operations were geared to US
thinking.
As was shown in Chapter 6, there was a tendency, over all companies, toward
adaptation, across all the elements of the mix. That is to say that clear evidence
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emerged that the marketing strategies of these successful companies were being
adapted to the Japanese context.
7.3.2.6.2. The "Differentiation" Factor
Foreign enterprises should also be aware that undifferentiated products fail to
win distribution in Japan. Consumers simply ignore anything not possessing either
a strong brand identity or a differentiated positioning. The most successful
positionings developed by foreign companies were those which reflected Japanese
values and or orientation or were made to synergize with them, for example Bristol
Myers' Sea Breeze, SKB's Contac Sogo, Nippon Lever's Timotei, Roily Doll's
Aunt Stella, and so on.
7.4. APPOSITE THEORIES
The subject studied was wide ranging in scope. Several of the sub topics, for
example advertising, entry strategies, distribution would all provide ample separate
opportunities for doctoral research. Since the field was considered an under
researched area (Grossberg, 1990) and this intended as an exploratory study, a
broad approach was taken, thus increasing the chances of identifying salient issues
that emerged.
7.4.1. DESIGN SCHOOL VS EMERGENT SCHOOL
However the apparently antagonistic views of Mintzberg, (1990); Wheelwright
(1984), Ouchi (1980), Lindblom, (1959) on the one hand and Ansoff (1965),
Ansoff et al. (1970), Bateman and Zeithaml (1989), Anderson and Paine (1978),
Das (1986), Mitchell et al. (1986), Simon (1957), Weick (1990) on the other were
shown to have more in common than in division. For example, the model depicted
in Figures 3.3, and 3.5 to 3.7 can be construed to accommodate both groups. It
does so by regarding the contents of the boxes as either processes of decision taking
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or information acquisition. The processes are continuous and iterative. By
allowing for iteration; and given that the inputs are dynamic entities, it is necessary
that it should iterate. It allows for the "softer" political, social, consensus aspects
of strategy formulation to play a part. Moreover, it would be plain foolish to
ignore inputs such as environmental change, competitive activity, and so on. These
precepts were acknowledged as important in strategy formulation as early as 400
BC in the works of Sun Tzu (Wee et al., 1991), and to attempt to dismiss them
would be nai've.
7.4.2. SUCCESS IMPROVES COMPETITIVENESS
Success in the highly competitive Japanese market enables foreign MNCs to
hone their product and marketing skills which in turn renders them more likely to
be able to succeed in other markets. The final stage of the marketing strategy
model in Figure 3.7 was the execution of the marketing mix and the collective
effect of the marketing mix determines the overall market share position (Reid,
1980). Moreover, competitiveness, according to Porter (1980), results from the
balancing of two sets of forces — internal and external (see Figure 3.8 reproduced
below).
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Indeed, Porter indicated that one of the key determinants of the success of
national economies is the ferocity of competition at home. He argued that Japan
and the old West Germany are both extremely competitive markets. The ability of
the kaisha to compete globally, he asserted, was determined by the preparation
Japanese companies receive by first competing ferociously in their home market
(Porter, 1990). This research has shown that successful participation in the
Japanese market conditions the behaviour of MNCs in other markets. For instance,
PepsiCo's success with its carbonated tea was emulated by Nippon Lever by way of
its Lipton's operation and comparable brands are now being marketed in Europe.
Moreover, as was mentioned earlier in the text, P&G was first converted to
compact detergents by the success that was registered in the Japanese market by
Kao. The implication is that Porter's model of competitive strategy (Porter, 1980)
may be extended to include Japanese market competence as a factor that adds to the
inventory of strengths and weakness of the enterprise and conditions the perception
of opportunities with which it is qualified to grapple in the longer term (see Figure
7.1).
463
Of the theories that were introduced in Chapter 3 under the heading of
International Marketing Strategy, one that had more explanatory power,
superficially at least, in this context was not Dunning's theory but the Process
Model (Carlson, 1966; Carlson, 1975). That theory predicted an evolving process
as a result of interaction between knowledge acquisition together with increased
resource commitment in the market. This explanation fits the pattern of almost
every foreign MNC in the sample. However is this just not another example of
incrementalism? Any intelligent management would surely attempt to limit its
exposure, learn from newly acquired experience and then determine in which
direction to go and at which pace to move. As Forsgren (1989) deduced, its prime
value is in providing illumination before the enterprise becomes greatly involved in
a market when lack of resources and knowledge are still a constraining factor.
To fail to appreciate the necessity of investing in relationship building in Japan
is to fail to appreciate one of the most fundamental aspects of the Japanese business
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culture. Whether considering tenure periods of top foreign executives or making
distribution decisions, relationship building pervades all aspects of business
dealings. Three year postings espoused by American companies were considered
particularly inappropriate. Since the costs of operating in Japan are so high, this
reinforces the need for wholehearted headquarters support because in the early days,
development of the business may be a slow process as connections are forged with
no immediate pay off. Failure to make this kind of investment was cited by the
interviewees as one of the key failures of foreign MNCs in Japan; a finding that
won support earlier from Abegglen and Stalk (1985). No doubt this could be
argued to be true for the development of any foreign operations but what is more
acute in the Japanese context is the high costs and the additional concomitant
commitments.
7.4.3. PORTER'S (1990) FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE
The sample companies were appraised against two literature based frameworks
(Quelch and Hoff, 1986; Porter, 1990). Porter's model of competitive advantage
was used first followed by the Quelch and Hoff framework which was adapted into
three sets of broad dimensions against which the approaches toward standardization
and adaptation to the Japanese market were classified high, medium or low.
Included in this appraisal were the business functions of the companies:
development, manufacturing and marketing. Their products were classified
according to the degrees of cultural grounding that existed. Then, marketing mix
elements: product design, brand names, product positioning, packaging,
advertising themes and copy, pricing distribution, sales promotion and customer
service were analyzed.
With the Porter (1990) framework, most companies tended to score high and
medium in the main, with the exception of Kohler. As was mentioned in the text, it
465
was a troubled company, its managing director being somewhat disaffected and in
the process of leaving the company to set up a consulting company. Given that the
companies were chosen to represent companies that by reputation were succeeding
in developing a presence in Japan, the data shows one of three situations. (1) These
sample companies are successful at developing competitive advantage vis a vis
Porter's (1990) framework, or (2) Porter's framework is shown to be valid for
successful companies or (3) Both. No single dimension in this framework in this
data set appears to offer high discrimination powers.
7.4.4. STANDARDIZATION VERSUS ADAPTATION
The appraisal against the Quelch and Hoff (1986) framework revealed that the
majority of managers interviewed regarded the advantages of globalization as being
applicable only in so far as they believed that other markets had much more to gain
by learning from their Japanese experience. An exception to this rule was the area
of marketing which was still regarded as a western strength. However, common
problems cited included:
• Industry standards remain diverse and even higher Japanese standards are not
necessarily acceptable or economically justifiable in other markets.
• Japanese consumers demand differentiated products, primarily on quality
• Being an insider remains critically important especially in terms of distribution
and marketing networks
• Global organizations are difficult to manage and most had problems in gaining
what they perceived to be appropriate support from corporate HQ
• Globalization often circumvents subsidiary competencies.
To some extent the marketing concept requires reinterpretation. "Marketing is a
social and managerial process by which individuals and groups obtain what they
need and want through creating and exchanging products and value with others"
(Kotler, 1988). In Chapter 3 it was emphasized that this definition is based on
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notions of: needs, wants, demands, products, utility, value, satisfaction, exchange,
transactions, relationships, markets, marketing and marketers, all of which are
linked by information flows. From the marketers' side it involves identification of
market opportunities, preparation and planning to exploit the opportunity profitably,
followed by effective execution of the plans.
7.4.5. KEY MARKET FACTORS
This research has unearthed some evidence that it is insufficient to merely take
account of the needs and expectations of consumers in local markets. It highlights
the requirement to take account of the influential effects of key markets. Markets
just as consumers have their opinion leaders in the longer term. The US, in
particular California, was a major influence on style and consumer tastes in the
1970s. The world witnessed the emergence of Silicon Valley and listened to
Californian sounds which have been recycled through advertising and movies.
However the emphasis during the 1990s through to the 21st Century is likely to be
influenced by Japan to a greater extent than hitherto. More consumers will own
more Japanese consumer products and will listen to music and watch movies that
are in turn produced and marketed by Japanese owned companies. As the scale of
the Japanese economy continues to grow and its technological supremacy expands,
Japan will market its culture more widely.1 Marketers will take cognizance of
trends in Japan and the standards of expectation of Japanese consumers to interpret
future opportunities in other markets as Japanese quality and inventiveness
expectations are exported world-wide.
^The Japanese government has sponsored major cultural exhibitions in London
and other major cities with which it has trading connections. Japanese artists
receive increasing shares of showings in art galleries worldwide.
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7.4.6. SUMMARY
Many instances were identified of companies that have succeeded in overcoming
the difficulties presented in the Japanese market. Foreign companies have
penetrated at the luxury end of the consumer goods' business, just as they have
succeeded in winning consumers of everyday consumables. While much is being
made by the US in particular about Japanese obstructiveness and unfair trade
practices, none of those companies interviewed would lend any support to the
notion. A clear signal was given that the consumer market is open to foreign
operations. That does not mean that the Japanese market is easy to enter. As we
have seen, it is extremely expensive, which is a major impediment.
Those foreign enterprises that have succeeded have done so by determining
approaches that suit the contexts of their products and organizations. To make their
entries into the Japanese market has required imagination and commitment to deal
with the difficulties that confronted them, but they have successfully entered and are
carving out significant positions in the marketplace. Such commitment however has
required massive investment but Japanese companies also incur the same high costs.
Those foreign MNCs that have succeeded are the types of companies that have the
competencies to survive gallantly in the next century. As Prahalad and Hamel put
it: In the 1990s, top executives will be judged by their ability to identify, cultivate,
and exploit core competencies that make growth possible. Core competencies are
the collective learning in the organization, especially how to co-ordinate diverse
production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies (Prahalad and
Hamel, 1990). They will have to rethink the concept of the corporation itself. The
critical task for management will be to create an organization capable of infusing
products with irresistible functionality or creating products that customers need but
have not yet imagined. For example, no consumer demanded a disposable contact
lens, but J&J's Vistakon is building a major business out of this unspoken need for
convenience.
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In the course of this work many theories have been accessed and mentioned. As
was indicated in Chapter 3 its purpose was merely to demonstrate the complexity of
the subject; highlight a lack of concurrence where it exists; introduce terms and
concepts that would be referred to, show the context in which marketing strategies
are conceived; develop an analytical framework; and pinpoint the danger of seeking
a denouement solely from the marketing literature. In this way some
methodological approaches were discarded a basis provided for others. Of those
that were accessed, some were gauged to be particularly apposite to this research
and worthy of further development for particular applications. These are presented
in Table 7.1 below which also details where some of the supporting data can be
accessed in the main body of the text.
Table 7.1 Apposite Theories
















Box 5.4, Box 5.11






5.4, 5.5.4.7, Box 5.14
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Distribution and market Network theory (Ford, 5.2.6







Marketing mix Standardization vs 6.4, 6.5,
development adaptation (Quelch and
Hoff , 1986)






7.5. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH AND FUTURE DIRECTION
This research was based entirely on the experiences of foreign MNCs that had
been successful in the Japanese market. However for reasons given in Chapter 4,
totally unsuccessful companies were not included because de facto they cease to
exist, but this was further defended on the basis that even these successful
companies had experienced failures during their time in Japan and therefore offered
the advantage of a dual perspective. Any decision to withdraw from the market is
likely to have had much to do with views prevalent at corporate HQ that would
have required a different thrust to the research. It is possible however, that had the
research concentrated on the experiences of failed companies, some different
perspectives may have been unearthed. Although every effort was made to effect a
faithful and objective assessment of the data obtained from these foreign MNCs, the
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data were limited to what could be recalled and what the executives were prepared
to reveal. With few exceptions these executives were extremely helpful and
forthright. However, such a piece of inductive research, as most social sciences
studies are, is, in the words of David Hulme: essentially an act of faith (Hulme,
1893; Hulme, 1947). Although every effort was made to eliminate personal bias in
the interpretation of the data, as the eminent structuralist Michel Foucault indicated:
we all think that we are value free but we are not (Dreyfus and Rabinov, 1983;
Foucault, 1970).
As the Pacific Asian economies are expected to become increasingly successful
and manifest high growth, more insights will be required by international
marketers. Similar thrusts of research should be initiated in the Asian region in
such key markets as Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, PRC, Indonesia and
so on. In this way some light may be shone on the opportunities and difficulties
that are presented by such markets and outlines developed for tackling the
opportunities in timely fashion. It should not be necessary for western MNCs to
wait until the kaisha demonstrate that yet more opportunities have passed them by.
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7.6. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Several objectives have been served by this study:
• The attractiveness and feasibility of penetrating the Japanese market has been
highlighted.
• The strategic necessity of gaining a position in the Japanese market has been
underlined.
• Pointers for guidance on strategy have been delineated at both the Corporate and
Subsidiary company levels.
• Incrementalism was found to be much in evidence to the detriment of the Design
School approaches advocated by Ansoff (1965) and others, although the rigours
of that type of strategic analysis are often applied, but from the perspective of
the position on the branch (Lindblom, 1959) where the company is sitting.
• The research highlighted that it is insufficient to focus analysis merely on
consumers but also to take account of influential markets.
• Porter's (1980) model of Competitive Advantage can be enhanced by the
inclusion of Japanese market competence as a factor.
In summary, the key to marketing success in Japan is to follow the precepts of
the marketing concept. What is required by foreign MNCs to develop a market
position in Japan is implementation of the marketing concept to its fullest extent:
the critical — and obvious— message since if MNCs can understand Japanese
cultural differences, Japanese consumers and their needs, develop strategies that
take account of the particular quirks of the Japanese market, primarily with its high
quality standards and sophistication, Japan offers great opportunities. Not only
that, Japan is becoming the development ground for international markets. It is
increasingly becoming a trend setting forum of significant influence and companies
with international interests will find it essential to establish a learning and
monitoring presence in Japan merely to hold their positions in their traditional
markets in the longer term.
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND COMPANY PROFILES
Gerry Rosenberg, Marketing Manager Japan
Amway
A direct selling company of home care, housewares, nutritional products, gifts and
personal care items. It was the fastest growing foreign owned company in Japan
1983-86 with a compound annual sales growth rate of 117%.
Interviewed: May 30, 1990
Koichiro Naganuma, Senior Director International Division
ASATSU Inc
One of the major Japanese advertising agencies with extensive resources. Known to
have considered making a hostile bid for the two largest advertising agency
networks Saatchi and Saatchi and WPP simultaneously during 1991.
Interviewed: June 5, 1990
David Fong, Vice President
Asatsu/BBDO Inc
The Japanese arm of the New York based World top 5 agency network. Famous
for its Pepsi advertising and other worldwide accounts such as Visa, Campbell's
Foods, etc.
Interviewed: October 30, 1990
James T. Conte, Senior Vice President
ASI Market Research (Japan) Inc.
A long time established marketing research company in Japan. Currently part of
the Maxwell owned AGB group.
Interviewed: May 29, 1990
Colin O'Halloran, Vice President - Planning and Development
Avon Products Co. Ltd.
Cosmetics, nutrition and personal care company famous for its direct selling
approach to distribution.
Interviewed: June 5, 1990
Mitchell P. Cybulski, President
Bristol-Myers K.K.
Major pharmaceuticals and consumer products company with major OTC brands
such as Bufferin.
Interviewed: June 6, 1990
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W. M. Thompson, President Consumer Products Group Japan and Korea
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
Major consumer company with brands such as Clairol.
Interviewed: November 1, 1990
Wong Chui-yin, Director Business Development
Business International
International technical publishing and consulting group.
Interviewed: June 4, 1990
George Maruyama, President
Chuo Bussan Corporation
A major consumer goods agency and distribution company with interests in hotels.
Interviewed: June 7, 1990
Frank Kelly, Representative Director & Executive Vice President
Coca Cola (Japan) Company Limited
The major international soft drinks giant; it has over 30% of the Japanese soft
drinks business and derives more profit from Japan than it does in the US.
Interviewed: June 6, 1990
Kumi Sato, President
Cosmo Public Relations Corporation
A Japanese PR company which some three years ago was acquired by Kumi Sato, a
Japanese American female ex McKinsey Consultant from New York.
Interviewed: June 7, 1990
Ira Caplan, Senior Vice President
Dai-ichi Kikaku Co. Ltd.
A major Japanese advertising agency dominant among those handling MNC and
foreign clients.
Interviewed: June 6, 1990
Toshio Nakano, Manager Public Relations
Eastman Kodak (Japan) Ltd
The major worldwide photographic company with a presence in a number of arenas
including pharmaceuticals. It recently acquired Sterling Drug which in turn owns
100% of Sterling Winthrop, the third fastest growing foreign company in Japan
1983-86.
Eastman Kodak (Japan)'s market share in seventeen product areas ranges from 15-
85%.
Interviewed: June 4, 1990
478
Norman M Roberts, President
Gillette (Japan) Inc.
A dominant player in the shaving and personal care business, its market share in
Japan is a reversal of its position to that ofWarner Lambert's Schick, in other
markets. In Japan Schick holds 80% with 20% held by Gillette.
Interviewed: December 18, 1990
John Russel, President & Chief Executive
ICI Japan Limited
A major British chemicals company, positioning itself as an international chemicals
company in Japan.
Interviewed: May 29, 1990
Robert Wilk, Managing Director
Infoplan
A marketing research company, owned by the advertising agency and services
group McCann Erickson.
Interviewed: May 30, 1990
Kneale H. Ashwell, Chairman
Johnson & Johnson Japan
Healthcare and consumer products company. It has 33% of the baby toiletries
market, 10% of the adult lotion market, 32% of the adhesive bandage market, 10%
of the toothbrush market, and over 30% of the cotton buds market.
Interviewed: June 4, 1990
Kerry Kennedy, President
Kennedy International Company Ltd.
Direct marketing company working with major companies such as Philip Morris.
Interviewed: June 8, 1990
Kenneth G. Boston, President
Kohler Japan K.K.
A major US based manufacturer of bathroom appliances and plumbing based
products.
Interviewed: October 30, 1990
David E. Schmidt, President - Representative Director
Levi Strauss Japan K.K.
Internationally famous manufacturer of denim jeans and other fashion wear.
Interviewed: November 2, 1990
Larry D. Blagg, Managing Director
Market Makers Inc.
Consumer marketing consultants.
Interviewed: May 31, 1990
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Ken Neilsen, President/Representative Director
Master Foods K.K.
Distribution company for Mars and Pedigree Petfoods.
Interviewed: June 8, 1990
Derek A. Groom, Senior Vice President
McCann Erickson Hakuhodo Inc
Japanese JV company of the international McCann Erickson advertising agency
network.
Interviewed: October 30, 1990
Tatsuki Kubo, Sr Manager Public Relations Dept.
McDonald's Company (Japan), Ltd.
Hamburger restaurant chain.
Interviewed: June 6, 1990
Kevin Jones, Principal
McKinsey & Company Inc.,
International management consultants.
Interviewed: May 30, 1990
Eric Webber, Marketing Manager
Nestle/Friskies K.K.
Probably the world's oldest multinational consumer products company with its HQ
in Switzerland. In addition to acquiring the pet food interests of Carnation, Nestle
has 70% share of the Japanese instant coffee market and 40% of the instant
creaming powder market.
Interviewed: May 31, 1990
Michael J. Schofield, Chairman
Nippon Lever K.K.
Anglo-Dutch owned MNC, one of the world's largest manufacturing concerns.
Highly diversified, its business spans six primary product groups - detergents (22%
total sales), edible fats (20/%), food and drinks (18%), frozen foods (12%),
speciality chemicals (8%), others (10%). It has more than 500 operating companies
in 75 countries. Nippon Lever ranks sixth in the league of largest foreign
companies operating in Japan, some way behind Nestle, and ahead of Procter &
Gamble. Its strategy is to establish high value adding operation inside local markets
and maximize responsiveness to the markets it serves.
Interviewed: November 1, 1990
Dermot Gatenby, Director Planning & Corporate Affairs
Philip Morris K.K.
Major multinational tobacco, foods and beverage concern.
Interviewed: June 8, 1990
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R. G. Pearce, President
Procter and Gamble Far East Inc.
Procter and Gamble manufactures and markets and wide range of laundry and
cleaning products, disposable paper products including diapers, personal care
products including pharmaceuticals. In Japan P & G currently manufactures and
markets a wide range of packaged consumer goods including laundry and cleaning
products, disposable paper products, personal care and OTC items. It has 11% of
the Japanese dish soap market and has regained a leadership position in the diaper
business.
Interviewed: October 29, 1990
Keith McCulloch, President and Representative Director
R. J. Reynolds/M. C. Tobacco Company Limited
International tobacco company.
Interviewed: May 28, 1990
Paul Hughes, President
Revlon KK
Major international cosmetics company.
Interviewed: May 29, 1990
Joseph Dunkle, President
Roily Doll Inc.
Chain of "Aunt Stella's" cookie stores,
and travel.
Interviewed: June 1, 1990
Has extended its rustic appeal into furniture
Richard J. Findlay, President-Japan
Smith Kline Beecham
Major pharmaceuticals and consumer products company.
Interviewed: June 5, 1990
Bill Haggerty, Manager
The Boston Consulting Group K.K.
International management consultants.
Interviewed: October 30, 1990
Richard A. Bush, General Manager
Tokyo American Club
The American Club is the social nexus for expatriate managers in Japan. Dick Bush
is highly knowledgeable of people and as a long term entrepreneur; of doing
business in Japan.
Interviewed: May 31, 1990
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Robert Leu, Regional Corporate Communications Manager - North Pacific
United Airlines.
US based international airline.
Interviewed: May 28, 1990
APPENDIX II
INTERVIEW TOPICS LIST
How would you describe the business you are in?
How well are you doing in Japan?
(probe for objective measure of success)
Do you have a mission statement or statement of philosophy for the business?
(what is it?)








What are the major opportunities on which you are focused?
What are the main broad environmental trends and events which are affecting the
business for good and bad?



















In the light of the balance between strengths, weaknesses and opportunities, how is
your position being leveraged if at all?
What are your goals?










How will/have you respond/ed to these obstacles?
developing product strategies












Is it the view of foreign MNCs that Japanese companies are strategically
superior?
Are the styles of planning in Japanese companies bottom up?
Does the theory of late entry shed any light on Japanese market behaviour?
How is Japanese strategic behaviour characterized?
How do foreign MNCs respond?
Branch plant effects, would they behave differently in their home markets?
Is segmentation a cornerstone of success in the Japanese market?
Is segmentation strategy applied at a strategic level?
How have foreign MNCs in Japan developed their market positions?
Do foreign MNCs in Japan permeate responsibility for strategic marketing
planning?
Is there an absence of incentive to plan for the longer term?
Is it true that Japanese companies have no clear self perceived weaknesses?
Is common thread perceived differently by Japanese companies?
Are Japanese companies particularly adept at coping with vagueness and
contradiction?
Is the principle of consensus a key to success?
Is the internationalization process progressive?
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APPENDIX III
RESEARCH PAPER REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER 4
APPENDIX IV
ACQUISITIONS BY FOREIGN COS & JV BUY-OUTS
In August 1983, Merck & Co of the US surprised the Japanese pharmaceutical
industry by acquiring controlling interests in both Banyu Pharmaceutical Co and
Torii Yakuhin KK, in what is still the most important acquisition by a foreign
company in Japan. Neither of the Japanese companies was facing immediate
financial disaster at the time of acquisition, but both faced bleak futures, since they
lacked the strong R&D capability necessary to provide that constant stream of new
products so essential for survival in Japan. This vulnerability made them natural
targets for acquisition, according to Merck, whose own problem was how to deliver
its world-class products to the Japanese market — armies of "detailers" being
required to provide the level of service expected by Japanese doctors. A strategic
fit was feasible, but there was no precedent for such a move.
Banyu's "people issue" — the key
Merck and Banyu had been JV partners since 1954, through Nippon Merck-Banyu
(NMB) — a 50.5:49.5 JV created to manufacture ethical drugs in Japan. Before
that, Banyu had served for a year and a half as Merck's marketing agent for
cortisone. In 1970, Merck established a wholly owned subsidiary (MSD Japan) to
import, export and wholesale Merck pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals, and
food additives, as well as to serve as a liaison between the company and its five
Japanese affiliates. From Merck's point of view, the JV structure was insufficient
to meet the needs of one of the big three world markets in pharmaceuticals. Even
though it had access to Banyu's sales force of more than 500 and its research staff
of 400, they were unable to sell their products as aggressively as Merck might have
wished (promotional expenditures were allocated as a percentage of current sales,
and the combined JV/Banyu sales force productivity was very low). A new
organizational structure was needed to maximize the firm's strengths and satisfy
Merck's strategic objectives.
Unlike many foreign companies, MSD was fortunate enough to have high-level
expatriate managers with considerable experience in Japan and familiarity with its
environment. Despite this and the JV's history, the pioneering US$332 million
acquisition still required nearly four years of negotiations. The local management
was farsighted enough to see that without a major shot in the arm, Banyu's future
was dim; but for president, Koichi Iwadare, son of the founder, the decision was a
heavy one. "He was in the precarious position of having sold out a national
treasure — a Japanese company listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange," said Bryan
Wright, vice-president of Merck Sharp and Dohme International. "It was a very
statesmanlike move on his part."
At the time of acquisition, Dr Iwadare faced a barrage of tough questions from
journalists: Why did he have to sell out when his firm was still making profits? If
he had to sell, why didn't he find a Japanese suitor? How could the firm be
494
managed with foreigners pulling the strings? Didn't he yield to foreign pressures?
Iwadare fended off these questions saying that in the interests of his employees'
long-term job security, he preferred to follow his own "chosen way", rather than
"fighting to the death" in classic Japanese style.
Nor did cultural obstacles disappear when the deal was finalized. According to
Wright, "we were faced with the challenge of marrying two corporate and national
cultures: Banyu's family-oriented and paternalistic, and Merck's freewheeling and
open." Former Merck Officer, P. Reed Maurer, concurred that settling the "people
issue" was and will continue to be central: "You are dealing with a big change in
mentality, and this requires a lot of talking to ensure that employees will be
protected." Merck also had to recognize the rights of Banyu's minority
shareholders; mainly banks and Kirin Brewery Co.
In February 1982, Merck purchased 4.99% of Banyu stock on the open market for
US$18 million, becoming the fourth largest shareholder. At the same time, Banyu
bought 0.8% of Merck's shares — an important face-saving gesture that expressed
Banyu's approval of the move. Negotiations continued until early August 1983,
when Merck acquired an additional 45.03% holding, for nearly US$314 million, in
the form of US$197 million of convertible bonds (CBs) and a third-party
distribution of new shares obtained by Merck through European Depository
Receipts (US$117 million). Rather than merely acquiring shares from the existing
owners (which would have been almost impossible), Merck injected new funds, a
sign of its commitment to fortifying Banyu's existing R&D. Upon conversion of its
CBs, Merck and MSD (Japan) edged over the 50% mark to gain control. The tight
maintenance of secrecy throughout the lengthy negotiations (which directly involved
only a small number of people) played a decisive role in holding down the cost to
Merck of the acquisition.
Five years later, Iwadare seems to have been vindicated. Banyu has, in Maurer's
words, "achieved immortality" as an entity — something that might have eluded it
had it waited until a rescue merger with a major Japanese producer became
necessary. Far from being swallowed up, Banyu's Japanese management remains
intact — as does its name and its TSE First Section listing — and in terms of sales, it
has moved up from 15th to 11th place in the pharmaceutical industry. Despite an
adverse market, which shrank for the first time in history in 1985, and the Ministry
of Health and Welfare's unyielding price-cutting policy, Banyu has held its ground.
With the introduction of two world-class Merck-developed products — Renivace (for
the treatment of hypertension) in June 1986, and Tienal (an antibiotic) in September
1987 — Banyu's future looks bright.
Torii: easy in, easier out
Torii Yakuhin KK, a much smaller family-dominated firm listed on the over-the-
counter market, approached Merck in search of new products. In contrast to the
Banyu case, there was no existing relationship on which to build, but there was an
economic case to be made — the use of Torii's 350 detailmen in return for access to
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Merck's products. The price included a 30% equity stake, for which Merck paid
US$8 million in February 1982.
Torii Yakuhin: lead shareholders end-March 1982 to end-September 1983
Company '000 % 000 %
Shares Shares
Merck & 4050 30.0 9,350 50.54
Co.
Takahashi 819 6.1 519 2.8
Torii
Sumitomo 500 3.7 500 2.7
Bank
Dai-Ichi 337 2.7 337 1.8
K. Bank
Mitsui 312 2.3 31 21.7
Bank
IBJ 312 2.3 312 1.7
Source: Torii Yakuhin
After becoming the largest shareholder, Merck had no immediate plans to raise its
stake in Torii. But when news of the Banyu purchase erupted, Torii's OTC share
price shot up and Merck had to make a quick decision; after an all-night session,
the US firm arranged to acquire an additional 20.5% of Torii's stock for US$11
million, pushing its share up to 50.5%. Here again, a new share issue (via a direct
allocation to Merck) was required. Of the 5.6 million shares involved in the
transaction, just 300,000 were purchased on the market. Within less than two
years, Merck had gone from no relationship with Torii to a controlling interest.
This transaction was entirely friendly and had the support of Torii's main bank, but
nevertheless the experience suggests that when a foreign partner has a commanding
bargaining advantage, a lengthy courting period may not be obligatory.
As it happens, the marriage was short-lived — and the divorce even more of a
shotgun affair. Merck's new chairman decided that the move had been a mistake,
and the Sumitomo Bank (which had acted as matchmaker between Torii and Merck)
took Torii off his hands.
Cash-rich Asahi Breweries (a Sumitomo Bank company) then jumped at the
opportunity to follow Kirin's example (a major Banyu shareholder) by diversifying
into pharmaceuticals. A deal was made within 48 hours, whereby Merck received
approximately 10 times its dollar purchase price for riding the endaka and the
Tokyo market with Torii. Instead of integrating the two organizations, Merck
decided to back Banyu, relying on direct recruitment for sales force growth. The
Torii divestiture resulted in part from a change in strategy by Merck's new
leadership, but it also illustrates the economic pressures associated with the post-
1985 currency realignment, and the subsequent escalation of Japanese stock prices.
496
Even before the changes in environment, it was hard work to form a consensus of
top management commitment to acquisition (or any other major direct investment)
in Japan, and it may be all the more difficult today.
Source: Abbeglen and Watanabe (1990)









Tokyo Ryuki Seizo (83)
Yokogawa-HP (83)
Gray Co. of Japan (84)
Komatsu Cummins (85)
Nippin De Vibiss (85)
Toyo Yuatsu Kikai (85)























Gould HB Medical Prods
(82)
Campbell Japan (83)
Japan Fleet Service (85)
Kao Colgate Oral Prods (85)




Modern Furniture Sales (88)
Others (7)





Aehr Test Systems (85)
Aeroquip Automotive (89)
Source: Abbeglen and Watanabe, (1990)
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